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Mark Pritchard: Notwithstanding the Minister's comments, prosecutions are not being brought under the existing legislation. New clause 2 relates directly to third parties and internet service providers, which are aiding and abetting that illegal and evil practice. The Bill is an opportunity for the Government to stand by their warm words on animal welfare, and if they want to pass by that opportunity, then people outside this Chamber should know about it.
Mr. Bradshaw: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's concern, but I repeat that this is the Animal Welfare Bill, which does not cover the illegal trade in endangered species.
Government amendment No. 61 fulfils a commitment that I made in Committee. The Government always intended that the concept of suffering, wherever it occurs in the Bill, should include both mental and
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physical suffering. We thought that point self-evident, so we did not include a definition in the Bill, but because of the unease expressed in Standing Committee, I agreed to table an amendment to put the meaning of the concept beyond doubt. Government amendment No. 61 defines suffering clearly, wherever it is mentioned in the Bill.
In Committee, the hon. Member for Leominster (Bill Wiggin) drew our attention to the point that an inspector or constable could feasibly exercise his powers under clause 16 without the person responsible for the animal in question being aware of it, and we agree that that point requires rectification. That is why we tabled Government amendment No. 78, which requires an inspector or constable to notify a person responsible for the animal in question as soon as reasonably practicable.
On new clause 6, I made it clear in Committee that we have not replicated the specific offence of abandonment, because it would be unnecessary. Abandonment is merely one way in which either the welfare offences or the cruelty offences can be committed. The hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice) has asked why we have made poisoning, mutilation and fighting special offences, but not abandonment. Those three offences do not necessarily involve suffering, which is why they are included separately. In Committee, we discussed administering heroin to a dog, mutilating an animal under anaesthetic and betting on an animal fight, all of which are offences. I also have concerns about the definition of abandonment in new clause 6, which we believe would risk catching the release of game birds or fish into a stream or pond or the release of animals on to common land. I am sure that Conservative Members do not want to prevent those activities.
Mr. Bradshaw: I will not give way, because I have very little time left.
From our proceedings in Committee and today, we are well aware of how strongly my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes (Shona McIsaac) feels about circuses. I hope that she and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew) were reassured by the written statement on the use of animals in travelling circuses that I gave the House last Wednesday. For the benefit of hon. Members who have not read the statement, it contained an undertaking to use a regulation under clause 10 of the Bill to ban the use of certain non-domesticated species in travelling circuses and to impose zoo standards on circuses' permanent premises.
As I have previously indicated, I sympathise with the view that performances by some non-domesticated species in travelling circuses are not compatible with meeting their welfare needs. I have also said that the welfare offence in clause 8 will be a significant step forward for circus animals, as it will for all animals. However, having listened carefully to my hon. Friends and Opposition Members on Second Reading and in Committee, I have concluded that a regulation under clause 10 will provide much needed clarity to both circus proprietors and enforcers on which animals' needs can
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be met adequately in a travelling circus environment. I have also undertaken to see that there is read-across between zoo standards and those for circuses' permanent premises. I trust that that undertaking will address my hon. Friends' concerns.
Shona McIsaac: I have been listening carefully to what the Minister has said following his statement to the House. Will he give us clarification on the timings—I understand that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Drew) has asked a similar question? I think that the statement said that the Minister would be undertaking consultation shortly, so will he give me some time scales? Will zoo licensing regulations also read-across to static circuses?
Mr. Bradshaw: I have already addressed static circuses. As I said in Committee, when we consider time scales, we will want to make the matter a priority.
Amendment No. 2 relates to responsibility for a stolen animal. As I explained to the hon. Member for Leominster in Committee, we believe that the amendment is unnecessary. More than one person can be responsible for an animal. Just because an owner is responsible for an animal, it does not mean that someone else who is in charge of the animal is not considered to be responsible for it, even if that responsibility is temporary, as is the case for a stolen animal. The person or persons responsible are required to take such steps as are reasonable to ensure the animal's welfare. Clearly, if someone's animal has been stolen, there are few such steps that that person could reasonably be expected to take.
Amendment No. 107 was tabled by the hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker). While I have the chance, may I give him my thanks and express my regret at his departure from the Front Bench? He has made an important contribution to the Bill and the cause of animal welfare in general. I have appreciated the co-operative way in which he has worked with me and the hon. Member for Leominster on the Bill.
