Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-74)

MR MERVYN KING, MR PAUL TUCKER, MS MARIAN BELL, PROFESSOR STEVE NICKELL AND MR RICHARD LAMBERT

24 MARCH 2005

  Q60 Mr Beard: When do you think we will be?

  Mr Tucker: I do not think that is something that I can judge, I am afraid.

  Q61 Mr Beard: The Treasury told us that the US trade deficit has reached the point at which received wisdom is that it has to correct, namely it is 5.7% of American GDP. The February MPC Minutes note the view of some economists that a sustained real dollar depreciation will be needed to secure such a correction. Would such a dollar fall threaten the economic outlook of the eurozone and the United Kingdom?

  Mr King: Of course, on the latest numbers the deficit is even larger, just over 6% of GDP. I think it is fair to say that one can conclude that this cannot go on indefinitely. Unfortunately, that does not help very much in knowing when it will come to an end. I do not think anyone can be at all confident about the time horizon over which this will adjust, hence it makes it extremely difficult to know when and by how much there will be a change in the dollar. If there were to be a sharp change—I am not saying that will happen at all but just take as a hypothesis if there were to be a sharp fall in the dollar—what will matter clearly will be against which other currencies that fall comes. That has been very much a bone of contention in discussions about exchange rates internationally over the past year. Those in the euro area are clearly concerned that if countries in Asia try, by one means or another, to link their exchange rates to the dollar, try to retain competitiveness against the US, then in so doing they will (a) not only frustrate the correction of the US deficit, but (b) it will mean that any correction that does take place will be taking place largely against the euro area and that would mean a bigger rise in the euro relative to other currencies and, more importantly, a bigger adjustment in current accounts with changes in movements of resources from one sector to another, from the tradeable sector to the non-tradeable sector. The adjustments are a matter of concern to everyone but the important thing here is not to try to pin blame on anyone because these deficits that we see around the world are not the result of any one country's policy, they are the result of what everyone is doing. I think it will be a matter of collective discussion at the various international fora as to how we are best going to cope with this adjustment as and when it seems to be starting to take place.

  Q62 Mr Beard: If there is a widespread appreciation of what you have just said, is that not in itself going to affect the economic expectations?

  Mr King: Yes. I think it is clearly part of the Federal Reserve's reasoning that they anticipate this adjustment at some point will come about and, if they are not careful, that could add to inflationary pressures in the United States, so they are watching that extremely carefully. I think it is part of the concern that those in the euro have that, if nothing else happened, that might mean some depression in terms of demand in the euro area. It is in everyone's interest to try to ensure that when this adjustment takes place, it takes place at a time at which all of us at least clearly understand the assumptions on which other countries' economic policies are being based so that we are not making mutually inconsistent judgments about what is likely to happen. That is the value of the international fora that we have for discussing international economic policy.

  Q63 Mr Beard: When the change takes place, is it likely to be controlled?

  Mr King: It will not be controlled because it will be a change in the exchange rate in a free market and that can sometimes move quickly and then stop and take place again. What should be controlled here is policy response and I think that will be controlled. It is something that we do need to discuss among several countries in the world. You cannot just leave this to the United States and say that it is up to them to deal with it and solve everyone else's problem.

  Q64 Mr Beard: Are those discussions happening?

  Mr King: There has been a lot of discussion. You will notice at the last two G7 meetings, China was invited to attend those meetings with the G7 precisely so that we could have a private discussion about exactly those questions.

  Q65 Mr Beard: Governor, you recently wondered aloud if there was any fundamental reason why the world's central banks should continue using one main currency as a source of liquidity. In February, however, the first hint that South Korea was considering diversifying its foreign exchange reserves out of the dollar was enough to produce another burst of volatility in world markets. Are you confident that any move by central banks to a wider basket of reserve currencies can be managed without provoking further turmoil in the markets?

  Mr King: If it is managed and explained very clearly then I think it could be managed, yes. The main thing is to make absolutely clear in advance in a transparent way what changes will take place and why. I think the volatility that you referred to occurred precisely because there was a misunderstanding about what the change actually meant. The message from all this is that things have to be discussed and explained very clearly to people before these changes in patterns of reserves take place.

  Q66 Mr Beard: Is there a wider international appreciation similar to your own that we do not really need this reserve currency concept?

