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7 Nov 2006 : Column 1373W—continued
Splitting the annual maintenance and operational costs of the passport programme and identity cards scheme would be a largely theoretical exercise as current plans are for an integrated infrastructure. However we do estimate that around 70 per cent. of the £5.1 billion operating costs over the 10 years from October 2006 to October 2016 would be incurred in the issuing of new generation biometric passports. The remaining 30 per cent. represents the incremental costs
of operating and maintaining the Identity Cards scheme though it relies on using the same technical and office infrastructure.
Identity Fraud
Mike Penning: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what training the Department has provided for (a) front desk and (b) administrative staff in relation to identity fraud. [41280]
Joan Ryan: Within the Identity and Passport Service (IPS), all Passport Officers, both administrative and front office, receive passport fraud awareness training as part of their initial induction. The training includes identifying attempts to obtain a passport where the applicant is not entitled to one, by reviewing documentation, photographs and the application forms. The focus is placed upon identifying key indicators of fraud.
Passport officers are assessed on their competence and are required to achieve a minimum standard of knowledge. The induction training is supported by desk training provided by line managers who guide passport officers through practical examples of fraud cases.
IPS also has a team of accredited fraud investigation staff working in its fraud and intelligence units (FIDs) within each IPS regional office.These investigators have specialist training in identifying and investigation of fraud. Instances of suspected passport fraud identified by passport officers are referred to FIU teams to determine whether or not fraud has taken place. The IPS central fraud intelligence unit also has a role in detecting and dealing with any cases of suspected or actual internal fraud.
IPS human resources and security staff are also trained in and are responsible for increasingly rigorous processes to establish the identity of new staff and for managing the security vetting process.
IPS is introducing specialist interviewing staff as part of the authentication by interview (Abl) initiative. These interview staff will receive training on processes established to authenticate the identity of passport applicants. In some instances this may lead to identifying suspected fraudulent applications. The Abl process will include training to develop skills in establishing a biographical footprint, questioning and assessing the answers provided by passport applicants.
Within IND, in terms of identification of travel document abuse, the national document fraud unit (NDFU) has responsibility for training in identity fraud. Basic level training is provided to all new immigration officers by the IND college. Once at border control offices local training, concentrating on the documents most abused at the individual locations, is conducted by port forgery teams. This can include training on imposters (or look-alikes) who attempt to pose as the genuine document holder.
More specialist training at intermediate and advanced level training is delivered by the NDFU. At intermediate level the NDFU offers two-day courses to border control, enforcement and managed migration staff who have worked in those directorates for several years and who therefore have experience of handling travel documents on a regular basis. The unit offers
advanced level attachments of ten weeks duration to experienced staff from the same directorates who have an interest in developing their document fraud knowledge still further. Those officers can then return to their own offices with a significant level of forgery knowledge and expertise. For those very experienced staff who wish to update themselves on new trends the NDFU offers a two-day advanced course.
The NDFU also provides basic awareness training to all new foreign office entry clearance officers and has recently commenced a focused programme of training on travel document abuse at high risk posts in entry clearance sections worldwide.
Mr. Evans: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what internal training courses on tackling identity fraud are provided to departmental staff who have access to members of the public’s personal information. [86643]
Joan Ryan: Within the Identity and Passport Service (IPS), all passport officers have access to personal information supplied by members of the public. All officers receive passport fraud awareness training as part of their initial induction. The training includes identifying attempts to obtain a passport where the applicant is not entitled to one, by reviewing documentation, photographs and the application forms. The focus is placed upon identifying key indicators of fraud. Passport officers are assessed on their competence and are required to achieve a minimum standard of knowledge. The induction training is supported by desk training provided by line managers who guide passport officers through practical examples of fraud cases.
IPS also has a team of accredited fraud investigation staff working in its Fraud and Intelligence Units (FlUs) within each IPS regional office. These investigators have specialist training in identifying and investigation of passport fraud. All instances of suspected passport fraud identified by passport officers are referred to FIUs to determine whether or not fraud has taken place. The IPS Central Fraud and Security Unit also has a role in detecting and dealing with any cases of suspected or actual internal fraud.
IPS is introducing specialist interviewing staff as part of the Authentication by Interview (AbI) initiative. These interview staff will receive training on processes established to authenticate the identity of passport applicants. In some instances this may lead to identifying suspected fraudulent applications. The AbI process will include training to develop skills in establishing a biographical footprint, questioning and assessing the answers provided by passport applicants.
Basic level training in identification of travel document abuse is provided to all new immigration officers. Port forgery teams then provide local training, concentrating on the documents most abused at the individual locations. This can include training on imposters (or look-alikes) who attempt to pose as the genuine document holder.