We explored the question of protecting property at considerable length in Committee. I note that I have succeeded in persuading the hon. Member for Lewes—a bit, at least—that there are legitimate considerations in some situations. As I said in Committee, the protection of property is not an absolute defence against the offence of cruelty, but one factor that a court may take into account. That does not indicate a belief on my part that property rights should somehow trump animal suffering. It simply reflects the reality that the protection of property might justify some animal suffering in certain circumstances. I cited the example of the use of riot horses by the police in Committee and clearly the hon. Gentleman has accepted that. I also gave the Committee the example of guard dogs that are used by private individuals to protect their homes or businesses. Sometimes, unfortunately, a guard dog will be injured by a person who threatens a property. For example, a burglar might hit a dog when it restrains him. In principle, that person could be held responsible for its suffering by virtue of clause 4(2). I hope that hon. Members will agree that that is an example of the protection of property being a legitimate purpose outside the police and armed forces.
Norman Baker:
Just as the Minister successfully constructed a list of tightly drawn exemptions for tail
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docking, why could he not construct tightly constrained exemptions to limit the use of the protection of property as a defence?
Mr. Bradshaw: Because it is best to leave that up to the discretion of the courts.
On amendment No. 108, I understand the motives of those who want a complete ban on giving an animal as a prize, but the Government have taken the view that it would be overly intrusive to dictate that an adult is not capable of making an informed and responsible decision about their ability to care for an animal on offer. As long as an adult is ultimately responsible for the decision to enter a competition in which an animal might be won, the Government do not feel that it is proper to interfere.
Amendment No. 17 would create a requirement for a vet to see an animal after it had been seized under clause 16. I can understand what the hon. Member for Leominster is trying to achieve. In practice, however, if an inspector removes an animal in a hurry because it is suffering or likely to suffer, and it is not reasonably practicable to wait for a vet, I cannot envisage a situation whereby he would then retain the animal without seeking veterinary advice. Indeed, if a person takes a suffering animal into their care under clause 16(6), they have, in effect, assumed responsibility for it, and they might fail to meet their obligations under clause 8 if they do not take it straight to a vet for attention and advice. We do not therefore think it necessary to include such a requirement in the Bill.
Amendment No. 18 deals with certifying that there would be no prosecution before an animal is disposed of. As I explained in Committee, an order can be made under clause 18 before a conviction is obtained or before a prosecution is started. In fact, an order can be made if a prosecution never takes place. A prosecution can take months to come to a conclusion, and it is sometimes necessary to take a decision about an animal's future without waiting that long. In some cases, a prosecution will not be in the public interest at all—for example, where the animal's owner is elderly or mentally impaired—but it will nevertheless be necessary to take a decision about the fate of the animal. That is what clause 18 allows.
Amendment No. 23 would reduce the time limit for prosecutions from three years to 12 months. As I explained in Committee, three years was chosen to reflect the Animal Health Act 2002, which inserted an extension to three years of the time limit in the Animal Health Act 1981. We believe that it is sensible to impose the same time limit for a welfare offence prosecution as for prosecutions of offences relating to animal health. There are precedents in more than 60 other pieces of legislation covering subjects such as agriculture, food safety and trades descriptions for a long-stop prosecution period of three years in place of the usual six months in summary cases.
The RSPCA told us of a case two years ago in which one of its inspectors found a dead dog in a cupboard under the stairs. The owner of the house admitted that he had starved the dog to death. However, because a vet estimated that the dog had died more than six months previously, the RSPCA was unable to prosecute. We do not believe that it is right that a person should get away with such animal cruelty simply because he has been successful in hiding the evidence or the evidence does not come to light quickly.
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Amendments Nos. 22 and 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Leominster, would create a two-tier system of offences whereby offences under clauses 8, 10, 11 and 30(9) would be subject to a time limit of one year, and more serious offences would be triable either way and therefore not subject to any time limit. They would also impose a maximum penalty of a level 5 fine and 51 weeks' imprisonment. My Department has considered very carefully where the balance needs to be struck in terms of which court should handle cruelty cases and what the penalties should be. I have some sympathy with the hon. Gentleman's view that we should treat those who cause animal suffering more harshly than we do currently. However, we are already increasing the fines that a magistrate can impose. Moreover, it is important that in offering animals the protection that they need and deserve under our law, we maintain consistency with other criminal offences.
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