  Mr King: To be honest, I do not think the phrase "reserve currency" has been used very much in discussion for quite a long time. Indeed, the phrase "international monetary system" is a phrase that you can look back to in the textbooks 20 or 30 years ago but has not really been part of the recent debate. There has been a lot of discussion at the IMF, G7 and elsewhere about "international financial architecture", but that has all been about financial flows, the question of lending to sovereign borrowers who may find it difficult to repay, the issues surrounding Argentina, the policy of the IMF towards the countries to whom they lend, those sorts of questions, not questions about the international monetary system which is much more to do with the relationship between the IMF and the major industrialised countries. I do think it is time for more active debate about what we mean by the international monetary system and the basis upon which it works.

  Q67 Mr Beard: Where should that debate take place?

  Mr King: The obvious place is the IMF because that is a forum where every country is represented around the table and there is plenty of scope for discussing how that representation might be reformed and the way in which the IMF works. As I said in the remarks I made at the end of January, I would encourage the IMF to be bold when it is thinking about a review of its own strategy. I would urge them to be as bold as they dare be, but I cannot say that bold is a word that comes to mind when thinking about recent changes.

  Mr Beard: Thank you very much.

  Q68 Mr Walter: Just following on from that point very briefly, Governor. It begs the questions in terms of reserves: if not the dollar, what? There has been some debate recently about smaller central banks diversifying into corporate bonds, equities and so on, but when we are talking about the Asian central banks which have literally hundreds of billions of dollars held in reserves, if they were to diversify out of the dollar, where would they go? One can only speculate that the eurozone is an alternative but is there sufficient liquidity in eurozone assets in order for them to be able to do that?

  Mr King: I think it goes to the heart of the question of why countries hold reserves. The most striking feature of the past 10-15 years is that foreign currency reserves by and large are now held in Asia and not held to the same extent anywhere else. In a world in which the major currencies are floating freely it is not clear that there is a need for significant foreign exchange reserves. What happened after the Asian crisis, for reasons unconnected with the international monetary system, was many of the countries in Asia realised that their banking systems were quite heavily involved in dollar transactions and that if there were to be a run on their banking systems then rather than have to go to the IMF, which they perceived at the time was lending money on terms which were not on the same basis as they had lent to Latin American countries, conditionality was imposed to a much harsher extent on the Asian countries, the lesson they drew from it was the need to build up very significant dollar foreign exchange reserves, not to do with supporting the currency as such or the monetary system but in order that they could act as an effective lender of last resort to their own banking system in dollars because their banking system was borrowing in foreign currency terms. I do not think that is going to go away quickly and that suggests to me the demand for diversification will not be such as to lead them to make a wholesale switch out of dollars at all. The role of reserves in the international monetary system is a rather different feature. These aspects need to be separated and need to be thought through. I think one of the things to which insufficient attention has been paid has been why these reserves have been built up, the scale to which they have been built up and the implications that has for the potential volatility of the currency of the big country in the world that has been supporting demand in the world economy and has, as a result, built up a large current account deficit which in the long run is unsustainable. There are certainly fragilities there.

  Q69 Chairman: Ms Bell, your term of appointment to the MPC will expire in May this year. What observations do you have after your three years' experience on the way the MPC works?

  Ms Bell: I think the main impression has been about the strength of the system, the design of the system, the potentially huge importance in practice of individual accountability and the terrific respect on the Committee and in the Bank for individual accountability. What that means is the process benefits from having nine individual views, independent views, not just the externals but also the internal members who are prepared to question and challenge each other's views and also the views of the staff so that we do not get an approach to monetary policy that is built up from the bureaucracy of the Bank of England. I think that is probably the single most important thing I have learned. The process, the strength of that, is laid out quite nicely in Richard's article.

  Q70 Chairman: If you were to stand for reappointment to the MPC, what criteria do you believe should be used to assess your individual record as a member of the MPC?

  Ms Bell: I think we have discussed this before.

  Q71 Chairman: We did, and I will give you the date: 22 May 2002.

  Ms Bell: I think I argued then that you would assess people's records on the wisdom, both at the time given all the information available, and also perhaps with hindsight, of the judgments that they have made. That is quite a challenge and it is something for other people to do, I think.

  Q72 Angela Eagle: On the international financial architecture, Governor, you did make some remarks at the Advancing Enterprise 2005 Conference about your vision of the future of the IMF. I suspect that particularly because we have a stable situation there are less crises, and hopefully that will continue in the future. Could you lay out in a bit more detail for us how you see the IMF evolving if your vision were to be adopted?

