|Previous Section||Index||Home Page|
Adam Price: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many service personnel (a) opted for an early discharge from duties, (b) opted against extending their service and (c) have been medically discharged in the last 12 months. 
PVR is defined as all applications and exits from trained personnel that are generated by the individual before their time expiry. Types of engagement and procedures for premature release differ between the services.
|IC(16) to CC(17)||250||240||(15)|
|CC(17) to FTC(18)(5508240019)||70||70||(15)|
|Royal Marines (Dec Board)||230||180||30|
|Royal Navy (May Board)||1,330||1,130||200|
Not all individuals are given the option of extending their service, and it is not possible to identify how many people would or would not have opted against extending their service if given the choice. The option to extend service can be offered over a year before the current service is due to end.
For the Royal Air Force, in the vast majority of cases it is not possible to tell whether an individual reaching the end of an agreed period of service has been offered the opportunity of further service. It is consequently not possible to tell how many personnel have turned down any offers.
Mr. Ingram: The average annual cost of maintaining HMS Victory over the last five complete financial years was some £1.1 million. This figure includes the cost of preservation, maintenance and restoration work.
Mr. Moore: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many reservists in Iraq have been classed as unfit since March 2003 and have since been classed as fit for mobilisation; and if he will make a statement. 
Mrs. Humble: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has sought a legal opinion on the compatibility of administrative discharge as a result of Manning Control reviews with (a) the Employment Rights Act 1996, (b) other employment legislation and (c) European law. 
Mr. Touhig [holding answer 25 October 2005]: I refer my hon. Friend to the answers given on 27 November 2002, Official Report, column 333W and 3 March 2004, Official Report, column 961W, to the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch).
Mrs. Humble: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what guidance he has issued on the conduct of manning control reviews; when the last occasion was on which such a review was the subject of a direction in daily orders; and if he will place copies of such (a) guidance and (b) directions in the Library. 
Mr. Gordon Prentice: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence further to his statement in the House of 7 July 2005, Official Report, column 481, on defence in the world, what recent assessment he has made of the risk of nuclear explosion in the UK arising from fissile material stolen in the former Soviet Union. 
John Reid: Threats from all forms of terrorism, including nuclear, are kept under constant review. The UK is currently undertaking a series of projects under the Global Partnership to enhance material security across the former Soviet Union. In addition to Russian funded security enhancements, foreign-funded programmes to enhance nuclear safety and security at sites across the FSU have resulted in significant improvements to the overall security of fissile material in Russia.
Mr. Ingram: The Ministry of Defence has not funded any pure research into fission or fusion reactors since 1975 and has no aspiration to change from the established pressurised water reactor type of technology employed in Royal Navy nuclear submarines.
Mike Penning: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he last had discussions with the chief of the defence staff about the availability and preparedness of the armed forces for sustained deployment; and if he will make a statement. 
|Chief Petty Officer||4|
|Warrant Officer 1||1|
|Warrant Officer 2||5|
|Chief Petty Officer||11|
|Warrant Officer 2||3|
|Chief Petty Officer||8|
|Chief Petty Officer||1|
John Reid: As stated in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the UK purchased 58 Trident II (D5) missiles. Missiles are either deployed onboard UK submarines or held ashore at the Royal Naval Armament Depot Coulport, on a temporary basis, or in the United States at the Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, as part of a shared pool of US/UK missiles. In line with the policy set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the UK maintains a stockpile of fewer than 200 operationally available nuclear warheads, 48 of which are onboard the single submarine on deterrent patrol. The remaining warheads are held ashore in the UK; none is stored in the United States.
John Reid: All the UK's Trident missiles have been de-targeted since 1994, and the submarine on deterrent patrol is normally at several days notice to fire. The missiles can be targeted in sufficient time to meet any foreseeable requirement.
|Next Section||Index||Home Page|