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Amendment No.
58 is also technical in nature, but would make an important change to
provisions in respect of the bereaved minor trust. That is an important
part of the Government’s new framework, and the amendment deals
with the circumstances that arise when a will leaves property on trust
to a spouse for life, with the remainder going to children on trust,
vesting when they reach 25. That arrangement will attract the full
force of the new schedule 20 charges, unless it can be varied to comply
with the requirements of proposed new sections 71A and 71D. Trustees
may
wish to do that, but proposed new section 71A(2)(a) means that a change
made by trustees will not enable them to opt into the bereaved minor
trust regime. That is because such trusts apparently can arise only
under a will and, in the circumstances that I have outlined, the trusts
arise as a result of the exercise of the trustees’
powers—that is, not directly under the
will.
Amendment No. 58 would ensure that a change by trustees in that situation will suffice to bring the trust under the proposed new section 71A regime. If it is not adopted, many thousands of wills, perhaps more, will still need to be reviewed. I hope that, at the very least, the Paymaster General will give the House clarification on that point.
Turning to the more substantive issues, rather than the technical one, our amendments would broaden the definition of disability in section 89 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984. Section 89 has received little attention up to now, because plenty of more useful and more flexible trusts could be set up for vulnerable people outside the scope of section 89. Now that the majority of such trusts will be hit by the new inheritance tax charges under schedule 20, the section 89 carve-out has suddenly grown significantly in importance.
Some problems in respect of trusts for disabled people have been solved by amendments tabled by the Government in Committee and the retreat continues with their amendment No. 92, which will be considered this afternoon and is to all intents and purposes identical to Opposition amendment No. 12. As drafted, the Bill would impose a double tax hit on the death of a disabled beneficiary under an interest in possession trust. Both inheritance tax and capital gains tax would be payable, which would leave disabled beneficiaries facing a higher tax bill than they would have done before Budget day. I am relieved that the Government have had second thoughts about imposing that extra tax hit on vulnerable people, despite the Paymaster General’s rejection of my amendment on that matter in Committee.
Similarly, I welcome the Government’s acceptance of the point made in Opposition amendment No. 52—that it would be unacceptable to leave a disabled beneficiary struggling with the administrative problems caused by the related settlement regime of IHTA section 80 when others are exempted. Unless the Bill is amended on that point, people setting up trusts for a disabled spouse will be in a more disadvantaged position than those leaving a life-interest trust in their will to a non-disabled spouse.
Even with the solution of those problems, however, significant difficulties will still arise in relation to the impact of schedule 20 on trusts for vulnerable and disabled people—some of the most disadvantaged communities in our society. Robin Williamson of the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group put it more articulately than I possibly could. He said:
“On Budget day...this year...the Government proposed—without prior consultation—the most far-reaching changes to inheritance tax in a generation. Their intention seems to be to exclude trusts for disabled people from the scope of the new tax charges to be levied on most other types of trust. But the definition of disabled person used for this purpose, substantially unaltered for more than 20 years, is so narrowly framed as to leave many disabled beneficiaries of trusts out in the cold.
While the rest of government forges ahead in its understanding of disability issues, with the Disability Discrimination Acts 1995 and 2005 ushering in a new age of inclusion, the tax system clings obstinately to ancient precedents. The final opportunity to put these matters right comes when the Finance Bill receives its third reading on Tuesday and Wednesday 4 and 5 July. We urge the Government to reconsider, otherwise this once-in-a-generation opportunity to bring the tax definition of disabled person up-to-date and into line with the rest of Government thinking on disability will have been missed.”
John Bercow: So that the issue is fully intelligible to those of us who were not privileged to sit on the Standing Committee, and to others outside this place who are very interested in this point, will my hon. Friend explain precisely what is the rather narrow definition that the Government have hitherto insisted on using?
Mrs. Villiers: Yes, I shall explore that point in a moment.
In a joint statement, the organisations Mind, the Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners, the Parkinson’s Disease Society, the Chartered Institute of Taxation, the Institute of Chartered Accountants, the Law Society, the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group and the National Autistic Society said:
“We are not seeking favoured treatment, but to prevent vulnerable trust beneficiaries from incurring a tax penalty that they would not have incurred before Budget day. There are so many inconsistencies in the definition in section 89 that we firmly take the view that the legislation cannot go forward as currently drafted without causing severe prejudice to the interests of vulnerable trust beneficiaries, and discrimination between different classes of beneficiary, some of whom may qualify as a “disabled person” under the definition and some of whom will not.”
