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We believe
that stem cell research offers enormous potential to deliver new
treatments for currently incurable illnesses, such as chronic heart
disease, diabetes and Parkinson’s disease. We want to encourage
research exploring all sources of stem cells, including embryonic stem
cells. In the March 2005 Budget, the Chancellor announced the
establishment of the UK stem cell initiative, a taskforce charged with
developing a vision and a costing strategy to make the UK a global
leader in stem cell research. It is undoubtedly the case that
frustrated scientists in the US who want to do the world some good
through such research are coming to Britain to share their expertise
and to be part of such an important scientific development, which
brings hope to so many thousands of people, and so many future
thousands of people,
too.
The hon. Member for Windsor made a point about the decision to remove donor anonymity. We took account of the views provided in response to a public consultation and a further targeted questionnaire sent to clinics and, through them, donors. The fundamental matter was whether it was right to perpetuate the situation whereby donor-conceived people were denied information held on a national database about their donor. Following consultation, we decided that it was not. Again, that is an issue about the rights of donor-conceived children to have some information about their own life and background. We asked some other questions about that in relation to the consultation and we have also been looking into wider issues around information, which we are hoping to share in the near future.
We have had a wide-ranging debate. Clearly, there is an interest in the subject in the House, of which I have taken note. I have also taken note of the many different points that hon. Members on both sides of the House have raised. As I said before, we should be proud that we have a law that has done a huge service to the development of policy on the subject, both on science and social grounds. However, we have to reflect social as well as scientific changes, and we have to reflect on the best way to get a regulatory authority that has some flexibility, while considering fully Parliament’s oversight role for the future.
I thank everyone for taking part in the debate, and I very much welcome having had the chance to respond to it.
Question deferred, pursuant to Standing Order No. 54 (4) and (5) (Consideration of estimates).
Electoral Commission
[Relevant documents: Oral and Written evidence, taken by the Constitutional Affairs Committee, Session 2005-06, on Electoral Administration, HC 640-i and 640-ii.]
This Estimate is to be considered in so far as it relates to the Electoral Commission (Resolution of 27 June).
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That, for the year ending with 31st March 2007, for expenditure by The Electoral
Commission—
(1) further resources, not exceeding £15,334,000, be authorised for use as set out in
HC 1039,
(2) a further sum, not exceeding £15,777,000, be granted to Her Majesty out of the
Consolidated Fund to meet the costs as so set out, and
(3) limits as so set out be set on appropriations in aid. —[Mr. Watts.]
7.45 pm
Peter Viggers (Gosport) (Con): This is the first occasion on which the House has ever had a general debate on the work of the Electoral Commission. As the House will know, the commission is entirely independent of Government, so the opportunities for private Members to initiate debate about its work are limited. I am therefore particularly grateful to the Liaison Committee for agreeing to provide time for this debate. I know that the Electoral Commission prizes the fact that it is directly accountable to Parliament through the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, for which I answer in the House, and has very much welcomed this first general debate on its work.
The House will see from the Order Paper that the Constitutional Affairs Committee has drawn attention to the evidence it took on electoral administration, which is one of the many facets of the work of the Electoral Commission. I shall say more later in my speech about how the various strands of parliamentary scrutiny of the Electoral Commission fit together, but I would like to make it clear at this stage that it is not the intention that the debate be restricted solely to the commission’s work on electoral administration, important though that issue is.
The debate is particularly timely because, five years into the Electoral Commission’s life, it is a good time to take stock of its record and to consider where its priorities should lie for the future. The Committee on Standards in Public Life recently began hearing evidence in its inquiry focusing on the Electoral Commission’s mandate, governance and accountability. I know that a number of Members on both sides of the House have already given evidence to it. I know, too, that the electoral commissioners themselves are taking this opportunity to consider the future direction of the commission, and that is entirely right. This debate will provide an opportunity for a wider cross-section of the House to make known its views on the Electoral Commission, and I hope that both the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the commissioners will take the views expressed into account when reaching their conclusions.
Mr. Anthony Steen (Totnes) (Con): I am having some difficulty understanding section 16 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, which outlines the arrangements for the transfer of the functions of the parliamentary boundary commissions to the Electoral Commission. Could my hon. Friend explain why the Committee on Standards in Public Life has anything to do with delaying that actually happening?
