Select Committee on Trade and Industry Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120 - 138)

TUESDAY 22 JUNE 2004

A.B. JACOBS & CO AND FERDINAND KELLY SOLICITORS

  Q120  Mr Hoyle: What would the benefits be for the pub companies, not that I am too worried about pub companies but one ought to see the analogy that you have. If they are going to continue to trade, what would the benefits be for them if that were to happen?

  Mr Jacobs: The pub companies in the end, if they lost the tie to their tenants, would still be in the position of being the wholesaler. The tenants would need to be serviced by somebody. Who are the biggest wholesalers in the country? The answer is: Punch and Enterprise are the biggest wholesalers in the country. Therefore, the pub companies could actually do better by expanding their wholesale base. There would be better competition between all the wholesalers to get the business and therefore they would have a chance of making more or losing. They will then be in the real commercial market.

  Q121  Mr Hoyle: I cannot see the pub companies doing that because at the moment they have guaranteed profit and guaranteed income. I do not think they believe that they would ever make as much money. All right, morally it makes absolute sense but I do not think it is something they are going to jump at. Presumably, if you did do that and ended the beer tie, all you would actually do would put the impact on the tenants of the dry rent?

  Mr Jacobs: That is true to a degree, which is one of the reasons why I think there should be a moratorium of two years before you review the rents because all the leases say is that "in the event that you are made free of tie, we have the right to increase your rent". All the leases say that. All I am saying is that there should be a moratorium for a period of two years. In the event that you put all these pubs now in a position to compete better with each other—they can all change their prices, change their structures, change their brands—you would be getting a different marketplace. That different marketplace will generate different levels of profit than what has historically been the case. It is only when you get those different levels of profit that you can re-look at what the rent should be. You do it on the straightforward basis of assessment of profit and computation of rent, ignoring any impact of time. The other interesting thing, of course, is that if you remove the supply tie, you will probably also replace or remove the tie relative to given AWP machines, which is a nice little earner for the pub companies because the pub companies invariably include within the assessment of profit machine income, whether or not the pub has machines. That is one part of it. The other part of it is that they assess what they believe the machine could be making, irrespective of what the machine is actually making. They will say, "Ah, you should have a couple of machines on there at £5,000 a year income and therefore that is £2,500 a year rent for us, thank you very much". It does not even stop there. They take the £2,500 and put it in their pockets; they put the other £2,500 in as profit and take a half again. So they take a double bat from the AWP machines. The only way in which you are ever going to stop that is either by taking care of that separately or just by saying, "no tie". Once you say "no tie", they cannot tell you what you do with AWP machines either.

  Q122  Mr Hoyle: Do you feel that we ought to have an independent rent tribunal panel that they could turn to, which would be much cheaper, rather than going through your good selves, people who charge by the minute? They could then say, "We are not under agreement here but there is another way". It would be like the rates; you can actually put an appeal in on your rates, go to the tribunal and represent yourself and they will make a decision that is binding on both sides. Do you not think that would be a better way? I do not want to put you out of business but I want to save some of these people some money. Do you think that is an alternative?

  Mr Jacobs: To a degree, that is an alternative. How you would actually set that up, I would not like to say. What you have said relating to rates is interesting because rates are based upon a fair assessment of the annual rent of these premises without tie, fully repairing and insuring. Therefore, in theory, the dear old Inland Revenue, and you cannot be more independent than that, actually decides what is a fair, open market rent and they calculate the rates accordingly.

  Q123  Chairman: You seem to suggest that there would be almost a Damascene conversion of the pubcos, that once they become wholesalers of beer, they will be changed people; they go from being these rapacious rentiers to some kind of benevolent owner.

  Mr Jacobs: Do not run away with that idea. They would still be seeking to extract the biggest rent they can possibly extract.

  Q124  Chairman: Why should they be any less rapacious as wholesalers than they are as rentiers?

  Mr Jacobs: Because it is a free open market; if Enterprise is supplying a function, a pub, an Enterprise pub, the tenant will be buying at the best possible price he can get.

  Q125  Chairman: The tenant was going in to rent at the best possible rent he could get?

  Mr Jacobs: He is already stuck with the rent, is he not? The next issue is when that comes to review, and the review would come either automatically on the release of the tie or at the next term of review. All I am saying is: stop; moratorium; release the tie; let them find a level pegging; and, once they are on a level pegging, and it will take them two years to do that, then review the rent.

  Q126  Linda Perham: Which do you think is the most important factor in reducing the viability of the tenants of pubcos? Is it the higher price they pay for beer or is it the rent situation and how that is calculated?

  Mr Jacobs: You have just identified the same thing. The reason I say that is because the higher prices of the beer should be deducted off the open market rents to arrive at a dry rent. Therefore you have x and x being equal. The problem is that they do not actually deduct from the free open market rent the true discount that the tenant is losing, ie the wet rent, to arrive at a dry rent. The answer is that the loss of the discounts and the wet rent affect the dry rent. All in all, it is the same thing.

