Mr. George Howarth
†Baird, Vera Clause 335 provides for forfeitures and deductions from the pay of service personnel. Under the clause, no forfeiture of pay may be imposed unless authorised under the Bill or another Act. Deductions may be authorised under the Bill or another Act, including what are called “relevant” instruments or by royal warrant. Under the clause, relevant instruments and royal warrants cannot be used to impose any deduction or forfeiture that amounts to a penalty. The types of forfeiture and deduction that can be made under the Bill are set out in clause 336. They include, for example, forfeiture in respect of prescribed periods of absence from duty and in respect of wrongful damage to public or service property.
Amendments Nos. 45 to 49 are closely related to new clause 12, which provides a harmonised system for setting service pay and allowances. At the moment, the legislative documents used for that purpose are different for each of the services. As I shall explain further in relation to clause 336, the new provisions allow all service pay and allowances to be made by royal warrant. They also provide for certain deductions from pay and allowances to be made by royal warrant.
Amendments Nos. 45 to 49 prevent deductions and forfeiture from being provided for by relevant instrument, but it will be possible for deductions to be provided for by royal warrant under new clause 12. The overall effect is that pay and allowances and certain deductions can be set out for all the services in a royal warrant.
This is a common problem. I have come across cases in all three categories regularly over the years in my constituency. It is a great aggravation to individual servicemen and women. The CSA example affects not only serving officers of all ranks, but their spouses, their ex-spouses and their partners. It is an ongoing problem, and this might be an opportunity to address it. I shall be grateful if the Minister can shed any light on it.
Why will such provisions be exempt from parliamentary scrutiny? Will the Minister clarify whether it would be legal under Government new clause for a future Secretary of State unilaterally to impose a pay freeze or pay cut on the armed forces without recourse to Parliament?
Amendment agreed to.
Amendment made: No. 46, in clause 335, page 168, line 29, leave out from “other Act” to end of line 33.—[Mr. Touhig.]
Mr. Burrowes: I beg to move amendment No. 172, in clause 335, page 168, line 29, leave out from “Act” to end of line 33.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 173, in clause 335, page 168, line 34, leave out “Royal Warrant or”.
Mr. Burrowes: With the Minister’s assurance that I will receive a response to my earlier comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: No. 47, in clause 335, page 168, line 34, leave out “or relevant instrument” and insert
‘under section (Pay, bounty and allowances)’.
No. 48, in clause 335, page 169, line 13, leave out from “may” to “which” in line 14 and insert
‘also be deducted from any bounty, allowance or grant’.
No. 49, in clause 335, page 169, line 16, leave out subsection (7).—[Mr. Touhig.]
Clause 335, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 336 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 337
Service inquiries
Vera Baird (Redcar) (Lab): I beg to move amendment No. 162, in clause 337, page 171, line 28, after “persons”, insert
‘(including, in the case of an inquiry into a death, the next of kin of the deceased)’.
The amendment is intended to facilitate a debate on whether the next of kin should be able to attend an inquiry into a death. I appreciate that the purpose of an inquiry is not to investigate a death but to investigate what has gone wrong for the future use of the military. However, we should consider whether the next of kin should be able to attend if a death is involved.
The current presumption seems to be that the next of kin should not attend. The rationale for that is that it can impede the inquiry’s purpose because there may be unpleasant testimony to be given about exactly what happened to the person who was killed, and such testimony may be much harder to deliver, although it is still essential that it be delivered, in the presence of the next of kin. It is also believed that the individual who may be responsible for causing the death or injuries might be impeded from being completely frank. That is not a criticism of the honesty of soldiers, but recognition of the pressure that the presence of a next of kin could put on an individual. Those are the arguments as to why next of kin should not be entitled to attend that the military have sustained throughout our inquiry on the issue. The question that we should consider is whether the presumption is that next of kin do not attend or that they do. In my view, the balancing factor to the two reservations that the military have expressed is the importance in the grieving process of allowing next of kin to understand as early as possible, and in as much detail as possible, exactly what happened to the person who died.
Sarah McCarthy-Fry (Portsmouth, North) (Lab): I accept what my hon. and learned Friend is saying about the grieving process. Does she accept that the purpose of a board of inquiry is to ascertain as quickly as possible what went wrong in order to prevent any operational difficulties, because until that is done, often planes are grounded and things do not happen? The purpose of a board of inquiry is different from that of an inquest.
