Inquiries Bill [Lords]


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Mr. Carmichael: The hon. Member for Huntingdon has dealt comprehensively with the amendments and, as a result of that, I can be more succinct. He has indicated that my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall (Mr. Tyler) and I support the amendment and have added our names to it.

As the hon. Member for Huntingdon said, the crucial factor is that inquiries are independent. More than that, however, they must be seen to be independent. The hon. Gentleman’s amendments are all about power—about taking a little bit of the power from the Minister. They are not about an absolute veto, but move from consultation to seeking agreement. If that agreement cannot be obtained, presumably the power to act remains with the Minister. Without wishing to be Swiftian, the proposal is modest and, as such, I have no difficulty in supporting it.

Mr. Leslie: I commend the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) on the concise synopsis of his argument. It contrasts slightly with the comprehensive comments of the hon. Member for Huntingdon. It is interesting to compare the two
 
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approaches. The amendments would all require the Minister to obtain the consent of the chairman about certain decisions throughout the inquiry.

Mr. Djanogly: Will the Minister give way?

Mr. Leslie: In my first sentence, yes.

Mr. Djanogly: As for the length of time that I took to speak to the amendments, it is worth my making the point that, in the other place, each amendment was taken separately and debated at some length. The Minister is therefore getting off quite lightly.

Mr. Leslie: For some reason, the hon. Gentleman imagines that I was complaining about him. In fact, sometimes I want him to talk for longer. It is a pity that he was not even more comprehensive.

We are worried about giving a veto to the chairman in respect of certain decisions during the inquiry and consider that the Bill, as drafted, is sufficient and strikes the right balance. Ultimately, the Minister has the responsibility for establishing an inquiry, so it follows that the power to cope with various details as a result of that decision, including the power to appoint a panel to look into the inquiry, its terms of references and so on should also rest with the commissioning Minister. That has been the case with all past inquiries, and there have not been massive complaints about it. The clause requires the Minister to consult the chairman before appointing a member of the panel or setting the terms of reference. That requirement carries with it an obligation seriously to take into account the chairman’s views. The fact that we seek not to give a veto, should not be interpreted as meaning that we do not seriously want to have a dialogue and consultation with the chairman. Of course we do. The process must be serious.

We must remember that, in practical terms, the Minister will have to make sure that a chairman is content with the panel and the terms of reference. It would not be in the Minister’s interest to appoint members of a panel or a chairman who did not want to undertake an inquiry, given the terms of reference. That would not make for an effective inquiry panel. The chairman will have the option of walking away from the job if he is not content with the proposed terms of reference, the initial panel members or any other proposals to appoint further panel members under the Bill.

It is the Minister’s job—not that of the chairman—to set up an inquiry. As for panel membership, clauses 9 and 10 create obligations on the Minister to ensure that the panel is impartial and has the necessary expertise. If the chairman were to have a veto over panel members, that might put stress on the Minister’s ability to fulfil those obligations and could overrule his important obligations under clauses 9 and 10. That would not be right. We must remember that, when something has gone wrong with the public service system, it is the Minister’s responsibility to ensure that
 
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it is investigated. He is responsible to Parliament for that. He or she is the person who must set out the terms of reference to Parliament and be answerable for them.

I was under the impression that amendment No. 3 drew attention to drafting issues, in that it sought to “seek the agreement” of the chairman, but not secure it. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland suggested that that was a deliberate attempt. I am not clear how it would work in practice because to “seek the agreement” does not necessarily entail securing it. However, it would not be wise to put that obfuscation into statute.

Amendment No. 11 deals with the removal of panel members. It is extremely important to the effectiveness of the inquiry and to public confidence in its findings that the panel members are, and are seen to be, competent, impartial and respected. The power to remove panel members is needed as a fail-safe mechanism, but the Minister must be able to act to ensure that the effectiveness and integrity of the inquiry is not compromised. The Minister is accountable to Parliament. It is important to remember that it is the Minister, not the panel chairman, who should carry the can for those changes. The Minister also has a responsibility to ensure that taxpayers’ money is not wasted. If an inquiry becomes ineffective or biased, or its panel loses the confidence of the public, it may be a complete waste of money. The Minister must be able to stop such a situation arising.

11.15 am

Mr. Djanogly: The hon. Gentleman says repeatedly that the Minister should be able to step in, but we are very worried about that. Can he not see that there are widely held public concerns, which go much further than those of the Conservative party, that the Government’s ability to step in could lead to unfortunate consequences that would affect the inquiry’s credibility?

Mr. Leslie: There are specific reasons and circumstances in which the Minister can remove panel members, which I will come to in a minute. The hon. Gentleman suggests that any reasons could be given, which is not the case. He also talks as if Ministers operate in a vacuum, which they do not. There are many pressures and constraints on Ministers—not just public opinion, and, ultimately, Parliament. That is our constitutional position; Parliament has ultimate scrutiny and control over Ministers, which is not to be underestimated. In our constitution, we must recognise that Ministers establish the inquiries and, as a consequence, they must be involved in the way those inquiries continue.

