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Charlotte Atkins: A driver does not have to accept a fixed penalty notice because he can elect to go to court to fight the case. The hon. Gentleman's remarks on the 1969 case demonstrate that there are so many various cases that it is important to leave these matters to the discretion of the police.
Mr. Chope: I take completely the opposite view. If someone chose not to accept the fixed penalty and went to court, there would, in the light of the decided cases, be no defence at all. The magistrates would have to find them guilty on the facts. To suggest that some sort of discretion might apply is to mislead the public. The Government are seeking to change the law so that an endorsement and a fine are mandatory in the circumstances we have described. That is manifestly absurd.
If we do not make it clear that that is not our intention, we will be deemed to be accepting that the same rules apply to the use of a mobile phone while driving, as in the case set out in 1969. That may seem a long time ago, but it is still the leading case regarding the definition of ''driving''. What the Minister said in our previous sitting, and some of what she said today, could mislead motorists into thinking that they will not be committing an offence if they use their mobile phone in a long traffic jam with the engine switched off and they have left the car. If we do not accept the amendment, however, they will be committing an offence.
Unless the Government are prepared to come forward with another amendment to cover exactly that situation, members of the Committee should use some people power and common sense and support the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 10.
[Division No. 6]
Column Number: 197
AYES
Chope, Mr. Christopher
Knight, Mr. Greg
Thurso, John
Wilshire, Mr. David
NOES
Atkins, Charlotte
Byrne, Mr. Liam
Ellman, Mrs. Louise
Heyes, Mr. David
Jamieson, Mr. David
Kidney, Mr. David
Mahmood, Mr. Khalid
Merron, Gillian
Reed, Mr. Andy
Stinchcombe, Mr. Paul
Question accordingly negatived.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Chope: In the light of the Government's refusal to accept the amendment, it would be unconscionable for us to put on to the statute book a requirement that there should be mandatory endorsement for a driver using a mobile phone when stationary, with the engine switched off, on the motorway for a quarter of an hour or half an hour. That is mad and it will bring the law into disrepute. We are faced with no option but to oppose the clause in toto.
Charlotte Atkins: We have had a good discussion. There is clearly a difference of opinion, but I urge Committee members to accept the clause. It relates to the proper control of a vehicle, whether that is a matter of using a mobile phone or dealing with other distractions.
John Thurso (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD): As I said in the previous sitting, I have great sympathy with the amendment and I just voted for it. However, the clause is important, and I shall vote for it in the hope that a similar amendment will be discussed, and perhaps accepted, in another place.
Mr. Wilshire: The only reassurance I have heard from the Government was offered in the last sitting, when the Minister said:
''Clearly, in such circumstances no police officer would prosecute a motorist simply because there was a long wait.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, Thursday 27 January; c. 189.]
Now we are told that it is reasonable to leave such matters to the police. I do not find that reassuring at all. If the police need to take action against a motorist, and that is the only way available for them to do so, the chances are that they will do it. We think that it is unreasonable to do certain things. The message I have got from the Government is that they acknowledge that we have a point, but that common sense can be applied by the police. If they accept the point in principle but will not make any concession, we have no alternative but to vote against the clause.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 3.
[Division No.7]
Column Number: 198
AYES
Atkins, Charlotte
Byrne, Mr. Liam
Ellman, Mrs. Louise
Heyes, Mr. David
Jamieson, Mr. David
Kidney, Mr. David
Mahmood, Mr. Khalid
Merron, Gillian
Reed, Mr. Andy
Stinchcombe, Mr. Paul
Thurso, John
NOES
Chope, Mr. Christopher
Knight, Mr. Greg
Wilshire, Mr. David
Question accordingly agreed to.
Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Breach of duty to give information as to identity of driver etc.
9.45 am
Mr. Knight: I beg to move amendment No. 48, in clause 23, page 26, line 31, leave out '6' and insert '3 to 6.'.
I have long been an advocate of pre-legislative scrutiny because when Ministers publish a Bill and it is examined by the House in Committee, there is a danger that they tend to defend it as drafted and to regard any amendment as a personal attack. I hope that Ministers in this Committee will not take that attitude because we are trying to make improvements.
I think that I understand the weakness in the law that the Minister wants to address. He can intervene if I am wrong. The problem is when someone who would receive more than three points on his licence for driving a motor vehicle at quite a high speed decides deliberately to tell the authorities when he receives a notice through the post a few days later that he has no recollection of the incident and no idea who was driving his vehicle. That is an attempt to prevent the courts from imposing a fairly harsh punishment for a serious case of speeding. For the offence of not supplying the name of the driver, he receives just three points.
However, just moving from three to six points and giving the courts no discretion and no ability to consider the circumstances of the case means that injustices could occur. I will give the Minister an example from my personal knowledge. During the recent European elections, a team of Euro-candidates were offered two vehicles by a supporter of my party to use during the election campaign. They accepted the use of those vehicles and they were delivered to one of the candidates, who notionally had responsibility for them both, although obviously he could not drive both of them at once. Over two weeks, the vehicles were driven by the candidates and their supporters. As might be expected during an election campaign, no one kept a log of who was driving at any one particular time. It was not a business. The insurance was for any driver. Anyone who was on the team had the opportunity to drive one or both of the vehicles.
