Select Committee on Treasury Fourth Report


3  Tackling tobacco smuggling

14. The majority of tobacco fraud detected by Customs involves large-scale organised smuggling of large quantities of cigarettes (typically between one and eight million sticks at a time) in freight. These cigarettes, although often manufactured in the UK, are generally sourced from outside the EU and carry little or no tax. Genuine products sourced in global wholesale markets may be obtained for as little as 70p per pack (significantly less still for counterfeit). The typical UK illicit street price is around £2.50 per pack. At the lower end of the smuggled market more product is sourced EU duty paid and brought into the UK by large gangs of air passengers working as 'runners' for organised groups.[14]

15. Customs' new strategy for tackling tobacco smuggling was launched in 2000 against a background of increasing growth in tobacco smuggling which, Customs estimate, would have seen the illicit market grow to some 34% by 2002-03 if no action had been taken. The strategy is based on attacking the economic profitability and risk/reward ratio of smuggling through an end-to-end strategy of disruption. It involves the suppression of supply of UK manufactured product, legislative change, the use of new technology, and increased resources both at the ports, overseas and inland. The strategy was funded by an extra £209m over three years, which was invested in increased resources and in new technology. Under the strategy Customs have:

  • increased front-line and investigative staff by almost 1,000 to allow better detection through improved intelligence;
  • further developed their network of officers based overseas who work closely with local enforcement agencies to detect tobacco (counterfeit or otherwise) targeted on the UK by international criminal gangs and provide tactical and profile intelligence enabling better targeting by detection and investigation staff;
  • installed a national network of x-ray scanners to detect high volume cigarette smuggling in freight;
  • following new legislative measures introduced 'UK Duty Paid' fiscal marks on tobacco products to help prevent, detect and deter the handling, distribution, sale and purchase of smuggled tobacco. The introduction of the mark was accompanied by a range of new offences and penalties designed to crack down on the sale of illicit tobacco; and
  • to distinguish more clearly between smugglers and genuine shoppers, increased (in October 2002) the guide levels for cigarettes and hand rolling tobacco from 800 to 3200, and from 1Kg to 3Kg respectively (representing a six months supply for the average smoker) .[15]

Estimating the level of tobacco smuggling

16. Customs' estimates of the revenue lost through fraud and smuggling for cigarettes and hand rolling tobacco, the corresponding illicit market shares, and how these have changed are noted in tables 2 and 3 below.Table 2: Cigarette revenue evaded through fraud and smuggling and illicit market share (%)
1999-2000 2000-012001-02 2002-032003-04
PBR2001£2,700m 20.5% £2,800m 21%
PBR2002£2,000m 17% £2,800m 21% £2,700m 21%
PBR2003 £2,700m 21% £2,600m 20%£2,400m 18%
PBR2004 £2,700m 21% £2,500m 20%£2,000m 15% £1,900m 15%

Source: HM Customs and Excise, annual publication on Measuring (and Tackling) Indirect Tax Losses, November 2001, November 2002, December 2003, December 2004 Table 3: Hand rolling tobacco revenue evaded through fraud and smuggling and illicit market share (%)
1999-2000 2000-012001-02 2002-032003-04
PBR2002£630m 68% £670m 61%£580m 52%
PBR2003 £680m 63%£580m 52% £580m 51%
PBR2004 £680m 63%£580m 52% £630m 53%£750m 57%

Source: HM Customs and Excise, annual publication on Measuring (and Tackling) Indirect Tax Losses, November 2002, December 2003, December 2004

CIGARETTES

17. Customs' estimates indicate that the amount of smuggled cigarettes in the UK peaked in 2000-01 at 21% of the market and that this has subsequently fallen to 15% by 2003-04. The Tobacco Manufacturers' Association told us that their estimate for the total volume of the market that evades UK duty through all forms of smuggling and cross-border shopping did not differ markedly from Customs'. For 2003 the Association estimated a level of non-UK duty paid for cigarettes and hand rolling tobacco of 28% and 72% respectively, which was comparable to Customs' estimate for 2002-03 of 27% and 69%. The Association noted that "unlike [Customs] we are not to able determine how much of this [non-UK duty paid] volume is smuggled. Our analysis, which is based on the analysis of cigarette packs found in regular large-scale pack collections and face-to-face consumer interviews, does not provide us with any insight as to whether they are legal or illegal imports. However, we are able to determine the product's intended country of sale and whether it is genuine or counterfeit. Counterfeit cigarettes are a recent development in the UK and although small in volume—we estimate around 2 billion cigarettes out of the total UK consumption of 74 billion in 2003 were counterfeit—it is a growing problem."[16]

