Clause 50
Complaints and misconduct
Amendments made:
No. 20, in clause 50, page 24, line 41, leave out 'three months.' and insert 'one month.'.
No. 96, in clause 50, page 24, line 29, at end insert—
'(1A) In relation to an offence under section [Disclosure to prosecuting authority] committed before the commencement of section 282 of the Criminal Justice Act (short sentences), the reference in section [Disclosure to prosecuting authority](6)(b) to 12 months shall have effect as if it were a reference to six months.'.—[Dawn Primarolo]
Clause 50, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 51 and 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
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New Clause 3
Disclosure to prosecuting authority
'(1) Disclosure is in accordance with this section (as mentioned in section 17(2)(b)) if made—
(a) to a prosecuting authority, and
(b) for the purpose of enabling the authority—
(i) to consider whether to institute criminal proceedings in respect of a matter considered in the course of an investigation conducted by or on behalf of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, or
(ii) to give advice in connection with a criminal investigation (within the meaning of section 31(5)(b)) or criminal proceedings.
(2) In subsection (1) ''prosecuting authority'' means—
(a) the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions,
(b) in Scotland, the Lord Advocate or a procurator fiscal, and
(c) in Northern Ireland, the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.
(3) Information disclosed to a prosecuting authority in accordance with this section may not be further disclosed except—
(a) for a purpose connected with the exercise of the prosecuting authority's functions, or
(b) with the consent of the Commissioners (which may be general or specific).'.
(4) A person commits an offence if he contravenes subsection (3).
(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he reasonably believed—
(a) that the disclosure was lawful, or]
(b) that the information had already and lawfully been made available to the public.
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, to a fine or to both, or
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both.
(7) A prosecution for an offence under this section may be instituted in England and Wales only—
(a) by the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions, or
(b) with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
(8) A prosecution for an offence under this section may be instituted in Northern Ireland only—
(a) by the Commissioners, or
(b) with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.
(9) In the application of this section to Scotland or Northern Ireland the reference in subsection (6)(b) to 12 months shall be taken as a reference to six months.'.—[Dawn Primarolo]
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
10.15 am
New Clause 4
Data protection, &c.
`Nothing in sections 16 to [Disclosure to prosecuting authority] authorises the making of a disclosure which—
(a) contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998 (c. 29), or
(b) is prohibited by Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c. 23).'.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
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New Clause 5
Disclosure of information to Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions
'(1) A person specified in subsection (2) may disclose information held by him to the Director for a purpose connected with a specified investigation or prosecution.
(b) the Director General of the National Criminal Intelligence Service,
(c) the Director General of the National Crime Squad,
(d) the Director of the Serious Fraud Office,
(e) the Director General of the Serious Organised Crime Agency,
(f) the Director of Public Prosecutions,
(g) the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, and
(h) such other persons as the Attorney General may specify by order.
(3) An order under subsection (2)(h)—
(a) may specify a person only if, or in so far as, he appears to the Attorney General to be exercising public functions,
(b) may include transitional or incidental provision,
(c) shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(d) shall not be made unless a draft has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, each House of Parliament.
(4) In relation to a person if or in so far as he exercises functions in respect of Northern Ireland subsections (2)(h) and (3)(a) shall have effect as if a reference to the Attorney General were a reference to—
(a) the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, or
(b) before the commencement of section 27(1) of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 (c. 26), the Attorney General for Northern Ireland.
(5) In the application of this section to Scotland, references to the Attorney General are to be read as references to a Minister of the Crown (including the Treasury).
(6) Nothing in this section authorises the making of a disclosure which—
(a) contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998 (c. 29), or
(b) is prohibited by Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c. 23).'.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 1
Transfer of property held off-shore
'(1) The Treasury shall make a scheme identifying any rights and liabilities in property of the old commissioners which shall, by virtue of section 43, vest in the new commissioners and which is owned by any person resident or company registered outside the United Kingdom.
(2) A scheme may include consequential and incidental provision.
(3) A scheme shall include provision that any property identified therein shall be managed in accordance with best value.
''best value'' means arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way in which functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and
the expressions ''the new commissioners'' and ''the old commissioners'' have the same meaning as in section 43.'.
Brought up, and read the First time.
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Mr. David Heathcoat-Amory (Wells) (Con): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause is tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Mr. Fallon), who cannot be here today because of his duties on the Treasury Committee. The purpose of both new clauses that we have tabled is to examine the provisions that have been made for future management of the property estate and the IT facilities of both the Revenue departments. New clause 1 would identify a scheme for managing the assets, and, indeed, liabilities, of the property of the departments, and to place a best value obligation on the new department, in line with what we understand the Treasury wants to achieve throughout the public sector. It should not be particularly controversial.
