Select Committee on Trade and Industry Written Evidence


APPENDIX 6

Supplementary submission by British Exporters Association

EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT—BOND SUPPORT

  One of the ways in which ECGD could improve its support to exporters, and especially to SMEs, would be to introduce a bond support scheme similar to that offered by several other Export Credit Agencies. We were encouraged by the Committee's interest in such a scheme and we are pleased to submit, as promised, a copy of our paper entitled "The Case for ECGD to support the Issuance of Bonds and Guarantees" that we sent to ECGD in February 2003. (Copies of the paper were also sent to the International Trade Minister, HM Treasury and the Export Guarantees Advisory Council), together with:

    —  a table showing the bond support facilities available from a range of Export Credit Agencies, up-dating the information contained in paragraph 7 of our paper; and

    —  a note by Aon Ltd on the collapse of capacity in the international surety market, which is an updated version of the note that was attached to our original paper.

  Since February 2003, we have repeatedly explained the need for bond support at meetings with senior officials and with ministers (both DTI and Treasury), and we have further pressed our case in several letters. But this has so far been to no avail. Indeed, the enduring theme of the written responses we have received from DTI ministers has been along the following lines:

    "I appreciate producing concrete and verifiable evidence may be difficult, but to date ECGD has only seen a few instances of bonding difficulties all of which appear to relate to company rather than market problems. Only if such evidence can first be provided to ECGD would a further meeting, to revisit this issue, be useful."

    (Extract from letter to BExA from Mr Mike O'Brien MP, Minister of State, Trade & Investment, 27th October 2003)

  It is almost impossible to provide the sort of evidence that would satisfy ECGD, but we believe that we have demonstrated a clear need for ECGD bond support to help exporters accept contracts that require them to arrange bonds. It is not only companies with weak balance sheets that are seeking such support. Relatively strong companies are also finding that, for capacity reasons, the commercial banking and surety markets cannot always deliver the level of bonding that is demanded by many of their overseas customers.

British Exporters Association

1 April 2004

THE CASE FOR ECGD TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF BONDS AND GUARANTEES

  Contents

  Introduction
  The Need for Bonds
  Providers of Bonds
  Current Availability of Bonds
        (1)  Surety Market
        (2)  Bank Bonds
        (3)  The position of individual BExA Members
  What ECGD can do to Provide Bond Support
  The SME Perspective
  International Competition
  Conclusion

February 2003

INTRODUCTION

  Exporters are frequently required to provide bonds against advance payments made by their buyers under their contracts (Advance Payment Bonds) and to provide comfort to their buyer that all their obligations under the contract will be satisfactorily performed (Performance Bonds).

  There is a severe shortfall of capacity in the surety and bank market for contractual bonds and both large and small exporters are experiencing significant difficulty in raising the bonds required to meet their future contractual obligations. It is feared that this capacity shortfall will continue and that it will be exacerbated by the introduction of Basle II disciplines.

  Whilst ECGD and the private insurance market offer coverage for the unfair calling of these bonds ("buyer risk"), there exists no ECGD cover to assist the exporter in raising the bonds from their banks or the insurance market ("exporter risk") at this time of unprecedented market capacity reductions.

  This market failure is not limited to the UK. Several Export Credit Agencies already provide exporter risk coverage on bonds—on a risk-share basis with the banks—and other ECAs are actively considering the introduction of such programmes.

  BExA's members believe that there is an urgent case for the British Government to follow suit by providing bond risk support to ensure that UK exporters are able to remain competitive in the international marketplace.

THE NEED FOR BONDS

  The requirement for some form of bonding has become almost universal in major projects and, indeed, all domestic and international trade that involves a performance risk and/or progress payments.

  The amount of bonding required by the customer on a particular project or contract will depend on a number of factors including:

    —  Location: In North America, it is commonly the case that 100% bonding is required (albeit those bonds are often conditional by nature).

    —  Contractual Responsibility: If the contractor is responsible for construction/erection, it is likely that a performance bond of at least 10% will be required.

    —  Payment Terms: Any advance/progress payments (including loan drawings) made available before completion of the project are likely to be bonded—initially 100% of each payment (typically 20-25% of contract value), but possibly with a reduction mechanism related to deliveries or commissioning.

    —  Project Finance: The lenders (and ECAs) will usually require developers of projects to insist on high levels of bonding.