Vera Baird: I have not mentioned inquests and I entirely accept what my hon. Friend says. In fact, I started by saying that an inquiry has a different purpose from investigating the death. If issues of delay arose, they would have to be discussed with the next of kin, but we are talking only about a presumption that people attend or a presumption that they do not. Let us say that there is a presumption that they attend. In an exigent situation in which it is impossible or wholly impractical for them to attend, the presumption can of course be rebutted. The question is about which leg the boot is on, as it were.
In my view, the need for parents or other next of kin to grieve and to understand as early as possible what happened outweighs the two reasons given by the military for not allowing there to be a presumption that people attend. The analogy is with an inquest. The purpose is different from that of an inquiry, but inevitably, if someone has died an unpleasant death, the next of kin are entitled to attend the inquest, and evidence is, so far as we know, given fully, frankly and openly by all parties. There has never been a suggestion anywhere that I can think of that an inquest was not a practical way to receive such evidence, or that it was not of good quality, because of the presence of the next of kin.
I accept that the purpose of the two things is different, but the circumstances of discussing in immense detail how the person died are the same. The presence of next of kin at inquests is something that we just live with on a day-to-day basis. My contribution to the debate is to suggest that it would be appropriate to have a presumption that the next of kin should attend an inquiry.
Mr. Colin Breed (South-East Cornwall) (LD): During the passage of the Bill, and in our visits and discussions, this issue has cropped up from time to time and that has enabled us to consider the balance of opinion on it. Whereas the presumption or the principle must be, I believe, that next of kin should have some right to attend an inquiry, we are aware of the practical difficulties and other relevant matters. There may be difficulties to do with where the inquiry is taking place. It may be on board ship a long way from these shores, or it may be in a conflict area and a difficult and dangerous place. There may be restrictions on time and if there were, the lessons would not be learned as early as they could be to try to prevent the repetition of the accident that had happened.
There is the question of classified material and whether all the evidence could be produced in certain circumstances. I accept that people could be excluded for certain parts of an inquiry. We have discussed the question of the sensitivity of evidence. Would the people giving evidence feel constrained in any way by the presence of the next of kin from providing all the detail, which can be quite distressing? Generally, that last point is a matter of subjectivity. If the next of kin were advised that some evidence might well be distressing but they still wanted to go ahead and hear it, that should be their decision.
There may be difficulties with time, place and so on, or of course there may be no such difficulties. There is a balance to be struck, but it is difficult to codify that in a legislative process. I support the presumption that the next of kin will attend, if at all possible. The defining phrase is “if at all possible.” If difficulties of time, place and everything else make it almost impossible, the presumption might be overruled. If we can somehow codify that so that the presumption is preserved, I am prepared to support it.
10.45 am
Mr. Burrowes: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) for raising the important matter of the attendance of the next of kin. It is important to focus on the function of the service inquiry, which is an internal inquiry for the purposes of establishing the facts of a matter or incident and making recommendations to prevent a reoccurrence. While the analogy with the inquest procedure has been drawn, I do not think that it is necessarily a proper analogy given the different functions. It is the functions that matter primarily.
While recognising the importance of the next of kin being properly informed—the presumption should be that they are involved in the proceedings—the stage of proceedings is important. Given that it is an internal inquiry, and bearing in mind the points that were raised on our visit to HMS Bulwark about the practical implications of attendance, we must recognise the different functions and the internalised nature of the inquiry, but nevertheless consider that at some point when the inquiries have reached their fruition the attendance of the next of kin may well be advisable. I understand that the issue will be dealt with in more detail in secondary legislation.
Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con): My hon. Friend referred to our visit to HMS Bulwark where these practical difficulties were explained to us. May I also remind him that when we were in Oman talking to RAF personnel, one of the people we spoke to was the godfather of the daughter of the commander of the C-130 Hercules that was shot down over Iraq? He felt very strongly that, even though he had a close personal involvement, the current arrangement was absolutely right and proper. I should like to put it on the record that he said he thought that the way in which the Ministry of Defence had handled that case was exemplary.
The Chairman: Briefly.