Peter Viggers: The committee is not delaying that; the Government have given power to enable the transfer to take place, but the proposal to make the transfer has not yet occurred. I will refer to that point later in my speech.
The Committee on Standards in Public Life, to which my hon. Friend referred, played a decisive part in the establishment of the Electoral Commission. In November 1997, the Prime Minister extended that committee’s remit by adding to its existing terms of reference:
“To review issues in relation to the funding of political parties, and to make recommendations as to any changes in the present arrangements.”
In the committee’s fifth report, on the funding of political parties in the United Kingdom, published in October 1998, it recommended the creation of a
“totally independent and authoritative Election Commission with widespread executive and investigative powers”
to underpin its recommendations relating to party funding.
The committee also envisaged that its proposed commission would report on the conduct and administration of principal elections or referendums within six months of their taking place, advise the Government on the modernisation and revision of electoral law, be consulted by the Government ahead of changes relating to electoral law and administration, and act as the registrar of political parties.
Crucially, the committee envisaged that its proposed commission would be, and be seen to be, an independent and impartial body, the members of which would be chosen on a non-partisan basis and by means of a non-partisan procedure, while none the less being acceptable to the leaders of the main political parties. It also recommended that the commission’s budget should be set in such a way as to preserve its authority and independence.
The Government responded to the committee’s report in July 1999 and were altogether more ambitious about the role of the new commissions’ functions. They accepted the recommendation to establish an independent and authoritative Electoral Commission, but they went on to say:
“The Electoral Commission’s role will not be a purely enforcement one. It will have a wide-ranging remit to review electoral law and practice, much of which dates back to the last century. As well as being a force for the modernisation of electoral machinery, the commission will have an important role in promoting public awareness of the democratic process and encouraging greater participation in it. The establishment of the Electoral Commission also provides an opportunity to rationalise the number of disparate bodies responsible for different aspects of the electoral process and to bring overlapping functions together under the overall control of one organisation.”
However, the Neill committee also made it clear that the Electoral Commission’s core functions would be those recommended by the Committee on Standards in Public Life. It stated:
“The bedrock functions of the Electoral Commission as recommended by the Neill committee will be those relating to the new regulatory framework for the reporting of donations to political parties, the ban on foreign donations and the controls on campaign expenditure at parliamentary and other elections.”
The Government also saw the establishment of the Electoral Commission as an opportunity to re-examine the arrangements for the review of electoral boundaries. The committee has expressed doubts about the Electoral Commission assuming the responsibility of the parliamentary boundary commissions, but the Jenkins Commission on the voting system, whose report was published shortly after the committee report, had argued for greater co-ordination and for bringing that work under the Electoral Commission.
The Government therefore created in the Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act 2000—usually referred to as PPERA, but I prefer to call it the 2000 Act—the legislation that gave effect to the new arrangements for regulating the finance of political parties and a range of other matters: a statutory framework in which responsibility for both reviewing parliamentary constituency boundaries and local administrative and electoral boundaries could be transferred to the Electoral Commission. To date, only responsibility for local authority administrative boundaries has been transferred to the Electoral Commission.
Mr. Steen: I am great supporter of the Electoral Commission’s work—it has done a wonderful job—but does my hon. Friend agree that the boundary commissions are in a terrible mess. There are all sorts of boundaries commissions—local government, central Government and so on—and I cannot quite work out which one does what. Does he agree that the boundary commissions are already producing new boundaries for the next election that are not within the 70,000 electorate limit that has been recommended. Some are as high as 110,000, and some are as low as 30,000. Is it not about time that the boundary commissions’ work, which is failing, was transferred to a better and more competent body?
Peter Viggers: If the Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice) should catch your eye,Mr. Deputy Speaker, it is possible that she might refer to this matter because she has laid down a timetable within which the work of the boundary commissions will not be transferred to the Electoral Commission, while leaving it open for it to be transferred at a later date. However, I would prefer to leave that to the Minister, who can speak with authority on it.
Mr. Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op): Part of the problem with the boundary commissions is that some of the seven criteria under which they operate are mutually contradictory, and we have had reference to one of them so far. Would anything in the rules of transfer allow the Electoral Commission to look at the criteria under which the boundary commissions undertake their work?
Peter Viggers: The hon. Gentleman has made his point, but I would prefer to leave that issue to the Minister, who can speak with authority on the matter, if I may. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making his point.
