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“On 22 March 2005 the case of Regina v Rayment and Others was terminated at the Central Criminal Court after it had been running since June 2003. The prosecution announced its decision not to oppose a defence application to discharge the jury and subsequently offered no evidence. The defendants were then acquitted.
Immediately afterwards I announced that I was referring the matter to the Chief Inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service under Section (2)(1)(b) of the Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate Act 2000. I asked the chief inspector: to review the circumstances surrounding the prosecution commonly known as the Jubilee Line case; to ascertain the factors leading to the decision to terminate; to consider what steps the prosecution could have taken to avoid that outcome; and to make recommendations aimed at preventing this happening again. The chief inspector’s final report was published yesterday. Copies have been placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
The report contains a detailed, but not comprehensive, analysis of the case. The constraints imposed by the remit of Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate means the report inevitably focuses on the role of the prosecution, whilst aiming to give as balanced a view as possible of what occurred. The chief inspector also requested Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to provide expert advice and analysis on the police work in this case, particularly the investigation. The work they did was used to inform the report which is published today.”
That would have been yesterday. The Attorney-General continued:
“Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary will also be publishing separately its own stand-alone report. The review team was also able to conduct individual interviews with 11 jurors in the case, and a group interview with eight of those
jurors. They were assisted in this task by Professor Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Dr Cheryl Thomas of Birmingham University, who have conducted previous research into juries. This enabled the review team to obtain the benefit of the jurors’ experience, whilst at the same time ensuring a proper distance between the jurors and the inspectorate.
The report concludes that the collapse of the trial was the cumulative effect of mistakes and shortcomings by a number of agencies and individuals responsible for the case, which tested the adversarial system, as well as the jury system, beyond breaking point. The review also concludes that the decision to end the case was inevitable and correct in the light of legal authorities, having regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time. The report highlights three specific issues which it sees as having had a major contribution towards the termination of the proceedings: the decision to include count two, conspiracy to defraud London Underground Limited; the slow and disjointed nature of the proceedings; and the illness of one of the defendants.
I very much welcome the valuable and detailed analysis by the chief inspector and his team. I pay tribute to the thoroughness of their work. I note the important conclusion that the decision to terminate the case was correct.
Views may differ as to what conclusions are drawn from the analysis on, for example, whether we should always have a jury in a case of serious and complex fraud. I will return to that subject later.
My overriding purpose in establishing the review was to ensure that we have done, and continue to do, all we can to ensure that there is no repetition of the events which led to the collapse of this case, particularly so far as the prosecuting authorities are concerned.
Investigation and subsequent prosecution of this case was spread over a long period, from 1997 to 2005. Some key decisions made at an early stage had a significant impact on the future handling of the case and, with the benefit of hindsight, can be seen to have created difficulties. I accept that there is justified criticism of some aspects of the prosecution.
Because, as I have said, the review report inevitably focuses on the CPS, and I am the Minister accountable for the CPS, it is right for me to draw the House’s attention to the steps which have been taken to improve the handling of these cases within the CPS, as well as changes in the external environment. I accept the report’s conclusion that fraud work within the CPS has not always been recognised as requiring a degree of dedicated resource and expertise. That is now being rectified, with the establishment of a separate and specialist fraud prosecution division within CPS London, a move welcomed by the report.
A wider issue is that of the case management and review arrangements which were in place during the duration of the Jubilee Line case. When I was appointed Attorney-General, it became apparent to me that the arrangements for supervising lawyers who had day-to-day control of serious and complex cases, and of reviewing the quality of their decisions, were not adequate. In particular, the culture had evolved where it was believed that only a lawyer who had read all—and I mean all—the papers could take a decision on the case. The disadvantages of this approach had already been the subject of discussion between my predecessor as Attorney-General and the then DPP, now Mr Justice Calvert-Smith. I signalled a new approach in a Written Parliamentary Answer on 27 February 2003. This enabled more senior lawyers within the CPS, including the DPP, to be involved in the decision-making process, or to take decisions on the basis of detailed briefing and consideration of the key material but without having to read all the often very voluminous papers. The effect of this change would be, as I said in the Answer, to enable greater input by senior lawyers into the most critical decisions that the service faces.
In addition, and after discussion with me, the current DPP has established a system of greater review by senior management of prosecuting decisions. In particular, he has established a system of case management panels. These are held on a monthly basis and enable a panel of senior lawyers to act as a “critical friend” to the lawyers handling a case. The panels, which have been in operation since September 2005, have already proved their worth
in strengthening the presentation of cases, identifying any potential weaknesses and, in some cases, shortening the predicted trial lengths. This is especially important given the report’s criticism that the Jubilee Line case was allowed to run without such senior management control. The CPS is also developing a new case management and case quality assurance system, particularly for serious and complex cases.