Mr. Howarth: Indeed, I will be brief. That person particularly mentioned how much the families appreciated being kept fully informed and being told before Parliament was. I hope that adds to my hon. Friend’s argument.
Mr. Burrowes: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. That is a model example of the need to inform the families and how it should be done. It can be dealt with without necessarily prescribing it as a right in the Bill. The involvement and attendance of the next of kin can be dealt with in secondary legislation.
Mr. Touhig: The purpose of the amendment is to give the next of kin a legal right to be present at the proceedings. If the next of kin were to be granted such a legal right, it would no longer be for the Secretary of State to decide whether he wished to permit them to be present at the proceedings. If family members are allowed to be present, other than to give evidence, it will be authorised on an exceptional basis under the regulations.
As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar mentioned, historically there are two main reasons why family members are not usually allowed to attend service inquiries if they are not called as witnesses. The first is because we judge that it would inhibit the witness who might prefer to withhold key evidence, rather than reveal distressing facts about himself or discuss the actions of other soldiers which the family might misinterpret. The second reason is a practical one that has been referred to by a number of colleagues. The panel will not necessarily sit for a given period in the same place. It may convene and adjourn three or four times over several months. It could move from the UK to Germany, Iraq, or wherever. However, there is also concern that if the next of kin have the right to attend, that will tend to create or reinforce unrealistic expectations about what an inquiry is for and what questions it will investigate.
The purpose of such inquiries is in some senses narrow. They find out the causes of events and look for lessons that the service needs to learn in order to prevent the recurrence of an incident. They are not intended to provide a far-ranging inquiry into the surrounding circumstances unless it is necessary to do so in order to answer the immediate questions. That does not mean that the next of kin will not be disappointed if it does not deal with their concerns. They might feel that, as they have the right to be present, they should also be entitled to be represented. If represented, they would no doubt wish to raise the questions about which they were most concerned or to challenge the evidence. That would be understandable, but we are concerned that it would not be an environment in which inquiries could do their job speedily and effectively. It even raises the possibility of panels being pressurised to convene at times and places that would be convenient for the family when their purpose is to discover the facts in the most effective way.
I should mention also that a service inquiry into a death does not replace the coroner’s inquest. Although their functions overlap to an extent, the final word on the cause of death is a matter for the coroner. The service inquiry is not and does not purport to be a tribunal that is compliant with article 2 of the European convention on human rights. In the same way as the police, Health and Safety Executive and air accidents investigation branch conduct investigations additional to, and for purposes separate from, the coroner’s inquest, so do the services.
The service inquiry is not and does not purport to be a tribunal compliant with the ECHR. We intend to continue the working practices of all three services, which require that families are contacted and given an opportunity to put forward specific questions that they would like the inquiry to address.
Mr. Breed: That is a helpful explanation. Is not one of the problems the interrelationship between the inquest and the inquiry, which prolongs the inquest? For a long period, the next of kin and everybody else must wait to have their say and to contribute to the inquest, because they are waiting for the inquiry to complete.
Mr. Touhig: I appreciate that point. Indeed, I have seen some reports of an inquiry that has been quiet for a long time and has delayed the inquest. Unfortunately, that is sometimes necessary because of the circumstances or location and the need to be certain of the causes of an incident.
We would also maintain regular contact with the family, informing them of progress in the inquiry and investigation process. Once the inquiry is complete and the report has been staffed by the chain of command, it is released to the family, which was the point made by Opposition Members. In the Army, for example, liaison and briefing is carried out by the Army inquiries and aftercare support cell. The report is delivered to the family by the visiting officer, who will be able to answer questions or explain any terminology.
Colleagues will know that Nicholas Blake conducted a review of the deaths of service personnel at Deepcut, which was published and about which a statement was made in the House yesterday. Mr Blake’s report made some recommendations about next of kin and boards of inquiry. Clearly, we will have to examine his recommendations in detail. I am sure that colleagues will understand that I will need some time to do that. Again, I give an undertaking that we will return to the matter as soon as we can. I recognise that it might not be possible for us to come to some conclusions before the Committee reports to the House, but I will expect the subject to come up on Report, and I aim to have some responses at that stage.
I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will feel reassured that I have huge sympathy with her point. I have tried to point out some of the practical difficulties. However, we recognise that the Blake report puts a certain emphasis on the issue that we must address. We will need time to do that, and I hope to be able to come back to the issue on Report.