John Bercow (Buckingham) (Con): Recently, entirely of my own volition, I provided to the Electoral Commission details of sponsorship of a number of visits that I had made overseas, overwhelmingly in the course of my then duties as shadow Secretary of State for International Development. However, given that one already has a responsibility to declare such interests in the Register of Members’ Interests, is there not a danger of duplication—I put it no more strongly than that—if by virtue of the 2000 Act, one is also required to make a declaration to a body that could perfectly well apprise itself of that information from a publicly available source?
Peter Viggers: It is not often that an hon. Member can give total reassurance to a colleague, but I assure my hon. Friend that the current legislation has now amalgamated the requirement to make a declaration to the House authorities and to the Electoral Commission and I share his relief.
Mr. Oliver Heald (North-East Hertfordshire) (Con): Is it not fair to say that the Electoral Commission pointed out such duplication and was very happy for that change to be made?
Peter Viggers: Indeed, I confirm that the Electoral Commission was entirely happy about the change.
Simon Hughes (North Southwark and Bermondsey) (LD): Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Peter Viggers: I must press on at this point.
I think that I have made the point that the 2000 Act substantially enlarged the original plan for an elections commission, which became the Electoral Commission and has been given very wide powers. The Government saw the functions of the new Electoral Commission
“as crucial to maintaining public confidence in our democratic institutions”.
It therefore shared the view of the Committee on Standards in Public Life that the commission should be wholly independent of the Government and be seen to be scrupulously impartial in its dealings with political parties. It was therefore deliberately not constituted as a non-departmental public body, but was made directly accountable to Parliament. During the passage of the legislation through the House, the Government introduced stringent restrictions on the extent to which commissioners could be involved in active politics.
The arrangements for setting the Electoral Commission’s budget were designed to reinforce that independent status. That responsibility was given to a statutory committee—the Speaker’s Committee—of nine Members of Parliament, including Mr. Speaker and of which I am a member. The Committee is deliberately constituted so that no party has a majority of the membership.
David Taylor (North-West Leicestershire) (Lab/Co-op): I understand that in the evidence given to the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs, the budget was then about £26 million a year, which represented about three times the figure that a broad range of similar activities had cost when they were subsumed within the Home Office. I support the work of the Electoral Commission and am very impressed by its chairman, but is the hon. Gentleman convinced that the extra two thirds, whatever that may be—£16 or £17 million—represents good value for money for the extra responsibilities that the Electoral Commission has within its brief?
Peter Viggers: I will be dealing with exactly that point in a few moments if the hon. Gentleman will contain himself. May I just deal with the matter of the Speaker’s Committee?
As there has been some discussion in evidence to the Committee on Standards in Public Life about an alleged lack of transparency in the operations of the Speaker’s Committee, I should perhaps note in passing that it was a deliberate decision of the House, welcomed by all the principal parties, that Mr. Speaker should chair the Committee that bears his name. In 2000, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Bill as originally envisaged, provided for Mr. Speaker merely to appoint members to the Committee. Mr. Speaker’s predecessor agreed with the Government that she would become an ex-officio Chairman of the Speaker’s Committee, and that decision was welcomed by all the principal parties. The view has been taken that it would be inappropriate for a Committee of which the Speaker is an active participant to meet in public. That is the basis on which the Committee currently operates. There is obviously a trade-off to be made between the degree of transparency and Mr. Speaker taking an active part in the Committee’s work. For my part, I have no doubt that the benefit of the authority of his involvement far outweighs the effects of the inevitable but limited reduction in transparency.
The Speaker’s Committee also approves the Commission’s five-year corporate plan. The Government intended the functions of the Speaker’s Committee to mirror as closely as possible those ofthe Public Accounts Commission in relation to the National Audit Office. They nonetheless had anxieties about how those arrangements would work in practice and included safeguards in the legislation designed to prevent what they described as runaway expenditure. The Speaker’s Committee is therefore required to consult the Treasury on both the estimate and corporate plan and to have regard to any advice that the Treasury may give. It must also have regard to the most recent annual value for money report on the Electoral Commission produced by the Comptroller and Auditor General.
Both the Treasury input and the NAO reports are very much more than a tick-the-box exercise. The NAO typically reports each year on a specific policy that accounts for a significant amount of the Electoral Commission’s expenditure, such as its public awareness strategy, on which the NAO has reported to us twice. In many cases, the NAO’s choice of subject reflects the concerns that the Speaker’s Committee has expressed, so there is a welcome synergy between us. It is also a very transparent input; the Speaker’s Committee publishes these reports for all to see.