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Several weeks later, after the vehicles had been returned to the owner, a notice was received by the registered keeper of the vehicles that one of them had triggered a speed camera. The owner of the vehicle sent the notice to the person to whom both vehicles had been delivered and told the police. At that stage, nearly three weeks after the event, the candidate had no idea who had been driving the vehicle on the date of the offence. He received a notice of intended prosecution. He replied explaining the unusual circumstances of the case and saying that he did not know who the driver was. He then received two more notices of intended prosecution. It seems to me that the Humberside safety camera partnership was putting that person under duress by sending out three notices of intended prosecution for one offence. The candidate replied on two more occasions pointing out the circumstances and saying that he did not know who was driving the vehicle at the time it triggered the speed camera.
The candidate may have a valid defence in that he should not reasonably be expected to know who was driving the vehicles at every moment, but if he does not and he is found guilty, it seems to me—the vehicle was only just over the speed limit so it was not one of the more serious cases that I mentioned—that the courts would be justified in giving him three points. They would not be justified in giving him six points, but that is the effect that the clause would have. It is intended to mandate the courts, in every case, to impose six points, even for the most minor transgression of speeding.
The amendment does not seek to require an ultra-lenient option, but merely to give the courts the discretion to decide, in the circumstances of the case, whether they should give three or six points. For example, a business man with nine points on his licence who drives at an excessive speed and gives no explanation of why he does not know who was driving his vehicle would justifiably be awarded six points.
Let us consider a case in which someone loans his vehicle in the circumstances I described, not necessarily during an election, but where voluntary work was being carried out and half a dozen people who were properly insured had the use of the vehicle, but the owner did not keep a log. If the courts feel that his error in not keeping a log of who was driving was a genuine mistake—that he did not understand the requirements of the law or of the predicament that he might get into—it is reasonable that they should say that the offence itself is fairly minor. In those circumstances, the courts should award only three points.
I can see why the Minister wants to amend the law, but the courts ought to have discretion, so that where genuine mitigating circumstances exist, they can take those into account.
The Chairman: May I explain that if hon. Members want to speak, it might help if they made that clear?
Mr. Jamieson: I take it that it will always be expected that I will want to speak at the end of a particular debate.
The Chairman: One never knows.
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Mr. Jamieson: The right hon. Member for East Yorkshire's amendment relates to a clause that is, I believe, affectionately known as the Hamilton clause. It refers to an instance in which somebody goes through a speed camera and then has a remarkable act of amnesia when they receive a penalty notice some time afterwards and cannot remember who was behind the wheel.
I take the point about pre-legislative scrutiny. The measures were published six or seven months ago. The Select Committee on Transport had an opportunity to pick over some of the points and I do not take it as a personal attack if an amendment is tabled. In fact, the right hon. Gentleman will recall that we accepted Opposition amendments to the Railway and Transport Safety Bill. Not many, I admit, but we felt that the Opposition had come up with a good idea in some cases.
I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman has chosen this amendment as one that he thinks is good and ought to be accepted. In the circumstances to which it relates, a road traffic offence is detected but the actual offender cannot be identified without the co-operation of another person—typically, but not necessarily, the vehicle keeper. The most common occurrence of this is in association with speeding offences remotely detected by safety cameras. If the offender was driving greatly in excess of the speed limit he would, if caught and prosecuted, be liable to an endorsement of up to six points or even disqualification in court. However, if in his capacity of vehicle keeper he claimed that he had suddenly been struck by amnesia and did not know who was driving the car at the time, he would then be liable to only three penalty points. So there is an incentive not to admit to a speeding offence. In existing law, if someone is way over the limit, there is a strong incentive to pretend not to know who was behind the wheel.
Amendment No. 48 suggests that the court might consider giving fewer than six points in some cases. I understand the concern. In certain circumstances, people may genuinely not find it possible to be sure of the driver's identity. However, even in the case that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned of a car or vehicle being used in an election, it is reasonable to expect the person who has taken responsibility for the vehicle to keep a log of who drives it because they need to know that the person driving it has the proper licence. We would not freely allow people to jump in and out of the driving seat. It would not be unreasonable to check the drivers to ensure that they are eligible to drive the vehicle.
However, the law comes to the rescue of such a person in exceptional circumstances. Section 172(4) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 provides a defence whereby the person
''did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained who the driver of the vehicle was''.
That will not allow members of the right hon. Gentleman's party to drive faster than the speed limit with impunity at the next election—although they will need to accelerate if they are going to improve in the polls—but it does provide a defence. The main point is
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that the amendment allows a person who has gone way over the speed limit to get three points rather than six or a disqualification. I am a little surprised that the right hon. Gentleman is on the side of such a person.
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