Vera Baird: I am glad that my hon. Friend has taken the opportunity to set out the steps that are taken to care for parents. There are counter-arguments to all those made for why next of kin should not be admitted, and I retain my view that they should be allowed in. However, the point of the amendment was to generate debate. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 337 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 338 to 345 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11 agreed to.
Clauses 346 to 351 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12
Amendments relating to reserve forces
Amendments made: No. 62, in schedule 12, page 227, line 12, at end insert—
‘Reserve Forces Act 1980 (c. 9)
A1 In section 10 of the Reserve Forces Act 1980 (call out for national danger) omit subsection (5).
A2 In section 11(2)(a) of that Act (call out for warlike operations), for “regular air force” substitute “Royal Air Force”.
A3 In section 18(2) of that Act (permanent service call out of Army Reserve) omit paragraph (b).
A4 In section 19 of that Act (duration of Army Reserve permanent service)—
(b) in subsection (5) for “subsections (3) and (4) above” substitute “subsection (3)”.
A5 In section 19A of that Act (postponement of discharge of members of Army Reserve during call out), for subsection (7) substitute—
“(7) In subsections (3) to (5)—
“the competent military authority” means the Defence Council or any officer of a description prescribed by regulations of the Defence Council; “prescribed” means prescribed by regulations of the Defence Council.”
A6 In section 21 of that Act (duration of Air Force Reserve permanent service)—
(b) in subsection (5) for “subsections (3) and (4) above” substitute “subsection (3)”.
A7 In section 21A of that Act (postponement of discharge of members of Royal Air Force Reserve during call out), for subsection (7) substitute—
“(7) In subsections (3) to (5)—
“the competent air force authority” means the Defence Council or any officer of a description prescribed by regulations of the Defence Council; “prescribed” means prescribed by regulations of the Defence Council.”
A8 Omit section 24 of that Act (permanent service call out of Ulster Defence Regiment).
A9 Omit section 25 of that Act (emergency service call out of Ulster Defence Regiment).
A10 In section 26(2) of that Act (call out notices), omit paragraph (g).
A11 In section 30(2) of that Act (liability of naval and marine pensioners to recall), for “The enactments concerning” substitute “Provision made under section 328 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 that applies in relation to”.
A12 (1) Section 31 of that Act (liability of army and air force pensioners to recall) is amended as follows.
(a) in the definition of “service pension”—
(i) for “regular forces” substitute “regular army”;
(ii) for “regular air force” substitute “Royal Air Force”;
(b) for the words from “and other expressions” to the end substitute—
““soldier” and “airman” include a warrant officer and a non-commissioned officer.”
(3) In subsection (7) for “those sections” substitute “this section and section 32”.
A13 (1) Section 32 of that Act (occasion for and period of recall under section 31) is amended as follows.
(a) in paragraph (a) for “regular forces or the regular air force” substitute “regular army or the Royal Air Force”;
(b) in paragraph (b) for the words from “section 2 of the Army” to “require” substitute “regulations under section 325 of the Armed Forces Act 2006”.
(3) In subsection (4)(a) for “as from which a person is recalled for” substitute “the person is accepted (by virtue of section 36) into”.
(4) For subsection (5) substitute—
“(5) No regulation under section 326 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 as to the term for which a person may be enlisted affects the operation of subsections (3) and (4) of this section.”
A14 In section 34(3) of that Act (liability of certain former soldiers to recall)—
(a) for “regular forces within the meaning of the Army Act 1955” substitute “regular army”;
(b) in paragraph (a) for “specified in the notice” substitute “he is accepted into service”.
A15 In section 39(1)(a) of that Act (application of section 38) for “regular air force” substitute “Royal Air Force”.
A16 Omit section 44 of that Act (requirement as to training of Ulster Defence Regiment).
A17 In section 48 of that Act (void enlistment in the regular forces)—
(a) in the sidenote, for “regular forces” substitute “Royal Marines or regular army”;
(b) for “Her Majesty’s regular forces” substitute “the Royal Marines or the regular army”.
A18 Omit section 139 of that Act (enrolment etc of members of Ulster Defence Regiment).