18. Imperial Tobacco noted that they were concerned that cigarette smuggling may have increased slightly in 2003 to 18% of the total market compared with Customs' figure of 15% for the year ended March 2004. But Imperial told us that "the important thing is that, while there may be slight differences over the estimates and the components of the non-UK-duty-paid segment, directionally we broadly agree the way things are going. […] we would agree with Customs that things are moving very much in the right direction."[17]

19. Customs and the tobacco industry broadly agree on the scale of cigarette smuggling, that it peaked in 2001 at around 21% of the market, and that it is now declining. Customs' strategy for tackling tobacco smuggling appears to be having an effect on illicit cigarettes, but with revenue losses running at £1,900 million a year, there is still a long way to go.

HAND ROLLING TOBACCO

20. Unlike cigarettes, where the trend in smuggling is downwards, the illicit market share for hand rolling tobacco has risen, following a decline to 52% of the market in 2001-02, to 57% in 2003-04. Given that a further 14% of the market is accounted for by legitimate cross-border shopping, Customs' figures show that as little as 29% of the hand rolling tobacco market in the UK in 2003-04 was duty paid. Revenue losses from smuggling on hand rolling tobacco have increased from an estimated £580 million in 2001-02 to £750 million in 2003-04. The Economic Secretary accepted that there was "a very significant level of illicit activity with hand rolling tobacco"[18] and told us that:

    "[…] we are dealing here with what is a very well-entrenched and long-established illicit market in hand rolling tobacco. The Pre-Budget Report explained that we are doing further work on this as we try and untangle the differences with hand rolling tobacco smuggling and bootlegging from cigarettes. We are considering, at the moment, within the Treasury and within Customs, a range of different things that we might put in place. I hope we will be able to confirm a fresh focus on hand rolling tobacco within the overall tobacco strategy fairly soon."[19]

21. The fact that only 3 out of every 10 packets of hand rolling tobacco consumed in the UK are duty paid is a matter of very serious concern. The illicit market share for hand rolling tobacco has been above 50% of the market for each year since estimates have been available, and is now rising. In our view this indicates that the level of smuggling in this area is extraordinarily high. We note that the Treasury and Customs are considering what action to take to provide a fresh focus on hand rolling tobacco in their strategy for tackling tobacco smuggling. Effective action is urgently required.

Co-operation with tobacco manufacturers

22. In the first two years following the launch in 2000 of Customs' new strategy for tackling tobacco smuggling, Customs seized over 5 billion cigarettes, either in, or en route to, the UK. The majority of these cigarettes were originally manufactured in, and exported from, the UK. While the vast majority of UK exports did not feed the UK smuggled market, most smuggled cigarettes were UK manufactured UK brands. As UK smokers are predisposed to purchase cigarette brands they are familiar with, it was not surprising that these brands were the most popular with smugglers.[20]

MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING

23. A key element of Customs' strategy is to reduce the supply of cigarettes available to smugglers. In respect of genuine product Customs aim to work closely with the major tobacco manufacturers to tackle smuggling and the manufacturers have all publicly stated a wish to see an orderly market in the UK for their products and to co-operate with Customs. To formalise this co-operation, Customs entered into Memoranda of Understanding with all three major UK tobacco manufacturers. These agreements were designed to reinforce co-operation in tackling tobacco smuggling into the UK, particularly the large-scale organised freight smuggling that dominates the illicit supply. Customs signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Gallaher in April 2002, with British American Tobacco in October 2002 and with Imperial in June 2003.[21]

24. Under these agreements Customs look to the manufacturers to ensure that they supply product only where there is a legitimate demand for it in the intended final market, sharing their understanding of that demand with Customs as necessary. Customs also look to the manufacturers to help identify the supply routes of any suspect export trade and to refuse sales where the end-sale (consumption) destination is in doubt. Where it is discovered that any particular distributor has been shown to be behaving improperly, Customs expect that manufacturer to re-visit the trading relationship in question with a view to discontinuing it.[22]

25. We asked the three major UK tobacco manufacturers for their views on how the memoranda of understanding were working in practice:

