Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140-159)

DR DAVID LONG, MR PETER SCULLY, MR IAN GOOD, MR GAVIN HEWITT AND MR IAN SHEARER

8 DECEMBER 2004

  Q140 Mr Walter: I am just trying to get a handle on the figures. To what extent is this excise duty fraud totally domestic? Is any of it totally domestic?

  Mr Good: What we are talking about principally is domestic duty; it is where duty is not being paid in the UK market. What probably would be happening would be that someone would sell, let us just take our company, we would sell to another company in warehouse X. That would be sold without paying duty. The expectation would be that when that company were putting it onto the shelves, they would pay duty and that would be gathered in the normal way. The problem would tend to be where that company, not necessarily that company, but a company in that warehouse, was selling onto another party who was not paying duty and was perhaps saying "I`m now selling it to France" and it was coming back in without duty being paid.

  Q141 Mr Walter: So basically you as an industry are losing control of the goods.

  Mr Good: Correct. That is one of the reasons why we are as keen as the Customs and Excise and the government to stamp out fraud.

  Mr Shearer: The big frauds of the 1990s were the so-called outward frauds where it started in a warehouse, a third party warehouse, and then it went off to the continent allegedly, but disappeared into the UK market.

  Q142 Mr Walter: It never actually went to the continent.

  Mr Shearer: It never actually got there. Then huge controls were put in place around about 1998 to stop that type of fraud and we believe that those controls were largely effective, though there have been one or two instances—

  Q143 Mr McFall: Give us a flavour of those controls.

  Mr Shearer: The warehouse controls were significantly improved. In the mid-1990s Customs had possibly been approving one or two people as warehouse keepers whom they perhaps should not have been approving and they clamped down on looking at what these warehouse keepers were doing in their warehouses. It is really just all about effective oversight of the warehouse.

  Q144 Norman Lamb: Are you talking about the London and City Bond?

  Mr Shearer: There have been one or two well-known cases.

  Q145 Norman Lamb: That is still in place and still doing business.

  Mr Shearer: It is a very large and successful third party warehouse and it is still widely used. I do not think there is any suggestion that it is fraudulent at the moment. But anyway, when that fraud was stopped, there was a risk of this other type of fraud called inward fraud where the stuff goes out to the continent, then comes back in again and then disappears. Customs picked up on that in around about 2000-01 and the secret to that is just putting more intelligence-based controls at the ports. John Rocques, who investigated all this in about 2001, said the only way to do this was to put controls at the ports. Customs have done that; in around about 2001, they put a whole lot more people in the ports. We help those people because they phone us up and say "What do you know about this brand or that brand". That has led to this decline in seizures at the ports that I reported, so we think the lid is on that type of fraud as well.

  Q146 Mr McFall: It was John Rocques who suggested duty stamps, was it not?

  Mr Shearer: It was among his recommendations.

  Q147 Mr Walter: May I just get a quantification? May I just look at the, if you like, cross-border fraud and try to get a quantification on that and the white van trade and so on? How much of that is through the corner shop as you have described it and how much is off the back of a van or through unofficial networks and so on? I have heard evidence, not in your industry but in the tobacco industry and we are going to hear evidence from the tobacco manufacturers later in this inquiry, that in terms of hand-rolling tobacco most of this is out of the back of a van on a Friday night. How much of that is there in the spirits industry?

  Mr Hewitt: You need to look at where the spirits are sold in the UK. About 70% is in the supermarket, the big supermarkets where the supply chains are very tightly controlled between the producers and appearing on the shelf. Fifteen per cent is in the controlled off-licences, the off-licences which are controlled by the big companies and where the supply chain is very, very tightly controlled. We do not believe that there is very much fraud at all within those tight supply chains. That leaves, at maximum, 15% for the corner shop. As Ian said before, on the figures which they produced last year in the PBR at 16% of £600 million, every single bottle sold, and that was the equivalent of 200,000 bottles a day, was going to have to be illegitimate in the corner shop, that is had escaped duty.

  Q148 Norman Lamb: What about sales to pubs and clubs? Does that not happen?

