Select Committee on Trade and Industry Twelfth Report


5  Other factors affecting wholesale gas prices

Indexation of contracts

74. One of the factors identified by Ofgem as contributing to comparatively high gas prices was the link between gas and oil prices.[192] A number of the representatives of industrial consumers doubted that this link was as significant as Ofgem thought. We explored with our witnesses the extent to which the wholesale gas price was affected by oil prices; whether any such link was deliberate (that is, was a major feature of contracts for the supply of gas) or simply a reflection of a general 'energy' market; what sort of oil or oil products formed the basis of any link, and whether there had been any differences in price movements between the types of 'oil'; and any divergence in practice between the UK and Continental Europe in these areas.

75. We were told that there has been a strong link between gas and oil prices. Historically, the connection had been an explicit one: when 'natural gas' was first traded, both buyers and sellers needed a means of establishing a fair price for it, and preferably a means that neither party could manipulate; at that time, oil was an important substitute for gas as an energy source; the oil market was much larger and reflected wider trends; so the long-term gas contracts that were negotiated had an important element of oil indexation built into them.[193] Volatility in oil prices could, to a certain extent, be smoothed out by incorporating in the contract a time lag between oil price and gas price changes.[194] However, oil was not the only basis of indexation, nor were gas prices necessarily linked to crude oil. We were told that most contracts in the past had been linked to a mixture of indices: heavy fuel oil, gas oil or diesel, sometimes an element of crude oil, electricity, gas prices themselves, and inflation (calculated in various ways) all featured in such contracts. While gas oil tended to track crude oil prices—and recently had been equally or even more volatile than crude—the price of heavy fuel oil had historically been more stable.[195] This trend had been reinforced during the last year when there had been a reduction in demand for low sulphur heavy fuel oil and therefore its price had fallen.[196] As a result, although fluctuations in the price of crude oil affected gas prices, the effect was tempered by the fact that oil was just part of a basket of indices.[197]

76. This general picture of the sort of indexation apparent in older, long-term contracts was confirmed by a number of gas buyers. SSE said most of its long-term contracts used a basket of indices, with four major elements: heavy fuel oil, light fuel oil, crude oil, and energy inflation as measured in the Government's statistics published in Energy Trends.[198] Just over half of Centrica's contracts were long-term ones based on a mixture of oil prices and the Retail Price Index; and in some the formula meant that the price of minor oil products (including duty) were a significant factor: in these contracts, about half the average change in fuel oil and gas oil prices fed through to the gas price.[199] Within Continental Europe, one shipper in the Netherlands had traditionally agreed contracts on the basis of indexation only to low sulphur heavy fuel oil, but was now reported to be moving to a split of 50 percent heavy fuel oil and 50 percent gas oil. More generally, we were told that the indexation of Norwegian and Algerian gas was weighted more heavily towards heavy fuel oil than gas oil.[200]

77. While the majority of Continental gas contracts were, it was thought, still based on oil indexation of some kind,[201] in the UK companies have tended to opt for gas price linkages for new contracts.[202] Our witnesses were very divided in their view of whether Continental Europe would shift to gas indexation as the gas market liberalised: some were confident they would,[203] but E.ON doubted whether gas customers would be eager to lose the advantages of having a base for indexation that could not be manipulated, and which provided for considerable smoothing out of fluctuations in the cost of the comparator.[204]

78. We asked several witnesses what they thought would be in the best interests of UK consumers: traditional oil indexation, or the newer model of indexation to gas prices. They responded that the situation would vary over time. Both BP and Centrica believed that, over the next two years, while the gas supply-demand balance remained tight, customers would benefit more from oil indexation, but longer term there would be greater benefit from gas indexation as the fundamentals of the commodity would determine price, and market signals would be clearer.[205]