  • Imperial Tobacco told us that it was "working so well that we have also signed Memoranda of Understanding with another 6 European nations' customs authorities, and we are in discussion with a further 12 customs authorities in Europe and beyond."[23]
  • Gallaher believed that the system was "working exceptionally well. We have seen a reduction in the non-UK-duty-paid volume from around 25 billion to 20 billion cigarettes in the last 5 years. […] We would still like greater resource put into Customs, but the Memorandum of Understanding, as a principle, has been very useful. We were the first to sign it, and we are equally looking to use this technique in other parts of Europe and also farther afield."[24]
  • British American Tobacco told us that "we have always co-operated with Customs anyway, so the Memorandum of Understanding just takes us to a new level of that co-operation. We are very happy with the way things are going. I think that Customs are very happy too."[25]

26. Asked what changes signing a memorandum of understanding had made to the way in which they co-operated with Customs, Gallaher considered that it had made no significant difference as it simply enshrined what they were doing at the time. Imperial Tobacco told us that the memorandum had not made a difference to trading policy but was "at the cutting edge of best practice on illicit trade prevention and detection."[26] British American Tobacco said "I think we were always doing stuff before, we are just doing more of it."[27]

27. Customs told us that they thought "what has undoubtedly happened is that tobacco manufacturers as a result of that memorandum of understanding have taken a lot more care who they supply a product to, in what markets they supply them to and I think you can see that in the amount of genuine UK manufactured cigarettes that are in the illicit market. It has reduced significantly and that is why counterfeit [product] has come up. So in my view things have changed significantly."[28]

28. Customs also introduced a voluntary system, which was not part of the memoranda of understanding, to raise concerns about particular customers of tobacco manufacturers. This involved Customs notifying the manufacturers of cases where repeated seizures were made of stock originally supplied to specific distributors and which appeared disproportionate. This process and the resultant requests that manufacturers take action to address those particular supplies by either restricting or ceasing future supply was known as the yellow and red card system. Cards have been issued where Customs believe that there is a serious risk of a high proportion of further supplies to a specific customer illegally re-entering the UK market. Customs expect manufacturers to take action against such customers and would fully expect customers who are given a yellow card to be the subject of enquiries by the manufacturer.[29]

29. The fact that Customs have not issued any red or yellow cards in the last two years was viewed by Customs as evidence that the steps they require under the memoranda of understanding to be taken by tobacco manufacturers were being taken.[30] The manufacturers were stopping supply before cards were issued or they were not supplying customers to begin with because they knew that the circumstances were not legitimate.[31]

30. Customs have signed memoranda of understanding with the major UK tobacco manufacturers designed to reinforce co-operation in tackling tobacco smuggling into the UK. We expect tobacco manufacturers to co-operate fully with Customs to ensure that their products do not get into the hands of smugglers. We note the views of both Customs and the UK manufacturers that the current arrangements are working well and that this is evidenced by a reduction in the amount of genuine UK-manufactured cigarettes in the illicit market.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PHILIP MORRIS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

31. Philip Morris is the only overseas manufacturer with a significant presence in the UK market. Customs officials told us that they worked "[…] with Philip Morris in much the same way as we work with each of the UK manufacturers. We seek to track and trace— the phrase we use—their product in the same way as we seek to with UK manufacturers and we meet with Philip Morris on a regular basis."[32] Philip Morris products sold in the UK are imported from their factories in Germany and Portugal. Philip Morris told us that while they had not signed a memorandum of understanding with UK Customs, and one had not been proposed, they did work closely with Customs.[33] Philip Morris noted that:

    "[…] we have signed an agreement with the European Commission and 10 of the Member States that is very extensive and constitutes a commitment on our part, and a commitment on the part of the European Commission and the 10 signatory Member States, to co-operate together to fight illegal trade of all forms; and, for us, particularly to focus on the alarmingly increasing trade in counterfeit goods. That agreement has very extensive compliance protocols, customer oversight provisions, product tracking and tracing provisions, as well as a commitment by us to contribute a substantial amount of money—over a billion dollars— to the European Commission over the next 12 years, in order to enhance their efforts to do everything they can to prevent the growing trade in illegal and, particularly, counterfeit products."[34]

32. Philip Morris observed that the UK was not a signatory to that agreement, but it could, if it wished, sign the agreement and become a party to it.[35] Philip Morris told us that "we are more than happy to have the UK sign the European agreement. It is far more extensive in its provisions, its scope and extent than any Memorandum of Understanding that exists with our company and other governments, or other companies and the UK government or other governments."[36]

33. Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) considered that the legal agreement between Philip Morris and the EU was "the gold standard by which all cigarette manufacturers' attempts to control excise tax fraud should be judged from now on [as under the agreement] specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed targets have been set and penalty payments are exacted from [Philip Morris] if these are not met. In contrast the 'Memoranda of Understanding' that [Customs] has with each of the UK manufacturers are inadequate. They rely entirely on the goodwill of the companies and have no measurable outcomes."[37] ASH believed that "the key feature of this agreement is that from now on Philip Morris […] will be heavily penalised if it does not control smuggling of its cigarettes. This is far more significant than the $1.25 billion dollars that the company have agreed to pay the EC over the next twelve years which is of symbolic value only as it is believed to represent only a tiny portion of the amount the EC has lost through smuggling, due to unpaid duties, fees and other taxes."[38]

34. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) told us that the agreement, signed by Philip Morris, the European Community and 10 Member States in July 2004, was "a landmark which is unique in scope and innovative in method"[39] as it includes:

  • a comprehensive set of rules that Philip Morris must follow as to how it sells and receives payment for cigarettes in order to significantly reduce the capability of third parties to smuggle cigarettes into the EC.
  • agreed tracking and tracing procedures, to assist law-enforcement efforts to combat future smuggling and counterfeit.
  • payments by Philip Morris in the event of any significant seizure of authentic cigarettes to the EC and the Member State which seized the cigarettes equal to the total amount of lost duties and taxes which would have been due on those cigarettes if they had been legally distributed for retail sale in the Member State of seizure.
  • additional payments by Philip Morris in the event that there are seizures of Philip Morris cigarettes in any given year in excess of a baseline amount (based on the average number of Philip Morris cigarettes seized throughout the EC in the years 2001 and 2002) equal to five times the customs duties and taxes owed on those cigarettes.[40]

35. The European Anti-Fraud Office considered that these commitments greatly exceeded those of any individual Memorandum of Understanding between a cigarette manufacturer and a Member State and noted that the agreement had two further unique features which distinguished it from other individual agreements. It is legally binding and subject to a specific enforcement mechanism; and it provides for substantial payments by Philip Morris, up to a total of some $1.25 billion over the next 12 years, which could be used to combat smuggling and counterfeit .[41]

36. The Agreement also resolves all past disputes between the parties relating to contraband cigarettes. In particular, the Agreement brings to an end all litigation between the European Community and the ten Member States and Philip Morris relating to contraband cigarettes. The Agreement also provides that any Member State has the unconditional right to become a party.[42]

37. We asked the UK tobacco manufacturers whether the EU agreement with Philip Morris was stronger than their memoranda of understanding with UK Customs and whether they would be willing to enter into a similar agreement. Imperial Tobacco told us that:

    "the difference I would see is that there was also litigation, or contemplated litigation, involving the EU and the ten Member States and Philip Morris. We are not involved in any form of litigation related to smuggling and we see the Memorandum of Understanding as more appropriate. It is extremely comprehensive. It not only covers illicit trade into the UK, ex-UK manufactured product, but it covers all our factories in other parts of the world and it comprehensively covers counterfeit, which has been the growing problem over the last couple of years. I would therefore argue that ours is a very comprehensive document with Customs and is working very well."[43]

British American Tobacco said;

    "I think there are bits of the agreement that we would support and there are bits that we would not support. The bits that we would not support would be voluntarily paying the excise on product that other people had smuggled, frankly I think that would be ridiculous. I think some of the tracking and tracing bits in the Philip Morris agreement are, to quote [Customs], 'missing the point' in terms of controlling smuggling because Philip Morris has talked about being able to identify the first customer and where there is a problem with the second customer, but by the time the product gets smuggled it has probably gone through ten or 12 customers, so I do not think that is going to create a great benefit either. I can understand why Philip Morris would like this to become an industry standard because they have spent a lot of money putting it together but I do not think it is going to solve the problems. I think bits of it we would support, but not all of it."[44]

38. The Economic Secretary told us that the reason why there was no memorandum of understanding with Philip Morris was because "we have given priority to our three UK manufacturers [as] their products were a significantly greater share of the illicit market in the UK and the seizures we were making. In the last year, Philip Morris's brands constituted only 3.5% of the seizures we made and the vast majority of those were counterfeit, not actually produced by Philip Morris. I would not rule out looking for a memorandum with Philip Morris and we are considering that but the imperative was to get a proper arrangement in place with our own manufacturers based in the UK."[45]