  Q127  Linda Perham: So they are in a difficult position, whatever? It is the same thing.

  Mr Jacobs: Yes.

  Q128  Mr Berry: I would like to know if you think the Court of Appeal's judgment in the case of Crehan v Inntrepreneur will have an impact and, if so, who will it have an impact on?

  Mr Jacobs: I do not think it will have any impact whatsoever, but my colleague will probably be able to expand more on that.

  Mr Kelly: There are two Court of Appeal judgments, and the one you are referring to I think is the most recent one in May of this year. I should just say that the first one is on one interpretation of support for the proposition that Mr Jacobs puts forward which is that there should be absolute compensation when computing the dry rent for the lack of discounts. The recent decision does relate, from a lawyer's point of view, to a historical problem involving the application of Articles 81 and 82 in European law having regard to the regulations that were in place really in the early 1990s. Inntrepreneur was the only unlucky one compared with all the other big brewers in that it actually was found to have been anti-competitive. Therefore, I agree with Mr Jacobs that once we are dealing with pubcos, it will not have much direct effect. The important implications I would say are that for the first time a Court of Appeal certainly has recognised that back in 1994 the OFT got it wrong. That is relevant because it would be our contention that the OFT got it wrong in the year 2000 when they were looking at the market. The way the OFT got it wrong was parallel in both cases. In both cases the OFT transparently, we would say, drew the wrong conclusions from the facts and figures that it was relying upon, and so it did that in 1994. The Court of Appeal has finally ruled that the European Commission had to be upheld in finding that the OFT got it wrong in 1994. For the current complaints that are made now one has to refer to the OFT report of 2000 when the OFT gave the industry a clean bill of health and said, for instance and by way of example, that it excused the price rises which were going way ahead of the RPI by trying to apply an argument that this was not a sale of products but that we should look at the services index, for instance. That was the same kind of mistake we would say that they made when they did their report in 1994 and 1995 specifically in the Inntrepreneur case. The interesting thing is that finally the Court of Appeal said that the OFT did get it wrong in 1994 and we say in fact it got it wrong for very similar reasons to the way we say it got it wrong in 2000, which is of course the context that we are looking at now.

  Q129  Chairman: Is anybody going to do anything about the 2000 decision then?

  Mr Kelly: What happened was that Mr Jacobs and I were joint authors of a submission commissioned by the FSB to the OFT in the first place complaining, in a sense, about the conclusions that the OFT had reached in the year 2000. The basis of our complaints was really to say that if you take the basic facts and figures on which you rely, the inferences you draw are wrong. In a sense, that was parallel to the complaints that I think Mr Jacobs and I had both made in 1994. We were not privy to the workings of Europe and the Commission and how it came to its decision, but we might argue that obviously arguments like the ones we put in were persuasive for the European Commission in finding that the OFT had got it wrong. In a sense, what is happening before you, sir, could be argued to be a review of what the OFT did in the year 2000, which we would still say was wrong.

  Q130  Chairman: What I was really meaning was this. Would you anticipate someone taking legal action against the OFT in respect of the 2000 decision in the way that they seem to have done successfully in respect of the 1994 decision?

  Mr Kelly: It is a possibility. The most likely candidate to have done that, looking around one, is the FSB. The FSB in a sense appears, having failed to persuade the OFT, currently to have been lucky enough to have a hearing before this Committee. Therefore, obviously it is a question that could go back to the OFT. I would say that from the point of view of individuals bringing cases, there is a bit of a cautionary tale in the case of Mr Crehan because I think it has taken him nearly 12 years to get justice. He has only been to the Court of Appeal twice. I do not know how many times he has been to Europe. About a year ago he had some pretty bad news, which was that he failed on liability. The good news was that the judge said if he was wrong about liability, then the damages were over £1 million. He had better news in the Court of Appeal because he won on liability but the damages went down to £130,000. One final thing that is relevant from Crehan and probably shows this better than anything is that the court was concerned with the amount of damage that one suffers when one is the victim of anti-competitive pricing in the pub business. The circumstances in a sense, in practical terms, are the same in Mr Crehan's case back in 1992 as they are in effect in the year 2004 for many people who are suffering from high rents and also high prices for beer.

  Q131  Chairman: To put it simply if I can, what you are really saying is that while Crehan does not create a precedent, nevertheless the kind of market analysis which is implicit within it if applied today, in the light of the 2000 decision, may have a relevance which would render it worth someone having a go, or certainly, and we probably will raise this with the OFT, the OFT having a fresh look at their decision of 2000 in the light of the Crehan case?

  Mr Kelly: Yes, sir.

  Q132  Chairman: As a layman, would that be a reasonable summation of it?

  Mr Kelly: Yes, sir. I wish I had put it as succinctly as that.

  Q133  Chairman: You get paid for doing it and we do not.

