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Mr. Chope: It is a very long time since I was a Minister in the equivalent of the Minister's Department, but I recall that in those days, it was the building inspector's responsibility to look at a building's construction and to decide whether the building regulations had been complied with. We privatised the building inspectorate so that a range of different people could carry out building inspection responsibilities, and my understanding is that it is already incumbent on the person constructing or seeking to alter a house to employ a building inspector. If so, why should a building inspector so employed not ensure that a building complies with the regulations? The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Andrew Stunell) thinks that—even before the new, much more stringent regulations come into force on 6 April—the majority of new houses do not comply with the building regulations.
Andrew Stunell: That is not my opinion; it is the result of a survey carried out by the Building Research Establishment. It identified the cause of the problem—the privatisation of the building inspection regime that the hon. Gentleman has just boasted about.
Mr. Chope: That is a bit of a non sequitur, is it not? As a result of such privatisation, house builders are entitled to ask a range of different people to carry out building inspections. If a builder fails to employ a building inspector or to produce certificates, they fail to comply with the building regulations. However, under the new clause, instead of the onus being placed on the building inspector, it is the constructor who will be subject to prosecution, and long after the event.
The extent of the powers being taken in the new clause is absolutely unconscionable. The normal principle in a magistrates court is that someone has to receive a summons or similar information within six months of committing an offence, and we know how that process operates with speeding or other motoring offences, for example. Unless someone is charged within a maximum of six months of committing such an offence, it is, in a sense, time-expired. The thinking behind that principle is that such a person cannot possibly recall exactly what they were doing more than six months after laying such information before a court.
That is the background to section 127(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, which provides an important safeguard against the abuse of arbitrary power. In essence, it says that anyone who is going to charge somebody with an offence had better get on with it. There is no reason why building inspectors should be unable to have the relevant information at the time
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when the building in question is being constructed. Six months is obviously a reasonable period within which they or the owner of the building can be prosecuted if there has been a failure to comply with the regulations. Why should the period be extended beyond that?
Implicit in the new clause is the belief that there is a problem with identifying whether there has been a breach of the building regulations, but surely such matters should be the responsibility of the building inspector, who has a statutory duty in this regard. If there is collusion between a building inspector and a developer—it seems that the hon. Member for Hazel Grove thinks that that has been happening—that is a separate issue. That would be a conspiracy to break the law. There is no time limit for the initiation of prosecution. Conspiracy is a serious criminal allegation and a serious criminal charge. If there is a conspiracy between a developer or the builder of a house and a building inspector to try to mislead on whether the building regulations have been complied with, that is not covered by the time limit, because that would be a conspiracy.
12.30 pm
In a situation short of a conspiracy, why do we need to make an exception to the general principle that is set out in section 127(1) that for such an offence any information should be laid within the period of six months? In the new clause, the Government are saying that such information can be laid within two years rather than six months. That is subject only to the qualification that information is laid within six months beginning with what is described as "the relevant date". That is the date
"on which evidence sufficient to justify the proceedings comes to the knowledge of the person commencing the proceedings."
An incredibly wide power is being taken by the Government. Subsection (5) says that if the person bringing the proceedings is a local authority—it does not matter if it is anybody else—
"evidence is to be regarded . . . as sufficient to justify the proceedings if in the opinion of the proper officer . . . it is sufficient to justify the proceedings."
In other words, there is no objective assessment. There is no scope for this to be justiciable in the court. Why not? Why is the power of the court being ousted in terms of whether or not the person, in bringing the proceedings, should have known, could have known or did know that the offence had been committed prior to the period of six months beginning with knowledge of the information?
Why should that power be contained in the subsection? Surely the test of whether the relevant date has been satisfied should be an objective one that the court can investigate as to when the knowledge of the person commencing the proceedings was such that he or she felt that there was sufficient information to enable the proceedings to be brought.
Paragraph (b) is a further affront to those of us who believe that evidence should be assessed by courts rather than on the basis that the evidence is as it is if some official says it is. That is no way in which to bring people to conviction following a prosecution. Why is it that this
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issue is not to be allowed to be justiciable? That is outrageous and entirely over the top. Of course, that is typical of so many things that the Government are doing at the moment. They are playing fast and loose with our civil liberties. This is a little measure to be brought in under the umbrella of a Bill that people may think is of no great issue. The result could be that people, long after the event, are being accused of offences, and at that stage no longer having the material available to enable them to defend themselves. That is the essence of the proposal before us. I am extremely concerned that the Government should want to introduce such a measure.
Like much regulation we see in this House, the provisions we are considering are based on a failure to ensure that the existing system operates properly. We have a system of building regulations and a requirement, which is separate from planning permission, for a building inspector's approval of new houses and alterations. Now we are saying that, notwithstanding that approval and even in cases in which there is no conspiracy, if it comes to light within two years that there has been an alleged breach of building regulations, it will result in a prosecution. In my submission, that could end up—as my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle suggested—being counterproductive. Only time will tell, but the provision is in any case oppressive and should not be included in the Bill. I shall oppose it.
Mr. Forth: On this occasion, I happily defer to the wisdom and experience of my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr. Chope), who has had a distinguished career in local government, as a Minister in the relevant Department and as an eminent lawyer. His comments chime with my lay reservations about this part of the Bill. The Minister did not make much of an effort to give any really good reason for the change. It is no secret that new clause 5 is something that the Government want to do and they are slipping it into this Bill as a precursor to some wider measure. It always makes me suspicious when private Members' Bills are used as a vehicle to further the Government's purposes.
A worse prospect is the real possibility that confusion will arise between the proposed two-year period and the existing six-month period. What the Minister said, in effect, is that the two regimes will run side by side, both covering building regulations and local authorities, from whenever this provision reaches the statute book—I hope that it does not—and whenever the Government get around to introducing a broader dispensation. We should not be in the business of increasing confusion. If the Government want to make such a change, they should introduce it properly so that it may be scrutinised properly.
The most worrying aspect was pointed out by my hon. Friend, based on his legal experience. Even a cursory reading of new clause 5 would make one suspicious that it would radically alter the balance between the individual and the authorities. We should always be very suspicious of such a change and, in my view, we should resist it unless an overwhelming case is made for it. We have not only not heard an overwhelming case today: we have not heard any real case at all. That should give us considerable cause for concern.
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"In the case of proceedings commenced by a local authority . . . evidence is to be regarded for the purposes of subsection (4) above as sufficient to justify the proceedings if in the opinion of the proper officer or an authorised officer it is sufficient to justify the proceedings".
If that is not an example of untrammelled power, I do not know what is. We do not even know who these authorised officers might be, nor what restrictions might be placed on the giving of the power under the new clause. That is a very worrying development.
Of course, we will be told that the new clause is all right, because it is going to save the planet. It is not all right. It will not save the planet, but even if it would, we would want much more justification than has so far been offered for what appears to be a fundamental shift in the balance between the individual and the authorities under the apparently innocent provisions in new clause 5.
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