79. Because of the variety of ways of determining future price increases under long-term gas contracts, it is impossible to come to a firm conclusion about the degree to which UK gas prices have been affected by the increase in prices of crude oil and some oil products. The effects will vary markedly from company to company. There seems to be a strong trend to replace oil indexation in contracts as they come up for renewal. There was a consensus that this trend was likely to be beneficial in the medium to long-term. However, there is no guarantee that gas prices would fall if oil indexation ended. Shell cited the example of the USA where—it said—there was no indexation to oil but gas prices had increased significantly, being at higher levels during the winter of 2004-05 than in both the UK and Continental Europe.[206]

80. The focus on indexation may be academic anyway. Shell argued that, even if there were no explicit indexation, a link would persist because, in global markets, the price of all similar commodities tends to move (even if not in synchronicity, in harmony) with the primary commodity—and in the case of the energy market, this is oil. As far as the UK was concerned, this tendency would only strengthen as it became more dependent on imported gas and therefore more integrated into the global energy market.[207] Oil and gas prices will to some extent tend to move together even if the explicit indexation to oil is broken because oil and gas are still, to a degree, competitive products. However, what the actual correlation between the two will be remains unclear.

Liberalisation of the European gas market

81. Ofgem thought that one of the major destabilising influences on the UK gas market was the lack of liberalisation in Continental Europe.[208] All our witnesses agreed. In much of the Continent, the gas industry is still dominated by a few powerful incumbents, who own the networks, and often also the storage facilities; retain a very high percentage of the supply market; and tend to trade upon the basis of contracts of several years' duration. BP described the current situation as follows.[209] The market was still in its infancy. Though there was an emerging spot market at the Zeebrugge hub, "the reality of an inter-connected network of Continental trading hubs remains a distant goal." Significant barriers to liquidity persisted, including: difficulties in obtaining economic access to gas storage facilities; issues concerning gas specification; and access to transportation networks. Among the improvements required were: full legal separation of the transportation and supply businesses;[210] 'equivalence' of transmission and distribution services when provided by a regulated company to third parties;[211] and freedom of parties to buy gas from and sell gas to anyone else.[212]

82. All those giving oral evidence who commented on the situation in Continental Europe called for liberalisation to be speeded up, in terms of not only agreement on the Gas Directive currently under discussion[213] but also practical implementation of the existing legislation.[214] Free and fair access to transmission networks and storage was considered crucial.[215] Centrica noted, for example, that third party access to storage should have been implemented on a fair and non-discriminatory basis throughout the EU from July 2004, but in November 2004 the gas storage operators had still not agreed how to implement it, and some Member States (notably France and Germany) had made no attempt to regulate such access, despite the fact that the incumbent transmission companies owned all the gas storage connected to their pipelines.[216] E.ON UK, whose parent company was formed from the merger of two large German companies, E.ON and Ruhrgas, argued that progress was being made in Germany: an extensive energy liberalisation law was being discussed in the Bundestag (the lower house of the German Parliament), and an energy regulator had been established. Moreover, the transmission owners had already agreed a large number of contracts for the transportation of third party gas.[217] Ofgem and the DTI, in contrast, felt that, although there had been some progress, it was very slow.[218]

83. A number of witnesses also suggested that none of the changes to the Continental market would be of much effect without a significant increase in the transparency of that market.[219] One witness argued that it was not enough simply to know how much gas was available at Zeebrugge: traders needed information about availability all the way through the gas pipelines from Russia.[220]

84. Ofgem and the DTI assured us that they were urging the European Commission not only to make progress with the new Directive but also to carry out a thorough review of progress to date in energy liberalisation. The Government has made it clear that energy liberalisation would be a key component of the UK's programme for its Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2005.[221] We therefore asked the European Commission what were its plans.