Turning to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (John Bercow), the current section 89 definition covers two groups: people who, by reason of mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983, are incapable of administering their property or managing their own affairs and people who are claiming attendance allowance or the highest or middle rate care component of disability living allowance.
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The Opposition seek to broaden both categories of the definition. In accordance with the representations made by Mind and other concerned groups, we propose to add a reference to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, so that it is sufficient if the beneficiary falls within the definition of incapacity contained in the Mental Health Act 1983 or the 2005 Act.
The problem that we seek to address with the new clause and these amendments was highlighted by James Kessler, QC, when he said:
“The definition of disabled is extremely narrow...the large majority of mentally vulnerable people will not be included. No relief is given for those with partial mental capacity... No relief is available to those who are aged or infirm or incapacitated whose disability is less than the grievous state required for relief.”
Sir
Nicholas Winterton (Macclesfield) (Con): I seek to broaden
the debate very slightly. I fully agree with the argument being
advanced by my hon. Friend from the shadow Treasury team, but is it not
utterly wrong
that there should be prejudice in the Government against the cascading
down of wealth from one generation to the next, particularly against
those who are seeking to hand on by way of a trust to those who are
disabled, either physically or mentally, or to those who have looked
after their elderly parents, thus sacrificing their own career? Their
future is prejudiced because of the measure that the Government want to
introduce—that is, it is unfair. Does my hon. Friend
agree?
Mrs. Villiers: It is certainly enormously important that parents who wish to provide for a disabled child for the rest of their child’s life are not prevented or inhibited from or penalised for setting up a trust for that purpose. It seems to be the most worthwhile thing in the world for people to want to provide security for their disabled children. That is what the Opposition seek to do in our new clause and amendments this afternoon.
The Paymaster General (Dawn Primarolo): Perhaps the hon. Lady would explain to the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir Nicholas Winterton) that the Government carried out a consultation exercise on this very issue two years ago and that, overwhelmingly, all the organisations consulted said that they want to stick with the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983. Would she also explain to the hon. Gentleman that we are talking about inheritance tax avoidance, not about planning for disabled children?
Mrs. Villiers: On the second point, the Paymaster General and the Government repeatedly say that schedule 20 is all about preventing the super-rich from sheltering their wealth from inheritance tax, but they adduce no evidence that trusts are used in that way. It is almost impossible to see how trusts can be used in that way, because they are taxed in the same way as an outright gift. The reality is that schedule 20 will hit a vast number of arrangements that have nothing at all to do with taxation. The fact that someone might wish to save their money and put it into a trust to provide after their death for their disabled child seems to have nothing whatsoever to do with inheritance tax.
I am glad that the Paymaster General referred to the consultation that the Government carried out, but she failed to mention that the consultation on the definition is two years old.
Dawn Primarolo: I just said that.
Mrs. Villiers: I am sorry—a slight omission—but certainly no mention was made of the fact that the consultation was carried out in the context of an income tax provision, which did not have nearly the same significance as section 89. Furthermore, again, I quote the QC to whom I referred earlier:
“Until now the tax reliefs for disabled persons have been almost entirely irrelevant because the value and importance of the reliefs have been trivial. The reliefs have not been significantly used because they are more trouble than they are worth. Thus it does not matter that the definition of disabled has been drawn extremely narrowly.”
Even
more importantly, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 had not been finalised
when the consultation was
carried out, so it would have been difficult for the organisations to
refer to such matters directly. Although a significant number of
charitable organisations were involved in the consultation, only six
responded on that issue during the two consultation exercises that were
carried
out.
A number of influential organisations protested that the definition was too narrow. On this point, the Treasury summary of the responses states:
“There was concern that the definition of vulnerable set out in the discussion papers—which covered disabled people and orphaned children—was too narrow.”
In Committee, the Paymaster General referred to the Disability Alliance as supporting the current section 89 definition. I would therefore like to quote from its response on the consultation, which it publishes on its website. Under the heading “Defining categories of disabled people”, it states:
“The proposals to restrict eligibility to those mentioned in paragraph 2 above appears to be far too restrictive and would exclude many disabled people who are currently defined under social security legislation. In this regard it would not appear to fit in with the government’s proposal of fairness.”
I was only too happy to take up the Minister’s invitation to refer to the consultation.
Mr. Philip Dunne (Ludlow) (Con): The Paymaster General quite rightly points out that the consultation began more than two years ago, but she has failed to acknowledge that no mention was made during that consultation of the main issue before us in relation to the changes in schedule 20—the reduction in age from 25 to 18 for accumulation and maintenance trusts. That was not referred to in the consultation at all. Nor was any evidence given by the Paymaster General in Committee of any systematic abuse. The consultation exercise failed to reveal the issues that the Government are now trying to introduce.
