Select Committee on Trade and Industry Fourteenth Report


3 The scale of the problem

18. We found general agreement that the scale of the problem had been under-estimated and that this had a bearing on the efficiency with which the compensation schemes were administered from the outset. The Minister acknowledged that the DTI and others had seriously underestimated the number of claims that could be made after the two schemes had been approved by the courts.[24] The Department speculated that, had the scale of the problem been recognised at the time, those negotiating the Handling Agreements might have recognised that the complexity of the Agreements, while accurately reflecting common law and the court judgments, was not suitable for such a large scale exercise. The complexity of the Agreements had slowed delivery of compensation, and a simpler scheme that involved more averaging of compensation payments would have been quicker to deliver, if less fair to some individuals.[25]

19. The English Monitoring Group was concerned that what its members saw as the "extraordinarily complicated" compensation arrangements were underpinned by an adversarial approach, which the Group attributed to a hangover from the original court process.[26] From its inception the Group had worked with all interested parties to "obviate the blame culture which had developed" at the beginning of the exercise.[27] It seems that such a culture might not have dissipated entirely. The CSG disputed the Minister's assertion that the mining unions and claimants solicitors had been involved in any initial scoping exercise:

"Neither the unions nor claimants' solicitors were involved initially in estimating likely claim volumes and capacities in either scheme. It appeared to the Claimants' Group after agreeing the COPD claims' handling agreement, that there had been inadequate planning and provision for what was likely in our view, to be very many more claims than the DTI envisaged."[28]

20. It is not clear from the evidence submitted to us how the DTI, with or without the input from other interested parties, could have been expected to gauge better the demand for the coal health compensation schemes, although it is disturbing that the Department's initial estimates were so wide of the mark. What is more important, however, is the way the Department and its contractors reacted once the true scale of that demand was recognised.

21. It was generally agreed that the implementation of the compensation schemes got off to a difficult start.[29] The CSG identified a number of problems with the way the project had been approached. It was critical of the efficiency of the scheme administrators and in particular of the company originally appointed by the DTI to perform the medical assessment procedures for COPD, Healthcall.[30] The DTI explained that after the Court Judgments of 1997 and 1998 it had been under pressure to ensure that compensation started to flow quickly to claimants, particularly those with lung disease, many of whom were old and sick and some dying of the disease. As soon as the structure and basic details of the Agreements were settled, the process had to be implemented immediately without any opportunity to test the Department's plans by means of a pilot scheme.[31]

22. Instead, it had adopted the approach of developing processes over time as problems had been identified by its contractors and claimants' solicitors. It had replaced its original contractor for medical assessment; and after claims began to increase in 2000 it had increased the resources available to its contractors to enhance claims handling systems and encouraged the use of electronic systems amongst claimants' solicitors.[32] For example, Capita-IRISC told us that it had increased the number of staff employed to handle claims from 150 in 2000 to 1,400 in 2005.[33] The company had developed compensation calculation models for use by its staff and solicitors to assess their clients' claims with a view to speeding up the settlement process.[34]

23. The Department identified a number of constraints on the speed with which claims could be processed which have been exacerbated by the high volume of claims. The key constraint on the COPD process has been the number of respiratory specialists in the UK that were available for the medical assessment process. There were only 600 respiratory specialists in the UK: about 200 were involved in the scheme.[35] There had been two main constraints on the rate of progress with the VWF scheme. Initially, the provision of training records to confirm the occupation of claimants was slow. The use of electronic data imaging between Capita-IRISC and Iron Mountain had largely solved this problem. More recently, it became clear that the remaining general damages claims had a high level of co-defendant involvement, where the claimant had worked for both British Coal and for privately-owned mines. Such cases were more complex.[36]

