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Mr. Browne: I am obliged, and I will consider the hon. Gentleman's request for a model entry and see whether I can respond to it. I am motivated to do so if at all possible.
By way of quick introduction to my remarks, I should say that, because the area is complicated and hon. Members have dealt with it quickly, my intention is to read a specific response to the amendments that they will have an opportunity to read and consider. If
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hon. Members wish to come back to me later in the proceedings, I shall not object to issues being raised, but it is important for me now to read information into the record.
The amendments are all concerned with the information that may be held on the national identity register as set out under clause 3 and schedule 1. I stress that schedule 1 provides a detailed and comprehensive list of the information that may be held on the register. I do not believe that anyone who reads it carefully would consider that there is anything there that would not be expected to be held on an ID card register. It does not allow financial information, medical or tax records or information about religious or political opinion to be held. Indeed, much of the identity information will already be on many Government or, indeed, private sector databases, although I accept that it has not been brought together before.
The information falls into three categories: personal identity information, including biometrics under paragraphs 1; various information relating to the application process and record history in paragraphs 5 to 8 and, finally, the records of the provision of information from the register at paragraph 9. The schedule lists all the information that might be held and information may be added to schedule 1 only by affirmative resolution and only if it were consistent with the statutory purposes of the register as set out under clause 1. That is a key protection against function creep and means that any additions must be for the purposes set out in clause 1(3). Those purposes are, in turn, tied in to the definition of registrable facts under clause 1(5), which could be amended only by further primary legislation. Modifications that would remove or amend, but do not add to the schedule are subject to the negative resolution procedure.
Clause 3(4) allows information to be kept for as long as it is consistent with the statutory purpose of the register as set out under clause 1. That means holding the information must be for the purposes set out in clause 1(3). Amendment No. 112 would remove the requirement to be ''consistent with'' and replace it with a test of necessity for non-personal data. The statutory purposes already contain a necessity test, when information is recorded in the public interest. The test of consistency with the statutory purposes is, in our view, sufficient.
The amendment could lead only to confusion by leaving the retention of information that is personal data for data protection legislation. The Bill sets out in detail the information that may be held and the purposes for which it may be kept, and the same rule governs retention of information whether it is personal data or not. There is no difference of substance between the test under the Bill and that set out in data protection legislation.
Amendment No. 113 would replace ''consistent with'' with a further test of necessity when deciding whether any addition met the statutory purposes. Again, that double test of necessity is unnecessary. The test of consistency with the statutory purposes is, in our view, sufficient. In addition, the clause as drafted already requires parliamentary scrutiny before any
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modification of information held under schedule 1, including affirmative resolution procedure to add information to schedule 1. However, the amendment would mean that, when information is not only added to, but removed from or, in some way, altered under schedule 1, regulations would at least require affirmative resolution. Such administrative changes do not seem a necessary use of parliamentary time.
For example, under amendment No. 21, when information became surplus to the requirements of the scheme and we want to remove it from schedule 1, we would have to go back to Parliament via affirmative resolution. We argue that they are more technical changes that are suitable for the negative resolution procedure.
Amendment No. 129 would have the effect that, for all types of modification of information under schedule 1, a super-affirmative resolution would be required. As for amendments Nos. 76 to 78, further primary legislation would be required as the amendments would remove entirely the possibility of modifying the schedule by secondary legislation. That does not seem to be an effective use of parliamentary time. There is already suitable scrutiny to safeguard people's privacy with the balance of negative and affirmative resolution procedure and the requirement that information may be added only if it were consistent with the statutory purposes. We also need to ensure that the scheme is flexible enough to respond to the changing needs of the individual and user organisations.
For example, when information becomes surplus to the requirements of the scheme and we want to remove it from schedule 1, we do not need to go through further primary legislation. Moreover, I refer to the position if the information was somehow altered. That might be as simple as the name of a piece of information changing as a result of other changes outside the scheme. Under the amendments, we would have to go back to Parliament via affirmative, super-affirmative or even primary legislation. Even the minor adding of information, such as changing the photograph from head and shoulders to full length would require that. Already, any addition of information must be consistent with the statutory process and would require parliamentary agreement via affirmative resolution. We argue that that makes the best use of parliamentary time.
Amendment No. 115 would require any information held in the register without the individual's consent—for example, information given to the police, the security services or to a Government Department under clause 19—to be retained and not to be removed. The amendment proposes that records of personal data that have been provided without consent could be removed only if unspecified criteria set by the information commissioner have been met. I do not see the need for the additional oversight of such administrative procedures.