    —  Offset Performance Bonds: Generally required for 5-10% of any offset obligation, and remaining valid for the duration of the offset programme (often 10 years or longer).

    —  Warranty and maintenance obligations: The requirement for warranty/retention bonds of at least 5% of the contract value is not uncommon.

    —  Tenders: It is a common requirement for a tender/bid bond of at least 2% of the tender price to be submitted with a tender.

  Following the award of a contract, the tender/bid bond will not be released until the performance bond and/or advance payment guarantee has been issued. Similarly, on completion of the project, the performance bond may not be released until the warranty bond has been issued.

  The inability of the contractor to provide a bond that is required by the contract could easily result in the contract being terminated and any existing bonds being called. Similarly, the inability to extend the validity of an existing bond (eg due to a delay in completion of the project) would almost certainly result in that bond being called.

  Thus, when bidding for a project, contractors not only have to provide a tender/bid bond, but they also have to be certain that they will be able to raise the contract bonds as and when they are required—and to extend them if necessary (not necessarily for reasons within the control of the contractor).

  In an ideal world, of course, customers would trust contractors to perform according to the contract specification and to use progress payments for the purpose for which they were intended. But in the current world economic and political climate, including several high-profile corporate failures and insolvencies, the requirement for bonds is increasing rather than diminishing—especially in international trade.

  One SME member of BExA observes that "There is a growing demand amongst customers to ensure the integrity of bid and of supplies . . .". The growing demand for bonds and guarantees is an issue that needs to be addressed internationally. Until more benign market conditions are restored, however, the ability to provide increasing volumes of bonds and guarantees remains vital to the winning of orders.

  As prime contractors are finding it increasingly difficult to procure bonds for export contracts, so too are their sub-contractors. Many of these sub-contractors rely on the "trickle-down" benefits of obtaining business from major British-led export projects.

  [Because prime contractors are having difficulty obtaining back-to-back bonding from their sub-contractors, we should be grateful if ECGD would consider reversing its recent decision to remove from its Bond Insurance Policies any liability for loss arising from the capricious calling of a bond due to an event attributable to a sub-contractor.]

PROVIDERS OF BONDS

  There are two distinct markets for the provision of bonds and guarantees:

    —  insurance companies who issue surety bonds; and

    —  commercial banks.

  The surety market generally resists issuing bonds that are callable "on-demand" because insurance companies prefer to satisfy themselves that the contractor is in breach of his obligations before honouring a bond call. Also they like to have the opportunity to remedy the situation that led to the bond call. For these reasons, most customers stipulate that bonds must be issued by banks, even though the credit rating of most banks is lower than that of most surety companies. Conversely, most contractors would, for the same reasons, prefer to provide surety bonds—especially as surety bonds do not erode the contractor's hard-pressed banking facilities.

  Outside of North America, customers usually require bonds that are callable "on-demand", rather than the "conditional" bonds that are favoured by the surety companies. These "on-demand" instruments can be dangerous in the wrong hands because the issuer is obliged to pay the beneficiary on first demand, without any regard to the justification of the bond call. Most contractors purchase insurance against the capricious/unfair calling of such bonds—either from ECGD (through the Bond Insurance Policy) or from the private insurance market.

  In some countries it is a requirement that bonds are issued by local banks (in which case, the contractor usually has to arrange for his relationship bank in the UK to act as an intermediary).

  In North America, banks generally issue standby letters of credit, which are similar in effect to bonds.

CURRENT AVAILABILITY OF BONDS

4.1  Surety Market

  Recent research by Aon suggests that the capacity of the surety bonding market has collapsed over the last couple of years. This is dramatically illustrated in the attached chart, which shows that the capacity of the two largest players (AIG and Chubb) has declined from, respectively, $500-$1,000 million in 2001 to $150 million in 2003; and $700-$900 million to $150 million. And other players have simply left the market. Global surety capacity has fallen from $6,850-$8,150 million in 2001 to only $1,400 million in 2003.

  Contractors in all countries have felt the effect of this dramatic reduction in surety market capacity. Until 2001, many large multinational contractors would typically have enjoyed significant bonding lines with several surety companies. In many cases, those contractors now have much-reduced surety lines that are full (and in many cases overfull) with existing bonds, leaving no capacity whatsoever to issue any new surety bonds.