A19 In section 140 of that Act (orders and regulations as to service in Ulster Defence Regiment)—
(a) in the sidenote, for “acceptance and service” substitute “pensions and other grants”;
(b) for subsections (1) and (2) substitute—
“(1) The conditions as to pensions and other grants in respect of death or disablement arising out of service in the Ulster Defence Regiment shall be such as may be prescribed by orders or regulations.
(1A) The reference in subsection (1) to service in the Ulster Defence Regiment includes service in the regular army by a relevant person during the relevant period.
“regular army” has the meaning given by section 364 of the Armed Forces Act 2006;
“relevant person” means a person who, immediately before 1 July 1992, was a member of the Ulster Defence Regiment;
“relevant period”, in relation to a relevant person, means the period beginning with 1 July 1992 and ending at the end of his term of service which was current on that date.”;
(i) for “Part of this Act” substitute “section”;
(ii) in the words after paragraph (b) for “Part” substitute “section”.
A20 Omit sections 141 to 144 of that Act (provisions relating to Ulster Defence Regiment).
A21 In section 145 of that Act (reinstatement in civil employment) omit subsection (2).
A22 In section 146 of that Act (protection of other civil interests) omit subsection (2).
A23 (1) Section 156 (interpretation) is amended as follows.
(a) in the definition of “prescribed” after ““prescribed”” insert “(except in subsections (3) to (5) and (7) of sections 19A and 21A and in section 140)”;
(b) omit the definition of “regular air force”;
(c) for the definition of “regular army” substitute— ““the regular army” has the meaning given by section 364 of the Armed Forces Act 2006.”
A24 (1) Schedule 8 to that Act (saving and transitional provisions) is amended as follows.
(a) omit sub-paragraph (2);
(b) omit sub-paragraph (5);
(c) in sub-paragraph (9) for “regular forces or for the regular air force” substitute “regular army or for the Royal Air Force”.
Reserve Forces Act 1996 (c. 14)
A25 In section 2(2)(a) of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (membership of the reserve forces), for the words from “the Army Act 1955” to the end substitute “regulations made under section 328 of the Armed Forces Act 2006;”.
A26 In section 4(1)(b) of that Act (orders and regulations concerning reserve forces), after “force” insert “(except pay, bounty and allowances)”.
A27 Omit section 7 of that Act (provision with respect to pay, bounty and allowances).
A28 In section 13(7) of that Act (transfer of non-officers between reserve forces), for the words from “by or under” to the end substitute “under the Armed Forces Act 2006.”’.
No. 63, in schedule 12, page 227, line 13, leave out
‘the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (c. 14)’
and insert ‘that Act’.
No. 64, in schedule 12, page 227, line 16, at end insert—
‘1A In section 24(2) of that Act (commitment to a period of full-time service) omit paragraph (b).
1B In section 25(2) of that Act (additional duties commitments)—
(b) in paragraph (b), for “while subject to service law, shall” substitute “shall, from any time specified in the commitment as the time at which he is to begin that period of duty until released from duty,”.
1C In section 27 of that Act (voluntary training and other duties) omit subsection (3).
1D In each of sections 53, 55 and 57 of that Act (maximum duration of service on call-out), in subsection (8)—
(a) at the end of paragraph (a) insert “or”;
1E After section 53 of that Act insert—
“53A Agreement to alter limits in section 53
(1) This section applies to a person if—
(a) he is not in service under a call-out order under section 52; and
(b) if accepted into service under such a call-out order, he would be immediately entitled to release under section 53(6) or (10).
(2) The person may agree in writing that, if he is accepted into service under a call-out order under section 52, in calculating when he is entitled to be released by virtue of section 53(6) or (10) any service of his under this Part or Part 4, 5 or 7 that occurred before he entered into the agreement is to be treated as not having occurred.
(3) An agreement under subsection (2) may also provide that, if the person is accepted into service under a call-out order under section 52, section 53 shall apply in his case as if for the period of 3 years specified in subsection (6) there were substituted a shorter period specified in the agreement.
(4) If an order under section 53(11) applies in relation to the person, subsection (3) above has effect as if the reference to the period of 3 years were to the period of 5 years.”
