Select Committee on Trade and Industry First Report


3 Compensation to customers

43. One of the issues which caused most concern to energywatch was the confusion which arose among consumers over what compensation was owed to those who experienced particularly long delays before their electricity supply was restored.

44. Under existing legislation,[46] customers who had been without power for more than 18 hours were entitled to compensation of £50 (£100 for business customers), rising by a further £25 for each subsequent 12-hour period without electricity. However, supply companies could claim exemption from this requirement if exceptional circumstances prevented them from restoring supplies, provided that they took reasonable steps to design and maintain their network to minimise power cuts, and to reconnect customers. Examples of exceptional circumstances include severe weather or inability to access premises to restore electricity supplies.[47]

45. Ofgem told us that the exemptions were introduced as part of the standards of performance arrangements in 1991 in recognition of the fact that there may be circumstances outside the control of companies which prevent them from restoring customers' supplies within the relevant timescales. Requiring companies to pay out compensation in such cases would expose them to higher levels of risk.[48] Customers were entitled to dispute whether an exemption should be made by applying first to energywatch, and then seeking a determination from Ofgem as to the validity of the exemption claim.

46. Some distribution network operators claimed such an exemption after the October storms, with the result that some customers, those of 24seven and Aquila, the worst performing network distribution operators, were informed by their suppliers that they would not be entitled to compensation.[49] energywatch felt that this advice had a major impact on the number of customers who submitted a claim to their companies during the one month claims period allowed by legislation.[50] Other customers were unaware that they needed to seek a determination from Ofgem and so, under the legislation, the supply companies were not obliged to pay compensation to them.[51] energywatch believed that consumers should have been advised at the time that they might be entitled to compensation, rather than dissuaded from applying for it.[52]

47. Despite these problems, the scale of the disruption was such that Ofgem received 3,250 applications for a determination of a claim for compensation and it was not until September 2003 that the regulator was able to announce its decisions about compensation. A total of 2,764 customers were awarded compensation following Ofgem determinations. In addition, electricity companies agreed to pay compensation to a further 18,000 customers who had made a claim to their supply company within one month but had not asked Ofgem for a determination.[53] Some companies went further: EDF Energy, for example, decided to pay compensation to all customers who made a claim to 24seven within three months of the storm.[54] Ofgem estimated that compensation payments from the industry as a whole would exceed £1.6 million.[55]

48. While 24seven was one of those companies who relied on their entitlement to claim an exemption from the normal compensation arrangements, the company did arrange to make voluntary payments to customers who were particularly badly affected. In recognition of the fact that all other distribution network operators had restored power to all of their customers by 10.00 pm on Thursday 2 November, or 100 hours after the storm, the company offered a 'special storm payment' of £100 to those of their customers who remained without power at that time.[56]

49. The special storm payment offered by 24seven to those customers who suffered most from the disruption to their electricity supply was, no doubt, welcome to those eligible to receive it. It was, however, considerably less than the sum that would have been due to them had the company not chosen to claim exemption from the normal compensation mechanism.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION

50. The 3,250 applications for a determination by Ofgem was the largest number of disputes that Ofgem or its predecessor OFFER had ever had to deal with.[57] The large majority of determination referrals came to Ofgem via energywatch, although a small number of customers contacted the regulator directly. The sheer number of applications prevented Ofgem from settling customers' determinations on the usual case-by-case basis. Ofgem instead adopted a method which involved grouping customers and assessing companies' effectiveness in restoring individual customers in each group relative to the effectiveness of the best performing companies. Even with this conflation of the determination procedures, it took Ofgem eight months to process the applications and announce its decision.[58]

51. The Electricity Association and some individual network operators expressed some reservations about this approach, arguing that 'benchmarking' performance in this way did not allow for proportionate consideration of the individual circumstances of each case.[59]
Ofgem argued that its approach was consistent with the conclusions of the BPI that:

    "there appears to be no fundamental reason why those companies that performed less well on this occasion should not meet the standards set by the best in how the event was anticipated and managed."[60]

52. It was regrettable that consumers had to wait so long for a decision from Ofgem on the validity of their compensation claims. However, this was perhaps inevitable given the scale of the problem and the large numbers of cases to be considered. We consider that the strategy developed by Ofgem to produce the determinations, although a significant departure from usual practice, was a pragmatic and effective solution to a difficult problem.

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS

53. The emergency highlighted the shortcomings of existing arrangements for compensation payments in cases of severe weather. Ofgem told us that during initial work on its distribution price control review (the results of which would take effect from April 2005) and ongoing work on the determination process, it had found important weaknesses in the current standards of performance arrangements and in particular the application of exemptions by DNOs. It had concluded that there was a lack of clarity in incentives to electricity distribution companies to maintain standards; there were delays in compensation reaching consumers; as was evidenced in this event, consumers were confused about the circumstances under which compensation was payable; and the determination process was highly resource-intensive for both Ofgem and energywatch. Ofgem was considering new arrangements to be introduced from April 2005, as part of the price control review.