39. Asked about the EU agreement with Philip Morris, the Economic Secretary noted that the basis for this agreement was very different. It was a legal document, largely designed as part of a deal to drop litigation in the EU against the company, circumstances which did not apply in the UK. The Economic Secretary accepted that there were some very substantial elements in the EU agreement, but considered that it was weaker in law enforcement terms than the UK memoranda of understanding which contained some features that were more useful to Customs. Under the UK memoranda companies had agreed to stop supplying customers when Customs issue a warning that they have serious concerns, rather than on the basis of a conviction which was a requirement of the EU agreement with Philip Morris. Similarly, under the memoranda Customs had the ability to track and trace a customer on a packet of 20 cigarettes found as part of a contraband consignment, but under the EU agreement a case of 10,000 cigarettes was required before the track and trace procedure would be instituted.[46]

40. The Economic Secretary noted that "we have three agreements in place with the principal sources of the cigarettes that we have a problem with that are working well. We certainly are ready to consider reinforcing those agreements and […] we are ready to consider whether or not we should be reaching some sort of memorandum of understanding with other tobacco companies as well […]."[47] The Economic Secretary thought that "if we become a party to the [EU agreement with Philip Morris] then we may be able to take advantage of some of the operational features of the [agreement], but I believe we would not stand to gain from any of the payments that Philip Morris may make under it."[48] In a subsequent note the Economic Secretary confirmed that, while not entitled to a share of the $1.25 billion being paid over 12 years for anti-contraband and anti-counterfeit initiatives, it was open to the UK to co-sign the agreement and invoke protocols for the receipt of supplementary payments by Philip Morris in the event of certain future genuine product seizures above a defined limit. Based on 2003-04 seizure volumes, Customs believed that the supplementary payments to the UK for smuggled Philip Morris cigarettes would have been "well under £1 million."[49]

41. Customs have not sought a memorandum of understanding with Philip Morris, as they gave priority to the three UK manufacturers whose products dominate the illicit market in the UK. Philip Morris have a legal agreement with the EU and 10 Member States as part of a deal under which litigation in the EU against the company was dropped. According to Philip Morris and some other witnesses this agreement is more extensive in its provisions and scope than the UK memoranda of understanding. This view was not shared by the three UK tobacco manufacturers or by Customs, who consider the EU agreement to be weaker in law enforcement terms in some areas.

42. The memoranda of understanding between Customs and the UK manufacturers predate the EU agreement with Philip Morris. However, answers we received to questions asking what difference the memoranda had made to what was being done before did not leave us with an impression of a radical change in the practices of the major UK tobacco companies. We recommend that Customs review the provisions of each memorandum in the light of the commitments contained in the EU agreement with Philip Morris with a view to reinforcing the existing arrangements where necessary.

43. We are concerned to note, particularly in view of the claimed success of the memoranda of understanding with UK manufacturers, that Customs have not sought a similar agreement with Philip Morris. The UK could have signed, and still can sign, the EU agreement with Philip Morris with the prospect of receiving payments from the company when their tobacco products are seized as contraband. Had this been done, payments would have been due to the UK for smuggled Philip Morris cigarettes in 2003-04. Whether it would be better for the UK to sign the EU agreement or to seek a separate memorandum of understanding with Philip Morris depends upon the arrangements that can be negotiated with the company. But doing nothing is unacceptable. We expect Customs to take this matter forward as a matter of urgency.

Counterfeit cigarettes

44. As a result of Customs' work with the tobacco manufacturers to reduce the availability of genuine products, large scale organised smuggling gangs who supply most of the illicit market have increasingly switched their attention to counterfeit product. Accordingly there has been a significant increase in the volume of counterfeit cigarettes seized. In 2003-04, 54% of cigarettes seized were counterfeit, a more than three-fold increase over 2001-02.[50]

45. Counterfeit cigarettes are completely untaxed and unregulated. Research on these cigarettes indicates that counterfeit cigarettes contain on average markedly higher concentrations of arsenic (3 times the level of their genuine counterparts), cadmium (5 times) and lead (5.8 times)—all of which are listed by the International Association for Research in Cancer (IARC) as carcinogens—as well as increased levels of tar and nicotine. This research has identified that habitual smoking of counterfeit cigarettes has significant potential harm to human health from these heavy metals and adds substantially to the considerable risks already associated with smoking cigarettes.[51]