1F After section 55 of that Act insert—
“55A Agreement to alter limits in section 55
(1) This section applies to a person if—
(a) he is not in service under a call-out order under section 54; and
(b) if accepted into service under such a call-out order, he would be immediately entitled to release under section 55(6) or (10).
(2) The person may agree in writing that, if he is accepted into service under a call-out order under section 54, in calculating when he is entitled to be released by virtue of section 55(6) or (10) any service of his under this Part or Part 4, 5 or 7 that occurred before he entered into the agreement is to be treated as not having occurred.
(3) An agreement under subsection (2) may also provide that, if the person is accepted into service under a call-out order under section 54, section 55 shall apply in his case as if for the period of 12 months specified in subsection (6) there were substituted a shorter period specified in the agreement.
(4) If an order under section 55(11) applies in relation to the person, subsection (3) above has effect as if the reference to the period of 12 months were to the period of 2 years.”
1G After section 57 of that Act insert—
“57A Agreement to alter limits in section 57
(1) This section applies to a person if—
(a) he is not in service under a call-out order under section 56; and
(b) if accepted into service under such a call-out order, he would be immediately entitled to release under section 57(6) or (10).
(2) The person may agree in writing that, if he is accepted into service under a call-out order under section 56, in calculating when he is entitled to be released by virtue of section 57(6) or (10) any service of his under this Part or Part 4, 5 or 7 that occurred before he entered into the agreement is to be treated as not having occurred.
(3) An agreement under subsection (2) may also provide that, if the person is accepted into service under a call-out order under section 56, section 57 shall apply in his case as if for the period of 9 months specified in subsection (6) there were substituted a shorter period specified in the agreement.”
1H In section 66(2)(b) of that Act (persons who may be recalled) for “regular air force” substitute “Royal Air Force”.
1I In section 72 of that Act (release and discharge from service under recall order) omit subsections (5) and (6).
1J (1) Section 95 of that Act (offences against orders and regulations under section 4) is amended as follows.
(b) in the words after paragraph (e), omit “triable by court-martial or summarily by a civil court”.
(3) After that subsection insert—
“(1A) A member of a reserve force (“A”) commits an offence if—
(a) a superior officer (“B”), in pursuance of orders or regulations under section 4, is acting in the execution of his office;
(b) A’s behaviour towards B is threatening or disrespectful; and
(c) A knows or has reasonable cause to believe that B is a superior officer.
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A)—
(a) “superior officer” has the same meaning as in the Armed Forces Act 2006; (b) section 11(3) of that Act (meaning of “behaviour” and “threatening”) applies.
(1C) An offence under this section is triable summarily by a civil court (as well as being triable by the Court Martial).”
(a) in paragraph (a) for the words from “court-martial” to the end substitute “the Court Martial—
(i) in the case of an offence under subsection (1)(a) or (e) or (1A), to any punishment mentioned in rows 5 to 12 of the Table in section 163 of the Armed Forces Act 2006;
(ii) in the case of an offence under subsection (1)(c) or (d), to any punishment mentioned in that Table, but any sentence of imprisonment or service detention imposed in respect of the offence must not exceed 51 weeks;”;
(ii) after “(e)” insert “or (1A)”.
(5) For subsection (3) substitute—
“(2A) For the purposes of determining the Court Martial’s powers when sentencing an offender to whom Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 applies (ex-servicemen etc) for an offence under subsection (1)(a) or (e) or (1A), subsection (2)(a)(i) has effect as if the reference to rows 5 to 12 were to rows 5 to 10.”
1K (1) Section 96 of that Act (failure to attend for service on call out or recall) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), for the words (after paragraph (c)) from “is guilty” to the end substitute “is guilty of desertion (if section 8(2)(a) or (b) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 applies to him) or absence without leave (if neither of those provisions applies to him).”
(3) In subsection (3) for the words from “by court-martial” to the end substitute “summarily by a civil court (as well as being triable by the Court Martial).”
1L (1) Section 97 of that Act (failure to attend for duty or training) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), for the words (after paragraph (b)) from “is guilty” to the end substitute “is guilty of desertion (if section 8(2)(a) or (b) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 applies to him) or absence without leave (if neither of those provisions applies to him).”
(3) In subsection (3) for the words from “by court-martial” to the end substitute “summarily by a civil court (as well as being triable by the Court Martial).”’.
