Select Committee on Trade and Industry Fifteenth Report


4  The dispute before the World Trade Organisation

78. During our inquiry, witnesses highlighted their concerns about the recent trade dispute between the US Government and the EU over the public sector support which had been given to the civil aerospace sector, and how the dispute would affect the UKAI.[171]

The 1992 EC/US Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft

79. A bilateral agreement between the EU and the US on financial support for large civil aircraft has been in existence since 1992 (EC-US Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft).[172] Signed under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the agreement established: limits on, interest rates and repayment periods for, the public support given to all Airbus aircraft and aircraft with capacity of 100 or more seats manufactured in the US ;[173] a number of mutual commitments to monitor the agreement; and institutional arrangements for future dialogue between the two parties on this issue. More specifically:

—  Restriction of launch aid to 33 percent of total development cost, with 25 percent to be repaid at the cost of government borrowing and the remaining eight percent to be repaid at the cost of government borrowing plus one percent;

—  A maximum reimbursement period of 17 years, and 20 percent of the repayments to be made over the first 40 percent of aircraft deliveries (and 70 percent over the first 85 percent);

—  An overall limit per annum on indirect support equivalent to three percent of the civil aircraft industry's annual commercial turnover in the country concerned and four percent of the annual commercial turnover of any one firm; and

—  Controls on general purpose loans and sales inducements.[174]

80. The agreement outlined two forms of support: 'direct', such as RLI favoured by EU Member States' governments; and 'indirect' such as R&D support favoured by the US Government.

The current dispute

81. In recent negotiations on a renewed deal, the US (and Boeing) were looking to ban all new state aid to large civil aircraft, but these discussions broke down in September 2004. This prompted the US to initiate the first steps towards the WTO's Dispute Settlement Proceedings in October 2004, by requesting formal consultations with the EU and the governments of the UK, France, Germany and Spain. The US Government alleged that $15 billion in 'illegal aid' had been paid to Airbus, particularly for the new A380 'super-jumbo' programme.[175] Their objections focussed around EU levy-based investment programmes (such as RLI), which, the US claimed, were given at either zero or below market rates of interest, and the fact that RLI did not have to be repaid if a new model was not successful.[176]

82. On the same day, the EU retaliated by launching counter-proceedings against the US, alleging that Boeing had 'illegally' been given $23 billion by the US public sector.[177] The EU claimed that the US Government had subsidised Boeing mainly through R&D grants from NASA and Department of Defense programmes but also through individual US States offering tax breaks and grants to attract Boeing manufacturing plants.[178] Ambassador Robert Zoellick, the US Trade Representative, also announced that the US would terminate the 1992 agreement, exercising a right provided in the agreement itself, a move which was rejected by the EU.[179]

83. When we asked the Department for their views on the WTO negotiations, officials took pains to stress to us the political sensitivity involved: "this case is at a very sensitive stage at the moment so I would rather not speculate on what the outcomes might be".[180] Shortly after we heard the Department's evidence, the WTO Director-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, announced that the EU and the US were "to negotiate a bilateral resolution to their ongoing dispute concerning aircraft subsidies rather than continue the cases they had brought in October to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body".[181] We will continue to maintain a watching brief on developments in this highly sensitive case.




171   For example see Appendix 14, para 6.3.1, Appendix 2 para 3.3 and Q 70 (Airbus UK) Back

172   Appendix 2, para 3.3 Back

173   Appendix 10, section 1 Back

174   Trade and Industry Committee, British Aerospace Industry, para 97 Back

175   WTO, European Communities and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft - Request for Consultations by the United States, DS316, 12 October 2004 Back

176   The communication also claimed that a loan to EADS from the European Investment Bank for the A380 could be considered an export subsidy in breach of Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). Back

177   WTO, United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft - Request for Consultations by the European Communities, DS317, 12 October 2004 Back

178   Appendix 2, para 3.3 Back

179   See: US Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case Against EU Over Unfair Airbus Subsidies, Press Release, 6 October 2004 and European Commission, US-Boeing: EU rejects US unilateral abrogation of the 92 aircraft agreement, Press Release, 8 October 2004 Back

180   Q 211 (Mr Scott) Back

181   WTO, Supachai welcomes EU-US decision on aircraft dispute, press notice 394, 11 January 2005 Back


 
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