The Speaker’s Committee has a significant part in promoting understanding between the Electoral Commission and the House. However, it is not the only body with a role in this place. I welcome the fact that various departmental Committees have examined the commission’s policy stances on a number of important issues. While it is the duty of the Speaker’s Committee to be mindful, on behalf of the House, of what we call the three Es—economy, efficiency and effectiveness—it is open to others to hold the commission to account in the context of its wider interests for its policy stances. The two strands of parliamentary strategy are complementary, not competitive.
Taken overall, I would submit that there are few tranches of public expenditure of a similar size for which Government are responsible that are subject to the same level of sustained and systematic parliamentary scrutiny as is the Electoral Commission.
About five years on after the creation of the Electoral Commission, where do we stand? The commission started out with an agenda that its chairman described to the Speaker’s Committee in November 2001 as “very ambitious” in relation to its newness and the existing resource level. The commission has grown. Its net resource requirement for 2006-07 is £26.18 million, and it now has an average full-time equivalent staff of 150, compared with 25 in March 2001.
The commission has thoroughly documented its work in the successive annual reports that it has presented to Parliament. I will comment later on some aspect of its record.
Over the past five years, the political outlook has changed considerably. The conclusions of the Jenkin’s Committee, which clearly had a marked effect on the Government’s thinking about the role of the commission, have not been implemented. The electoral modernisation has thrown up real doubts about the wider impact of some of the changes that have been made, such as easier access to postal votes. More recently, the controversy over loans to political parties has raised doubts among the general public over the effectiveness of the controls enacted in the year 2000, and further dented public confidence in politicians and political parties. At the same time the level of voter engagement remains historically low.
Not surprisingly, this change in political outlook has impacted on the Electoral Commission and raised questions as to whether the original 1991 blueprint still meets the current requirements. Thus some have expressed the view that the commission’s remit is too broad and that it would be a more effective body if its remit were concentrated on its core regulatory functions. Others have accused it of lacking political awareness, suggesting that it would be more effective if some, at least, of the commissioners had experience of active politics.
The commission has had its disagreements with Government on a number of issues—notably on the extent of the piloting of postal voting in the European elections and the acceptability of all-postal voting at elections, and the need for improved safeguards for our current system of postal voting on demand. There is particularly the debate about individual electoral registration.
In that context, it is worth
recalling the key principles on which Henry Samuel Chapman built the
first secret ballot law 150 years ago—the rock on which our
current system ultimately rests and
which
“by combining secrecy with limited vote-tracing both protected the elector and detected fraud when election results were in dispute.”
People tend to remember the secret ballot and tend not to know about limited vote tracing, both of which are very important.
That an independent body has a difference of view with the Government over a policy issue is not inherently a problem, but each of these is a sensitive political issue, and there is a risk in these circumstances that such disagreement may lead to a loss of confidence in the political process at a time when there is general concern about overall levels of political engagement. Some, such as the Government in their evidence to the Committee on Standards in Public Life, have therefore raised the issue whether the commission’s policy development role continues to be appropriate.
There have been two general elections—in 2001 and 2005—since the Electoral Commission was established, but the most recent general election was the first in respect of which the relevant provisions of the 2000 legislation, including the provisions relating to notional expenditure, applied fully. For all these reasons, and others besides, it seems right that the opportunity is now taken on a number of fronts to take stock of the arrangements put in place in 2000, and to consider how best to move forward. One contribution to this process is, of course, this debate. I welcome the many Members who wish to participate. If the debate did not start at7 o’clock as we originally intended, I do not think that it is for me to apologise. I am grateful for the attendance. The debate is an important part to the process of discussion.
There are three other strands that I should mention. The first is the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s inquiry, which is currently in hand, focusing on the core issues of the mandate, governance and accountability of the Electoral Commission. In practical terms, this means examining the current responsibilities and the balance between the commission’s executive and advisory functions. The inquiry is expected to be completed by the end of the year. I have been pleased to give evidence to it on behalf of the Speaker’s Committee. I will do so again, and I look forward to seeing the Committee’s conclusions.
The Speaker’s Committee has taken steps to satisfy itself that its conclusions that the estimates and corporate plans that it lays before the House are, in the words of the 2000 Act, consistent with the
“economical, efficient and effective discharge by the Commission of its functions”.
