Select Committee on Trade and Industry Written Evidence


APPENDIX 3

Memorandum by the Air League Council

THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UK AEROSPACE INDUSTRY

  1.  The importance of the UK Aerospace Industry should not be underestimated. It is the last engineering-based manufacturing industry that is world-class as evidenced by its success in supplying both Airbus and Boeing and by its positive contribution to the balance of payments. It provides hundreds of thousands of highly paid and high value-added jobs. It is the type of knowledge and technology-based industry that other countries envy.

  2.  The exemplary performance of this industry is hidden in the overall "average" of the UK manufacturing industry. The "average" is pretty lacklustre and is consistent with the steady decline in the UK's manufacturing competitiveness. Whole sectors have been absorbed by more successful overseas competitors or have disappeared altogether.

  3.  During WWII, and for 20 years after, the UK Aerospace Industry had everything for airframes, engines and equipment in terms of innovation and technology. However, between 1957 ("no more manned aircraft") and in the late 60's (cancellation of TSR2 and withdrawl from Airbus) the collective nerve of both government and industry began to fail and the UK's relative global position began to decline. Only collaborative projects were entered into and these turned out to be hugely wasteful, inefficient and slow. Their only advantage was that they were almost impossible to cancel.

  4.  In the early 90s, studies conducted by the SBAC, concluded that the UK was consuming its technological inheritance because of lack of investment by both government and industry exacerbated by the absence of an industrial policy and strategy.

  5.  In the past 25 years, the three aerospace sectors have behaved quite differently. The equipment sector was the first to realise that the domestic market was not the relevant market to address. So, after an exceptional record for exports, the equipment companies (Smiths, Dowty, Lucas, Cobham, Meggitt) all acquired subsidiaries overseas. No other country achieved this on the British scale. The consolidated jet engine companies (Rolls-Royce) achieved an exceptional export record and then set up overseas operations, firstly for overhaul and later for research, development and manufacturing (50% of Rolls-Royce R&D is now performed outside of the UK due to more attractive economic conditions) The consolidated aircraft manufacturers (BAE Systems), ironically, were slow in setting-up shop overseas mainly due to their preoccupation with collaborative programmes, but now have a substantial subsidiary in North America.

  6.  In the early 90s, the SBAC attempted to re-start a dialogue with government (DTI, MoD, No 10) about the future of the industry and the need for a joint plan including a substantial uplift in R&D spending. (Incidentally, the SBAC "discovered" that the government spent over £6 billion on Research and Technology but found no one was in charge of the total). This initiative proved largely ineffective because of a lack of resonance. Both of the top level government/industry committees, (DTI Aviation Committee and National Defence Industries Council) became mere talking shops.

  7.  In the mid 90s, The Technology Foresight Programme was a breathe of fresh air under the leadership of the Government Chief Scientific Advisor. At one time the Defence and Aerospace sector committee had more than 200 people working on the programme at no cost to the government. Technology road maps (including technology demonstration programmes) were prepared for the eight key technologies identified to be essential for the future of the Defence and Aerospace Industry. This really was a joint effort between Industry, Academia and the Government. The CSA concluded that the Defence and Aerospace Industry was "at the cusp" and could go either way.

  8.  Then in 1997 the government changed and despite protestations to the contrary the Foresight Programme for Defence and Aerospace slowly disappeared into the background.

  9.  Subsequently, the fresh approach became the Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team. Launched with much fanfare and promise, even this initiative has achieved very little. Industry frustration with lack of government response led to a breakfast at No 10. However, no commitments were made other than assigning another co-ordination task to Lord Sainsbury.

  10.  Perhaps the surprising thing is the continuing success of the industry in spite of the relative lack of government support. (Launch Aid is really Launch Investment with commercial returns to the government for taking a relatively longer view than commercial banks.)

  11.  Evidence suggests that properly structured aerospace manufacturing operations in the UK can still be world-class competitive and even the lowest-cost producer. One example is the Messier-Dowty plant at Gloucester which for the first time has won the complete landing gear system for the Boeing 7E7.

  12.  Rolls-Royce has been the outstanding example for successful implementation of a global strategy ever since 1971. This is a uniquely valuable enterprise and maintains the world's most recognised prestige name. This company will be the bell-weather for the industry in terms of how it adapts to the new realities.

  13.  However, the industry has become anti-synergistic—the whole is worth less than the sum of the parts. This explains why so much of the industry has been sold to more successful overseas competitors (often partially government-owned) eg Airbus, Messier-Dowty, Lucas, Claverham, Westland, Ferranti, Plessey, Pilkington, Racal, and nearly Alvis-Vickers. And ownership does matter in the medium to long term.

  14.  Today's position of the UK aerospace industry is comparable to that of British Leyland in 1968 when BL was still the fourth largest volume car manufacturer in the world. The remaining rump has recently been rescued by Shanghai!

  15.  Before it is too late, the Government needs to decide that a UK-owned Aerospace Industry is worth supporting for the long term. Substantial sums of government investment are required in research, technology and technology demonstrators. The allocation of these funds needs to be controlled by a joint council composed of industrial, academic and government members. It is quite straight forward—we just need to decide.

Tony Edwards

Visiting Professor, Royal Military College of Science

Chairman, The Air League

President, British Aircraft Preservation Council

Past President, The Society of British Aerospace Companies

Past President, The Royal Aeronautical Society





 
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