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Afghanistan (Troops Levels)
4.28 pm
The Secretary of State for Defence (Des Browne): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement about UK deployments to Afghanistan. On Thursday, I spoke about Afghanistan during the defence debate. Today, I reiterate the enormous debt that we owe to the British soldiers who have given their lives and who have been injured while serving there. I also salute the bravery of all of our forces who are working to bring about lasting change in Afghanistan.
On Thursday, I also said that we had received requests for additional forces in Helmand and that I would announce our response as soon as possible. I will do that today; but first, I want to place that response and indeed the whole of our deployment to Helmand and to Afghanistan as a whole in its proper context.
On 11 September 2001, a devastating terrorist attack was launched against the west from within Afghanistan’s borders. That happened, at least in part, because we abandoned Afghanistan to become a failed state after the Soviet occupation, and that is why it remains overwhelmingly in our national interest to ensure that Afghanistan does not revert to a haven for terrorists. It is also in the interests of the Afghan people, the vast majority of whom have no sympathy for terrorism or violent extremism. There are many malign influences holding back the Afghans and we need to fight them, but we should be under no illusion about what is required to succeed.
Only by rebuilding Afghanistan, by strengthening its Government, its security forces and its legal system and by tackling its desperate poverty will we be able to help Afghanistan to make real and lasting progress. I have heard hon. Members on both sides of the House agree that we should help. The UN agrees. NATO agrees. Thirty-six countries are providing troops to seal their agreement. We all agree, and everything that we do and say should reflect that consensus.
It is also important to recognise where our efforts in Helmand stand in relation to the strategy for Afghanistan as a whole. NATO has been in charge of that mission for three years. It has helped to generate the confidence for millions of refugees to return, and improved access to better medicine and education. It has followed a clear plan to expand security and reconstruction from the north to the west, and now to the more challenging south. We have been engaged in that process throughout, having until recently provided a provincial reconstruction team in Mazar-e-Sharif in the north. The south is more challenging, but that was always well understood, which is why NATO sought a firm platform of progress in the north and west first.
Let me turn
specifically to Helmand. We began deploying to Helmand in February,
building up to full operating capability on 1 July. It has been said
that we have been over-optimistic about that deployment, that we told
the House that it would not be difficult and that we sent the wrong
force. None of that is true. We said from the start that it was going
to be a challenging mission. My predecessor’s statement to the
House on 26 January included a sober assessment of the threat. The
force package, which was designed by the military and endorsed by the
chiefs of staff, reflected that. It
contained attack helicopters, artillery and armoured vehicles. We
deployed tough, capable units, with robust rules of engagement, because
we expected violent resistance.
We knew that the Taliban, the drug lords and certain tribal elements would resist any attempt to bring security to the people of Helmand. We knew that the kind of people who behead teachers, burn schools, smuggle drugs and assassinate Government officials were not likely to stand by and allow progress to happen. Yes, we have taken casualties, but we have over-matched the opposing forces every single time that we have faced them. They have tried to block our deployment, and failed. They will continue to try to disrupt our mission, and they will continue to fail.
Let me turn now to that mission. Some say that it is confused and that it is spurious to say that it is about reconstruction, when the reality for soldiers has been fighting. We always knew that there was a probability of violent resistance. That is why we sent soldiers to do the task, but that does not change our overriding purpose, which is to rebuild. We have been accused of naivety by drawing a distinction between the ISAF—international security assistance force—mission to spread security and the US-led mission focused on counter-terrorism. But that distinction is not naive at all. In both cases, soldiers will have to fight, but the nature of the ISAF mission reflects the fundamental fact that we will not reach a lasting peace by force alone; we will reach it when Afghanistan has changed and when the Government have been able to deliver such security, development and prosperity that the ordinary Afghans will no longer tolerate terrorists and criminals in their midst. That is why rebuilding is our mission. Our forces on the ground understand that, and the Afghans understand it. In that sense, the mission is simple, but its delivery is complex. That complexity arises from the situation. Three decades of conflict have stripped the south of all signs of governance and robbed many Afghans of hope. And in that uncontrolled space, violence, criminality, narcotics and extremism have flourished. We have confronted those threats and learned much about them since we deployed. As with any deployment, those experiences have allowed us to review our forces and approach. That is what we have been doing in recent weeks.