  Mr Kelly: We are not paid today when we do not even get an allowance. There is one thing that I should just raise in that context. Everybody has been talking as though of course the beer tie is lawful at common law. It is questionable whether in fact the beer tie, in so far as the other party is not a brewer, is lawful at common law because it was always held to be one of the restraints of trade, or prima facie restraints of trade, that was always accepted. The context always was that it was a restraint of trade by a brewer and the law on that is a House of Lords decision that goes back about petrol companies in 1966. The problem is: what publican is going to take a case to the House of Lords to point out, although he might be upheld at First Instance, that a pubco is not a brewer and therefore the legal validity of a tie is questionable overall? Somebody could take a test case. Again, looking at the example of Crehan, one might hope that legislators, with help from their legal advisors, might be able to cut through that.

  Chairman: We will bear that in mind when we are making our recommendations.

  Q134  Sir Robert Smith: One of the things the OFT gave in their letter back to the Federation of Small Businesses after the FSB put their concerns was a general analysis. In point 8 of their reply they talked about: The question of market definition would only become significant if we had evidence of a lack of competition. As it is, there is evidence which points to the entrée sector as a whole being very competitive. In particular, the press carries regular reports of reduction in pubcos' margins and competition between high street pubs being particularly fierce. The increased blurring at the edge has been that different types of entrée licence appear also to have brought pubs more into competition with other types of entrées. Do you see that view that there is quite fierce competition in the entrée sector as a fair reading of the market?

  Mr Jacobs: I do not see a fierce competition except probably in city centres. There is no major competition when you get out into suburbia where most of the pubs are. If you take most of those in the city centre, very few, in actual fact a minority, of those licences suffer from this, whether tenants or whatever. The greatest majority are owned by pub companies.

  Q135  Sir Robert Smith: What is your view of the margins that pubcos make?

  Mr Jacobs: The margins that the pub companies make in what respect?

  Q136  Sir Robert Smith: It is just that the OFT were suggesting, admittedly in talking about press reports, reductions in pubcos' margins.

  Mr Jacobs: There is no reduction in pubcos' margins. The pubcos keep marching on and on and on and pushing the margins higher and higher and higher. They keep getting bigger and bigger discounts from the brewers, from the manufacturers, and never pass those on to the tenants. If they pass them on in any way, shape or form, even in the smallest amount, as they do with the Punch Growth Lease, they go and whack a huge chunk on to the rent. Therefore you finish up with a situation where you are not really better off, unless your volumes increase dramatically, and then they hit you with the rent next time round.

  Mr Kelly: I think there is a principle of inelastic demand here. I am thinking particularly of rural public houses where of course there is no substitution. I am not an economist and I realise that you are better economists, but in a sense with certain products—and the Chancellor is well aware of this—you can increase the price but the public will still go on buying. That is exactly what is exploited in the case of beer because if that were not the case, prices would not increase ahead of the RPI year in and year out as they have done over many years. Although there is a total drop in volume, the person who is in fact getting the big margin is still well ahead, so his profits increase. It is the retailer who has the smaller margin and a smaller volume who then suffers. Looking at it from the point of view of the public, it is people of modest means who are used to going to their local public house who are squeezed out, but the people behind pubcos are happy to see them go because overall, notwithstanding the smaller volume, their prices have increased well ahead of inflation because they are exploiting an inelastic demand.

  Q137  Sir Robert Smith: One of the things, of course, that affects an individual pub is the local circumstances if the factory in the community closes and the local economic circumstances change in the area. What more do you think the pubcos could to do aid their tenants who are struggling as a result of external factors?

  Mr Jacobs: First of all, you could say that they should be prepared to review the rent downwards to reflect substantial changes. I came across a case down in Devonport when the nuclear submarine base was shifted up north. The pubcos expected the same rent and they wanted to apply the RPI. The fact that probably 75% of the people who were using that pub had disappeared did not matter—oh no, you stand by your lease.

  Q138  Sir Robert Smith: What was the final outcome there?

  Mr Jacobs: From memory, that particular person went bankrupt and I think they then closed the pub actually. There you are.

  Mr Kelly: One final point on that: the public at large of course give great rebates, particularly in the countryside and in particular to country public houses, and the pubcos are happy to be supporting that. You might wonder why it is that if the public is providing that, in fact there is not a concomitant generosity shown by the landlord in the way he is charging rent. You might think that there should be a link, again as we have said before, between rates and rent.

  Mr Jacobs: Let us face it, one of the prime reasons why the pub companies got behind the lower rateable values and lower rates for the rural pubs was because the lower rates meant higher profits and higher profits meant more rent for them. It was self-serving.

  Chairman: That is very helpful, gentlemen. We are very grateful to you for these insights. Certainly I think some of the points you have made will be raised not only with the pubcos but with the OFT as well when they come. Thank you very much for your information and your forbearance because we realise this session has gone later than we anticipated.






 
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