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|Chinook Mk 2/2a||40||13||None|
|Lynx Mk 7||60||22||16|
|Lynx Mk 9||15||7||2|
|Lynx Mk 3||23||8||8|
|Lynx Mk 8||24||10||2|
|Merlin Mk 1||29||13||2|
|Merlin Mk 3||15||7||None|
|Puma Mk 1||31||7||8|
|Gazelle Mk 1||107||None||12|
|Sea King Mk 3||13||6||None|
|Sea King Mk 3a||4||2||None|
|Sea King Mk 4||29||8||None|
|Sea King Mk 5||13||3||1|
|Sea King Mk 6||3||2||40|
|Sea King Mk 6c||5||None||None|
|Sea King Mk 7||9||2||None|
|Apache AH Mk1||56||11||None|
In addition to the aircraft listed in the table, the department contracts for a Commercially Owned Military Registered (COMR) fleet of helicopters. These helicopters are on the Military Register and flown by military aircrew, but are owned and maintained by commercial operators, these are shown in the following table. Servicing of the COMR helicopters is the responsibility of the leasing agency.
Adam Price: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) whether the British Deputy Senior Judge Advocate in Iraq referred to in a letter from the former Minister of State to the hon. Member for Carmarthen, East and Dinefwr submitted regular reports to his British superiors; 
(5) whether the UK officer acting as Deputy Senior Judge Advocate in Iraq advised (a) the US authorities and (b) his supervisors in the chain of command that some of the interrogation techniques in the CJIF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy Document
27 Jun 2005 : Column 1209W
(i) were inhumane under UK case law and (ii) constituted a potential breach of the Geneva Conventions in the view of the Government; 
Mr. Ingram: I undertook to write to you in answer to your Parliamentary Questions of 23 May 2005, Official Report, columns 2425W, on the role of UK staff embedded within the office of the Staff Judge Advocate in the Combined Joint Task Force 7. I wrote to you on 16 June correcting an inaccuracy in a previous letter and attaching responses to these outstanding Parliamentary Questions. I am writing to you again now to set out in the body of a letter the answers I gave you so that they can be published in the Official Report.
The British Officer embedded within the office of the Staff Judge Advocate had a very limited role in relation to detainees. In addition to providing comments on a US interrogation policy document in August 2003, he produced a summary of an ICRC Report in November 2003, which was circulated to senior personnel within CJTF-7. With regard to operational law, he provided advice on targeting and operational planning at Corps level. This involved the application of the Laws of Armed Conflict and US Rules of Engagement.
We have established that the British Officer did not see a version of the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance" policy. The British Officer played no part in drafting that policy. This is contrary to my letter of 31 January 2005. I apologise for the error. In fact, the British Officer saw a separate US interrogation policy document dated 27 August 2003.
That Document was entitled ABU GHURAYB: Saddam Fedayeen Interrogation Facility (SFIF) Detainee Interrogation Policy". We understand that it was drafted to apply to one section within Abu Ghraib, and the Fay report confirms that it was quickly superseded by the September version of the Interrogation and Counter-Resistance" policy, which we have not seen.
It sets out a range of interrogation techniques which were considered to be lawful under the prevailing US interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. The document was written by and for US personnel to whom the US interpretation applied. The document was passed to us in confidence, and we cannot release details of its contents.
Harry Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what action has been taken on unexploded ordnance in the region of Iraq where the UK has responsibility; how much has been (a) allocated and (b) spent to date by the UK for this purpose; how much ordnance has been destroyed; what estimate has been made of unexploded ordnance still to be dealt with in the area; and if he will make a statement. 
Mr. Ingram: The UK takes seriously its obligations to deal with unexploded ordnance in Iraq. Since the end of major combat operations, a UK Joint Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group (currently about 90 strong) has been deployed alongside other coalition forces, NGOs and contractors clearing sites containing unexploded ordnance. During the war fighting phase over 200,000 items of munitions were destroyed by coalition teams. Since then a further 860,000 items have been recovered or destroyed by UK teams. The UK has uncovered 67 formal ammunition depots in the region of Iraq where the UK has responsibility. The UK has currently cleared 64 of these depots; the final three are in the process of being cleared.
The Department for International Development has provided further funding to this area through UN-related organisations and a UK-registered charity, Mines Advisory Group. £30 million has been provided to the United Nations Development Group International Trust Fund to support Explosive Ordnance Disposal capacity building and clearance. Inaddition, £4 million has been directed to the UnitedNations Mines Action Service to provide the UN's humanitarian agencies with a responsive and co-ordinated mine action capability to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Further funding of around £2 million has been directed through the Mines Advisory Group to facilitate a number of projects.
Mr. Ingram: The United Kingdom is committed to remaining in Iraq for as long as the Iraqi Government judge that the coalition is required to provide security and assist the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The prevailing security situation, progress on the political process and development of the ISF will be factors in determining the timeline for eventual UK force level reductions.
Mr. Meacher: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) US soldiers and (b) UK soldiers have been killed in (i) Iraq and (ii) Afghanistan in each month since the end of the wars in those countries. 
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