The merger and the Bill should be an opportunity anyway to review the existing provisions for managing the assets in question. I do not think that the House should agree to a merger unless it is satisfied that the assets of the departments will be in good hands. However, I am afraid that the history of property management in the departments is not altogether happy, and it has engaged the critical attention and comments of the Public Accounts Committee.
The departments put their property out to tender. It was a very comprehensive process, not just for the management but for the future ownership of the property. The tender was won by a company called Mapeley STEPS, a new company in the field. It is clear now that not much was known about it at the time. It was later discovered that one of the reasons why Mapeley STEPS could win the overall contract was that it had the advantage of being based offshore, in Bermuda, and was therefore receiving substantial tax advantages. It was, on the face of it, not very surprising when it beat its rivals to the management of that enormous property portfolio.
Whether through innocence in the departments, lack of experience or failure to take advice—we do not know—the fact of the offshore tax advantages was simply not known at the time of the contract. Indeed, when it was spotted by others, the initial parliamentary answers given by the Treasury were misleading. That was, I am sure, an innocent oversight, and was corrected when it became apparent that the company concerned was based overseas. But I am afraid that it showed a startling lack of proper oversight by the Treasury in this enormous transaction, which will stretch forward for the next 20 years. We are not discussing a passing business arrangement of a revenue nature; this was a contract to place the whole property estate in private hands, managed by the private sector, for the best part of a generation.
The affair attracted a good deal of parliamentary criticism, as I have said, but it is still not clear to me how it happened. The failures of management and oversight should perhaps have led to a more thoroughgoing review in the departments concerned. Perhaps something went on that Parliament was not told about. Clearly, the action that we understood to have been taken did not measure up to the scale of the problem.
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That is the history of the matter. The Bill is an opportunity, not for a fresh start—that is not possible—but at least for an examination to ensure that the claims made at the time of the transfer have indeed been fulfilled and will be carried forward under the new arrangements. I should therefore like to ask the Paymaster General some questions.
It seems that the National Audit Office made some projections about the cost to the Revenue departments of the new contract. It estimated that the so-called facility payment that makes up the bulk of the cost would run at £170 million per year. That would be the overall cost of all the works undertaken by Mapeley on behalf of the departments. That is not the total cost because the facility price, although the biggest cost, is not the only one. There are other costs, to do with new buildings, and pass-through costs; costs incurred by Mapeley that are simply recharged to the departments. The great bulk of the overall cost is the facility price.
According to the figures that I have, over the first three years of the contract, instead of running at £170 million a year, the costs ran at £196 million for the first year, then £219 million, and then, last year, £233 million. Those figures are of course far in excess of what the National Audit Office projected at the time. The Paymaster General has written to my hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks to try to explain the figures, but it is not altogether clear to me that they are satisfactory.
The Paymaster General points out that the National Audit Office estimate was an average over 20 years, but then writes that the actual cash payments are higher than this average in all years. I do not understand how, if they are high in all years, they can possibly reach that average. Perhaps there is an arithmetical complexity there that I have overlooked, but it seems that the earlier estimate was a pretty gross underestimate.
Indeed, if the other costs that I mentioned, such as the pass-through costs, are added on, the costs are getting on for twice what the National Audit Office price stated. It seems that under the terms of the contract—or because of escalation clauses, indexation or whatever—the amount of money paid by the public sector is substantially higher than was expected at the time. Will the right hon. Lady enlighten us on that point?
My main point is that merging the two departments should bring the opportunity for substantial savings; that is one of the reasons advanced for such a merger. Operations are to be consolidated, and presumably a number of physical changes will take place, as departments that have been separate move into the same building. Some examples of where that will definitely be the case have been given. One assumes therefore that provision was made for that possibility under the Mapeley STEPS contract. Will the Paymaster General tell us what was anticipated about that possibility, which has always been an option, when the contract was signed?
The Treasury always has such matters under review—it certainly did in the last Government—and, as we know, the Treasury Committee has urged merger on the Government before. The possibility would
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definitely have been foreseen, even if it was not a definite plan at the time of the signature of the contract. My question is about what we can trigger now to allow those savings in property to flow through and for lower payments under the Mapeley STEPS contract to be made by the merged departments.
Finally, I revert to the terms of the new clause. It would require the Treasury to bring forward such a scheme, which would best be done by the publication by the Treasury of further details of the Mapeley STEPS contract, amended or adapted to take account of the merger. The new clause would also impose a best value obligation, which would sweep up many of the criticisms and suggestions made by the Public Accounts Committee and others after examining the history of the departments in managing their property, not always particularly well.
Let us use this Bill and this merger as an opportunity for a changed approach. We have a contract before us, but my question to the right hon. Lady is about what savings she can assure us will flow through to the public sector as a result of the merger.
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