National Document Fraud Unit (NDFU) offers further specialist to experienced border control, enforcement and managed migration staff: two day intermediate level courses and 10 week advanced attachments.
NDFU also provides basic awareness training to all new Foreign Office entry clearance officers and has recently commenced a focused programme of training on travel document abuse at high risk posts in entry clearance sections worldwide.
Intercept Evidence
Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what consideration has been given to the use of electronic intercept evidence in court. [92426]
Mr. McNulty: The Government are continuing to look very closely at the possibility of changing the law to permit the evidential use of intercept material. There is a clear Government commitment to this work but also recognition of the need to protect our intercept capability, particularly in the light of changing technology and to avoid placing disproportionate burdens on intercepting agency resources. The Home Office is leading work on two legal models: a ‘PII Plus’ model which seeks to protect sensitive material primarily with public interest immunity with the defendant’s interests being protected by special advocates; and an ‘examining magistrates’ model based on the French system. Officials will report in November.
David Davis: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what plans he has to introduce legislation to allow intercept evidence to be used in court. [95904]
John Reid: As I informed the House during the debate on the Intelligence and Security Committee annual report on 11 July 2006, Official Report, column 1312, the Home Office is undertaking a further review of this issue. A report will be made to Ministers in due course.
Internet Crime
Patrick Mercer: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what steps he has taken to raise public awareness of internet crime. [97807]
Mr. Coaker: Education is a major challenge in tackling the growing risk of internet crime. The Get Safe Online campaign, which is now in its second year, is the UK’s first national internet security awareness campaign. It is a joint public and private sector initiative to raise awareness of internet security among the general public and micro-businesses. Its website, www.getsafeonline.org , provides simple, reliable and practical security advice on a range of topics including: how to install anti-virus software, protect your privacy, how to shop and use online auctions safely. The Government are a sponsor of the campaign along with SOCA, BT, eBay, HSBC, Microsoft, and secure Trading.
The recent Get Safe Online Week, which commenced with an internet safety summit on 9 October, involved a series of events, roadshows and training sessions nationwide. For example, experts were on hand in shopping centres in eight cities to give the public face to face advice and information on how to protect themselves online.
We also work closely with a wide range of stakeholders on this issue, for example through the Home Secretary’s Task Force on Child Protection on the internet.
Internet Pornography
Mr. Amess: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what representations he has received on restricting internet pornography since January; how many (a) supported and (b) opposed restrictions; how many and what percentage were written by (i) hon. Members, (ii) organisations and (iii) members of the public; and if he will make a statement. [99251]
Mr. Coaker: The information is not held in the form requested.
The available information shows that 145 letters and emails have been received on the subject of pornography since January 2006. Of these, 77 (53 per cent.) letters have been received from Members of Parliament and a further 68 (47 per cent.) letters and emails were received directly from the public.
Records do not show whether the views of the correspondents supported or opposed restrictions on pornography, either on the internet or elsewhere.
Mr. Amess: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many (a) males and (b) females have been (i) prosecuted and (ii) convicted of accessing child pornography on the internet in (A) Southend, (B) Essex and (C) England and Wales in the last 12 months, broken down by age. [99252]
Mr. Sutcliffe: It is not possible to identify from data collected by the Office for Criminal Justice Reform, those prosecutions, or convictions which relate to accessing of child pornography on the internet as the data is not collected centrally.
Data from the court proceedings database held by the Office for Criminal Justice Reform for the number of (a) males and (b) females, broken down by age that have been (i) prosecuted and (ii) convicted of distribution, possession, etc of an indecent photograph in (A ) South East Essex Local Justice Area, (B) Essex and (C) England and Wales in 2004 can be found in the following table.
| Number of persons prosecuted at magistrates courts, and found guilty at all courts for offences relation to indecent distribution, possession, etc of pictures of children, in South East Essex local justice area (LJA), Essex police force area, and England and Wales, 2004( 1,2) | ||||||||
| Offence description | ||||||||
| Take, permit to be taken, or to make distribute or publish indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children( 3) | Possession of an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph( 4) | |||||||
| Male | Female | Male | Female | |||||
| Area/age group | Prosecuted | Guilty | Prosecuted | Guilty | Prosecuted | Guilty | Prosecuted | Guilty |
| (1) These data are provided on the principal offence basis. (2) Every effort is made to ensure that the figures presented are accurate and complete. However, it is important to note that these data have been extracted from large administrative data systems generated by the police forces and courts. As a consequence, care should be taken to ensure data collection processes and their inevitable limitations are taken into account when those data are used. (3) Statute: Protection of Children Act 1978 Section 1 as amended by Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, Sec 84 and Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 S.41(1). (4) Statute: Criminal Justice Act 1988 Sec. 160 as amended by the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. (5) Nil. Source: RDS—Office for Criminal Justice Reform | ||||||||
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