46. The Economic Secretary acknowledged that Customs were not doing enough to tackle counterfeit cigarettes, but noted:

    "[…] we certainly are doing more than we were a couple of years ago as it becomes much clearer that counterfeiting is a bigger problem. […] the threat of counterfeit cigarettes is not just a threat to the revenues to the public purse, the latest evidence suggests that counterfeit cigarettes are significantly worse than ordinary cigarettes for the health of the people that smoke them, and in many cases have very significant levels of heavy metals like arsenic. The sorts of measures we are trying to take to deal with counterfeit include—and this is relatively recent I have to say—increasingly constructive co-operation with China and some of the governments in the Far East, because it is there that we have the biggest problem as the largest source of counterfeit cigarettes finding their way into the UK and other parts of Europe."[52]

47. Philip Morris told us that a memorandum of understanding between Customs and the UK manufacturers estimated that 190 billion cigarettes had been counterfeited in China in 2002, making it one of the main sources of such material. However, there was also counterfeiting in Europe, in other parts of Asia and in Latin America. Philip Morris noted that "China is working very, very hard to address the problem, and last year the Chinese Government prosecuted more than 150,000 cases against counterfeiting operations."[53] British American Tobacco noted that:

    "Most counterfeit cigarettes, including many of those coming into the UK, originate from China. To address this particular problem in China, a coalition was established by a number of international cigarette manufacturers and Chinese authorities to identify and de-commission the factories making counterfeit cigarettes. […] British American Tobacco, Imperial and Philip Morris are members of this coalition together with [Japan Tobacco]. The coalition has been operating for several years and has achieved considerable success. In 2004 alone nearly 400 factories in China were raided and 350 cigarette making machines were seized."[54]

48. Some of the additional resources provided to Customs for tackling tobacco smuggling were used to further develop their network of officers based overseas. During our visits to Hungary, the Czech Republic and China we met and were briefed by the Customs' Fiscal Liaison Officers based overseas covering those countries. The value of close co-operation with local enforcement agencies and intelligence gathering was clear.

49. We were also briefed by the Chinese State Tobacco Monopoly Administration on the scale of counterfeiting cigarettes in China, their efforts to tackle the problem, and the efforts of the coalition with manufacturers which makes a valuable contribution to this work. It is all the more surprising therefore that although a memorandum of understanding on co-operation on Customs matters was signed with China in October 2002, a single UK Customs officer remains based in Hong Kong but is expected to cover the whole country.

50. Counterfeit cigarettes are a significant and growing problem in the UK that threaten both revenues and public health. We note Customs' efforts and those of the industry to tackle this issue which, to be successful, depend on co-operation with enforcement agencies overseas to identify contraband destined for the UK and to cut off the supply of counterfeit cigarettes at source, the illegal factories where they are made.

51. We were surprised to learn during our visit to China, the largest source of counterfeit cigarettes destined for the UK, that there was only one UK Customs officer, based in Hong Kong, to cover the whole country. We were also surprised to discover that until our visit there had been no meetings between UK Customs and the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, the agency charged with tackling cigarette counterfeiting in China. We recommend that Customs review the resources they are devoting to intelligence gathering and co-operation with enforcement agencies overseas and the location of the officers concerned and consider placing officers within China.


14   Ev 79, paras 10-11 Back

15   Ev 79, paras 14-19 Back

16   Ev 77, paras 9, 10 Back

17   Q 284 Back

18   Q 377 Back

19   Q 376 Back

20   Ev 105, para 3 Back

21   Ev 105, paras 4, 5  Back

22   Ev 105, paras 5, 6 Back

23   Q 261 Back

24   ibidBack

25   Q 261 Back

26   Q 330 Back

27   Q 331 Back

28   Q 418 Back

29   Ev 105, paras 9, 10 Back

30   Between February 2001 and March 2002, 19 cards were issued to Imperial, 2 to Gallaher and 0 to British American Tobacco (source: HM Customs and Excise memorandum to Committee of Public Accounts, HC (2002-03) 143, pp 59-60) Back

31   Ev 105, para 9, Qq 427, 428 Back

32   Q 56 Back

33   Q 262 Back

34   Q 262 Back

35   Q 263 Back

36   Q 264 Back

37   Ev 129, paras 1, 2 Back

38   Ev 131 para 11 Back

39   Ev 136 Back

40   Ev 136 Back

41   Ev 137 Back

42   Ev 137 Back

43   Q 269 Back

44   Q 358 Back

45   Q 422 Back

46   Qq 423, 427-429 Back

47   Q 430 Back

48   Q 434 Back

49   Ev 138 Back

50   Ev 107, para 20 Back

51   Ev 107, para 21 Back

52   Q 415 Back

53   Q 342  Back

54   Ev 104, para 9 Back


 
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