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Mr. Browne: The response to the understandable argument of the hon. Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) is twofold. First, the forgery, alteration or attempted use thereafter of a birth certificate already comes within the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981. The Act, as I have indicated, has similar penalties to those being promulgated here. In addition, it would be an offence for someone to have within their custody equipment designed for the making of birth certificate copies. The offence is liable to the same penalty as a clause 27 offence. Otherwise, the answer to the hon. Gentleman's argument is that an official birth certificate is an inappropriate addition to this list because it is not an identity document, but the record of an event.
I must admit that, as I read that, I thought that of course a driving licence was not an identity document either in that sense, but evidence of an individual's ability or legal capacity to drive in this country. When I thought of that, my inclination was to go away and think again. However, I then recollected that a birth certificate specifically states: ''This is not an identity document.'' It would seem inconsistent to define it as an identity document in a piece of legislation, given that there must be a statutory basis for that statement.
Mr. Clifton-Brown: I hear what the Minister says, but a birth certificate is one of the documents that one is required to produce to prove one's identity while obtaining a passport. For that official purpose, it is regarded as an identity document. When an ID card is first issued, people will have to produce proof of identity, presumably. If they do not have a passport or a driving licence—there must be a number of people in this country with neither document—the next document that everybody has or has had at one stage is a birth certificate. It is a universally applied document, and although it may state that it is not an identity document, it is regarded as such.
Mr. Browne: The hon. Gentleman opens up an interesting area of debate. The facts that I am aware of show an apparent contradiction between practice and the legal position. I am afraid that with the information that I have at present, I am not able to untangle that conundrum for myself, never mind for the Committee. However, I know that a birth certificate is not accepted on its own for passport applications, which the hon. Gentleman mentions.
I am not prepared to concede that a birth certificate is accepted as an identity document because it states specifically that it is not one. I suspect that it is included in the passport application process to communicate the facts that it conveys about the
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event to those required to make a decision about the issue of a passport, if that is not too convoluted a way of putting it.
I resist the amendment for the obvious reason that a birth certificate has clearly emblazoned on it ''This is not an identity document''. To agree to the amendment in that context would create a statutory contradiction. However, I shall think about the matter and, if necessary, come back to Parliament about it.
Mr. Clifton-Brown: In view of the Minister's very reasonable reply and the fact that he will reflect on the matter, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Allan: One other area of clause 28 remains of interest: the definition of the UK driving licence in subsection (3). That refers to the licence itself, and, in paragraph (c), to the counterpart of the licence. It is worth highlighting the strange legal status of the counterpart. I do not know, Ms Anderson, whether you have ever lost your driving licence. I have lost the counterpart on a couple of occasions; it is very easy to lose. One carries the photographic card, but the counterpart gets lost.
If a person rings the DVLA and says, ''I have lost my driving licence,'' it asks whether they have lost both parts or one. If the person has lost only the counterpart, the agency says that they have to go to the post office, fill in a form and send in a cheque—a huge bureaucratic process. If the person asks what would have happened if both parts had been lost, the agency says that it would ask for their Switch card number and send a replacement licence by first-class post. So the person puts the phone down, rings back and says, ''I have lost my driving licence.'' The DVLA asks, ''Have you lost both parts?'' and the person says, ''I have now.''
The counterpart of the driving licence has a weird legal status. One has to reclaim it if the licence is still in existence, but if the whole thing is lost, that is fine. That situation seems replicated in a curious way in the matter under discussion. It strikes me that the ID bit is the photographic card, and the counterpart has an odd status. We are replicating what happens elsewhere, but sometimes it is worth highlighting that what happens elsewhere is a bit ridiculous.