85. Our witnesses from the Competition and Transport and Energy Directorates General of the Commission ('DG Competition' and 'DG TREN') admitted that progress on implementing existing Directives had been slow so far. It had been five years since the electricity market and three years since the gas market had been opened to competition, and the Commission was disappointed by progress to date.[222] However, while the first 'package' of liberalisation Directives had started the process of separation of supply functions from the ownership and management of transmission networks, these Directives had required such 'unbundling' only in budgetary terms: incumbent companies had not been required to make practical changes that would increase cross-border flows of energy or enable customers to switch suppliers. The European Commission had therefore brought in a second package of measures in 2003 to require functional and legal unbundling. At the time of our evidence session with the Commission officials, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers were still considering the final element of the second gas package: a Directive on access to the grid, which—according to the Commission officials—contained improved 'use it or lose it' mechanisms to prevent pipeline capacity from being under-used.[223] The European Commission expected this Directive to come into operation by July 2005.[224] DG TREN intended to wait to see whether this legislation would have the desired practical effect; if not, it was willing to consider the next stage: forcing the incumbents to break up into separate supply and network operator companies.[225]

86. The officials reported that ten Member States had yet to transpose the Directives into national law, let alone implement them.[226] Germany lagged significantly behind the others.[227] However, the officials believed that even the most reluctant Member States were starting to notice the advantages gained by other Member States that liberalised early, and were making efforts to catch up. In Germany, for example, although the legislation to transpose the European Directives was still under discussion, it would, if agreed, not only cover the measures intended to be transposed by 1 July 2004 but also some of those for which the deadline was 1 July 2007.[228]

87. Despite these promising signs, there still remained much to be done. Although all 25 Member States now had energy regulators, their powers varied in respect of the relationships with the national Governments and the incumbent operators. The German Government had only recently appointed an energy regulator, and this regulator also had to deal with the telecommunications and postal services sectors.[229] The regulators met regularly to discuss progress and best practice, and the Commission officials felt that, as a result of these meetings, the introduction of competition was speeding up.[230] The officials believed there was no need for a pan-European regulator. The national regulators had a better knowledge of conditions within their countries, and were therefore able to judge potential harm more easily and react more swiftly.[231] DG Competition was also trying to establish better co-ordination between the European and the national competition authorities so that it could more quickly and easily identify problems that had cross-border effects.[232]

88. We asked which areas still to be fully implemented would have most impact on practical liberalisation. We were told that, apart from the vital question of third party access to transmission networks[233] and storage facilities, the most significant were connected with ensuring that consumers had and could exercise choice of supplier: the problems of tackling dominant incumbents in many Member States, and in particular the anti-competitive nature of many of the long-term contracts for gas supply (which often, for example, contain clauses forbidding the onward sale of gas).[234] However, Mr Lowe, Director General of Competition, was of the view that even if the Directives had been implemented fully, it would still take time for companies to change their behaviour in such a way that they would respond to the opportunities and problems of a competitive market.[235] He foresaw a continuing need for the competition authorities, both national and (where cross-border issues arose) at EU level, to monitor the energy markets closely; and he noted that the new Competition Commissioner had stated that one of her main priorities would be the promotion of further competition in the energy sector.[236]

89. The European Commission officials announced that the two Directorates General which they represented intended to launch investigations beginning in May 2005 into the operation of the gas and electricity markets within the EU. They hoped to publish some preliminary results by the end of 2005, and final conclusions in 2006. DG Competition thought that the inquiry might discover areas of anti-competitive behaviour where either it or the national competition or regulatory authorities could take action, but it also might highlight a need for further legislation.[237] Meanwhile, the DG TREN had already been given the task of producing a report on behalf of the Commission in 2006 reviewing the general situation of both gas and electricity markets.[238]

90. We welcome the European Commission's announcement of these parallel inquiries. We note the timetable announced to us, and look forward to the completion of both inquiries by the end of 2006. We are also pleased that the UK Government has taken such a firm stand on the centrality of energy liberalisation to the whole Lisbon Agenda. However, we recognise that both the Commission and the UK Government will need to exercise considerable persuasive powers to convince other Member States of the need to take prompt action.

