4 Safety
19. Our precursor committee reported:
Transport for London believes that the management
arrangements for the PPP are so complex that they will jeopardise
safety. The trade unions agreed, suggesting that the complex contractual
management regimes would blur the lines of responsibility and
accountability.[27]
When we took evidence, it was clear that concerns
still remained.
20. The London Underground is one of the safest underground
railways in the world, but its assets are ageing, and problems
are increasing.[28] London
Underground has overall responsibility for safety. Mr O'Toole
told us:
The safety case for all four companies comes
back to me. London Underground holds the safety case. It is our
job to make sure that they work safely and it is our job to put
the systems in place that establish safety assurance. As a result
I can say to you that I believe they will maintain safety because
I intend to ensure, and I know anyone in this chair would ensure,
that they do. [29]
21. The Health and Safety Executive told us that
"there is currently no evidence that London Underground's
safety record has suffered directly as a result of operating under
the PPP regime"[30],
although the number of adverse incidents had increased over the
past four years. [31]
Since the PPP began there have been 4 derailments, and the numbers
both of broken rails and of signals passed at danger because of
equipment problems have increased.[32]
Table 2: Safety
on London Underground
| Type of incidents on LUL network:
| (Shadow run PPP)
2001/02
| (Shadow run PPP)
2002/03
| Under PPP
2003/04
|
| Major incidents
(derailments)
| 0 | 1
(Chancery Lane)
| 2
(Camden, Hammersmith)
|
| Broken rails | 25
| 29 | 33
|
| 'Technical' SPADs (Category B)
| 150 | 166
| 197 |
Ev 45 Since the period to which the table relates
there have been derailments at White City and at Barons Court.
22. The White City derailment in May 2004 appears
to have been caused by inadequate communication. A Chief Engineer's
Regulatory Notice had set out remedial work required to the type
of points involved in the derailment. Although the measures required
had been communicated to the infracos' chief engineers by LUL
that information "had not been adequately communicated or
explained to individuals within the Metronet Rail BCV Ltd Central
line track team" and LUL itself did not have the systems
in place to assure itself that safety critical information was
being adequately acted upon.[33]
23. The HSE noted that there had been an increase
in the number of incidents with potential for an adverse effect
on safety over the last three years. Many of these may have been
an unavoidable consequence of the ageing assets, rather than a
direct result of infraco performance. Nonetheless an increase
in the number of incidents has potential to become an increase
in the number of accidents. The infracos and LUL must ensure that
the complex interfaces between the many organisations involved
in the underground do not increase the risks.
24. The unions were concerned that infracos had made
changes to safety procedures without consultation, and that there
was little consistent dialogue between all parties on safety,
although they welcomed Metronet's introduction of health and safety
co-ordinators.[34]
25. The Trades Unions told us that there was no consistent
safety training for the employees of the different infracos and
of LUL itself; the charge was denied by Mr O'Toole and Mr Weight,
the Chief Executive of Metronet, told us that his staff underwent
the same safety training as London Underground "for the skill
sets they need".[35]
However, the TSSA later told us that the fact that training was
being delivered by each organisation meant that the delivery and
emphasis would vary. Previously London Underground had been able
to highlight the issues which it considered important. It is particularly
disturbing that Mr Crow told us that there is little or no information
available to staff about what they should do in a major emergency
"there is supposed to be a plan but we do not know what the
plan is. We have not been told."[36]
26. It is clear that the fragmentation of the system
has led to inconsistent communications between the infracos and
their employees. Much better communication and consultation is
needed. At the very least, the infraco management and LUL need
to ensure that all employees know that no matter who is employing
them, the same standards of training are required for the same
tasks.
27 Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee
, London Underground HC(2001-02)387, para 19 Back
28
London Underground Public Private Partnership: the offer to Londoners:
DTLR, April 11 2001, http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_railways/documents/page/dft_railways_504024.hcsp Back
29
Q123 Back
30
Ev 46 Back
31
Ev 46 Back
32
Ev 45 Back
33
Final Report:, Formal Investigation into the derailment of a Central
line train at White City on 11th May 2004, August 2004, Back
34
Ev 61 Back
35
Q244 Back
36
Ev 7 Back
| 
