[holding answer 5 July 2006]: There have been significant improvements in the performance
of the probation service in recent years. However, we need to do more. We published on 30 March 2006 Working with probation to protect the public and reduce re-offending. This sets out how we will work with the probation service and other partners to develop more effective end-to-end management of offenders throughout their sentence. We intend to bring forward legislation to give effect to our proposals as soon as parliamentary time allows.
Mr. Graham Stuart:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many offenders were found guilty of (a) drunk and disorderly behaviour and (b) drunken and aggravated behaviour in (i) England, (ii) Beverley and Holderness and (iii) East Riding of
Yorkshire council area in each year since 1997; and if he will make a statement. 
Mr. McNulty: Data from the Court Proceedings Database held by the Office for Criminal Justice Reform showing how many offenders were found guilty of drunkenness offences in England and in the East Riding of Yorkshire are in the following table. We are unable to supply convictions for Beverley and Holderness constituency as the data is not available at the level of detail required. Figures for 2005 will be available in the autumn of 2006. The table also shows the number of penalty notices (PNDs) for drunk and disorderly behaviour in England in 2004. Data of the number of PNDs issued in the East Riding are not available as figures are not collected at this level of detail.
|Number of defendants found guilty at all courts of drunkenness offences in England and the East Riding of Yorkshire, 1997 to 2004( 1)
|n/a = not applicable, as penalty notices were not introduced until 2004. (1) These data are on the principal offence basis. (2) The figures cover four local justice areas: Goole and Howdenshire, Bridlington, Beverley and the Wolds and Hull and Holderness. Source: RDSOffice for Criminal Justice Reform.
Mr. McNulty: LTI 20.20 laser speedmeters can be used up to a distance of 999.9m. The instruments are technically capable of operating to distances twice as far, but the maximum distance they can display is 999.9m. Use is therefore limited to this distance.
Sarah Teather: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department in how many cases of arson attacks on schools a suspect was (a) cautioned and (b) charged in the last year for which figures are available; and what percentage of total cases of arson attacks on schools these figures represent. 
Mr. Sutcliffe: It is not possible to identify cautions or prosecutions resulting from arson attacks on schools, in the data held by the Office for Criminal Justice Reform as such offences cannot be distinguished from all other offences of arson. Data compiled by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) show that in England during 2004, there were 677 fires on schools in which deliberate ignition was established or suspected. DCLG do not collect any information on whether the police arrested or charged any suspects, or on subsequent court appearances.
Patrick Mercer: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department pursuant to his written statement of 16 February 2006, on the Private Security Industry Approved Contractor Scheme, what assessment he has made of whether companies that have obtained (a) UKAS Quality Assurance standards (EN 45012) or (b) UKAS Product Certification standards (EN 45011) specific to the security industry should be passported through to membership of the scheme. 
Mr. Coaker: It is not currently possible for a company to achieve ACS accreditation via the passporting route. The SIA is currently in discussion with one certification body that is preparing an application for accreditation of a passport scheme. No other expressions of interest have been received to date.
Companies that meet standards that do not directly and exactly cover all the 89 indicators or that cover other criteria in more depth may be eligible for the Fast Track route. This includes companies that have met relevant quality assurance standards and product certification standards as assessed by a UKAS accredited body under EN 45011 and/or EN 45012.
Greg Mulholland: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what procedures are in place to deal with information from the public about those suspected of terrorist acts or conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. 
Mr. McNulty [holding answer 3 July 2006]: Any information about suspected terrorist activity should be passed to the police. There are a number of ways in which this can be done including the Anti-Terrorist Hotline. The Metropolitan Police Service Anti-Terrorist Branch would be informed in appropriate cases. Any information received by the Anti-Terrorist Branch is logged, assessed and prioritised formally on a daily basis. This process would include detailed inquiries to establish the veracity or otherwise of the information.
Greg Mulholland: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether proper procedures were followed by the police and intelligence services when Mr. Martin Gilbertson approached West Yorkshire police in 2003 about Mohammed Siddique Khan and other individuals responsible for the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005; why the police told Mr. Gilbertson to post the information rather than arranging to speak to a police officer; whether the information received was logged and properly dealt with; and if he will make a statement. 