Scheme administration and the DTI's oversight

24. The CSG identified longstanding and continuing concerns about the planning and procedures for claims handling and the organisation and deployment of both IT and human resources by the DTI's contractors. The Group was also concerned about the DTI's oversight and management of its contractors and its ability to hold them to account.[37] The CSG identified a number of problems common to both schemes in the past. It claimed that there had been difficulties in obtaining the training and employment records that were essential to demonstrate a claimant's right to compensation.[38] It criticised IRISC's inability to respond to claimants' solicitors' correspondence and resolve inquiries and to match incoming documentation from claimants' solicitors to files.[39] It drew our attention to the high turnover rate among staff handling claims at Capita-IRISC, which it claimed was as high as 25 percent in 2004.[40] The CSG also expressed concern about the effectiveness of the training provided to IRISC staff and pointed out that much of it seemed to be "on the job training".[41] The CSG maintained that all of these factors had contributed to unsatisfactory performance on the part of the contractor dealing with the claims adjustment part of the settlement process and a poor understanding of the Claims Handling Agreements themselves.[42] While the Group acknowledged that Capita-IRISC had tried to address many of these shortcomings, the company had failed to address them all to the CSG's satisfaction.[43]

25. For Capita-IRISC, Kate Roy[44] acknowledged that the number of claims had caused problems during the early years of the schemes, However, she explained that IRISC had increased the throughput of claims for both schemes for every year since the Claims Handling Agreements had been agreed, as was required in the company's contract with the DTI.[45] As previously discussed, staffing had been increased to the point where 1,400 staff were employed in four sites in former mining areas across the country.[46] Martin Trainer[47] told us that since Capita took over the business less than 12 months ago it had put in place a Business Improvement Programme designed to increase productivity and the quality of implementation of the schemes.[48]

26. Jeff Wilson[49] defended his company's record on training. He pointed out that Capita-IRISC had developed bespoke training for its staff, with appropriate mentoring and coaching. He felt that the quality of the company's training was reflected by the fact that its staff were recruited by solicitors involved in the schemes.[50] Ms Roy told us that 28 percent of staff who left Capita-IRISC were subsequently employed by such solicitors. She acknowledged that staff turnover was running at 25 percent, but did not feel that this was too surprising in areas of high employment like Sheffield.[51] The company sought to address the problem through its Business Improvement Programme.[52]

27. For its part, the DTI rejected the suggestion that it exercised inadequate supervision over its contractors. The Department acknowledged that the main risks to smooth delivery of compensation had been operational problems and delays due to changes in policy or process and operational risks between the service providers and solicitors. However, the Coal Liabilities Unit closely monitored the performance of its service providers and had put in place a programme of regular auditing of the systems, processes, and disaster recovery arrangements operated by its contractors.[53] The DTI's risk management processes had been commended by the National Audit Office.[54]

28. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the original underestimate of the scale of the problem meant that the resources allocated to the compensation schemes were inadequate from the outset and that mistakes were made. Since then, however, the Government and its contractors have invested heavily to address the original shortcoming and all of the stakeholders in the process have made significant efforts to make the system work better. In general, these efforts have borne fruit. There are, however, a number of specific points of disagreement between claimants' representatives and the Government and its contractors. The most significant of these are discussed below.


24   Q 119 Back

25   Appendix 2, para 36 Back

26   Appendix 8, para 6 Back

27   Ibid Back

28   Appendix 7  Back

29   Q119 Back

30   Appendix 5 Back

31   Appendix 2, para 27 Back

32   Ibid, paras 32 and 38-40 Back

33   Q 91 Back

34   Q 94 Back

35   Q 136 Back

36   Appendix 2, para 35 Back

37   Appendix 5 Back

38   Ibid Back

39   Ibid Back

40   Qq 12 and 19 Back

41   Q 10 Back

42   Appendix 5, Q 9 Back

43   Q 3 Back

44   Ms Roy is Operations Director, Capita-IRISC  Back

45   Q 90 Back

46   Q 91 (Roy) Back

47   Mr Trainer is Chief Executive Officer, Claims Outsourcing, Capita-IRISC Back

48   Q 91 (Trainer) Back

49   Mr Wilson is Technical Director, Capita-IRISC Back

50   Q 94 Back

51   Q 95 Back

52   Q 96 Back

53   Appendix 2, para 50 Back

54   National Audit Office, Managing Risks to Improve Public Services, HC 1078 (2003-04) Back


 
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