Mr. Browne: I have some knowledge about the importance of these two parts of a driving licence, and I shall quickly share it. When was I was a Northern Ireland Minister, we used photographic driving licences long before they were available in the rest of the United Kingdom. We used them as proof of ID in the context of the interdiction of electoral fraud. Concern was expressed about people being denied their vote because they did not have both parts of the driving licence. Both parts made up the driving licence. If I am wrong, I shall write to members of the Committee, but I suspect that the root of the provision lies in the road traffic regulations on driving licences
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under which the licence is both parts, so that people understand that to have in their possession in relevant circumstances just either part of the licence would be an offence. Such a rule has been included in the Bill to clarify matters. I was interested in the hon. Gentleman's short anecdote about what I think was his telephone call to the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency in Swansea.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29
Unauthorised disclosure of information
Mr. Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 230, in page 25, line 24, after first 'he', insert 'knowingly or recklessly'.
T
he Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 231, in page 25, line 26, after 'he', insert 'knowingly or recklessly'.
No. 141, in page 25, line 44, at and insert—
'(4A) It is also a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that the provision of information or the making of the other disclosure in question was in the public interest.'.
No. 229, in page 25, line 38, leave out paragraph (c).
Mr. Malins: We have moved to an important clause, which makes whistleblowing an offence. It will be a criminal offence to disclose confidential information without lawful authority to others, such as journalists or loyal members of Her Majesty's Opposition, and information learnt during the course of employment by individuals who have responsibility for
''the establishment or maintenance of the Register; or . . . the issue, modification, cancellation or surrender of ID cards'',
which is deemed to be confidential.
I shall begin by speaking to amendments Nos. 230 and 231, which go together. Under clause 29, a person is guilty of an offence if, without lawful authority,
''he provides any person with information''
that he should not provide. I read the rest of the clause to see whether there were any defences. I was not looking for the whistleblowing provision, but I found the first reference to a defence under subsection (4). Let us assume that I work in such areas and I supply someone with information, because of negligence on my part, utterly accidentally. It cannot be impossible that I supplied information accidentally, not intending to cause any harm nor necessarily aware at the time that I had carried out such action.
I could not avail myself of subsection (4) because that would enable me to have a defence if I could show that, at the time of the alleged offence, I believed on reasonable grounds that I had lawful authority to provide such information. I could not possibly say that, because it would not apply in my circumstances. I put before the Committee the proposition that someone can supply another person with information somewhere between accidentally and negligently, but without what might be described as a level of criminal intent.
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Such a person would not have a defence under the clause, which is why I want ''knowingly or recklessly'' inserted into the clause. There might be a better phrase than that. ''Reckless'' is not a word that actually commands great respect in criminal law at present, and has not done since the case of Caldwell. I am trying to cover the morally innocent person who supplies information to another accidentally or carelessly, but without the intent to cause a problem. The position of the whistleblower is different, because he or she supplies the information wholly and intentionally with a purpose. I shall deal with that in a moment. However, in amendments Nos. 230 and 231 I am trying to cover an individual who has, at worst, been negligent.
3.15 pm
Amendment No. 229 would omit paragraph (c). Subsection (3)(c) states:
''information is provided or otherwise disclosed with lawful authority if . . . it is made in pursuance of a Community obligation''.
I have no idea what community obligations are. By seeking to omit paragraph (c), I can at least draw from the Minister some explanation as to what is meant by ''a Community obligation''.
Amendment No. 141 would widen subsection (4) to say that it shall be a defence if
''the provision of information or the making of the . . . disclosure was in the public interest.''
That is a public interest, or whistleblower, defence. Because such worlds are too complicated for me, I cannot envisage circumstances in which a whistleblower may want, or feel it essential, to provide some information to the public via the press or someone else. However, whistleblowers have been badly treated by Governments over the years, and the Government, on this occasion, ought to consider carefully our amendment on whistleblowers and the issue of public interest. Perhaps the whistleblower wishes to make public some dreadful scandal—I cannot say—but at least amendment No. 141 gives the Minister an opportunity to speak to us, hopefully at some length, on whistleblowing and a possible whistleblower's defence.
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