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Mr. Harper: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) if he will break down the Request for Resources (a) 2 and (b) 3 outturn by (i) direct resource departmental expenditure limit (DEL) and (ii) indirect resource DEL for financial years 19992000 to 200405; 
(2) if he will break down each of the figures for conflict prevention costs in (a) note 2 page 188, (b) note 2 page 159 and (c) note 2 page 135 of his Department's Annual Report and Accounts 200405 (HC 1080) by (i) direct resource departmental expenditure limit (DEL) and (ii) indirect resource DEL. 
Prior to the introduction of Stage 2 Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) in financial year 200304, indirect RDEL did not exist as a budgeting aggregate, and I therefore provide figures for Request for Resources 2 for financial years 200304 and 200405 in the following table. These are the same figures as those disclosed in the Annual Report and Accounts 200405 page 188 note 2 (HC464) and 200304 page 159 note 2 (HC1080), to which I assume the hon. Member refers.
13 Feb 2006 : Column 1581W
|Outturn||RDEL direct||RDEL indirect|
|Total conflict prevention costs: 200405|
|Conflict Prevention Programme||48||48||0|
|Total conflict prevention costs: 200304|
|Democratic Republic of the Congo||1||1||0|
|Conflict Prevention Programme||40||40||0|
Request for Resources 3 is for the payment of war pensions and allowances, and all costs disclosed in the Annual Report and Accounts for each year since the introduction of RAB are classified as annually managed expenditure (AME), rather than as resource DEL. There are no separate direct and indirect controls on AME. The outturn figures for each year are published in the Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts for financial years 200203 onwards, which are available in the Library of the House. Prior to that the Veterans Agency (formerly the War Pensions Agency), which administers these payments, was the responsibility of the Department of Work and Pensions, and the Ministry of Defence did not have a Request for Resources 3.
Mr. Touhig: The Ministry of Defence last changed its London Weighting allowance in 2002 as part of its four year pay settlement which concluded in 2005. London Weighting will be one of a number of issues being considered during this year's pay negotiations.
Mr. Touhig: Figures are not held centrally on the total number of Service personnel who are suffering from clinical depression or post traumatic stress disorder and this could therefore only be provided at disproportionate cost.
Mr. Bone: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 11 January 2006, Official Report, column 667W, on RAF aircraft, whether the current estimated cost of Eurofighter Typhoon is (a) substantially below, (b) substantially above and (c) similar to the original cost. 
Mr. Hoyle: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he last discussed departmental requirements in Gibraltar with the (a) Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, (b) Governor of Gibraltar and (c) Chief Minister of Gibraltar. 
Mr. Ingram: There are no plans to change Gibraltar's current military role, which centres on providing a forward mounting base and other facilities to support overseas operations. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has had no discussions on this issue with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Governor of Gibraltar or the Chief Minister of Gibraltar.
Mr. Touhig: The Government has received a significant number of representations about Gulf War Syndrome over the years. It places a high priority on addressing the concerns of 199091 Gulf veterans and we continue to respond to representations from parliamentarians and others on various issues relating to Gulf veterans' illnesses, including Gulf War Syndrome. We remain committed to providing medical assistance through the Medical Assessment Programme, financial support through the War Pensions Scheme and armed forces occupational schemes. We have commissioned a large amount of research on these illnesses and remain committed to openness in response to this complex issue.
As indicated in my written statement of 24 November 2005, Official Report, columns 12829WS, the Government was pleased to note the recent decision of the Pensions Appeal Tribunal (PAT) in the case of former Guardsman Daniel Martin which accepted the use of Gulf War Syndrome as an umbrella term to cover accepted conditions which are causally linked to the 199091 Gulf conflict. We hope that the use of the umbrella term will address the known concern of some Gulf veterans that we have not recognised a link between their ill-health and the 199091 Gulf conflict. The PAT decision also confirmed our position that there is insufficient reliable evidence to indicate that Gulf War Syndrome exists as a discrete pathological entity, or in other words as a recognised disease.
Mr. Touhig: The RAND Report entitled A Review of the Scientific Literature as it Pertains to Gulf War Illnesses, Volume 2: Pyridostigmine Bromide" was published in October 1999. Following its publication, a detailed review and written assessment were produced by the Ministry of Defence's Gulf Veterans Illness Unit. A copy of this is available in the Library of the House.
In summary, the review presented no new scientific work on pyridostigmine bromide and its possible association with Gulf Veterans Illness; rather it discussed a series of possible hypotheses drawn from speculation and debate at the time. The report did not advance our understanding as to whether pyridostigmine bromide was a contributing factor to illness suffered by Gulf Veterans. MOD has not commissioned any further work on the RAND Report.
Mr. Ancram: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what weapon systems using propellants and explosives containing pyridines were employed by UK forces during Operation (a) Granby and (b) Telic. 
Mr. Touhig: No weapon systems using propellants and explosives containing pyridines were used by UK forces during either Operation Granby or Operation Telic. There are no explosives or propellants currently in service with UK armed forces that contain pyridine.
Mr. Ancram: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence to what extent the decision to provide nerve agent pre-treatment tablets to forces serving during the Iraq war in 2003 was based upon information on chemical weapons in Iraq; what chemical weapons were identified in this information; and for how many of those chemicals the information on use in Iraq was not borne out by the report of the Iraq Survey Group. 
Mr. Touhig: In preparing for operations in Iraq, an assessment was produced on the likely CBRN threats to UK forces. A number of nerve agents were assessed to be available for use by the Iraqi regime. Delivery systems were assessed to include mortars, artillery, rocket artillery, aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, spray tanks and UAVs.
The decision to issue NAPS, a licensed pre-treatment for nerve agent poisoning, to UK deployed forces and subsequently to order its use was a sensible and prudent measure, partly based upon this assessment and Iraq's previous use of CW during the Iran/Iraq war and against the citizens of Hallabja.
The Iraq Survey Group did not discover any large scale CW agent production facilities or stockpiles. However, in their findings they judged that Iraq had the intention to pursue WMD programmes when UN sanctions were lifted.
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