Those are the three Es that I mentioned earlier. The Committee was itself planning a general inquiry that would have encompassed issues relating to the commission’s governance and accountability, but deferred these elements when it learned of the proposed inquiry by the CSPL. Instead, the Speaker’s Committee asked the Scrutiny Committee—that is the scrutiny unit at the House—to carry out a detailed study of the commission’s business and financial planning processes, how it assesses the effectiveness of policy outcomes and how the statutory roles of the Treasury and the National Audit Office contribute to the discharge of the Committee’s duty.
The Speaker’s Committee entrusted this review to the scrutiny unit, which has the necessary specialist expertise to conduct precisely this sort of review. I understand that this is the first exercise of this type that the unit has undertaken. The Committee was pleased with the thorough job done by the unit, and the positive response of the Electoral Commission to the recommendations addressed to it. The Speaker’s Committee is still considering the detailed recommendations that the unit addressed to it, designed to improve the effectiveness of its scrutiny. Already, however, it has set up a sub-committee, which I chair, and the Minister is good enough to participate in our discussions. This is to give consideration to the recommendations, and I expect to be putting forward recommendations as to their implementation before the full Committee before the summer recess.
Finally, there is Sir Hayden Phillips’ review of the funding of political parties. It is also relevant to the work of the Electoral Commission. Given the extension of the terms of reference in 1997 to the Electoral Commission, specifically to cover party funding issues, it is perhaps surprising that a separate review was felt necessary as a result of the controversy over loans to political parties.
I propose briefly to analyse three specific aspects of the work of Electoral Commission, including its record in each and some of the concerns that have been expressed. They are: first, governance and accountability; second, regulatory functions; thirdly, advisory functions.
In broad terms, the accountability arrangements to the House appear to have worked satisfactorily. As I have already said, the arrangements for regulating its finances have operated effectively, and the run-away expenditure feared by the Government has not materialised. All the existing commissioners whose original periods of office have expired have been reappointed; none of the reappointments has proved controversial in the House. The commission has been to keen to participate in Select Committee inquiries, and this has provided an opportunity for its policy stances critically to be examined.
Less satisfactory, perhaps, have been the arrangements for the political parties to make an input to the commission. While the political parties panel, constituted under section 4 of the 2000 Act, has provided a mechanism for party inputs at an official level, the parties and the commission appear not to have developed a similar mechanism at a political level. Given that commissioners are by definition people with no political experience insofar as that relates to donations, political employment or standing for election for at least 10 years before their appointment, this has been seen as a weakness, in that the commission has had little exposure to front-line political reality. This, some would argue, has been reflected in the overall way in which it has interpreted its role, and on occasion in the nature of the proposals that it has made.
In
relation to its regulatory functions, the commission has continued to
register new political parties. The number on the register has more
than tripled since 2001 to 394. The commission has also received and
published details of more than 13,000 donations to political parties
totalling more than
£180 million, and some £86 million of campaign expenditure
at six elections and one referendum, since 2001, while investigating
where there is doubt about whether the existing rules have been
followed.
A welcome change, for which provision will be made in the Electoral Administration Bill, will be the one-stop-shop for Members, whereby the information needed by the Commission for its register of recordable donations may be drawn from information given to the Register of Members’ Interests. However, as the recent controversy over loans to political parties has shown, there is evidence that public confidence in some parts of the political arrangements is fragile at best.
It is right to record that the Electoral Commission has successfully completed the 126 reviews of local authority electoral boundaries in England that it inherited from the Local Government Commission for England and has implemented all the consequent changes in good time for the next election in the reviewed area. It successfully conducted the regional government referendum in the north-east of England in November 2004.
Simon Hughes: On the local government boundary issue and the transfer of functions to the Electoral Commission, is it the view of the Speaker’s Committee that that job has been well done? If it is, has the committee taken the view that therefore it would be logical—this point was made earlier by one of the hon. Gentleman’s colleagues—for the commission to be given as soon as practicable the responsibility for all other boundaries, because the precedent is a good one?
Peter Viggers: My best answer to that is that the Speaker’s Committee takes the view that the Electoral Commission has fulfilled its role satisfactorily—even very satisfactorily—but that it does not follow logically that the work of the boundary commission should be referred to it. I hope and trust that the Minister will refer to that matter later.
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