Select Committee on Trade and Industry Fifth Report


7 Protecting vulnerable customers

55. The main emphasis in the efforts to prevent debt and disconnection has been on the protection of vulnerable customers. This was the core of Ofgem's and Energywatch's joint guidelines in 2002, and was the reason for ERA's original proposals for the industry, which were put out to consultation and on which we took oral evidence, and for its final paper published on 8 September 2004.

56. The regulatory framework provides some protection for vulnerable customers. A condition of the licences for gas suppliers (Condition 37A) is that pensioners must not be disconnected in winter. However, there is no requirement for companies to reconnect pensioners' supplies disconnected in, for example, August as winter approaches. Moreover, the condition applies only to households consisting entirely of people of pensionable age or under 18 years: if pensioners live with other adults, disconnection can still take place.[95]

57. Companies are also required to adopt and implement Codes of Practice containing certain elements. Companies must offer a wide variety of payment methods and, if a debt accrues, must set the repayment at a level the customer can afford (if a customer relies only on basic benefits, this cannot be more than £2.80 a week).[96] Disconnection of supply is permitted only if the customer has failed to agree repayment terms, and even then the company is required to attempt to install a PPM before disconnection is allowed.[97]

58. However, as indicated elsewhere in our Report, the consensus is that these broad requirements do not provide sufficient protection for vulnerable groups. In 2003 energy companies imposed on themselves a voluntary moratorium on disconnecting vulnerable customers. British Gas decided that broadly receipt of certain types of benefit indicated that a customer was likely to be vulnerable, and, where such customers were at risk of disconnection, the process of disconnection was halted.[98] The ERA's final paper of September 2004 said that, at that point, since December 2003 no vulnerable customer had been disconnected.[99] However, it is not easy to identify the vulnerable. The main issues are as follows.

Definition of 'vulnerable customers'

59. Before ERA's consultation process in 2004, energy supply companies used different definitions of the 'vulnerable customers' to whom extra advice and support should be offered. ERA attempted to find an agreed 'ready-made' definition of vulnerable groups, but found wide variations in legislation and in use amongst, for example, social services representatives.[100] ERA's first attempt at an industry-wide definition in its April consultation paper was welcomed as trying to encompass all those potentially as risk, not just pensioners and the disabled, by including, for example, families with young children. There were criticisms of the definition, however, in particular its emphasis on the "customer", which was interpreted as meaning that households would receive the extra protection only if the person who held the contract with the supply company was a member of one of the vulnerable groups.[101]

60. The ERA's revised definition concentrates on people at risk:

"A customer is vulnerable if for reasons of age, health, disability or severe financial insecurity they are unable to safeguard their personal welfare or the personal welfare of other members of the household."[102]

The ERA's September paper gives further guidance to companies on how to identify such customers, encompassing such factors as whether a customer is caring for an elderly person in the household; if a permanent member of the household is disabled and unable to support themselves or has a long-term medical condition; whether a household member has been identified as vulnerable by a social worker, a doctor or health visitor; if the household is on a low income or state benefit and contains young children; or whether the customer is dependent on medical equipment operated by electricity, including stair lifts.[103] The ERA says the guidance is not intended to be over-prescriptive as this would run the risk of excluding vulnerable customers; it will be for the companies to review the circumstances of each customer on a case-by-case basis. The ERA has committed itself to reviewing the guidance after a year to assess its effectiveness and to refine it in the light of experience.[104]

61. The rewording of the definition of vulnerability to make it clear that it extends to members of a customer's household meets the most frequently-voiced concern of our witnesses and of the respondents to the ERA's consultation paper. However, it is not clear that even this definition would apply to many of those whose energy supplies are disconnected for debt at present.[105]

Identifying the vulnerable

62. The ERA's September paper sets out in considerable detail a model for how supply companies will attempt to identify vulnerable customers during their contact with customers over debt.[106] The ERA states that typically, over a period of several months, companies will make eight attempts to contact customers in debt by letter, two attempts at contact by telephone, and two personal visits to the property, before any application to the court for a warrant and the final visit to install a PPM or disconnect supply.[107] The ERA explains that: "If, during a contact with an indebted customer, … suppliers' front line staff are made aware that a customer is unable to pay the bill, they will attempt to capture and record information about the customer, subject to the customer being willing to provide this." Such information would include the customer's age, if the customer was receiving benefits, the number of young children in the household, and whether anyone in the household was disabled or had special needs. The staff would flag up the records of customers identified as potentially vulnerable so that colleagues would be aware of this information during any future contact with the customer. Staff would also encourage eligible customers to register on the Priority Services Register.[108]