  The reasons for the reduction in surety capacity include:

    —  knock-on effects of September 2001;

    —  collapse for formerly high profile, respected, companies (Enron, World Com); and

    —  general reduction (or perceived reduction) in the capital value of many major companies arising from declining share prices.

  These factors have caused a "perfect storm" of events and resultant losses causing some insurers and re-insurers to withdraw from certain areas of cover. The surety market is one that has been particularly hit by a reduction in capacity.

  This all amounts to a market failure that is damaging the ability of contractors to bid for contracts, particularly in North America. Whilst such contracts do not tend to require ECGD-supported finance or ECGD insurance, there is an urgent case for ECGD to provide some degree of bond support in order that UK contractors can continue doing business—and, particularly, large projects—in the important North American markets.

4.2  Bank Bonds

  There is also a severe reduction in capacity in the bank market to provide exporters with the bonds required to perform their export contracts.

  The export finance banks offer their corporate clients a range of finance facilities, often including bonding lines to support their export activities. According to each bank's own strategy, these bonding line facilities will be viewed either as a stand-alone product or offered as one of a range of products to existing corporate relationships. In both cases the banks will analyse the corporate credit risk and ensure it is one acceptable to the bank.

  When reviewing a request for bonds the bank will therefore address three issues:

    —  Credit.

    —  Pricing/Return.

    —  Capacity.

  Credit—An acceptable credit risk is a pre-requisite to the bank providing any bonding lines. Put simply, if the bank cannot get comfortable with the corporate risk, then no bonding facility will be provided.

  Pricing/Return—Pricing is dictated by supply and demand in the marketplace. With the introduction of Basle II, it is hoped that the banks will be free to select their own level of risk capital allocation according to their respective risk assessments. Banks that perceive bond facilities as low risk will require less risk capital and pricing should be relatively low. The converse will also apply. There is therefore likely to be a greater disparity in the risk perception and bond risk pricing in the bank market under Basle II, with most of the leading banks in London likely to adopt the advanced approach to credit risk capital.

  Pricing in the market has generally been on the increase over the last 12-18 months, partly driven by risk capital returns being taken more seriously in anticipation of the new disciplines of Basle II being introduced in 2003-04, but also by a perception that corporate credit risk has generally deteriorated.

  Capacity—Capacity on a specific corporate risk is a problem for a bank from time to time, especially when the exporter has been successful in winning business and has a strong relationship with the bank, which may be a core bank for the exporter. That bank's own policy and operational guidelines will frequently determine a maximum level of bonding facilities per corporate client/exporter. Prime considerations may include the net worth and commercial reputation of the particular corporate, its overall level of exposure to that corporate, and overall relationship issues. In some cases the upper limit on the bond facility will be absolute, in other cases the bank might consider adding additional capacity to the limit if it can obtain additional security, for example in the form of cash collateral. [However, it is often impractical for corporates to provide cash collateral for bonds—not just because of other demands on their cash and in some cases the constraints of financial covenants, but also because they need to use the contractual progress payments for their intended purpose—to finance work-in-progress.]

  Following major corporate failures such as Enron, banks are increasingly unwilling to bear high concentrations of risk on any one corporate and this has resulted in an overall reduction in the exporter risk market. As a result, many manufacturing members of BExA are finding that their bank bonding facilities are full (or overfull) with existing bonds and that there is no capacity for the issue of new bonds, regardless of price.

  Moreover, in the absence of any capacity in the surety market, contractors are now having to offer bank bonds to customers who would have been willing to accept surety bonds. This is putting increased strain on contractors' bank bonding lines.

  As in the surety market, therefore, there are real signs of market failure in the bank bonding market too. In normal times, it might have been possible to ameliorate the problem in the banking market by turning to the insurance sector—but because of the crisis in the surety market this is not a practical solution to the current problem. The only way of creating increased capacity, therefore, is to look outside of the normal markets, hence BExA's urgent plea for HMG to provide support, either through ECGD or through some other means.

4.3  The position of individual BExA Members

  In view of the commercial and financial sensitivity of information about the borrowing/bonding facilities of individual contractors, and of the attitude of individual banks and surety companies towards bonding lines, we have asked our members to provide supplementary information directly to ECGD. We would ask that all such information is treated as commercially confidential.

