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Mr. Robinson: The hon. Gentleman may wish to wait a moment before he intervenes, as he may have more to say.
The Secretary of State cannot give the hon. Gentleman an undertaking. I heard an undertaking that the Secretary of State will not implement the piece of the comprehensive agreement whereby effectively the two largest parties—the Democratic Unionist party and Sinn Fein—can determine whether Ministers in fact achieve ministerial office. However, the Secretary of State cannot give such an assurance because of the legislation that was encouraged and supported by the hon. Member for Foyle. The Belfast agreement ensures that there will not be any Ministers in Northern Ireland unless those two parties are satisfied, because they must propose the First and Deputy First Ministers. If they do not do so, for whatever reason, the rest of the process does not take place. I suggest to the hon. Gentleman, therefore, that there is a requirement for change.
The Belfast agreement structure is based on a mandatory requirement for Ministers to be appointed according to their strength, which runs contrary to the voluntary nature of the appointment of the First and Deputy First Ministers. If it is a mandatory system for all the other offices and every other Minister in every other Department, if it is mandatory for the Committee Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen, if it is mandatory for Committee membership and almost everything that the Assembly does, why is it suddenly turned on its head for the appointment of the First and Deputy First Ministers? If it is a mandatory system it should be mandatory throughout. If it is a voluntary system—and I would encourage such a system—it should be voluntary throughout. Regrettably, however, the hon. Gentleman would deny us the opportunity to have a voluntary coalition. Government could be up and running tomorrow if he were willing to move in that direction.
Mark Durkan:
The hon. Gentleman has misrepresented the Secretary of State as well as the
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SDLP. I do not believe that the Secretary of State gave me the assurance that the hon. Gentleman thinks that he did. On the specific provisions in the comprehensive agreement, if the SDLP and the Ulster Unionist party did not vote to show their confidence in Sinn Fein and the DUP members as First and Deputy First Ministers, we would be excluded from office. By contrast, under the Belfast agreement members of the DUP rightly took up ministerial office even while voting against the First and Deputy First Ministers. Sinn Fein members could take up ministerial office while abstaining from the vote on the First and Deputy First Ministers. When those two parties have a chance, however, they change the deal and they deny inclusion on the same basis for anyone else. They have concocted what would be a voluntary coalition between Sinn Fein and the DUP, which would be the only parties in government, because they would vote for themselves.
Mr. Robinson: I am puzzled why anyone who believes in power sharing and an inclusive Government in Northern Ireland should say that they want to be part of that Government while not wanting to show any support for the people who will be First and Deputy First Ministers. That is inconsistent.
Mark Durkan: The hon. Gentleman did so.
Mr. Robinson: Yes, but we were opposed to it. The hon. Gentleman is supporting it. His position is quite inconsistent.
Mark Durkan: We oppose the hon. Gentleman's changes.
Mr. Robinson: Let me make the position clear. When members of my party decided to take up seats in the Executive and operate in silos, as they were entitled to do under the legislation, the hon. Gentleman's party said that we should not be allowed to behave as rogue Ministers—effectively, Ministers in opposition. We proved that we could do so. If we want to make genuine progress in Northern Ireland, we need joined-up government and collective responsibility. To achieve that there must be a level of trust that does not exist at present. The fact that it does not exist is a reality, and the hon. Gentleman knows that the trust necessary to run the Government in Northern Ireland is not there.
I cannot understand why the hon. Gentleman refuses to accept the reality and, together with us, tell the Government to consider a lower level of devolution. We should achieve the highest level possible under prevailing circumstances so that important decisions can be taken in Northern Ireland, progress can be made and trust built. I should have thought that that was in the interests of the whole community in Northern Ireland. The hon. Gentleman's approach is one of all or nothing—I think I offended him at the weekend by referring to it as the SDLP's scorched-earth policy—in which Executive devolution must be up and running, with Sinn Fein in harness, otherwise there will be nothing in return. The reality for the people of Northern Ireland, however, is that no one is pressing my party to go into government with people who are still involved in criminality, as the IMC has indicated is the case with Sinn Fein.
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Leaving aside the general tenor of issues relating to policing and justice, some Members have told the Minister of State that it is essential that he deals with the issue of the triple lock in the comprehensive agreement. My party does not intend to divide the House this evening, although there are issues that we want to examine in Committee. If they are not dealt with satisfactorily, we have the option of voting against the Bill on Third Reading. It would be unfortunate, given that this is an important piece of legislation, if the Minister could not carry the main parties with him.
I will touch on some of the issues relating to other provisions in the Bill. First, there is the power that the Secretary of State has given himself to bring forward the date of the next Assembly election. I have some experience in that area because I ended up taking a previous Secretary of State to court over the issue. The case went right through to the House of Lords, where, on the narrowest vote possible—by three to two—a decision was made in the Secretary of State's favour. On reflection, I am probably glad that that was the result and the Secretary of State is probably unhappy that it was, although at the time we both felt very differently about it. The reality is that if the election had been held at that point, we would not have reached the level that we were then at and the outcome might have been different. However, that is all academic because our level of support has increased even from the last election, so the Secretary of State will not get the opportunity to play that one again.
Indeed, it is probably because our level of support has increased since the last election that it is unlikely that the Secretary of State will ever use the provision that he has given himself in the Bill to call an early election. However, if he wants to, my party will be more than happy to get on to the hustings and show that the community still supports our position. It is right that he has the provision. I can envisage circumstances in which it might be better to have an election now and then move on to whatever might be agreed over the months after it has taken place.
