Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-239)

DR DAVID LONG, MR PETER SCULLY, MR IAN GOOD, MR GAVIN HEWITT AND MR IAN SHEARER

8 DECEMBER 2004

  Q220 Mr McFall: I understand that. What I am saying to you is that what is in Edrington's control is that you are supplying to people. If you have doubts about them, then you ask them to pay duty. That is the point.

  Mr Good: Exactly and that is what we do; that is what we have done.

  Q221 Mr McFall: What is the problem then? This should be a land free of fraud then, if that happens.

  Mr Good: The point I was making earlier was that we have had one call in the last year from Customs and Excise with even a question mark over fraud of our products.

  Q222 Mr McFall: I would put it back to you that maybe a quality control exercise should be instigated by yourselves with your own companies looking at things like that to verify the veracity of the people down the line.

  Mr Good: We have a team of people; Diageo have a team of people; Allied have a team of people. Their job is security. That is to make sure that we are not trading with illicit traders.

  Q223 Mr McFall: There is a dislocation here. You are here because there is fraud. You have said that we cannot stop fraud, but we are trying to eliminate it and we want more radical steps to eliminate that. You have already admitted that in Liverpool and elsewhere you have it. If you have doubts about this step, asking for duty to be paid, surely to goodness that must eliminate fraud quite a bit. Would you not agree?

  Mr Shearer: The big companies do look at this.

  Q224 Mr McFall: But others do not, is that correct?

  Mr Hewitt: Yes.

  Mr Good: Yes.

  Q225 Mr McFall: How can we get to the others who do not?

  Mr Good: Some of the companies you say do not, are small companies and they do not have the resource effectively to have a protection department; they do not have anything like that. They may legitimately sell—

  Q226 Mr McFall: So we have identified a black hole here; we have identified a black hole.

  Mr Good: There are areas—

  Q227 Mr McFall: No, no; we have identified a black hole.

  Mr Good: That is why there is fraud.

  Q228 Mr McFall: How do we . . .?

  Mr Hewitt: May I say how we do it? We have suggested to Customs that those companies allowed to trade under duty suspension should be registered and there should be a known register of companies which are totally approved by Customs to operate under duty suspension, to trade under duty suspension.

  Q229 Norman Lamb: A fit and proper person test of some sort.

  Mr Hewitt: It is the job of Customs to make sure that each company is legitimate, has a good track record on paying tax.

  Q230 Mr McFall: So you are discussing this with Customs, there is a memorandum of understanding coming. What is your suggestion? Would you agree that memorandum of understanding can take us a long way? Is that right?

  Mr Hewitt: We should like Customs to do that, but Customs say they have a problem because they cannot stop people trading. I am sorry: that is not an acceptable response.

  Mr McFall: There is an industry responsibility here. You should have accepted that industry responsibility and seen it and that black hole which was described.

  Q231 Mr Walter: Are you saying that there are warehouses, there are traders who are what one might call bonded traders, who are trading, yet Customs and Excise do not approve or register or have any control or any means of checking what is in those warehouses, what is bonded, what is duty paid?

  Mr Hewitt: No. Technically every person who is trading in bonded goods is checked by Customs and they do have, and they say and they claim they have, an assurance and they check to make sure they are legitimate traders. If they have done enough checks, we will not have leakage from these people. If they are leaking, they are not legitimate traders and they should not be on the register. Hence the point I made about one bond which we know has a director who has a criminal record for fraud.

  Mr Shearer: One example of a very new control which has just come in is that all these warehouses now have to do electronic mandatory warehouse returns. Monthly they have to submit detailed information about what is in their warehouses and the idea is that Customs can then do trend checks on this. This is one example of the kind of controls where I think they have been very successful. I really believe that the level of fraud has come down significantly and it is a story of success.

  Q232 Norman Lamb: It did come down.

  Mr Shearer: Since 1997 all sorts of new controls have been put in place and one has to give Customs credit, they are policing this system more effectively.

  Q233 Mr Walter: You are saying that it has come down, but that does not alter the fact that the system still operates whereby somebody can operate duty free in the UK and Customs are happy for them to operate duty free, yet Customs themselves admit that this is open to abuse. Let me give you a parallel. I used to have a farm and a Customs and Excise man would come to check my VAT returns and he would be more interested in the level of my phone calls. Yet here we are talking about millions and millions of pounds, to which they seem almost to have turned a blind eye in the past.

  Mr Hewitt: That is exactly the point we are making. It seems to me that like a football referee, if someone gets it wrong there is a yellow card, if someone gets it wrong twice there is a red card on the basis that the first time it might have been a mistake, but with two mistakes where you are cheating the system you should not be let off.

  Q234 Mr McFall: I would be the last to divide you, but I think Ian Shearer has a different view on that in terms of Customs.

  Mr Shearer: It is very interesting to see that you are in the Thatcher Room. If we go back to Mrs Thatcher, in those days there used to be a Revenue officer in every bonded warehouse. They were taken away during the 1980s and this was great for blue chip companies, because there was no Revenue officer watching everything they were doing. Blue chip companies were trusted to police themselves effectively. It did open up opportunities for the unscrupulous in these third party warehouses. I believe that by policing these properly—

  Q235 Norman Lamb: Hang on. We have already established that Customs and Excise were allowing the frauds to continue; they were aware of it happening. Whether you have a bloke there or not—

  Mr Shearer: I do not know whether that was before these new warehouse returns or not.

  Q236 Norman Lamb: It was in the 1990s.

  Mr Shearer: With these new warehouse returns and other effective controls, if you watch, where is the brand going that these warehouses are sending? Is it going abroad? Why would a warehouse in Liverpool be exporting one of Mr Good's brands? Surely an intelligent use of warehouse returns would mean that Customs would be phoning up and asking whether this brand should be going abroad. You can police this system effectively if you study the warehouse returns properly. This system has just come in and I believe that it will be very helpful in trying to police the system more effectively.

  Mr Hewitt: There are still gaps, but they are doing better.

  Q237 Mr McFall: There is still a black hole and there is responsibility on both sides.

  Mr Hewitt: Yes.

  Mr Good: Absolutely.

  Q238 Mr McFall: Is there any scope for a more consistent standard of vigilance across the industry to reduce fraud? Are some traders more careful than others to whom they sell? If so, is there anything the trade as a whole can do to ensure more rigorous checks?

  Mr Good: A lot of it comes back to scale. Small companies will not have the resource to put in the policing which the larger companies do have. Some of the smaller companies will not be trading with what you might call international brands and therefore perhaps would be less concerned, not about fraud, but less concerned about where their goods end up. For example, if we sold our goods to a warehouse in the UK and they legitimately sold it on to a warehouse in France, we would be concerned because in fact our distributor in France was getting goods coming into France from the UK that could disrupt the market. The question of control over brands is perhaps much more legitimate in terms of the bigger companies than a smaller company which is not developing brands, but is perhaps developing a secondary brand. They would not have the resource and they may be vulnerable to the person who just wants to trade a bottle of whisky rather than a brand.

  Mr Hewitt: Additionally, in the 17 proposals we put forward before the Budget, there was a very important proposal and I touched on it already. It was that warehouses, particularly now we are talking about third party warehouses, should not have their guarantee used for the movement of goods under bond. It is the person who owns those goods who should actually be liable for that guarantee. If that owner is a fraudulent person, he will find it very difficult to get that guarantee. It is a fundamental change of where you get the guarantee for moving and holding.

  Q239 Norman Lamb: Is it perfectly possible to implement that? No problem with European law or anything like that?

  Mr Hewitt: Nothing. There is no difficulty whatsoever.


 
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