Mrs. Villiers: I agree that it was deeply unfortunate that the Government carried out the two-year consultation and never once mentioned the proposals on inheritance tax that they were seeking to put forward.
Rob Marris (Wolverhampton, South-West) (Lab): Will the hon. Lady indicate whether her amendments are aimed at dealing with trusts for people with disabilities set up inter vivos or on death? Those things are very different in terms of whether one is making provision for a child with a disability. Amendment No. 7 seeks to include the lower rate of disability living allowance as a kind of qualifying gateway. What level of disability is encompassed by the lower rate of DLA definition? Will she give some examples?
Mrs. Villiers: I will come to the second point later. On the first point, the amendments are most important in relation to inter vivos trusts, because at least there are other options open in relation to trusts set up on death. After the Government’s amendments in Committee, it will now be possible to set up life-interest trusts under a will without suffering the tax penalties. The primary advantage to be gained by the Opposition’s amendments is in relation to the establishment of inter vivos trusts, which would obviously otherwise incur the charges.
Rob Marris: I am grateful for that clarification. Perhaps I have misunderstood the hon. Lady, and she can clarify things if I have, but the reply that the Opposition amendments are related to inter vivos trusts suggests that we are talking about a tax dodge, rather than the laudable aim of a parent of a child with a disability—who will have that disability for life and who is likely to outlive their parents—who wants to make provision for that child after the parent is gone. I can see the situation with trusts on death, but the hon. Lady is talking about amendments relating to inter vivos trusts. I hope that she will realise why there appears—certainly prima facie—to be a tax dodge in that scenario.
Mrs. Villiers: I know that the hon. Gentleman is keen to crack down on tax avoidance, but it is harsh to accuse parents who set up trusts to provide for their disabled children of doing that for motives of tax dodging. Let us take, for example, a situation in which the parents of a disabled child are becoming elderly. They may find it difficult to continue to manage the financial affairs as their own capacity starts to diminish. It is an entirely understandable wish on the part of a parent to get things sorted out, set up and finalised well before they die. There is a real social need to sort out and secure the future of one’s children, even before one’s death.
The definition in the 2005 Act is much broader than in the 1983 Act and will more easily cover the people with partial, variable and fluctuating levels of capacity to which I referred earlier in the quote from James Kessler, QC.
Moreover, the definition in the 2005 Act is more up to date—many of the relevant provisions of the 1983 Act are soon to be repealed. That Act is geared towards determining whether compulsory treatment is required. The background to its operation is the question whether someone is a risk to themselves or others—that is, whether they should be sectioned. In contrast, the 2005 Act focuses on whether someone has the capacity to manage their own affairs and considers their ability to make decisions about their own lives. It is much more empowering. It focuses more closely on the situation that we are considering, whereby a disabled person may wish to use a trust to assist them in managing their property. Our amendment is focused specifically on capacity in relation to financial matters.
The key problem is that many people who need trusts to help them to tackle the serious difficulty that they may have in managing their finances fall short of the degree of mental illness required to bring them within in the definition in the 1983 Act. For example, many people who have a diagnosis of manic depression or schizophrenia will not be ill enough to fall within that definition, yet they may be the very people who need trusts most of all. As the charity, Rethink, points out on its website, people with manic conditions often believe that they are richer than they are and go on irrational spending sprees. One family wrote to me about the trust that it had set up for their daughter, whose bipolar disorder, more commonly known as manic depression, leads to such irrational spending. They said:
“We are not wealthy and we imagine our assets are probably about average or less for families that live in this part”—
“We know that other parents in Scotland of modest means whose children suffer manic depression or problems such as drug addiction, alcoholism etc. have also set up IIP trusts. We need flexibility from limited funds to care for the surviving spouse as well as for a mentally sick (but not disabled) offspring. We write to ask you to seek to influence the legislation. We are concerned that trusts that have no tax avoidance intention or action will suffer unfairly large taxation...Our sole intention is to provide trustees to regulate my daughter’s income so that she does not make herself destitute by claiming her legal share of assets if they are not protected by an existing IIP trust.”
I hardly think that people in that position can be accused of engaging in a tax dodge, as the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) suggested. Unless amended, the Bill will impose a 20 per cent. tax charge on capital plus a 6 per cent. tax charge every 10 years on a trust of this nature set up for a vulnerable person. The definition in the 2005 Act was subject to 12 years of consultation. It has a wide range of support among groups working with people with mental health difficulties, and I appeal to the Government to accept its incorporation into the Bill.