Let me now explain why we need to adjust and strengthen our force structure in Helmand. The original intent was to tackle the challenges incrementally, spreading security and reconstruction from the centre of Helmand out. But the commanders on the ground grasped an early opportunity. They saw the chance to reinforce the position of the local governor and the Afghan army and police by going into northern Helmand and challenging the impunity of the Taliban there. In doing that, we moved faster towards achieving our ultimate objectives but also extended ourselves.
We must respond to that
development. But it is our actions—our decisions and our
determination to grasp the challenge—that have brought about the
development, and not, as some suggest, a failure to anticipate a
violent response to our arrival. Yes, the violence has increased, but
that was inevitable. We are challenging the power of the Taliban and
other
enemies of the Afghan Government, and they are reacting. But despite
their efforts, we are spreading
security.
Our commanders have asked for additional forces to secure the early advances in the more remote communities in the north, while also enabling more progress to be made in central Helmand. Last Monday, I said that I was aware of ongoing work on such additional resources. I was also aware that, as part of that process, the chiefs of staff were going back to operational commanders and urging them to ensure that they had asked for everything that they needed. As I said in the House on Thursday, that iterative process produced a recommendation, which I received on that day. I and the chiefs of staff have considered the recommendation, and I have now endorsed it. I am grateful for the support and assistance of other Departments, especially the Treasury, in working through the necessary detail of this process as quickly as possible.
Let me outline the key elements of the additional force. In order to accelerate the reconstruction effort in the current security environment, we will deploy 320 engineers from 28 Regiment Royal Engineers to start projects to improve local infrastructure. A company from 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines will provide force protection for them. Those deployments will take place in September. We will deploy an additional infantry company, drawn from 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, to provide more mobile forces, and two platoons from 1st Battalion the Royal Irish Regiment to provide additional force protection. There will be small increases in headquarters staff. We will also boost our medical and logistical support to reflect the increase in troop numbers.
We will step up our efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan national army. Its brave soldiers have fought side by side with us in recent months, and they are the key to our eventual exit strategy. We are therefore deploying additional staff to Helmand, and to the regional Army headquarters for the south. Great strides have already been made in that essential task and, following forthright discussions that I had with the Afghan Defence Minister, Wardak, additional Afghan troops have been sent to Helmand, and more will follow. There are also about 2,300 Afghan police and military in Helmand, building to about 4,800 in 2007.
As with previous deployments, there will be a requirement to deploy reservists. Some 150 reservists are serving in the joint operational area, including members of the sponsored reserves. Some 450 call-out notices will be served on individual reservists in order to fill approximately 400 posts in theatre. One of the main reasons for the increase in reservist numbers is the planned deployment of 100 reservist personnel from 212 field hospital.
Those enhancements—totalling some 870 personnel—will place additional demands on our air transport. We have already increased the flying hours available for attack and support helicopters, as requested by commanders, and today I can say that we will also make available more support helicopters and one additional Hercules C130. We also plan to deploy a radar installation, provided by No. 1 Air Control Centre, Royal Air Force.
All those additional deployments will be made as soon as possible. I also want to cover the planned changes to the force structure resulting from the roulement in October, when the units currently comprising the Helmand taskforce, drawn predominantly—but not solely—from 16 Air Assault Brigade, will complete their tours. They will be replaced by units drawn principally from 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, including 42 and 45 Commando and other supporting elements, including 12 Signal Regiment. That roulement will also involve a change to the force structure, reflecting the differences in the two brigades’ structures and equipment, including the requirement to support the commandos’ Viking armoured vehicles. That represents approximately 125 additional personnel. The House will also be aware that last month, I announced the deployment of 130 personnel from 34 Squadron Royal Air Force to increase force protection at Kandahar airfield.
This is a complex picture. Some troops will be going immediately and others in October; some will constitute an enduring addition, and others are being deployed on a surge basis. But I can tell the House that as a result of today’s announcement, the steady-state size of the Helmand taskforce will increase between now and October from some 3,600 personnel to approximately 4,500.
I am aware that our armed forces are heavily committed. As I said in the personnel debate, about18 per cent. of the Army is currently deployed on operations. That is challenging, but sustainable. Taking into account deployments in Iraq and the planned increase in personnel to Afghanistan, most of our deployable units will operate outside harmony guidelines. I do not accept that lightly, but I do believe that it is necessary, and judging by comments made in this House in recent months, so do the majority of Members. We will do all that we can to minimise the impact, and we will continue to seek further contributions from our NATO partners in order to relieve the pressure in some of those areas.
