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John Reid: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his remarks about our troops. I should make it clear that my frustration with Iraqi politicians is no greater and no less than my frustration with British politicians. It is the nature of democracy that we do not always agree, but in the midst of the coalition negotiations, all of us should remember the risks that the Iraqi people themselves have taken in coming out to vote in these elections. Ultimately, the salvation of the Iraqi people and their democracy, stability and peace will lie in the hands of Iraqis themselves. It has never been our intention to stay there indefinitely through some imperialist presence. We have said that we will stay until the job is done, that the job will be done when the Iraqis themselves are capable of defending their own democracy and of defending themselves against terrorist activity, and that that will be a process.

Today, I have announced another part of that process—not the end of it by any means. In a sense, this is not even the beginning of the end, but, to quote our most famous politician, it is perhaps the "end of the beginning." This is a significant reduction based largely on the ability of the Iraqis themselves to participate, and to defend themselves against counter-terrorism. There is a very long way to go, and I have been absolutely clear that we are not yet at the stage where the Iraqi security forces can take responsibility for whole provinces. We will continue to assess the situation and when the conditions are met, I will make another announcement to the House.

As far as other coalition troops are concerned, nothing that I have said today about the British disposition of troops—as part of the normal six-monthly announcement of roulement deployment—causes, or is caused by, troop dispositions, reductions or increases among any of our allies in the coalition. So the announcement stands on its own, but we have of course informed our Japanese, Italian and Australian partners in Multinational Division South-East—I spoke to the Australian Minister this morning—and we have informed our other allies, including the Americans.

Dr. Gavin Strang (Edinburgh, East) (Lab): Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Brookings Institution estimates that between 12,000 and 21,000 Iraqi civilians have died in the violence since the start of the war, in addition to the deaths of more than 1,800 coalition troops and more than 4,000 Iraqi police and military personnel? Does he agree that our most important objective in Iraq should be bringing about an end to the killings, whether of civilians or of service personnel?

John Reid: When discussing deaths in Iraq, we should recall that in history the price of establishing, fighting
 
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for, maintaining and struggling for democracy has sometimes involved sacrifice. It is nothing compared to the hundreds of thousands of deaths under the tyrant Saddam Hussein. I agree entirely that a benchmark of our progress is in the treatment of civilians. I regret whenever civilians suffer as a result of actions that fall beneath civilised standards, whether performed by our troops, anyone else's troops or the Iraqis themselves. But I would point out the watershed of difference between what happens now and what happened 10 years ago in Iraq. Now, if there is maltreatment of civilians, it is exposed, whereas under Saddam it was covered up. It is exceptional now, and under Saddam it was institutionalised. The perpetrators are penalised, prosecuted and—I hope—incarcerated, but under Saddam they were honoured and promoted. That is not an insignificant difference.

Mr. James Arbuthnot (North-East Hampshire) (Con): What the Secretary of State has told us about the training of an extra 45,000 security forces in Iraq is very good news. The achievements of our British forces there have been very significant indeed. Was the reduction of 800 troops that he has announced discussed with the Iraqi authorities, and what is the general state of discussions between them and British troop commanders, especially in Basra?

John Reid: In answer to the first question, it was discussed with the Iraqi authorities insofar as it could be, given that there is no national Government formed at present. We keep in touch with our Iraqi colleagues inside the security forces and so on. As regards the second question, the short answer is that they are better than they were a few weeks ago. As the hon. Gentleman knows, several events—not just the video, which was wrongly portrayed as the main reason for the breakdown in communications in several areas—including in the Basra area, our arrest of certain policemen whom we regarded as being involved in nefarious activities, led to a breakdown in communication in that area, but in all of the areas where there was non-co-operation we have either re-established co-operation or are moving towards doing so.

Paul Flynn (Newport, West) (Lab): Would not the best way to pay tribute to the 103 bereaved families and to those still serving so splendidly in Iraq be to have a proper inquiry into the reasons why we involved ourselves in the war in the first place? We have had four inquiries, all based on out-of-date information, two of them conducted by committees that were well disposed towards the war anyway, and two that considered only partial aspects of the war. Is it not now time for an inquiry that would be comprehensive, rigorous and genuinely independent?

John Reid: Well, the facts of the matter are that there have already been four inquiries. Notwithstanding what I thought was a rather misleading slur—I hope that my hon. Friend was not referring to Members of Parliament when he referred to two of the committees as being prejudiced—

Paul Flynn: I did not say that.

John Reid: I did not say that he said that: I said that I hoped he was not saying that. However, two of the
 
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committees that conducted inquiries were Committees of this House and I accept their opinion and that they were not prejudiced in their approach. I do not know whether the other two, one of which took place under Lord Hutton, can be regarded as prejudiced, but if I were my hon. Friend, I would be careful about what I said. All of the committees approached their specific task with a commendable degree of open-mindedness and scrutiny. The fact that we have had four inquiries and they have not reached the conclusion that my hon. Friend wanted them to reach may be unfortunate, but perhaps it is statistically relevant. I can only suggest that what he is actually asking for is an inquiry that agrees with him, rather than one that discovers the truth.

Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington and Chelsea) (Con): I declare an interest in a company that works in Iraq. The House will have noticed the Secretary of State's very careful words that the slide towards civil war is neither imminent nor inevitable. However, he did not say that it was unlikely. Does the Secretary of State agree that Donald Rumsfeld's remark that if there is a slide into civil war it must be dealt with by Iraqi security forces conceals a fundamental problem in the whole of coalition policy, because a very high proportion of those security forces is drawn from the Shi'a and Kurdish communities, and it has been elements of the security forces, particularly the police, that have been responsible for many of the killings and atrocities that have been committed against Iraqi civilians? Can the Secretary of State say what Her Majesty's Government are doing to impress upon the Iraqi Government that not only must the armed forces be drawn substantially from the Sunni as well as other communities, but much more must be done than is being done to prevent atrocities by rogue elements within the security forces themselves?

John Reid: I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will accept that, without necessarily agreeing with all his premises, I entirely agree with both his conclusions. First, not only must there be a competent Government in Iraq but it must be non-sectarian in character and must reach out to the Sunni section of the population as well as to the majority Shi'a or the Kurd section. That means that the analysis of the violence must be more sophisticated than it sometimes is in some quarters. It is not the case that everyone who is opposed to the Government or to our troops is on the other side of the international war on terrorism. Many young Sunnis are dispossessed, unemployed and alienated—there are 200,000 of them in the Euphrates valley—and may drift in and out of violence for reasons unconnected with fanaticism or extremist ideology. I agree that if they are to be brought into ownership of Iraq, the Government have to reach out to them. Secondly, where there is evidence of bias, ranging from a natural bias towards one's own community through to the intentional infiltration of the security forces by militias, it has to be rooted out in practice, ideology and theory as well as in operational terms. Both of those things are essential if Iraq is to build national unity.

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