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It will be the task of the national identity scheme commissioner to oversee the whole of the operation of the scheme, and he or she will be able to comment on any administrative procedures such as how long information is retained in different parts of the register. It would complicate the scheme unnecessarily if, in addition, there were to be a role for the information commissioner.
Amendment No. 26 would remove the ability to store a signature on the register and would seriously reduce the benefits of the identity card scheme and harm its operation. Following publication of the draft Bill, signature was added explicitly to schedule 1, which deals with information that may be recorded in the register, to put beyond doubt the fact that we need to be able to record signature. There are three key reasons for that. First, most existing identity documents such as passports or driving licences incorporate a signature as standard. Secondly, the provision of a signature for ID cards also supports benefits in visual verification for organisations such as financial institutions that hold signatures in their own systems and use them as an identifier. In that sense, the signature is another identifier, in addition to biometrics. Thirdly, the provision of a signature provides a form of consent from the individual during the enrolment process, and it is appropriate that consent in that fashion be retained.
Amendment No. 143 would require the unique personal number that will be allocated to each registered individual to be the same as the ID card number. Although the national identity registration number will be a key unique number allocated to each individual, there is likely also to be a need to provide a serial or issue number for individual cards that are issued, so the numbers will not be the same.
Amendment No. 27 would remove the ability to hold the number of a designated document if it does not fall elsewhere in the paragraph. It is expected that any currently planned designated document—for example, a passport or residence permit—will already be included in the list in paragraph 4 of schedule 1. However, it is possible that in the future, we will want to designate a document that is not already on the list, and it will be important to be able to hold the number of that document on the national identity register.
Amendment No. 28 would remove the ability to hold information on the date of expiry or period of validity of a document for which the number can be recorded. In the case of work permits or immigration documents, it could be very important to know that. With other designated documents, it may not always be the case that the document and the ID card expire on the same date. The expiry or validity of such documents is therefore a relevant fact that should be held on the register.
Amendment No. 29 would remove the ability to hold details of counter-signatories on the register. In order to counter fraud, it will be important to be able to check whether there has been a fraudulent application. It will be possible to check all the circumstances surrounding the original application,
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including the details of the counter-signature, to determine whether the counter-signatory was complicit in a false application. Information about counter-signatories is currently held, for example, with passport application details.
Amendment No. 30 would remove the ability in paragraph 9 of schedule 1 to record the provision of information, with or without consent, from the national identity register. It is important to have the ability to record such information and to have a reliable audit trail. First, it is important that a record is kept of situations in which information has been provided from the register. That will ensure that an individual can obtain details of who has been provided with information recorded in his entry under the Data Protection Act—subject, of course, to certain exemptions contained in that Act in respect of national security or criminal investigations—and that it will be possible for the commissioner to investigate any allegation of improper provision of information. That will reassure individuals on the register that their details cannot be provided without a record being kept of the fact, and it will provide a deterrent effect to anyone attempting to obtain information improperly, as their details will also be kept. That is in line with good practice for data protection.
Secondly, clauses 19 and 20 set out the circumstances in which information recorded in paragraph 9 of schedule 1 can be provided to the intelligence and security agencies for their statutory purposes. The information can also be provided to the police and other agencies involved in preventing or detecting crime, such as the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, but only for purposes connected with the prevention and detection of serious crime. The removal of the paragraph from the schedule would seriously restrict the use of the register in providing those organisations with an intelligence picture of persons on it who might be suspects in relation to serious crime or national security. It would be odd if the police or security services could obtain details of a suspect's mobile telephone or credit card usage, but were unable to trace when they had used their national identity card. Paragraph 9 is important because it ensures that the information cannot be misused, and it has important public interest benefits in relation to safeguarding society.
I understand why my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Anniesland (John Robertson) tabled amendment No. 155, but I seek to reassure him that the UK Passport Service biometric enrolment trial is currently considering biometric enrolment, including
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for those with visual impairment. The Bill contains provisions for regulations to provide for different needs and gives the necessary flexibility, for example, for special enrolment procedures for people with disabilities. We are working with the Royal National Institute of the Blind to resolve such issues among other organisations.
On the privacy impact assessment, which the information commissioner suggested should be prepared, there is no agreed standard, or any requirement, for such an assessment on legislation being considered by the House. The consultation paper on the draft Bill included, in annexe D, the principles of the Data Protection Act 1998 and how the identity card scheme would comply with it. The Government's position is that that is sufficient response to the issues that have been raised by the commissioner. We have continued to consider what the commissioner says and to take it into account, because he is an important contributor to the discussions on such matters.
I have nothing further to add. I have tried to deal with all the issues that hon. Members raised, but they can look at their leisure at the Hansard report. I have dealt with the issue of the signature. I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
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