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Mr. Allan: I understand the point the Minister is making on the issue of people on witness protection programmes, and think it very valid. However, amendment No. 163 would help him there in that presumably someone on a witness protection programme would not ask to have the information corrected if that threatened them. That just places the power back in the hands of the individual.
Mr. Browne: In actual fact the hon. Gentleman's amendments place a duty on the Secretary of State to modify information where he is satisfied that it is inaccurate and incomplete. It may well be that at some stage in the future the hon. Gentleman may want to come back with amendments that are not mutually contradictory, or that do not defeat the objective which he accepts is sensible. We could then look at them. I do not intend in the time that is available to speculate as to what he may want to do.
On amendment No. 163, I do not think it sensible to have a situation whereby, despite the fact that the Secretary of State does not consider it appropriate to modify the entry, he is compelled to do so by the individual to whom the information relates. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that all the norms of data access should apply to the register. That means of course that, for example, the record of police access and an ongoing investigation of crime required to be recorded under paragraph 9 of schedule 1 would not be appropriate to disclose under the subject's access request. There would be exemptions to those norms, and we would use them for very sensible and appropriate reasons.
Any person who is unhappy with the Secretary of State's decision not to modify information would, in the way in which this scheme has been constructed, be able to complain to the national identity scheme commissioner. Although I accept he would not have the power to override the Secretary of State or direct him to reverse his decision, the commissioner would be able to examine and report on the way in which he was using his power under the section. That would be a significant compulsion on the Secretary of State not to use the power that I believe is necessary in a way that acted in the continuing interests of the individuals who were on the scheme.
For those reasons I consider the amendments to be undesirable and invite the hon. Members to withdraw them.
Mr. Allan: For the speedy business of the Committee, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendments.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
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Clause 3
Information recorded in Register
Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 18, in page 3, line 25, leave out paragraph (b).
Mr. Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 19, in page 3, line 27, leave out paragraph (c).
Patrick Mercer: These amendments simply strike out paragraphs (b) and (c), thus leaving that clause much more easily understood. The only information that may be recorded in the register is information the inclusion of which in an individual's entry is authorised by schedule 1, and in accordance with subsection (2).
I simply do not understand the meaning of paragraph (b), which states:
''information of a technical nature for use in connection with the administration of the Register''
nor of paragraph (c), which states:
''information of a technical nature for use in connection with the administration of arrangements made for purposes connected with the issue or cancellation of ID cards''.
I should be grateful if the Minister could explain those paragraphs because the clarity of paragraphs (a) and (d) are confused and we may be in danger of function or mission creep. Paragraphs (b) and (c) should be struck out.
Mr. Browne: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for explaining his amendments with such clarity and brevity. As he said, they would remove the ability to record the technical information that is necessary to ensure the integrity and operation of the scheme.
The hon. Gentleman asked about information. The sort of information to which clause 3(1)(b) and (c) refer concerns error, database and events logs, which are essential for problem diagnosis. That is technical information relating to the use of the database, which is essential for the diagnosis of problems should they occur. The logs are also useful for the safe recovery of information in case of failure of the system. They are important in tracing where the information is.
Other examples of necessary technical data include network event information, which could be used to detect and prevent security attacks on the system, and encryption codes, which need to be recorded to validate cards and to protect the integrity of the identity so that it cannot be accessed by those who are not entitled to do so. The clause also covers the keeping of useful records of cards, card reader and biometric reader information, such as current operational status—whether they are working or not—manufacturing information and fault history, which is important for maintenance purposes. The information is technically essential for the security and operation of a such a database and I do not believe that it provides an opportunity for function creep. The information concerned is technical.
Patrick Mercer: The Minister has explained with admirable brevity exactly what the paragraphs means. Would it not be useful to put that in the Bill?
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Mr. Browne: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I have given him examples. If I brought an IT expert here to explain all the technical details and information, I suspect that the explanation would be longer than the Bill. Much of the technical information would require a significant explanation. We sought to make the provision generalised. I gave a clear example and a clear undertaking that the information concerned is just technical data for the operational functioning, maintenance and security of the system. I trust that that will be sufficient for the Committee and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
Patrick Mercer: I am most grateful to the Minister for his clear explanation. I suggested that examples might be useful, but, that said, the Minister has been helpful and has cleared up the point that I raised. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr. Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 73, in page 3, line 30, leave out paragraph (d).
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:No. 74, in page 3, line 31, leave out subsection (2).
No. 20, in page 3, line 38, leave out 'both practicable and appropriate' and insert 'reasonable'.
No. 75, in page 3, line 41, leave out subsection (3).
Mr. Allan: We took a shotgun to the clause to test what it means. Amendment No. 75 refers to subsection (3). Following our previous discussions about witness protection programmes and the circumstances in which it may be sensible to have a technically inaccurate entry in the register, I am starting to understand the point, which is the value of being in Committee, so I shall not focus on subsection (3).
Amendments Nos. 73 and 74, which would knock out subsection (2), are more substantive. We believe strongly that if we are to have an identity register, it should be confined to the specific purpose of an identity register and there should not be mission creep. I understand the argument for putting in additional data for convenience. One way of selling a card is to say, ''You may have to pay 85 quid for this card, but next time you need to open a mobile phone account or a bank account, it will be more convenient for you because we can stick in the extra data that you need.'' Subsection (2) seems to be a permissive provision that allows people to say, ''Can I have some extra data recorded?'' The Government are not doing anybody a favour by doing that. They should restrict the register to specific purposes and the data that are recorded in the register to specific items. They are not doing anybody a favour by including in the Bill powers that allow that to be expanded.
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Subsection (2) seems inappropriate. If we are to expand the register, that should be done explicitly rather than by having this catch-all provision, which seems to allow infinite expansion. I recognise that that is with the individual's consent, but I do not think this
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appropriate in a proposal that has such a statutory framework and which has been established for specific statutory purposes. I hope the Minister will consider whether the functions of the card should remain narrower and whether the idea that the information can be expanded voluntarily should be taken out of the Bill.
Mr. Browne: I shall restrict my remarks to the amendments the hon. Gentleman spoke to; I presume he is not arguing for the others. He referred to amendments Nos. 73 and 74, which would remove the ability of an individual to request that voluntary information be recorded. Perhaps there is an issue between us in relation to that. The provision is a consequence of consultations with the public on ID cards. It emerged that the ability to record voluntary information was mentioned frequently as a feature that people would like on their card.
Many people saw the advantage of being able to record information such as donor status, blood group or allergies—we referred to that in an earlier debate. As it is possible to do that, it is the Government's position that the Bill should provide for it, where that information is practicable and appropriate. I do not think we intend to move from that position.
I understand the hon. Gentleman's point that the ability to be able to record additional information undermines the integrity of the card as a method of proof of identity, but I do not accept it. If people are given the facility—if that is practical and reasonable—to put restricted information of that nature on to the card, that is an added advantage of the system. It will not lead to the card being used by the Government or by authorities for any other purpose. That seems an appropriate response and I am content that that is the case.
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