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Mr. Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 40, in clause 35, page 30, line 14, leave out 'or'.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 41, in clause 35, page 30, line 15, at end insert
(d) increase the penalty.'.
Mr. Malins: Amendment No. 41 is the one to which I am keen to get a response. It relates to what the court can do when people appeal to it. It can allow the appeal and cancel or reduce the penalty, or dismiss the appeal. We propose that it should be able to increase the penalty. The discretion of the court to increase a penalty is sometimes useful, because it can act as a disincentive. I have regularly known prosecutors appeal against a sentence to a higher court and get it increased. When one dismisses an appeal, can one increase the penalty or not? One probably ought to be able to, but the purpose of the amendment is to probe.
Mr. Browne: The hon. Gentleman will be aware that at the objections stage the Secretary of State has the power to increase the penalty. That is relevant.
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5 pm
Sitting suspended for Divisions in the House.
5.30 pm
On resuming—
Mr. Browne: I was responding on amendments Nos. 40 and 41, which we are considering together. We heard that their effect would be to give a court considering an appeal against a penalty the power to increase that penalty, in addition to the options of reducing or cancelling the penalty or dismissing the appeal.
This is not necessary. As I said before we adjourned for the Divisions, the Secretary of State has the power to increase a penalty as a result of an objection made under clause 34(3). At that stage, the Secretary of State will have an opportunity to ascertain the full circumstances of any breach that justifies a penalty and of the individual concerned. That stage is appropriate for the penalty to be fixed, once and for all.
The purpose of clause 35 is to give individuals access to the court for a re-hearing of the Secretary of State's decision to impose a penalty. The significant disincentive of the possibility of an increased penalty would act against the interests of the appellant when the Secretary of State had imposed a penalty and against there being an opportunity to ascertain all the relevant facts.
In those circumstances, I am confident that the provisions are fair and equitable; I see no compelling need to change them. However, I also remind the Committee that this is not a revenue-raising power. It is designed to encourage people to conform to the scheme and not commit any of the offences that are relevant to these penalties. I hope that I have reassured the hon. Member for Woking that we have a coherent and fair regime of civil penalties and I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Mr. Malins: I am grateful to the Minister and on that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Allan: Just to flesh out what this means from a citizen's point of view—what would happen with the expenses of an appeal under this clause?
If an individual has been served with an order, gone through an objection on paper to the Secretary of State and now wishes to appeal the decision, am I right in assuming that anyone has the right of appeal, whatever the outcome of the objection? If they then choose to exercise that right, are there any costs associated, whether or not the appeal is successful? What is the Government's intention? The procedure will clearly cost somebody money if a county court has to take time to sit and hear an appeal.
Mr. Browne: My understanding—which will be subject to further qualification if not correct—is that the Secretary of State would not apply for a cost order with any appeal that had to go before the court.
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However, it would be inappropriate for the Secretary of State to bar an individual from the opportunity of applying for a cost order were they to be successful in an appeal and had incurred expenses. I would be content to leave that matter to the discretion of the court.
I can give an undertaking to the Committee that the Secretary of State is not presently minded to consider applying for a cost order in the event of an unsuccessful appeal by an individual.
Mr. Malins: That the matter of costs should lie within the discretion of the courts on most occasions is absolutely right. I am grateful for the Minister's answer.
Mr. Browne: I implied that the matter would lie within the discretion of the court, but that neither the Secretary of State nor I would not seek cost orders in the context of such appeals. However, that would not be a rule to be applied to the individual, who may want to take their case to appeal and may be successful. They would have to make their arguments on the basis of the normal arguments.
Mr. Allan: That is helpful. Perhaps the Minister will clarify the other point, which was that 100 per cent. of people who have been through the objection process can ask for an appeal if they choose to do so. Is there a narrowing of eligibility, because under clause 35 it seems as though there is not? Is everybody who is issued with the original notice a potential appellant, with no weeding out along the way?
Mr. Browne: I see no way in which they can be weeded out, as the hon. Gentleman suggests—although that seems an inappropriate phrase. People have to be mindful of the danger of the process being abused, but that would be a matter for the courts. If appeals without merit were taken in large numbers, the Secretary of State may have to revise his view on costs.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Fees in respect of functions
carried out under Act
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Allan: I understood, having read the record of our proceedings, that on Tuesday there was a wider debate on charges generally, and one specifically about charges that might kick-in in respect of modification of entries on the register. The Minister's response did not advance a definitive position, but suggested that there might be a distinction between changes that require the modification of the card itself, and therefore a reissue of the card that might be chargeable, and ones that did not require the card to be reissued. There remains a concern that that would also be permitted under
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clause 37(1)(a) and that charges could be made for modifications of the data that is held.