More widely within the criminal justice system, Ministers and the judiciary have agreed the criminal case management framework which clearly sets out the responsibilities of all those involved in trials; and the then Lord Chief Justice issued a protocol on the management of heavy and complex cases in March 2005. These developments, combined with revised disclosure protocols and my own revised guidelines to prosecutors on disclosure, combine to make a very different system from that which was in operation during the Jubilee Line trial.
The report makes 11 recommendations. They are set out in detail in the report and I will not take time repeating them. They have been considered by Government and the agencies involved. The substance of all the recommendations are accepted, save for recommendation 10, which will require further discussions between Ministers and the senior judiciary.
Earlier in my Statement I said that I would come back to the issue of jury trials for serious and complex fraud cases. We have had extensive debates in this House and in the other place about the Government’s established policy that there should be the opportunity in some serious and complex fraud cases for those trials to be heard without a jury. The Jubilee Line report concludes that the circumstances of this case were so unusual that it cannot be relied on directly to support the case either for dispensing with, or retaining, juries. It also concludes that the case was not intrinsically of such seriousness or complexity that it would necessarily have been accepted by the Serious Fraud Office as falling within its criteria for taking on cases, nor that it would necessarily have met the conditions set out in Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
I should say that I take a different view. I am very clear that no blame for the termination of the case should fall on the shoulders of the individual jurors; rather, they are to be commended for their commitment and attention. Nevertheless, I believe the case illustrates a good deal about the challenges of presenting long and complex cases in front of a jury.”—[ Official Report, House of Lords, 27 June 2006; Vol. 683, c. 1096-99.]
Mr. Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con): I thank the Solicitor-General for the statement. I fully accept his apology. He sought to keep me completely informed about the nature of the statement to be made in the other place and supplied me with a copy of the document in good time. I am glad that he acknowledges that it would have been better if statements had been made in both places simultaneously, especially as the subject matter, although it may be legalistic, touches on several contentious topics that are relevant to issues before the House at present.
The report is to be commended. I am sure that the House would wish to thank Mr. Stephen Wooler and his team. Although its remit is restricted to the Crown Prosecution Service, with an added angle of the police role, it is detailed, illuminating and helpful. The fact that no verdict was returned in the case enabled Mr. Wooler’s team, most unusually, to be able to interview jurors about their views in relation to the process, which he described as a “hugely valuable insight” into the case.
The collapse of this case was at huge public expense—some £25 million, with no verdict returned. It has been
used extensively by those who have supported the argument that juries should be got rid of in long and complex fraud cases. Does not a detailed reading of this report show that that assertion is entirely unjustified? Is not one of the most interesting conclusions of Mr. Wooler’s report that his analysis does not support that at all, and that the argument is wholly erroneous? At paragraph 9 of the executive summary, Mr. Wooler said that
“although the collapse of the Jubilee Line case was regarded in many quarters as relevant to the debate about the suitability of juries to try charges of fraud, and in particular the proposal to implement Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003”—
which has been a highly contentious issue before this House—
“its circumstances were in reality so unusual that it cannot be relied on to support either position in that debate.”
Will the Solicitor-General please confirm that that is the position of the Law Officers, because I noted both yesterday and in the Solicitor-General’s remarks, but especially in remarks made by the Attorney-General on a news programme yesterday evening, that he appears to disagree with his own inspector’s report in respect of that matter?
Furthermore, the main body of the report contains ample evidence that goes further in supporting the role of juries in trials of this kind. At paragraph 1.40, in relation to the jury, Mr. Wooler says:
“No responsibility for the inconclusive outcome of the case can properly be attributed to the capabilities or conduct of the jury. Overall, they discharged their duties in a thorough and conscientious manner. Collectively, they appeared even at the time of our interview with them to have a good grip of the evidence and the issues, particularly allowing for the fact that many months had passed since they had last heard any evidence.”
What is perhaps most telling—I should be grateful for the Solicitor-General’s comments on this—is that the inquiry had before it a letter from one of the jurors, written on the day on which the trial had collapsed and the acquittals had been recorded, in which he expressed his deep displeasure. The letter, which can be found in paragraph 11.6 of the report, says:
“I, along with the majority of the jurors, had a good understanding of what was going on in the courtroom and I have taken exception to comments made by yourself”
“and Mr Upward”
“in tonight’s news coverage. It is being stated that you and other members of the court thought that we were unable to remember evidence from the early stages of the trial and thus a fair trial would prove impossible. Nobody asked for our comments and what we felt. Why would the majority of us be making notes? So that when we came to deliberate we could refer back to them and make informed decisions. I personally referred to my notes regularly during the trial and was thus able to compare evidence and make informed judgements as the case proceeded. To now be labelled an incompetent is not acceptable”.
These are important issues. I have to tell the Solicitor-General that I am troubled that on repeated occasions when we have come to consider the issues of juries in long fraud trials, we have appeared to be faced with a blank wall when we have confronted the Government. In a debate in the House on 21 June 2005, when a statement was made that there would be an end to juries in certain fraud trials, the Solicitor-General said:
“Stephen Wooler is indeed looking into the background of the Jubilee line trial and will no doubt make his report in due course, but the House needs to know when the Government have made a clear decision.”—[ Official Report, 21 June 2005; Vol. 435, c. 658.]