54. Interim arrangements were introduced on 13 November 2003 to cover major events before the next price control, and to simplify the determination process. For small, localised events, the normal arrangements would continue to apply. For events at the other end of the scale, that is in cases of extreme weather where supply to more than 25 percent of a distribution company's customers was interrupted or where conditions precluded actions to restore supply,[61] Ofgem and the companies concerned would agree an appropriate compensation regime. For all other severe weather events,[62] where supply to more than two percent of a distribution company's customers was interrupted, or where there were more than seven times the average number of faults on the high voltage network, a simplified compensation procedure would be implemented. Customers who registered a written claim to their distribution network operator within one month of the restoration of their supply would be eligible for compensation of £25 after being off supply for 48 hours and £25 for each subsequent period of disconnection up to a maximum amount of £200. Part of the cost of compensation would be met directly by the company; part would be funded by subsequent increased charges to customers.

55. The compensation system proposed by Ofgem as part of its consultation on the new price control due to come into force in April builds upon these interim arrangements.[63] The regulator envisages the banding of weather conditions into four categories for the purpose of establishing standards of performance for supply restoration and the determination of appropriate compensation to customers.

56. Normal conditions would be defined as periods where there are no weather events causing more than eight times the average number of faults in a DNO network in a 24 hour period. Under such conditions domestic consumers would be entitled to £50 if they were deprived of power for 18 hours (non-domestic consumers would get £100), with a further £25 for each 12 hour period thereafter. There would be no limit to the total compensation payable to an individual consumer.

57. Under Ofgem's proposals, severe weather conditions would be divided into three categories. Category 1 would cover cases where lightning strikes caused eight or more times the average number of higher voltage faults in a 24 hour period provided that fewer than 35 percent of exposed customers were affected;[64] and other weather conditions which induced 8-13 times the average number of faults provided that fewer than 35 percent of exposed customers were affected. Every affected consumer would be entitled to compensation of £25 if they were off supply for 24 hours and £25 for each subsequent 12 hour period up to a limit of £200.

58. Category 2 events would be defined as non-lightning events producing 13 or more times the average number of faults affecting less than 35 percent of exposed customers. In these conditions every customer would be paid £25 if they were without supply for 48 hours and £25 for each subsequent 12 hour period. The maximum payment would again be limited to £200.

59. Category 3 would cover any event where more than 35 percent of a company's exposed customers were affected, i.e. very large events such as occurred in some areas in October 2002. Ofgem has proposed that the trigger period for each event would be determined on a sliding scale which would reflect the scale of the event in terms of the number of customers affected expressed as a proportion of the potential number. The trigger period would be calculated by the formula:

    48 hours multiplied by the number of customers affected divided by 35% of exposed customers

Customers would be eligible for compensation of £25 if they were off supply for the trigger period and £25 for each subsequent 12 hours up to a maximum of £200.

60. Under all weather conditions, there will be a delay in the clock starting to count towards the trigger period for compensation if snow, flooding or ice accretion directly prevents the DNO from carrying out the work necessary to restore the customer's supply.[65] Furthermore, all DNOs affected by a Category 3 event will be exempt from paying compensation to customers if for any of those DNOs more than 60 percent of their exposed customers experienced a power cut.[66]

61. Ofgem has also acted to remove the financial incentive on DNOs to refrain from informing customers that they may be entitled to compensation after a power cut, whether in normal or in severe weather conditions. Ofgem has decided to ensure that the penalty to DNOs is the same whether or not the customer claims. Where a DNO does not make the payment to the customer, it will suffer an equivalent reduction in its revenue. Ofgem adds:

    "DNOs should make reasonable endeavours to pay out automatically under the standards where possible and should be more proactive in contacting affected customers to make them aware of their right to compensation."[67]

62. We consider that, although the proposed new compensation mechanism is rather complex, it and the interim arrangements from which the new system has been developed represent a marked improvement on the previous compensation scheme. DNOs should be able to give clear, unambiguous advice to customers about their entitlement to compensation. In addition, greater precision in the definition of the circumstances under which compensation is payable should reduce the number of disputed cases to the regulator for determination, so settlement of compensation claims should be faster.


46   SI (2001) No. 3265:'The Electricity (Standards of Performance) Regulations'  Back

47   See Regulation 17 in Statutory Instrument (2001) No. 3265. Back

48   App 10 Back

49   App 1, App 5 Back

50   Q 126 (Part 1) Back

51   App 5 Back

52   Q 128 (Part 1) Back

53   Ofgem Press Release 2 September 2003 Back

54   App 5 Back

55   App 10 Back

56   Q70 (Part 1) Back

57   App 10 Back

58   Ibid. Back

59   Qq 110-113 (Part 1), App 1, App 5 Back

60   BPI Report, Executive Summary, Page 3 Back

61   For example, when flooding or ice accretion prevents restoration work Back

62   Except in the Highlands and Islands, where the distribution network was built to a different standard Back

63   As set out in Electricity Distribution Price Review - Update paper, Ofgem, September 2004  Back

64   Exposed customers are defined as those supplied from overhead wires or cables. Back

65   November proposals, para 4.35 Back

66   Ibid., para 4.36 Back

67   Ibid., paras 4.39-4.40 Back


 
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Prepared 13 December 2004