63. ERA told us: "In discussions with social services representatives it is clear that there are no hard and fast rules in identifying a vulnerable customer… The only clear guidance that social services can offer in identifying vulnerability is to look for changes in lifestyle that have made it difficult for a customer to pay the bill."[109] Moreover, we have already noted that some customers are unwilling to give personal details to companies. Extracting the right information to make an assessment of vulnerability will therefore be a difficult task requiring trained staff. We asked our witnesses whether they believed that the companies would commit enough time and money to training their staff to the level required. The ERA noted that not all staff would have to be trained to the same level: those operating at general call centres would not need high levels of training, but the specialists dealing with repayment negotiations would.[110] British Gas told us that it was already putting in place a team of specialists to ensure that all referrals of vulnerable customers across the organisation were properly and consistently dealt with.[111] Ofgem suggested that the retraining necessary would take some months to complete.[112] Energywatch was optimistic that, in financial terms alone, the effort would be worthwhile for the companies: given the cost of debt and disconnection to them, an investment of about £40 in training each member of staff to give appropriate advice in order to avoid disconnection made commercial sense.[113] The NEA, however, was sceptical not only about the likelihood of staff being able to identify vulnerable customers, even after training, but also about the inherent conflict in the roles of such staff: as, in essence, revenue protection agents for the company, would they really make the necessary effort to identify vulnerable customers and refer them for extra support?[114]

64. We share the NEA's concerns. It is impossible to judge whether the staff of energy supply companies will be able to identify most vulnerable customers and subsequently prevent the disconnection of their fuel supplies. The proof will lie in the disconnection figures. Because of the length of the disconnection process, Ofgem's quarterly reports do not yet show the effects, if any, of these initiatives. We expect Ofgem to keep the situation under close review, and we recommend our successors to return to this issue.

65. The ERA noted a further problem with ensuring that their staff were aware of the identity of vulnerable customers. When customers' records were 'tagged' to indicate vulnerability and details were noted, these details were not passed on if the customer switched supplier. In effect, the new supply company had to go through the same process of identification again. There were two reasons why companies did not pass on such details: one was a concern about whether this would comply with the Data Protection Act 1998; and the other was incompatibility between the electronic data management systems used by individual companies. The ERA suggested that: "the cost of harmonisation [of such software] is prohibitive at this time."[115]

66. It is absurd that companies should spend time and effort in identifying vulnerable customers in order to safeguard them only for this protection to be lost if the customers follow the regulator's and Energywatch's advice to change supplier. We believe that the companies should, as a matter of urgency, seek clarification from the Information Commissioner about the Data Protection issue. Given that the transfer of information between companies is designed simply to protect the customer, we hope that the Information Commissioner will be able to permit it, with safeguards against use of the data for other purposes. The comfort of customer confidentiality is of little consolation if the members of the household are freezing to death.

67. The technical problem may take longer to solve. However, as noted above, difficulties with transferring data on switching of supplier do not end with the flagging up of vulnerable customers: many of the problems with billing errors that lead to the threatened or actual disconnection of supply occur when customers switch suppliers. Sorting out incompatibilities between electronic systems must form a major part of the effort to tackle the failures in the customer transfer process. Despite the expense, we believe that Ofgem should press the companies to deal with these problems expeditiously.

The 'safety net'

68. The safety net for vulnerable customers proposed by the ERA consists basically of the elements already discussed in this Report: reference to those able to advise on debt management, a range of repayment options (including PPMs), the use of Fuel Direct, and provision of energy efficiency advice and support under various schemes (including benefits health checks). However, for vulnerable customers, the ERA proposes that companies should make extra efforts to involve external support mechanisms, as such customers often need wider help not limited to managing energy costs and the repayment of fuel debt. For example, under the proposals, staff dealing with vulnerable customers would liaise with any appropriate person or body that could provide support, whether family members, friends, or social services departments. Such liaison has become easier since the Information Commissioner clarified that, in his view, energy supply companies were allowed to pass on key information to any person or organisation that might be able to help a vulnerable customer at risk of disconnection.[116]

69. The ERA also acknowledged the potential problem of self-disconnection when a PPM was installed. In its September paper, it said: "To ensure that a recently installed meter is being used and the customer is coping with the repayments, suppliers will make regular checks on the customer, often in conjunction with a carer or other support service."[117] This should help where a customer is experiencing problems in using a PPM. However, the ERA noted that, if customers chose not to use the PPM (and this problem seemed more prevalent with gas supplies which were often regarded by customers as less vital than electricity supplies), then often they would not respond to the company's attempts to contact them.[118]