Turning to the second limb of the section 89 definition, the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group and its influential coalition point out that the benefits-related test is a very blunt instrument. In many cases, people with serious disabilities will not qualify for the middle or highest rate care components of disability living allowance as required by section 89. To qualify even for the middle rate—here I respond to the intervention by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West—someone must be so severely disabled that they require frequent attention or continual supervision throughout the day or night. In particular, the provision excludes beneficiaries under trusts set up for personal injury damages or to cover money from disaster funds, who may have a high mobility component and a lower care component of DLA—in other words, they may need an hour’s care a day or more but not frequent or continuous care. Surely such cases, where for example personal injury damages have been obtained, are exactly the type of situation in which a trust can be most useful, in that a large cash sum is received that has to be managed carefully to provide for the rest of the beneficiary’s life. Again, the Government want to slap a 20 per cent. up-front charge on those damages and a 6 per cent. charge on capital every 10 years. As the Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners points out, such people can ill afford to pay those new charges since the quantum of damages awarded to them has been carefully assessed to meet their needs for the rest of their life.
We should remember that the sums involved in such damages settlements and court cases are likely to be very significant. As they are intended to cover the rest of the claimant’s life, with the high cost of living with disability factored in, they may well exceed the inheritance tax thresholds. The Opposition have tabled cautious amendments to extend the scope of section 89 as regards those who can claim the lower rate of the care component. That would embrace many more disabled people. We urge the Government to accept those amendments in order to seize this last opportunity to prevent schedule 20 from penalising some of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged people in our community.
4.15 pm
Rob Marris: I declare an interest in that I used to work for Thompson’s personal injury solicitors, who give money to my constituency Labour party. I point out to the hon. Lady that under her amendments some personal injury victims would get a windfall. When their awards were calculated the then tax regime would have been taken into account, and if she then ameliorated the tax regime, those individual would get a windfall. Secondly, the Government are, rightly, encouraging PI victims with large settlements to take them as a series of staged payments, to put it in the vernacular, rather than in one large lump sum.
Mrs. Villiers: The point is that the courts have not taken the new tax regime into account. The changes will impact on existing trusts, so, far from a windfall, there will be a tax penalty. Even if the courts had been sharp enough to say, “We will look at what is in the Finance Bill and start tailoring compensation awards accordingly,” how are they supposed to know how the legislation will turn out? Only two days ago, the Government were still tabling amendments. They have tabled 50 amendments to schedule 20. It is completely impossible for any court in a PI case to have tailored its settlement to take into account the current tax regime because, quite frankly, no one knows what it is. The hon. Gentleman may shake his head, but he knows that that is a valid point. [Interruption.] Indeed, the Government have been making it up as they go along.
That brings me neatly to insurance, and a prime example of how the Government have been making it up as they go along. It has been a problem for them ever since they slipped out Budget note 25. They simply did not think through the impact of schedule 20 on millions of people who hold life insurance policies in trust. Writing insurance policies into trust has been considered best practice for many years because it means that money can be paid out to the family swiftly in the event of tragedy, without lengthy delays waiting for a grant of probate. It also means that it is simple and easy to change the beneficiaries under a policy to take account of changing family circumstances.
Data from the Association of British Insurers suggest that there are 22.5 million single premium and regular premium life policies in force, and anecdotal evidence indicates that about 20 per cent. are written in trust. The ABI estimated that about 4.5 million policies may have to be reviewed as a result of schedule 20. The families affected would be faced, at worst, with the threat of a punitive new tax bill, and at best with the need to review and amend their policies. Prudential and Standard Life both suspended the sale of life policies under trust because of the uncertainty surrounding the Finance Bill.
Initially, the Government’s reaction was denial. They denied that there was a problem. They issued a guidance note and dismissed the furore as scaremongering. However, following the Bill’s publication, it was clear that there was no specific exclusion for life policies. Kevin Martin, the Law Society president, confirmed that millions of life policies would still be caught. Julie Hutchinson of Standard Life expressed the concerns of many when she said:
“We’re extremely disappointed that the clear statements in the guidance note are not carried into effect in the bill itself and will be making further representations via the ABI on this retrospective effect issue”.
The concerns that I set out on Second Reading were brushed aside, then a few weeks later, in Committee, the Government suddenly tabled a set of deeply obscure and complex amendments. Although I welcome the Government’s change of heart on that, as on so many other aspects of schedule 20, a number of serious problems remain. As Colin Jelly of Skandia Life pointed out, the Government’s amendments in Committee were only a small, albeit a welcome, step in the right direction. He said:
“A significant number of people are still likely to be affected by the changes and the government is doing nothing more than tinkering at the edges of the proposed legislation.”