If we are saying to people, ''You are under quite a serious legal obligation to modify the record'' and they do so, it would be inappropriate for them to be hit with a charge. I question whether that would be appropriate, even where a card has to be reissued, given that the driving licence, as I understand it, has a similar provision where one is required to notify a change of address. The address is printed on the driving licence and therefore a card has to be reissued, but I understand that no charge is made.
I am thinking particularly of younger people, about whom we talked at the beginning of our proceedings, who change address regularly. If the address is on the ID card and they are required to change their address—and hit with an additional fee each time—the Government's own figures on charges, which the Minister knows we dispute, which show a one-off payment of 85 quid over 10 years that is not particularly onerous, starts to fall apart.
It is important that when we are talking about fees we understand the totality of the matter and people understand whether they are being asked genuinely to pay 85 quid every 10 years and nothing in between, or whether under clause 37 other charges will be levied against them.
Mr. Browne: The hon. Gentleman is right to understand that the clause provides the power that is required to set fees for a wide range of functions associated with the scheme. It is intended that when the scheme is established, overall running costs will be covered by a combination of charges for applications, issue of cards, identity verification services provided by the scheme, and related services, such as accreditation.
The hon. Gentleman concentrated on an issue that we have already debated at some length, but I am reluctant to go into the same detail on that issue as I did previously, because I do not have before me exactly what was said then. I was confident that what I said then was correct; I rest on that and do not wish inadvertently to contradict myself. However, I will say that the clause provides a power to charge, but it is not presently planned to charge for notification where no new card is to be issued, and I do not envisage that that will ever be planned.
The hon. Gentleman postulates a situation in which a card has to be reissued because an address will be on the face of the card. In keeping with current advice, it is not the intention to issue cards with the address printed on them. That is for obvious reasons; people might well not want that information to be on the card, or it might be overlooked in innocent circumstances but used for malign purposes.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38
Amendment of Consular Fees Act 1980
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
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Mr. Clifton-Brown: I would be grateful if the Minister clarified his thinking on this clause. It allows cross-subsidy with regard to certain groups of people applying for passports. When the Bill comes into effect, the identity card will be an integral part of applying for a passport. Pensioners who apply for a passport have been receiving them free of charge for the last little while; will that also extend to ID cards?
Mr. Browne: I rise to respond, in so far as I can, to the hon. Gentleman's point. The policy in relation to ID cards for those pensioners who are entitled to free passports has not yet been fixed. However, there is a logic in what the hon. Gentleman says, and I will bear his comments in mind when the time comes to make those decisions, and I am sure that the Secretary of State will, too.
The clause amends the statutory basis of passport fees to provide explicit powers to cross-subsidise between applications and to make exemptions. It will come into effect two months after Royal Assent, by virtue of clause 45(5).
This provision is necessary to moderate the impact on passport fees of the development costs of passport initiatives, such as the introduction of biometrics and of interviews for adult first-time applicants. Otherwise, there would have to be a differentiation of fee for those first-time applicants whom it is intended will, for very good security reasons, be required to undergo a face-to-face interview comparatively quickly. The amendments the clause makes to the Consular Fees Act 1980 will allow the recovery of such costs to be spread across several years, and across all types of passport application, not just those directly affected. That is fair.
The initiatives currently being pursued by the UK Passport Service are intended to improve the security of the British passport—which is to the benefit of all of us—and to maintain its acceptability for international travel. Many of them will also in due course be incorporated into the ID card scheme, but facilitating the ID card scheme is not the principal purpose.
Clause 38 makes it possible for free passports for those born before 2 September 1929 to be funded from passport fees; that replaces the current arrangement of supporting that from the general Home Office funds. That is also fair, because it is a reflection of the debt we owe those people; we all agree that that should be reflected in this modest measure.
I must emphasise that there remains a provision in the 1980 Act that all fees prescribed shall be levied, accounted for and applied in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Treasury. Any proposed passport fee increase will therefore remain subject to Treasury scrutiny and approval.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
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