Reference to social services

70. Apart from improving the operation of existing processes for dealing with debt problems, the ERA proposed that, if all else failed, vulnerable customers should be referred to social services.[119] The ERA described to us the rôle for social services that it envisaged: "to undertake an assessment to decide on the most appropriate action, which might include help in the management of the customer's financial affairs, for example by setting up arrangements with a third party such as a relative or a court."[120]

71. Other witnesses were frankly sceptical about this proposal, given the huge existing demands on social services departments.[121] Ofgem suggested that the energy companies should not depend too heavily on social services but should seek to work with a wide range of groups—such as charities and voluntary bodies—that could provide support to customers in repayment difficulties. The regulator felt that social services departments could be of most use in, for example, helping to identify family members who could assist vulnerable customers.[122]

72. We understand from the tone of the ERA's September paper that the social services departments were even more concerned than our witnesses about the apparent dependence on them to sort out energy customers' problems. The Association of Directors of Social Services told the ERA that their priority was those already identified as vulnerable by their own systems. While they would check any referral by an energy company to see whether they had already classified the customer as vulnerable—and, if so, would follow up the referral—they could not simply take on the cases of any customers identified as vulnerable by the energy companies.[123]

73. The ERA subsequently agreed with the Association of Directors of Social Services a best practice approach to consulting local social services departments and jointly identifying customers in need of support. This approach comprised a number of steps. While the process was under way, and if at the end of it the customer was agreed to be vulnerable, the fuel supply would not be disconnected. Once an energy company had identified a customer as vulnerable and at risk, it would ask the social services department to check whether the customer was already on the department's 'at risk' list. If so, social services would arrange support. If not, the supplier would provide social services with its reasons for assessing the customer as vulnerable to enable the department to decide a course of action. If necessary, the supplier would carry out a second visit to the customer to re-assess the situation and gather further evidence of vulnerability for social services.[124] Apart from visits to customers agreed to be vulnerable, in extreme situations the social services departments might intervene by arranging power of attorney or applying to the Court of Protection to help with the management of the customer's financial affairs.[125]

74. The ERA concluded that, although the number of times departments are contacted by companies will vary from area to area, local offices should not normally receive more than one or two referrals a month of customers considered by their supply companies as being potentially at serious risk. The ERA considered that the caseload would be small because: "Disconnections as a whole continue to fall and suppliers' systems have improved to the point that customers identified as vulnerable are not disconnected."[126]

75. While the ERA's latest proposals have reduced the burden which the earlier ones appeared to place on local social services offices, this has merely confirmed that the onus is on the companies themselves to identify, advise and support vulnerable customers. For the reasons already explained, we are not convinced that they will be able to provide a complete safety net. However, they must try.


95   App 13, para 4.2 (NEA), App 1 paras 2.2-2.3 (Age Concern) Back

96   Q 135 (Ofgem) Back

97   Q 124 (Ofgem) Back

98  App 2, para 3.1 Back

99  p 6; see also App 5, para 9 (EdF Energy) Back

100   App 7 Back

101   See Qq 21and 31 (Energywatch), 130 and 138 (Ofgem), and 45 and 58 (ERA) and App 12, para 2 (National Consumer Council) Back

102  September Paper p6 Back

103  Ibid p7 Back

104  Ibid pp 6-7 Back

105   Q 46 (ERA) Back

106   Figure 1 Back

107  September Paper p 10 Back

108  Ibid pp 9-10: for more information on the Priority Services Register, see paragraphs 48-51 above Back

109   App 7 Back

110   Q 56 Back

111   App 2, para 3.2e Back

112   Q 131 Back

113   Q 24 Back

114   Qq 103 and 117, and App 13 (NEA), para 5.4. See also App 1, paras 2.5-2.6 (Age Concern) and App 4, para 2 (Centre for Utility Consumer Law) Back

115  September paper, p 10 Back

116  Ibid, pp 10-11 and 13. For an account of how one company tries to apply such a safety net for vulnerable customers, see App 5, paras 12-17 (Edf Energy) Back

117  Ibid p 12 Back

118  Ibid p 19 Back

119  App 7; Consultation document, Figure 1 Back

120  App 7 Back

121  Qq 105 (Help the Aged) and 133 (Ofgem); App 13, para 5.5 (NEA), App 1, para 2.7 (Age Concern) and App 12, para 2 (National Consumer Council) Back

122  Q 133 Back

123  September paper, p 14 Back

124  Ibid p 15, Figure 3 Back

125  Ibid pp 15-16 Back

126  Ibid p 16 Back


 
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Prepared 10 February 2005