The carve-out introduced by the Government in Committee does not cover all pre-Budget day policies. It therefore contravenes the Treasury’s guidance note of 7 April and the statement made to the House by the then Chief Secretary on Second Reading that
“no one who wrote a life insurance policy in trust before Budget day will have to pay a new inheritance tax charge as a result of these changes.”—[ Official Report, 24 April 2006; Vol. 445,c. 369.]
This statement is still not true. The new charges will still apply to pre-Budget day policies where there is a change of beneficiaries, except where that change results from death. If, for example, a new baby is added to a policy, that will amount to a new settlement and will trigger the new, penal schedule 20 regime. Furthermore, where an interest in possession is removed from someone who remains a beneficiary, the new reservation of benefit rules in paragraph 33 of the schedule mean that the trust could be liable for a 40 per cent. inheritance tax charge on the death of the former life tenant.
Because of those gaps in the protection provided by the Government amendments that were made in Committee, substantial numbers of people—perhaps millions—will have to review their policies. Even more worryingly, the Government’s climbdown in Committee does nothing to assist life insurance policies written into trust after Budget day, all of which will be subject to the new regime and charges. Having originally thought that no policies would be affected at all, the Government appear to be happy that some policies will be caught by the new charges from now on. Almost by accident, they have proposed to introduce significant new taxes on life insurance policies that will operate in an arbitrary way when the 6 per cent. charge is levied on the 10-year anniversary of the trust.
Sir Nicholas Winterton: Why does my hon. Friend think that the Government are against saving, which is for the benefit not only of an individual family but of the country? The measures appear to accuse people of avoiding inheritance tax—I personally believe that inheritance tax is a pernicious second tax, which I would abolish altogether—but why is it wrong to save for insurance policies related to a trust?
Mrs.
Villiers: To be fair to the Paymaster General and the
Government, I do not think that they are actively against saving, and I
do not believe that their
motivation in schedule 20 is to try to discourage saving. However, the
reality is that the new charges are a tax on thrift, prudence and
responsible behaviour, which is why the Opposition oppose the new
inheritance tax charges.
Dawn Primarolo: But does the hon. Lady agreewith her hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield(Sir Nicholas Winterton) that inheritance tax should be abolished—yes or no?
Mrs. Villiers: We have made it clear that we are not making promises to cut taxes at present. We accept the long-term importance of reductions in taxes, but—
Dawn Primarolo rose—
Mrs. Villiers: I will give way to the right hon. Lady in a moment.
We have promised to share the proceeds of growth between real increases in public spending and reduced borrowing and taxes over the economic cycle.
Dawn Primarolo: If the hon. Lady is not making any commitments at all, bearing in mind what her hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield said about abolishing inheritance tax, will she give him an undertaking that she will consider the matter and inform him and the House in due course?
Mrs. Villiers: Our tax reform commission is looking at all those issues, and it will report very soon.
We are not discussing the current inheritance tax regime, however, but penal new inheritance tax for people who use trusts to provide responsibly for their future and for the future of their family. The new taxes will operate in an arbitrary way, because the value of the life insurance policy —[ Interruption. ]
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Economic Secretary should not interrupt the hon. Lady, because it is unfair.
Mrs. Villiers: Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.
Sir Nicholas Winterton: I am not seeking a commitment from my hon. Friend that we should abolish inheritance tax. I was expressing a view as an independent Conservative—the tax is pernicious, and we should consider abolishing it in due course—but I was not asking her to give a commitment.
Mrs. Villiers: I am grateful to my hon. Friend.
Returning to the subject of the debate, the arbitrary operation of schedule 20 in relation to life insurance policies arises because those policies depend on the health of the person insured. They have virtually no market value unless the insured person is very ill or terminally ill. If the 10-year anniversary occurs when they are fit and healthy, the value of the policy is minimal, and inheritance tax is not payable, because its value is likely to be below the nil rate band.
If, however, the insured person becomes seriously or terminally ill just before that 10-year anniversary occurs, that could push the value of the policy above the threshold and the IHT charge will apply. At this point there is no property in the trust to pay the tax, and the insured person faces an unwelcome extra tax bill at a time when their possibly terminal illness presumably means they are too ill to work. Remember, the proceeds generated by such policies must be very considerable to give bereaved families a sufficient income on which to live, so it is entirely possible that a tax charge will be triggered in this situation. Not only is schedule 20 a tax on prudence, but in this instance it is a tax on terminal illness as well.
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