  Mr Hewitt: This is another form; there are other problems associated there.

  Mr Good: That is the difference between the on and the off trade. Gavin is talking about the off trade. There is the on trade, which is selling to the pubs and that would tend to be done through wholesalers, cash-and-carries.

  Q149 Mr Beard: What steps do you take in the industry to vet the people who are driving the lorries or running the warehouses, to make sure they are bona fide people? In the London bonded warehouse which has just been referred to, some of the people involved there had criminal records.

  Mr Hewitt: Companies who have controlled supply chains know exactly who it is they are using, whether it is Edrington, Diageo or Allied.

  Q150 Mr Beard: In the past they have not done, have they?

  Mr Hewitt: They do.

  Q151 Mr McFall: Could you tell me, when you lose control, at which stage you lose control? I think that is what Nigel is getting at.

  Mr Good: When you say lose control, we always know the bottle, because it has a lot code number on it. On the back of the label there will be a lot code number which will say when that was bottled, the time it was bottled, that would lead to a case and the case is then controlled. So we can control the bottle. What we cannot do is control it once it goes from our warehouse or our distribution company's warehouse to the third party. At that point, the third party can either quite legitimately put it onto its shelf, quite legitimately sell it onto another party. There is nothing to stop him doing that, but what we have to hope is that when he sells it on to another party, if he is selling it duty paid there is not a problem, if he is selling it under bond, we need to be sure that the warehouse that he is selling it to has the same controls as the original warehouse.

  Q152 Mr Beard: If we are just talking about when it is under bond, it would not take a lot to vet the people properly who are handling it.

  Mr Good: Let us talk about guarantees.

  Mr Hewitt: What we as the industry had proposed to Customs was that most of the fraud was coming and produced out of third party warehouses, not out of the primary producer and the distributor. Those third party warehouses, in our view, were not being adequately controlled by Customs.

  Q153 Norman Lamb: Were not or are not?

  Mr Hewitt: They were not being adequately controlled and we still believe there are aspects which are still not being adequately controlled. I use one example and this is within the last year, a Liverpool bond third party warehouse where I have been told that one of the directors of that company has a criminal record for fraud and that bond is still operating.

  Q154 Norman Lamb: Outrageous, is it not?

  Mr Hewitt: That is a fact and that is a question of control by Customs.

  Q155 Mr McFall: Yes, but is it not a question for the industry as well, for the industry to alert Customs to check what is happening?

  Mr Hewitt: Yes; absolutely.

  Mr Good: I think the other thing is that legitimate companies, the Allieds, the Diageos, the Pernods, the Edringtons, the Grants, these kinds of people know that because we have intelligence on which warehouses we would not send our goods to and we would not think of sending our goods to that warehouse.

  Q156 Norman Lamb: There was a period in the 1990s, which went on for quite a long time, when we knew that massive frauds were going on and yet the products were still going through those warehouses.

  Mr Good: Yes, but they were not going direct to those. That was the point. We were selling it to them.

  Q157 Norman Lamb: I appreciate that, but you could see what was happening, because you were tracing your goods.

  Mr Good: Yes.

  Q158 Mr Walter: I just want to try and get a quantity. We have talked about the measurable fraud, but what is the black market? How do you know how big that is of the people who are either selling direct to the consumer into the back door of a pub or a club or the restaurant or whatever? How big is that market?

  Mr Hewitt: It goes back again to the estimates of fraud and the basis on which you calculate that fraud and there are different data sets which have produced different figures.

  Q159 Mr Walter: What do you think it is?

  Mr Hewitt: We think the figures, obviously working on the GHS, the General Household Survey, together with the consumption, together with the clearances, taking all that together, indicate that fraud at the moment is in the region probably of 2 to 3% maximum. Maybe even less, but I am willing to accept that there is fraud and let us put it at that. We believe that it is not even at 7%. That is because we are looking at an official government set of statistics, using that in exactly the same way as Customs and Excise are using a different set of statistics, hence the ONS study of which is the right data set to use. We are in a difference now between a very low percentage figure, let us accept 2 to 3% or less, and the 7% which Customs are now using.


 
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