Mr. McNulty [holding answer 3 July 2006]: West Yorkshire police have released a press statement confirming that they have no knowledge of any contact with Mr. Gilbertson prior to 7 July 2005 in relation to the matters raised by him. West Yorkshire police have informed us that Mr. Gilbertson continues to assist officers as part of the overall investigation into the 7 July bombings.
Mr. Keith Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment she has made of progress towards achieving prosecutions in Afghanistan for those involved in the trafficking of narcotics. 
Since August 2005, over 460 individuals have been arrested on suspicion of drugs related offences in Afghanistan. Prosecutors have handled over 350 cases and over 150 individuals have been convicted. This progress is being supported by
improvements to the criminal justice system infrastructure, including the establishment of dedicated and secure narcotics courts and prison facilities. A counter narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force of 80 Afghan investigators, prosecutors and judges has been established to work with the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan specifically to conduct drugs prosecutions. New Afghan counter narcotics legislation was adopted in December 2005. The new law gives wide-ranging powers for prosecution of drugs offenders, covering both those transporting drugs and those facilitating or conspiring to do so, and sets out stringent minimum sentences for drug trafficking offences and tough sentences for public officials interfering in cases.
Gregory Barker: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what companies are involved in the Amazonian Deforestation Soya Certification Project in the Para region, Brazil; what proportion come from the region; and if she will make a statement. 
Mr. McCartney: Cargill is the only company involved in the Amazon Deforestation Soya Certification Project. It is a US based privately owned company with regional offices in Santarem, State of Para, Brazil. Approximately 300 local Brazilian producers supply Cargill with soya. All these producers participate in the Amazon Deforestation Soya Certification Project. The project works intensively with approximately 20 of these producers.
Mr. Hoon: Two British high commissions are staffed by a single UK-based diplomat. They are in St. Johns (Antigua and Barbuda) and Castries (St. Lucia). Our embassy to the Holy See is also staffed by one UK-based officer.
British Embassy Office, Abijan
The Administrators Office, Ascension Island
British Consulate-General, Auckland
British Embassy Office, Banja Luka
British Consulate-General, Bordeaux
Embassy Office, Conakry
British Consulate-General, Lille
British Consulate-General, Lyon
British Consulate, Monrovia
British Consulate, Nagoya
Pitcairn Islands Administration, Pitcairn
The Administrators Office, Tristan de Cunha.
Mr. Clifton-Brown: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment she has made of whether the recent move of the Burmese capital is related to the development of a nuclear site in the vicinity. 
Mr. McCartney: We were formally notified of the Burmese authorities decision to relocate the seat of administration to Pyinmana on 7 November 2005. The State Peace and Development Council claims that moving to a more central location will enable the Government to carry out the development of the whole nation more effectively. We have no evidence that the move was related to the development of a nuclear site in the vicinity.
Mr. McCartney: In 2005 we looked into allegations that the Burmese regime had used chemical weapons against Karenni fighters but there was no hard evidence to confirm this. Since then we have not received any further reports.
Mr. Keith Simpson: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent discussions she has had with her (a) US and (b) European counterparts on the reinstating of International Atomic Energy Agency verification and monitoring activities in Iraq; and if she will make a statement. 
There are two distinct International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) activities in Iraq. The IAEAs first mandate is to continue to implement safeguards in Iraq under an agreement pursuant to the global Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The IAEAs second mandate in Iraq derives from authority of the UN Security Council under the auspices of adopted Resolution 687 in 1991. This included the establishing of an international inspection regime for disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction; in particular to uncover, map, monitor and neutralise Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The IAEA, through its Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO), remains responsible for this aspect of the nuclear file in Iraq.
On 17 March 2003, the IAEA and all other UN organisations suspended field activities in Iraq ahead of the announced military operations. During this interruption of inspections, INVO has focused its activities on consolidating and further analysing the information collected, with the objective of identifying lessons learned for the future and determining to what extent the Agencys plan for resuming verification activities needs to be adapted in light of those lessons
and the changing situation in Iraq. Periodic reports are filed with the UN Security Council. The IAEA has stated that it remains prepared to resume its field and related activities in Iraq, pending guidance from the UN Security Council.