The provision is useful but, by and large, the problem with this Government has not been to do with calling elections early, but with putting elections off. On every previous occasion, the Government have come to the House, or taken the power themselves, to call off elections so that the people do not have the opportunity to express their views democratically. For a Minister to come to the House and say, "We want to take the power to give the people of Northern Ireland the opportunity to speak" is something that I would encourage. I hope that, at some stage, he uses it.
I also want to touch on the extension of the decommissioning period in the Bill. I do not think that there has been too much discussion about it, but the realities are as follows. The Loyalist Volunteer Force started the process by decommissioning a very small number of fairly old and not very usable weapons. That was followed by a gesture. Nobody knows the extent of that gesture accurately, although I do know that, after three such gestures by the IRA, one well-known official—who I will not name because I do not like naming officials in the House—indicated that they would be embarrassed to have published the amount of weaponry that had been decommissioned in those three tranches. Indeed, the process that was then under way,
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whereby the IRA was allowed to have its representatives in government even while it still held on to its weapons, allowed it to use its weapons to buy concessions.
When my party became the largest party in Northern Ireland and spoke on behalf of the Unionist community, one of the first things that it said was, "We can't allow the IRA to continue to have that control. The situation has to be reversed so that it does not get into government until it gives up its weaponry." The substantial amount of weaponry that was decommissioned came about because people were prepared to dig in their heels and say, "To get into this club, you have to pay your membership. You don't become a member and then consider how much you're going to pay."
My right hon. Friend the Member for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley) was pilloried by some on the day when that great decommissioning act took place because he had some misgivings about whether the totality of weapons had been decommissioned. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, led by General John de Chastelain, was unequivocal and said that all the weapons had been decommissioned. The IRA said the same and the Government immediately said the same, too. However, it later transpired that intelligence was available on the matter. The Independent Monitoring Commission reported in its eighth report that it had intelligence that indicated that a significant number and variety of weapons—not just handguns—were still in the possession of the Provisional IRA.
The IICD was rushed out to respond and take away the sting from that remark. It said, "Oh well, yes, we have seen that intelligence and as a result of that we have started to investigate." It made the mistake of telling us how it investigated the matter. First, it went to the Garda Siochana, who said, "In our jurisdiction, we have no evidence of that." Obviously, because the Police Service of Northern Ireland and MI5 were providing the intelligence, it was clear that it was coming not from the Garda Siochana's jurisdiction, but from the United Kingdom's jurisdiction. Having received that reply from the Garda Siochana, a further call was made by the IICD. It went to the IRA and—surprise, surprise—guess what the IRA had to say? It said that it had handed over all its weapons and was shocked and irate that anybody would suggest otherwise.
Is it not amazing that the whole basis on which the IICD was able to tell hon. Members and the world at large that all the weapons had been handed over and destroyed was intelligence from the Police Service of Northern Ireland and MI5? They supplied the IICD with the statistics of the weaponry that they believed that the IRA had, which was based on the information that they got from Colonel Gaddafi, when he became our great friend, and informers within the organisation. They believed that they could give an accurate account of the IRA's weaponry in every category. The IICD was prepared to accept that their intelligence was sound, that they were the people to listen to and that, on the basis of what they had provided, all decommissioning had taken place. However, when those self-same people came back and said, "Hold on a minute; they've still got guns," the IICD did not want to believe them.
Anyone in Northern Ireland who thinks about that for a moment will realise that it is more than likely that the IRA still has weapons. Most people will think that no one should ever have said with the clarity and
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certainty of the Government and the IICD that all the weapons had been decommissioned. From the very beginning, everyone in this party believed that weapons were still held out there. We have been vindicated, and it is still the responsibility of the Government and, for that matter, the IICD to pursue the remaining weapons in the IRA's arsenal.
Of course, the IRA will not admit it, but am I not right in saying that weapons were discovered at a farmhouse—I will go no further than that—in recent days? Is it not true that another search was carried out in the Irish Republic and a weapon was found? Where are those weapons coming from if all the weapons of the Provisional IRA have been decommissioned? It is vital that we continue to press for the full decommissioning of all paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland.
I have dealt extensively with the republican movement, so let me touch on the loyalist paramilitaries. This party believes that every illegal gun should be destroyed, whether it is held by a loyalist paramilitary organisation or a republican paramilitary organisation. No one in this party will put forward any excuses for any loyalist paramilitary organisation. We believe that they should all decommission. They should all end their paramilitary and criminal activities.
I will bring my speech to a conclusion because several of my colleagues and the hon. Member for North Down wish to speak. I urge the Minister to ensure that we have proper time to deal with all matters in Committee, whether on the Floor of the House or upstairs, especially if the Government intend to introduce, by way of amendment, important provisions to give life to an Assembly in Northern Ireland. I have misgivings about introducing important constitutional measures by way of amendment to a miscellaneous provisions Bill. It does not say too much for Northern Ireland that the way in which it is to be governed is dealt with by a miscellaneous provisions Bill. It would be more proper if separate, custom-made legislation was brought forward for such measures, rather than bringing them in by way of amendment. I urge the Minister to ensure that priority is given to the provisions for an Assembly, rather than provisions on what might happen when an Assembly is under way and running in Northern Ireland.
8.48 pm
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