Some commentators have suggested that insufficient infantry soldiers are deployed in comparison with the force’s overall size. Let me be clear that the delivery of this mission is not borne by the infantry alone, and it does a disservice to a great many brave men and women to suggest otherwise. Indeed, of the six deaths in Afghanistan since the deployment, half have been from other arms. The infantry do have a challenging task, but so do all our forces in Afghanistan. Air power, artillery, light armour and others are involved in combat. However, the work done by the provincial reconstruction team, the training teams, and those who enable others to operate is every bit as essential to eventual success. Some more infantry are indeed deploying, but the fundamental balance of combat forces to others carrying out vital roles will not change. That is because the mission has not changed.
Questions
have been raised about NATO’s capability and the intentions of
the United States. NATO now has many more troops to reflect the greater
challenge in the south. Rules of engagement have been made more robust.
This morning, I spoke to Commander ISAF, General David Richards. He
told me that in the south, effectively there were no caveats placed by
nations on the use of their forces. Across Afghanistan, he
was
seeing a “new NATO” in which such caveats were becoming a
thing of the past. He also said that he was confident that he had the
forces to do the job, and that he had been encouraged to see nations
like Germany and Spain considering making additional forces
available.
I believe that NATO is thoroughly fit for this role. It has been suggested that because it does not have forces in every province, it cannot succeed, but that misses the fundamental point that we are in a stage when NATO is expanding in Afghanistan. Months ago there were no NATO troops in the south at all, and few US troops. Soon, there will be nearly 9,000 in the south—part of a total of about 18,500. NATO is building on a success that many seem determined to ignore.
As for the US, last week I spoke to GeneralJohn Abizaid, the US commander responsible for Afghanistan and Iraq, and he was absolutely clear about the US commitment to Afghanistan. They are not leaving this to NATO. They are part of NATO and likely to be the biggest force contributor in Afghanistan for some time to come. Accusations that they are abandoning NATO are misplaced.
Lastly, I want to address counter-narcotics. I said that stability was the key to Afghanistan’s future, and part of that stability must be delivered by the Afghan Government facing up to the evil of narcotics. President Karzai’s personal commitment to this has been clear, and we must help. Again, the aim is simple, even if the implementation is difficult, and it is the same aim as for all other aspects of our task: to rebuild.
We will only make a lasting impact on the narcotics industry by strengthening all aspects of Afghan life, so that the economy can function without drugs money and farmers have alternative livelihoods to turn to. That will take time, but the process must start now.
Our soldiers are not narcotics police, and we do not ask them to be narcotics police. They are not waging a narcotics war; they will not destroy poppy fields; and they will not fight farmers for bags of opium. They are helping to create the conditions of security and development in which the narcotics industry will be weakened and eventually driven out by the Afghans themselves.
I trust that I have made my position clear. My decisions on these matters have been shaped by what I saw and heard when visiting Afghanistan. Our people there are doing a fantastic job in very difficult circumstances. They know why they are there, and they recognise the importance of their task. They have achieved a great deal already, and I intend to give them what they need to secure those achievements and to help the Afghans towards the stable future that they deserve.
Dr. Liam Fox (Woodspring) (Con): I thank the Secretary of State for his statement, and for making it available in advance to the Opposition. I join him in saluting the bravery and professionalism of our armed forces, their families and their civilian support.
The Secretary of State was
right to remind the House at the outset of the reasons behind
our
involvement in Afghanistan: it is a failed state that acted as an
incubator to terror, which was inflicted on innocent people in New
York, Madrid, Bali and elsewhere, possibly even in London. A failing
Afghanistan represents a threat to our national security. We can choose
to confront the forces of terror at their source before they develop,
or we can wait until they develop, and confront them here on our
doorstep. Not confronting them at all is not an option. Dealing with
the savagery and fanaticism of al-Qaeda and its allies will have an
unavoidable cost, but the cost of failing to tackle them could be
incalculably greater. Security is never a cost-free option.
In the House last week, I said that there were three reasons why we must not fail in Afghanistan. First, the reputation and cohesion of NATO is on the line. Secondly, failure would embolden our enemies in the region. What state could then feel safe? What if the next target for destabilisation were to be Pakistan, with its nuclear capability? That is a truly terrifying thought. Thirdly, we owe the people of Afghanistan, broken by decades of war and attrition, the chance to enjoy peace, stability and prosperity. We must not abandon or betray them.