91. Without further real (not just cosmetic) liberalisation of the European gas market, the wholesale market in the UK will malfunction: it will continue to be difficult for buyers to access adequate supply and, because of this and other distortions caused by the mismatch between the liberalised market in the UK and the more rigid contractual arrangements on the Continent, there will be a tendency for prices to diverge significantly. Even on the most optimistic forecast, it is unlikely that the Continental market will be functioning as a fully liberalised one before about the end of this decade. Moreover, as BP reminded us, "Liberalisation does not, per se, lead to lower prices. Rather it gives consumers the freedom to choose suppliers, encourage the development of new products and services and lets the market react more quickly to changes in supply/demand fundamentals."[239] European liberalisation is not a complete answer to the problems in the UK gas wholesale market. In fact, the Director for Conventional Energies, Directorate General for Transport and Energy, observed that the object was not cheap energy but rather a more efficient mechanism for establishing energy prices.[240]


192   Ofgem report, paras 1.52, 6.12-6.15, 6.18 and 7.14  Back

193   See, for example, Qq 117-118 (BP), 236 (Shell) and 334 (E.ON) Back

194   Q 236 (Shell) Back

195   Q 120 (BP) Back

196   Qq 52 and 56 (EIUG) EIUG attributed the low demand for low sulphur fuel oil to a mixture of environmental concerns about its use in the West, and possibly changes in consumption patterns elsewhere in the world. Back

197   Qq 117-118 (BP) Back

198   Q 430 Back

199   Q 381 and App 2 (Centrica), para 3.5.3 Back

200   Q 56 (EIUG) Back

201   Q 52 (EIUG) and 120 (BP) and 334 (E.ON) Back

202   Q 118 (BP) and 381 (Centrica) Back

203   For example, Ofgem (Q 499) and the European Commission (Qq 564 and 582-583) Back

204   Q 334 and App 4 (E.ON), para 27 Back

205   Qq 119 (BP) and 382-383 (Centrica) Back

206   Q 233 The independent energy analyst, ILEX, agreed: cited in App 29 (UKOOA), para 32  Back

207   Qq 237-241 Back

208   Ofgem report, summary Back

209   App 3, paras 17 and 19-20 ; see also Qq 59-60 (EIUG) Back

210   Known technically as 'unbundling' Back

211   In other words, complete parity in the treatment of other companies with the network owner's own supply subsidiaries in relation to access to, and charging for, network use. Back

212   At present, a number of Continental gas contracts prohibit purchasers from selling on gas - even surplus gas -to anyone else. Back

213   Qq 494 and 500 (Ofgem) Back

214   Qq 6 (energywatch), 187 (CIA), 282 (EEF) , 403 (Centrica) and 494 (Ofgem) Back

215   See, for example, App 2 (Centrica), paras 7.1.4-7.1.5 and 8.2-8.3 Back

216   App 2 (Centrica), para 8.4 Back

217   Qq 334 and 342 Back

218   Qq 494 and 500 (Ofgem) and 532 (DTI) Back

219   Qq 391 (Centrica) and 459 (Ofgem) Back

220   Q 393 (Centrica) Back

221   Qq 494-495 (Ofgem) and 532 and 533 (DTI) Back

222   Q 485 Back

223   Q 560 Back

224   In other words, to become European law by this date. There is then an agreed period for Member States to transpose the Directive into national law. Q 545 Back

225   Qq 569 and 577 Back

226   Qq 545 and 575 The ten are: Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden Back

227   Q 575 Back

228   Q 575 Another promising sign cited by both Ofgem and the Commission was that the German competition authorities were finally taking action against some anti-competitive provisions in long-term supply contracts: Qq 500 (Ofgem) and 559 (European Commission) Back

229   Qq 575 and 555-558 A point also made by Ofgem: Q 500 Back

230   Qq 558 and 587 Back

231   Q 568 Back

232   Q 554 Back

233   The officials noted, for example, that any company wishing to transmit gas from Budapest to Zeebrugge had to use five different pipeline networks, each with a different tariff and management system: Q 545. See also Q 561  Back

234   Qq 545 and 549 Back

235   Q 552 Back

236   Qq 546, 548, 549, and 560; 576 and 579 Back

237   Qq 547 and 549 Back

238   Q 549  Back

239   App 3 (BP), para 21 Back

240   Q 585 Back


 
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