5.  WHAT ECGD CAN DO TO PROVIDE BOND SUPPORT

  To date, ECGD has expressed reluctance to provide support for bonds/guarantees because it suffered considerable losses on an earlier ECGD Bond Support scheme in the 1970s as a result of the insolvency of one major UK corporate. At the time, ECGD provided 100% bond support to corporates that could not obtain bonding lines from their banks. BExA maintains that that loss was incurred because of inadequate underwriting disciplines. There is no suggestion that ECGD should, in today's environment, provide a last-resort facility, nor that 100% cover is required.

  Indeed, our proposal is for ECGD to risk-share with banks. This would increase the overall bonding capacity available to an exporter whilst at the same time ensuring that ECGD did not take un-commercial risks.

  There are several ways that this support could be provided, for example:

    —  General Bonding Line: Where an exporter has a general bonding line with a bank or surety company, ECGD would increase the exporter's bonding capacity by providing a guarantee/indemnity to the bank/surety for a proportion of their exposure on a portfolio of existing and/or future bonds, thereby increasing overall capacity.

    —  For a particular export project with a large bonding requirement: ECGD might join a bonding syndicate for 50-70% of the value of each bond. (Either overtly or by providing guarantees/indemnities to the fronting banks/sureties).

  In either case, ECGD would rely on a counter-indemnity from the exporter that ranks pari-passu with the counter-indemnity given to the banks/surety companies.

  Both ECGD and the banks/surety companies would receive commission from the exporter, broadly in proportion to the risk each was taking on the exporter. This should be compatible with ECGD's break-even objective.

  ECGD should provide this facility even if it is not providing other forms of support for the project in question.

6.  THE SME PERSPECTIVE

  A bank member has argued that the most difficult scenario relates not to large customers, but to SMEs. They may not be "poor credits" but their balance sheets are often not sufficiently large to support the combination of bonding and working capital required for new overseas business. Some form of support should be considered for SMEs, even if it has to be taken outside of ECGD's normal trading activities.

  As mentioned earlier, many SMEs obtain work as sub-contractors on major export projects, and they are usually required to provide bonds to the prime contractor. It is therefore important that such sub-contractors are eligible for bond support even though their contracts might not involve direct exports.

7.  INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

  Exporters in several other countries already benefit from various forms of bond support provided by their official ECAs—and more ECAs are recognising the need for such support and are seriously considering the establishment of new schemes.

    —  AUSTRIA: OeKB are currently not yet providing exporter bond risk support.

    —  AUSTRALIA: EFIC provides exporter bond risk programmes.

    —  BELGIUM: OND provides exporter bond risk programmes.

    —  CANADA: EDC provides exporter bond risk programmes.

    —  FINLAND: FINNVERA provides bond risk support on a case-by-case basis. Cover may be up to 85% but usually they prefer a risk sharing on a 50/50 basis with a bank.

    —  FRANCE: The French Authorities are currently considering a scheme under which bonds issued by commercial banks will be partially insured by Coface against exporter risk.

    —  GERMANY: Hermes are currently not yet providing exporter bond risk support.

    —  ITALY: SACE is currently discussing with exporters the provision of bond risk support.

    —  NORWAY: GIEK provides exporter bond risk support programmes and covers up to 50% on private risks and charges the same premium as the bank.

    —  SPAIN: CESCE has for many years provided exporter/buyer bond risk support programmes to provide insurance against the calling of bonds for any reason—fair or unfair.

    —  SWEDEN: EKN has operated a "counter-guarantee facility" for seven or eight years. Normal cover is 50-75% and the premium varies between 0.5-2.00% per annum, payable annually. Approximately 75% of the premium relates to the Exporter risk. There is no requirement that this guarantee should be complementary to any other EKN guarantee.

    —  SWITZERLAND: ERG is currently discussing the provision of an exporter bond risk support programme, however it may require a change in law to achieve it.

    —  UK: No bond support scheme is currently available.

  As bonding capacity has dried-up, the absence of ECGD support is becoming an increasingly important component in the competitiveness of British exporters—and, in some large multi-national groups, it is already an important factor in sourcing decisions.

8.  CONCLUSION

  BExA strongly recommends that an HMG Bond Support scheme along the lines described above should be introduced as a matter of urgency in order to prevent a further reduction in the competitiveness of government support for British industry. At a time when the UK's visible trade balance is at an all-time low, HMG intervention as a result of market failure would be more than justified. Such support would be very much in accordance with ECGD's mission to help exporters win business.