The Government have two basic duties: to maximise the mission’s chance of success; and to minimise the risk to our forces in carrying out that mission. We intend to fulfil our constitutional role by holding the Government to account, not for the aims of the mission, but for its delivery.
We have set out a number of questions and reservations in recent months. On 26 January, I said in the House:
“There is widespread support in the House for the strategic objectives...set out by the Government, but the Secretary of State will be well aware of widespread anxieties that the level of resources committed by ISAF may not be sufficient to achieve the stated objectives, and that we may consequently be drawn into an escalated conflict.”— [ Official Report, 26 January 2006; Vol. 441, c. 1534.]
It was always to be expected that our deployment would lead to increasing Taliban activity, and that has certainly happened. Those who took a less optimistic view than the Government have been shown to be correct.
I am pleased, however, that the Secretary of State has today provided greater clarity about our other main reservation: the anti-narcotic role. We have often said in the House that using our forces overtly to destroy poppy crops would result in farmers being pushed into the arms of the Taliban. The reduction in poppy production is not a role for our soldiers, but for the Afghan Government, supported by international assistance in providing substitute incomes. We must not allow the Taliban the propaganda weapon that our troops threaten the income of poor Afghan farmers. I note the assurance that our forces will not be used as narcotics police, and we will monitor events closely to ensure that that is true on the ground.
What are our specific questions
about the delivery of this mission? First, can the Secretary of State
tell us what are the most recent plans from the Americans in relation
to reducing their troop numbers in Operation Enduring Freedom? Surely
we must do all that we can to persuade our United States allies that
they cannot reduce their commitment in the current security
circumstances, with the upsurge in Taliban violence. Given that rise in
Taliban activity, would it not also be sensible to ensure an early
merger between OEF and the NATO mission? The circumstances of the
mission have changed markedly. Would not that simply reflect the
reality on the ground? What discussions have taken place about
it?
What discussions have been held at Head of Government level about increasing the contributions from other NATO countries? There will be some 15,000 to 18,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan, of whom 5,000 will be British, with more on the way. Whatever the capabilities and professionalism of our forces may be, we cannot be expected to carry NATO in this manner. Our NATO allies must understand how frighteningly high the stakes are, and those who may long for a security relationship without the United States need to realise that a defeat for NATO in Afghanistan would be likely to produce greater American isolationism and unilateralism—the very things that they claim most to resent. All must carry their share of the burden.
The Secretary of State talked of making more support helicopters available. Will there be more attack helicopters as well? Where will the extra helicopters come from? How many will there be, and when will they arrive? How many extra personnel are being earmarked to help train the Afghan army? Where will they come from, and what will the time scale be? And what of the police? What representations have been made to the German Government, who are responsible for training the police, that they must have sufficiently robust vetting procedures to stop Taliban infiltration of them, which would pose a security threat to our troops?
Finally, can the Secretary of State tell us about the plans to put non-governmental organisations on the ground? If they are not there, there will be no reconstruction at all. Will the Secretary of State consider the plans outlined by my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague), the shadow Foreign Secretary, to install an international co-ordinator in Afghanistan to ensure that money is not wasted, and that the Afghan people benefit, not the middle men?
The tone of the statement leads me to believe that the Government now recognise that the impression given to the British public was that this mission was less dangerous than it has turned out to be. Sadly, the admission that these operations will be outside harmony guidelines constitutes an acceptance of the reality of overstretch. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that under this Government we now have an insufficiently large standing army.
It is vital that we give our forces all that they need to do the job, for the price of failure in Afghanistan would be intolerable. The Government deserve the support of the House in achieving their aims, but they need to get their detailed decisions right at this point, for the patience of the British public and the House is not inexhaustible. Above all, the security not only of ourselves but of future generations is at risk. The stakes could hardly be higher.
Des
Browne: I thank the hon. Gentleman forhis
unswerving support for our engagement in
Afghanistan. It is very important that our troops, particularly those
whom we have deployed in Afghanistan, know that there is support for
whatthey have been sent to do. I agree with the hon.
Gentleman—without going into the same amount of detail in
setting out the geopolitical situation—that doing nothing is not
an option. That, of course, underpins the Government’s
approach.
When we began to deploy in February, continuing until 1 July when full operational capability was reached, we sent the force package for which the military commanders had asked. It was designed by the military commanders—in consultation with the chiefs of staff—to do the job. The purpose of our deploying further resources is to reflect the experience and learning gained from that deployment.