  Mr King: I would rather not set out a fully fledged vision because the IMF is going through its own internal discussions and the UK will contribute to that. Rather than pre-empt any of that discussion, the IMF itself, in the form of the managing director, will be presenting to us at the end of April his views as to where the IMF will go. I will do no more than just flag two or three areas. One of the things the IMF feels very strongly from the staff end, and I understand why, is it wants to be seen to behave symmetrically towards all its members. That is one reason why it has felt that it should always be involved in dealing with low income countries, even though the issues that are involved in low income countries are really about development and not the areas in which the IMF has great expertise. Another area where I think we do need to think in terms of what was meant by symmetry is the relationship between the IMF and the industrialised countries. A lot of resources go into regular monitoring of the economy and sometimes I think they stray into areas that cannot really be of any great interest or relevance to the overall macroeconomic position. What I would like to see the IMF do is to talk much more about the implications of the main macroeconomic policy settings of each industrialised country for the rest of the world economy. It is the interactions between countries where they have their comparative expertise. That is one area. Another is to get back to the question of the policy that is going to be adopted towards lending to countries in serious financial difficulty that want to borrow large sums of money. Exceptional access, as it is being called. These are not poor countries, these are middle income countries. A very large proportion of the IMF's balance sheet is now tied up in loans to a small number of those countries. We still need to proceed to make sure that the framework for exceptional access is really robust and is not just left to making it up on the hoof as we go along. That is a way in which discretionary decisions are often influenced by political factors rather than economic factors that enter into the decisions. Clearly we have not seen the end of the debate on the consequences of the Argentine default and that will have repercussions for the international financial system for many years. Those are just two areas where I think the idea that we have got a settled system and it is just business as usual is not right. It is the international monetary system, it is the role of the IMF in the monitoring and surveillance of the industrialised countries and making a more effective contribution to ensuring, almost of making, the G7 and other countries face up to the fact that their policies have implications for each other. The second aspect is that there is still more work to be done in ensuring that we have a robust exceptional access framework to ensure that sensible decisions are made about lending such vast amounts of money to middle income countries in financial difficulty.

  Q73 Angela Eagle: There was an aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, which we touched on earlier, and you touched particularly on the effect it has had on the behaviour of central banks in Asia since. Do you think that there are other aspects of the international financial architecture, which was created originally in 1945 and renewed in the 1970s and 1980s, which really lag in terms of not only the political situation that we now find ourselves in in the 21st century but also the economic development that has gone on since which has seen countries emerging, such as China and India, which can have a big effect on the world economic system but are not properly represented at an appropriate weight in the international systems? How do you see this reform process developing? Clearly there is a lag between the institutions we have now and what we may wish to see in the future.

  Mr King: I agree that the institutions and the arrangements for meetings that we have now are not the ones that we would set up today if we were starting again and there is a big gap between those two. How we get from one to the other is a matter of politics and experience and does not lead me to be entirely optimistic about how much progress we will make. At G7 level, and the UK Presidency played a big part in this, we have encouraged China to attend the meetings and to play a big part in explaining to us what their views are and we could have a private discussion with them about how we saw the situation. I hope that interaction with the Chinese is a permanent feature of our discussions. I think it needs to be if we are to have any serious discussion of the world economy. As you say, there are other countries that have grown in size and importance, and India is the most obvious example but there are others, where they probably do not have the weight of representation that they should. The obvious place to deal with this is at the IMF because all 184 countries are represented around the table of the IMF Committee through constituencies. I do not think there is an enormous logic to the pattern of constituencies. If it is to be effective I think it is most important that the share of each constituency, the person at the table, really is the big country that matters. I do not think we can expect to make much progress if we do not have a group where the countries that really matter are there. That was the origin of G20 which came out of a G22, a G33, a G18. All of these Gs were tried and we finally converged on the G20. It is a slightly cumbersome body but it has got the right countries around the table. It has not yet become an effective body, there are still some countries which are nervous about raising sensitive issues at that forum. We need to work hard on that. It may come out of a process of informal development and, of course, the representation of the euro area in the G7 or, indeed, the G20 is an issue that some countries feel is holding up progress in rationalising membership. There are a lot of difficulties ahead but it is so important and without being willing to take on board the issue of membership voting rights and who sits round which table, I do not think we are going to persuade the rest of the world to take seriously the other questions of substance which it is important that the fund deal with, if it is to be as important now as it was when it was set up in 1944.

  Angela Eagle: Thank you. It is clearly an important agenda.

  Q74 Chairman: Governor, can I thank you and your colleagues. There has been an heretical suggestion by Mr Mann this morning that we extend Lent to Whitsun. Could I say on behalf of this Committee that 40 days is enough and in the next few days it will finish. Can I wish you and your colleagues a happy Easter.

  Mr King: Thank you. Happy Easter to you, Chairman, and to Members of the Committee.





 
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