British Exporters Association

February 2003

EXAMPLES OF ECA BOND SUPPORT


CountryBond Support? Notes

AustriaNo
AustraliaYesIf involved in a large export project and the exporter's bank limit has been reached, EFIC may either issue bonds directly or provide guarantees to banks issuing bonds. Security requirements depend on bond type and risks involved.
BelgiumYesOND provides exporter bond risk programmes.
CanadaYesUnder its Bid or Performance Guarantee programmes, EDC can insure banks against any call made on letters of guarantee given to buyers. The bank is fully protected (100%) by EDC so the exporter's working capital is not affected.
Czech RepublicYesEGAP provides insurance against "fair calling" of guarantees (bonds) as a result of non-fulfilment of the Czech exporter's obligations.
FinlandYesFINNVERA provides bond risk support on a case-by-case basis. The Bond Guarantee can be a counter security for a bank issuing a bond on behalf of the exporter in favour of a foreign buyer. If there is a claim, Finnvera recovers from the exporter the full indemnity paid to the bank. The Bond Guarantee can also be used simultaneously both as a counter guarantee in favour of a bank and as risk insurance in favour of an exporter. The standard Bond Guarantee coverage for the bank is 100% but risk sharing on a 50/50 basis with a bank is preferred. The bond may be given by either a Finnish or a foreign bank or insurance company.
FranceCase-by-caseThe French Authorities have introduced a scheme under which bonds issued by commercial banks can be 65% insured against exporter risk.
GermanyNoHermes can act as Surety, but without government support.
ItalyNot yetSACE has been discussing with exporters the provision of bond risk support.
MalaysiaYesFor certain classes of contract, Malaysia Export Credit Insurance Berhad is able to provide support either by way of insurance bonds, or by giving indemnity to banks for issuing such bonds.
NorwayYesGIEK provides exporter bond risk support programmes and covers up to 50% on private risks and charges the same premium as the bank.
PolandYesKUKE S.A. can either issue bonds or provide re-guarantees as a security for guarantees issued by a bank.
PortugalYesAdvance payment and reinforcement bonds can be provided by means of COSEC's Bond Insurance Policies.
SloveniaYesSlovene Export Corporation can issue bonds.
SpainYesCESCE provides exporter/buyer bond risk support programmes to provide insurance against the calling of bonds for any reason—fair or unfair.
SwedenYesEKN's counter guarantee product will be explained by Susanne within a separate session.
SwitzerlandNot yetERG is considering the provision of an exporter bond risk support programme, however it may require a change in law to achieve it.
UKNo
USAYesOPIC guarantees repayment to US financial institutions in the event that guaranties, typically letters of credits and bonds, are drawn. OPIC's Financial Contractors Programme expands the ability of US financial institutions to issue additional contractor guaranties, thus enhancing the liquidity available to contractors. US contractors, especially small and medium-sized businesses, with an established track record, demonstrated financial viability and the ability to establish a credit relationship with an issuing financial institution are eligible for the OPIC program. Up to 75% of the amount of bonds can be covered by the OPIC guaranty, with financial institutions assuming 25% or more of the transaction.

British Exporters Association
October 2003


INTERNATIONAL SURETY CAPACITY 2001-04

(per account, in US$ millions)


Company
2001 capacity
2002 capacity
2003 capacity
2004 capacity

AIG
500-1,000
500
150
225
Chubb
700-900
200-400
150
300
CIGNA
500-700
Nil
Nil
Nil
CNA
500-700
75
75
75(1)
Firemen's Fund
1,800
Nil
Nil
Nil
Kemper
600
100-150
Nil
Nil
Liberty
500-700
100-200
75
100
St Paul
750
750
200
Nil(2)
Travelers
500
500
500
500(3)
Zurich
500
500
250
300(4)
Total
6,850-8,150
2,725-3,075
1,400
1,500

  Notes:

  1.  Outside USA, open for accounts in UK and Canada only.

  2.  Being merged with Travelers.

  3.  Outside USA, open for accounts only in Australia and the European Union, although Canada and Mexico may be added after completion of the merger with St Paul.

  4.  Special acceptance by reinsurers required for accounts in Argentina, Brazil, Japan and Mexico; capacity of $400 million available for accounts rated investment grade.

  The following chart incorporates the maximum amounts in the above ranges.


January 2004



 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2005
Prepared 4 February 2005