I dealt specifically with the issue of narcotics because I felt that it, among other issues, required clarification—not that there was any doubt about the objectives that we set for our troops when we sent them to Afghanistan in the first place. Indeed, I remember reading carefully what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Airdrie and Shotts (John Reid) when he announced the deployment on 26 January not only in the House, but elsewhere. He made it clear then that we were not sending our troops out to be narcotics police. However, given the commentary that there has been since then, I felt that it was important to make it clear again that there is no change in the position. That is not what our troops are doing in Afghanistan.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the continuing size of the American commitment to Afghanistan, particularly in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom. Before coming to the House, I spoke to the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, specifically about that matter. His response to me was that the Americans deploy their resources in Afghanistan and in other theatres in response to the circumstances, that forces increase and sometimes reduce and that that is what they will continue to do, but he gave me a reassurance, which I have reiterated to the House in the context of the statement, that the Americans' commitment to Afghanistan will be unwavering.
The hon. Gentleman has referred on more than one occasion to the fact that we need to remove the distinction between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. That is one of the issues on which I disagree with him. My concern is that, if I were to accede to his request in relation to that and encourage NATO and others to do away with that distinction, exactly what I think will put our troops on the ground at risk in Afghanistan would happen. We would at one stroke do the job the Taliban are trying to do with their information operation in communities all over Helmand province, and that is to suggest to people in those villages that what we are telling them we are about there—reconstruction—is not the truth and that we have other objectives. If I were to accede to his request to remove the distinction between Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF even conceptually and argue for that more broadly with NATO, I would achieve that objective at one stroke.
The hon.
Gentleman asks about further helicopter support. I had to decide
whether I would be able to give detailed information to the House today
and, if not,
whether to delay the statement, or whether to make the statement in the
way in which I have because there is other work to be done in relation
to helicopters. I assure the House and the hon. Gentleman, however,
that the helicopter support that will be made available to support the
package will be that which has been asked for by the commanders on the
ground.
On the issue of NGOs and reconstruction, it is clear to me, from my experience both in Afghanistan and from what was reported back to me from Afghanistan, that our longterm objectives there will be served by the success of reconstruction, but that we will not be able to achieve that reconstruction without security and we will not be able to build the security without reconstruction. We have deployed the significant resource of engineers in order that they will be able to enhance the reconstruction that we can do and the security that we can create in the communities through the deployment of our resources thus far.
Nick Harvey (North Devon) (LD): May I reiterate our support for the engagement in Afghanistan and pay tribute to the courage and professionalism of our forces who are undertaking that dangerous work? It is essential that we build long-term stability in Afghanistan not only for the Afghan people but because, as others have said, lawless chaos provides sanctuary to militant extremists and that threatens everyone’s security. I also stress our support for the deployment of additional troops announced today. Where they are able, the Government clearly must provide the commanders on the ground with the troops and equipment that they need.
Can the Secretary of State tell us how much of what he has announced today is totally new and how much of it is an acceleration of plans that already existed? Is he confident that the additional deployment he has announced will be sufficient? Is the breaching of harmony guidelines and the dependence on reservists to which he has referred sustainable for the long term, as it is becoming increasingly clear that this will be a long-term job?
Is he satisfied that all the helicopter, lift and air attack capability that is required has now been committed, and can he tell us where the men to do the proposed extra flying hours will come from? Will the additional commitment impair our ability to train more crews back home?
The Secretary of State tells us that a sober assessment of the threat was made at the start of the mission, and I am sure that that is true, but the former Secretary of State for Defence described it as
“a small but hugely significant step”.—[ Official Report,26 January 2006; Vol. 441, c. 1533.]
It remains hugely significant, but it looks somewhat less small than it did in January. Of course we have to respond to changing circumstances and a more challenging environment, but can the Secretary of State tell us whether the role and operational objectives of British troops have changed at all from that time?
We
have the lead responsibility for counter-narcotics, but there has been
a record harvest in the south of the country, and there are grave
questions about the
feasibility of simultaneously achieving both security and
counter-narcotics objectives. A concerted strategy is needed to provide
alternative livelihoods for those who depend on narcotics. The
Secretary of State said in his statement that that process must start:
does he mean that there is as yet no strategy, or simply that the
practical work on the ground must now start? Finally, with two weeks
until the summer recess begins and given the fast changing environment,
can he tell us what measures the Government have in mind to keep
Parliament in the loop as changes are necessary over the summer
recess?
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