Memorandum by the Health and Safety Executive
(HSE) (LU 04)
PERFORMANCE OF LONDON UNDERGROUND
This memorandum sets out, for the benefit of
the Committee, the role and responsibilities of the Health and
Safety Executive (HSE) in the matters relevant to the Committee's
Inquiry into the "Performance of London Underground",
including whether safe operation has been affected by the introduction
of the Public-Private Partnership.
ROLE OF
THE HEALTH
AND SAFETY
EXECUTIVE (HSE)
1. HSE is the independent health and safety
regulator for a range of activities and industries including the
railways. This includes the safety of the travelling public as
well as those who work on the railways.
2. HM Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) has been
part of HSE since 1990. HMRI provides advice and guidance for
the railway industry, investigates railway incidents in order
to understand root causes and to establish and disseminate any
lessons. Additionally HMRI administers and enforces the Health
and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and regulations made under that
Act, including the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations.
3. The Railway (Safety Case) Regulations
2000 require all railway operators (both those running train services
or providing railway infrastructure) to prepare and submit to
HSE a safety case. The safety case sets out: safety policy and
objectives; a risk assessment; risk control measures and health
and safety management systems. It is illegal to operate without
an accepted safety case or to fail to follow the procedures and
arrangements it describes.
LONDON UNDERGROUND'S
SAFETY CASE
4. On 10 July 2002 HSE announced that it
had accepted London Underground Limited's (LUL's) railway safety
case for operation under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP). The
acceptance of a safety case does not guarantee safety, but indicates
that HSE is satisfied that an effective safety management system
is in place.
5. Responsibility for adhering to the safety
case, and therefore maintaining safety, rests with the duty holder
(in this case, LUL). Each infrastructure company (Infraco) also
has a contractual (non-statutory) safety case with London Underground.
In the event that an Infraco fails to meet its safety obligations,
London Underground can demand corrective action and increase monitoring
of works at the Infraco's expense or, in the last resort, the
Infraco can risk losing its contract.
6. Duty holders are required to review their
safety case (every three years or if a significant change to operations
would affect safety) to ensure that it continues to provide adequate
control of the risks. LUL will review its safety case and is expected
to report to HMRI in July 2005.
LEVELS OF
SAFETY OF
LONDON UNDERGROUND
UNDER PUBLIC
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
7. Although London Underground has a good
safety record, there are a number of areas of continuing concern
with respect to operations, including the potential for derailments,
the number of broken rails discovered on the network and the number
of Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) by trains.
Derailments
8. Since the full introduction of PPP, HMRI
have investigated four derailments to trains running on the passenger
network, of which three were in passenger service. The two most
recent incidents (in 2004-05), at White City and Barons Court,
are still under investigation by HSE. The cause of the other two
incidents (in 2003-04), at Camden and Hammersmith, cannot be directly
linked to the introduction of PPP. The incident at Chancery Lane
in 2002-03 occurred during the "shadow running" period
for operation under PPP.
9. A recent NAO report London Underground:
Are the Public Private Partnerships likely to work successfully?
(HC 644, June 2004) on the success of London Underground's PPP
concluded that the "response to the (Chancery Lane, Hammersmith
and Camden) derailments show that the PPP structures probably
function as designed with respect to safety".
Broken Rails
10. The cause of the derailment at Hammersmith
in October 2003 was a broken rail. The defect originated on the
underside of the rail and was not detected by methods in use at
the time. Infracos are developing new ultrasonic and other testing
methods to improve detection rates of rail defects in the future.
One of the main categories of rail breaks has been where jointed
rail has been welded to reduce problems with rail joints (LUL
has a much higher proportion of jointed rail than the mainline
national rail network). The practice of welding these joints has
now ceased but the Infracos are seeking improved ways of managing
the inherited results of this practice.
Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs)
11. Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) on
London Underground are regarded as low risk due to the mitigation
afforded by mechanical train protection systems (train-stops).
Train-stops are designed to ensure that trains are safely halted
before any potential conflict point is reached.
12. The trend for total SPAD numbers on
LUL has shown no decrease for the last three years. However, within
that total, the last year has shown that Category A SPADs (where
the driver had sufficient time to stop at the signal) have been
decreasing. Increases have been seen in "technical"
or Category B SPADs, accounting for 20% to 30% of the total. This
type of SPAD is often associated with equipment failure, and can
be seen as reflecting the difficulty of maintaining ageing assets.
These incidents also illustrate the "fail-safe" principle,
in that problems with the equipment cause signals to show the
most restrictive aspect.
Summary of incidents 2001-02—2003-04
13. A breakdown of the number of incidents
(before and after introduction of PPP and during the "shadow
run" period) that have potential to have an adverse impact
on safety is provided in the table below:
Type of incidents
on LUL network:
| (Shadow run PPP) 2001-02 | (Shadow run PPP) 2002-03
| Under PPP 2003-04 |
Major incidents
(derailments) | 0
| 1 (Chancery Lane) | 2 (Camden, Hammersmith)
|
| Broken rails | 25 |
29 | 33 |
"Technical" SPADs
(Category B)
| 150 | 166 | 197
|
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14. The PPP arrangement has been in operation (or in
shadow running) for only a short period of time. It is not yet
possible (from performance to date) to provide a definitive view
on whether the introduction of the PPP has had a direct effect
on safety or whether safety performance has actually deteriorated
under the PPP.
HEALTH AND
SAFETY INTERVENTIONS
15. HSE are alert to the possibility that management
arrangements for the London Underground under PPP could (as well
as many other factors) have an impact on safety. HMRI are monitoring
LUL's health and safety management arrangements in order to test
that they are as described in their railway safety case.
16. HMRI continues to review and monitor the safety performance
of London Underground through a planned programme of inspection
that addresses areas that have the greatest potential risk to
safety. During 2003 HMRI served two Improvement Notices requiring
improved prioritisation of track and signal maintenance. A recent
audit of maintenance on both the Central Line and Circle Line
found generally robust arrangements for managing inspection, maintenance
and overhaul of rolling stock.
17. HMRI takes steps to inform trade union safety representatives
about its inspection programme and listens to any concerns they
may have about health and safety at work. HMRI also responds to
complaints by the public, employees, trade unions and their representatives.
Information received from safety representatives has led to formal
enforcement action in some cases.
CONCLUSION
18. Despite the increase in the number of incidents with
potential for an adverse effect on safety over the last three
years, there is currently no evidence that London Underground's
safety record has suffered directly as a result of operating under
the PPP regime. HSE will keep London Underground's safety performance
under review and will receive LUL's statutory three-year review
of its safety case next year.
Allan Sefton
Director of Rail Safety
Health and Safety Executive
November 2004
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