May I ask the Solicitor-General and the Attorney-General, in the light of this extremely compelling and interesting report, to reconsider their position and to take on board the comments that have been made? Will the Solicitor-General also confirm the other point that was made so tellingly in the report—that even if the Government’s proposals in section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act had been implemented, the trial would almost certainly have taken place with a jury in any event? To use this case because of the waste of public money that has resulted is particularly pernicious, and I very much hope that the Attorney-General will stop doing it.
The causes of the collapse have been correctly identified by the Solicitor-General, but one of them deserves special focus. The decision to charge conspiracy to defraud at common law was regarded by Mr. Wooler as muddling matters by introducing a charge that was vague and insufficiently particularised, and which, most remarkably, added 10 months to the trial when the issues surrounding it had to be fully explored.
The Solicitor-General will know that as the Fraud Bill has made its way through the House, the Government have resolutely maintained that the law of conspiracy to defraud at common law must be retained. May we please have an assurance from the Solicitor-General that as the Report stage of the Bill has not yet been reached, he will give careful consideration to the comments made by Mr. Wooler as an example of the particular application of the charge of common law conspiracy? Is it not the case that the decision to charge conspiracy to defraud at common law was one of the most disastrous elements that led to the eventual collapse of the trial? There must be lessons from that. Even if we do not get rid of conspiracy to defraud at common law, I very much hope that the Solicitor-General can assure the House that the issue will be examined in the context of the guidelines that the Attorney-General has already published.
The Solicitor-General will be aware of substantial criticisms of the way in which fraud has been handled by the Crown Prosecution Service in recent years. In saying that, I am very conscious of the fact that it is clear from the Solicitor-General’s statement that steps have been taken to rectify the situation. But the House is entitled to be concerned to discover that this was an unintended consequence of setting up the Serious Fraud Office. Will the Solicitor-General give an assurance to the House that the way in which changes are brought about will be kept under close review? For example, in respect of cases such as this one, should the SFO be encouraged to expand its remit in bringing prosecutions, thereby taking them away from the Crown Prosecution Service? Otherwise, there will have to be two parallel centres of expertise, because in the light of the report it is clear that the lack of a centre of expertise within the CPS was a contributory cause of the prosecution’s failure.
The Solicitor-General mentioned that he was able to accept 10 of the 11 recommendations, and, obviously, I welcome that very much. In respect of the recommendation that he was unable to accept, I entirely understand why
that cannot simply be done by the Government, because it concerned the involvement of the judiciary in the development of procedures to have a comprehensive view of cases, and particularly the role of judges in case management.
I appreciate that that is a difficult issue. Judicial independence must be maintained. The judge in this case was—very properly—unable to co-operate with the inquiry, and to have done so would have been a misconduct on her part. But it would be desirable if a mechanism could be found to help judges in an area that all experience suggests is very challenging, and where even the ablest of them often have difficulty. I very much hope that the Solicitor-General is able to indicate to the House that this matter is being properly progressed.
The Solicitor-General: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the way in which he has raised his points and for his general welcome for the report of Stephen Wooler and his team, and I join him in thanking them for what they have done. They produced a very thorough report that dealt with all the issues that they were asked to cover, and we in this House are very grateful to them for that.
The hon. Gentleman raised a number of issues. In relation to non-jury trials and section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, there is nothing in the report, as he indicated because he read the relevant part of it, that suggests that there is proof either way of whether non-jury trials are desirable. However, what my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General said was not that the report somehow proved the case one way or the other, but that it was illustrative to a considerable degree of the challenges of presenting long and complex cases in front of a jury—such as the way in which such cases had to be presented, the sheer length of them, and the enormous pressures on the jury.
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that we have agreed that the issues in relation to section 43 will be dealt with by way of a free-standing Bill, which will give us all the opportunity to look at the detailed arguments about non-jury trials. However, let me just say this: we are dealing with a suggestion in relation to not the 29,000 cases that are currently dealt with by juries, but perhaps half a dozen a year—up to a maximum of 20—of the most serious cases, which represents a fraction of 1 per cent. We need to find ways in which not only blue collar crime, but the most complex fraud and white collar crime, can be tackled effectively. I support using juries in the vast majority of cases. However, for some cases I argue not that the jury cannot understand the evidence—I hear what the juror said about making notes, and I am sure that he was assiduous in ensuring that he followed the evidence with great care—but that very long trials impose an unacceptable burden on jurors.
To make trials manageable, prosecutors often have to resort to tactics such as splitting complex cases into separate trials and reducing the number of counts on an indictment, and therefore the full culpability of criminals is frequently not exposed to a jury. We need to find a better way. We have repeatedly offered to discuss the matter with the Opposition to see if we can reach an agreement. That has not yet been possible, but I hope that between now and when we consider the Bill, we will have the opportunity to reach agreement.
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