Of course, the chairman should be consulted about the removal of a panel member and the Minister will have to take the chairman’s views into account. The Bill sets out the process for panel members to make representations and request wider consultation with the panel to ensure that they are treated fairly. However, at the end of the day the Minister has to take responsibility for the decisions and defend them, and the chairman has to be free to get on with the inquiry. If we accepted the amendments and the matter was left
 
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to the chairman, who is not accountable to Parliament, there is no ultimate sanction or way of dealing with his decision.

The hon. Member for Huntingdon suggested that Ministers could remove the panel members for any reason, which is not quite the case, as clause 13 sets out reasons why panel members can be removed. The first is that they can no longer carry out their duties, because of illness, for example. The second is that there is a conflict of interest. The third is a failure to comply with the duty under the Bill. The fourth is misconduct.

Amendments Nos. 16 and 17 deal with the circumstances in which the chairman’s concurrence might be sought for the suspension, or early ending, of an inquiry. Clauses 14 and 15 are designed as safeguards in case unexpected situations arise. If a Minister suspends an inquiry or ends it early, he has to set out his reasons for so doing and inform Parliament of them. Any improper or unreasonable decision to suspend an inquiry could be challenged in the courts through judicial review because Ministers are always obliged to act reasonably, and it would also be open to question in Parliament, where the Minister, not the chairman, would be held to account.

The Minister is already required to consult the chairman about suspending an inquiry or ending it early, and the Minister would have to think carefully before going against the chairman’s wishes, not least because the chairman has the powerful option of making his objections public. In certain circumstances, there can be good reasons to suspend an inquiry and a statutory requirement for the chairman to consent is not appropriate. For example, clause 14 allows an inquiry to be suspended to allow for the completion of civil or criminal proceedings, which is very important. If an inquiry was ongoing at the same time as a criminal trial, it could prejudice the trial. The Government must protect the public interest in the interests of the effective administration of justice. As a public authority, they are bound to protect individual rights to a fair trial under the European convention on human rights. It is not appropriate potentially to prevent Ministers from performing those duties by giving the chairman a veto in such circumstances.

The Minister also has a duty to safeguard public funds. If it is clear that it is no longer in the public interest to continue the inquiry, the Minister has to be able to bring it to an end; otherwise, public money could be wasted. In the vast majority of cases, there are sensible reasons for ending an inquiry with which the chairman might agree, but I am not convinced that the chairman should have the right of veto, for the reasons that I have given. The amendment would mean that in very rare situations in which a chairman weighed up the factors differently, he could insist that an inquiry continued. Taxpayer’s money could be spent wastefully on continuing the inquiry, but, unlike the Minister, the chairman could not be held accountable to Parliament for his actions in the way that our constitution currently sets out.

Ministers do not operate in a vacuum. They are accountable to Parliament and ultimately Parliament has sanctions over them. I therefore believe that this is
 
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the best way to proceed with the Bill. I understand that there was widespread debate in the other place about the nature of the powers that might be given to the chairman. Indeed, the shadow Lord Chancellor when moving his amendment on the different powers that the chairman might have, including a veto over terms of reference, acknowledged that it would give a chairman a power

    “which I think in the circumstances is inappropriate”. [Official Report, House of Lords, 18 January 2005; Vol. 668, c. GC232.]

Lord Kingsland recognised that the Government were putting forward serious issues and that we needed to protect in our constitution the power of Parliament to hold Ministers to account. For those reasons, I hope that the amendments will be rejected.

Mr. Djanogly: As the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland said, these are reasonable amendments. They are supported by virtually every political or human rights organisation that has commented on them. The Minister has stated twice that the Government do not operate in a vacuum. His position on these amendments tends to indicate that they do, in so far as they have not listened to other people. Once again we are seeing the creeping powers of the Executive. The Minister has been up front in his response, but we cannot agree with his position here. I shall be requesting a Division on amendment No. 3, which represents the official Opposition’s position.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 2, Noes 6.

[Division No. 3]

AYES

Carmichael, Mr. Alistair
Djanogly, Mr. Jonathan

NOES

Campbell, Mrs. Anne
Davies, Geraint
Leslie, Mr. Christopher
Pound, Mr. Stephen
Prentice, Bridget
Rooney, Mr. Terry

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Setting-up date and terms of reference

Mr. Carmichael: I beg to move amendment No. 36, in clause 5, page 2, line 21, at end insert—

      ‘(ia)   consult, as appropriate, on the terms of reference.’.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 38, in clause 5, page 2, line 28, at end insert

    ‘and may consult any other person or bodies as he considers appropriate.’.

Mr. Carmichael: The effect of both amendments is to give the Minister the power to consult beyond the chairman about the terms of reference for any inquiry set up under the Bill. Hon. Members who have taken the time and trouble to read them will see that they are
 
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identical in their effect, if not in their terms. There may be one of two explanations for that. The Committee may wish to accept my view that we have offered the Minister two versions of the same thing from which he can choose. The Committee may feel, however, that this is an inevitable consequence of trying to manage
 
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affairs in Committee from the remoter parts of a fairly remote constituency on a Friday afternoon when deadlines for tabling amendments loom.

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o’clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half past Two o’clock.

 
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