No. 65, in schedule 12, page 227, line 17, leave out from beginning to ‘subsection’ in line 18 and insert—
‘(1) Section 98 of that Act (trial and punishment of offences of desertion or absence without leave) is amended as follows.
(a) for the words from “section 37” to “1957” substitute “section 8 or 9 of the Armed Forces Act 2006”;
(b) for “as well as by court-martial” substitute “(as well as being triable by the Court Martial)”.
(a) for “court-martial” substitute “the Court Martial”;
(b) for the words from “service law” to the end substitute “section 8 or 9 (as the case may be) of the Armed Forces Act 2006.”
(4) In subsection (3)(b) for “service law of desertion or absence without leave” substitute “section 8 or 9 of the Armed Forces Act 2006”.
(5) In subsection (4)(a)—
(a) for “court-martial” substitute “the Court Martial”;
(b) for “service law of absence without leave” substitute “section 9 of the Armed Forces Act 2006”. (6) Omit subsection (5).
No. 66, in schedule 12, page 227, line 23, at end insert—
‘3A For section 100 of that Act (arrest of deserters etc) substitute—
“100A Arrest by civilian police of deserters and absentees without leave
(1) An officer of a UK police force may arrest without warrant a person who is reasonably suspected of being a member of a reserve force, or a person liable to recall, who has deserted or is absent without leave.
(2) If an authorised person is satisfied by evidence given under oath or affirmation that a relevant suspect is or is reasonably suspected of being within his jurisdiction, he may issue a warrant for the arrest of the relevant suspect.
“authorised person” means a person who has authority in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person suspected of an offence;
“relevant suspect” means a person reasonably suspected of being a member of a reserve force, or a person liable to recall, who has deserted, is absent without leave or has committed an offence under section 95.
(4) In this section “UK police force” has the meaning given by section 365 of the Armed Forces Act 2006.”
3B Omit section 102 of that Act (record of illegal absence).
3C In section 104 of that Act, omit subsection (3).
3D (1) Section 105 of that Act (trial of offences by civil court) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for “which is triable by court-martial is also” substitute “is (as well as being triable by the Court Martial)”.
(4) In subsection (3) for “an offence under service law (other than an offence of desertion or absence without leave)” substitute “any service offence (other than an offence under this Act or an offence mentioned in section 98(1))”.
3E Omit section 106 of that Act.’.
No. 67, in schedule 12, page 227, line 25, after ‘(1)’ insert ‘— (i)’.
No. 68, in schedule 12, page 227, line 26, at end insert—
‘(ii) for “under service law” substitute “a service offence”;’.
No. 69, in schedule 12, page 227, line 31, at end insert—
‘4A In section 108 of that Act (evidence) for subsections (1) and (2) substitute—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision with respect to evidence, including the admissibility of evidence, in proceedings before a civil court for an offence under this Act.
(1B) Regulations under subsection (1A) shall be made by statutory instrument, which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”
4B Omit section 124 of that Act (exemption from tolls etc).
4C Omit section 126 of that Act (amendments relating to transfers to reserves etc).’.
No. 70, in schedule 12, page 227, line 32, leave out from beginning to ‘subsection’ and insert—
‘(1) Section 127 of that Act (interpretation) is amended as follows.
(a) omit the definition of “regular air force”;
(b) for the definition of “regular army” substitute— ““the regular army” has the meaning given by section 364 of the Armed Forces Act 2006;”;
(c) in the definition of “regular services” for “regular air force” substitute “Royal Air Force”;
(d) for the definition of “service law” substitute— ““service offence” has the meaning given by section 50 of the Armed Forces Act 2006;”.
No. 71, in schedule 12, page 227, line 36, at end insert—
‘(4) Section 163(2) and (3) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 apply in relation to section 95(2)(a) of, and paragraph 5(3) of Schedule 1 to, this Act.”’.
No. 72, in schedule 12, page 228, line 14, leave out sub-paragraph (5) and insert—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1) omit “or recklessly”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (2) for “subject to service law” substitute “a member of the reserve forces”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (3) for the words from “has since” to the end substitute “becomes a member of the reserve forces is liable on conviction by the Court Martial to any punishment mentioned in rows 2 to 12 of the Table in section 163 of the Armed Forces Act 2006.”;
(d) after that sub-paragraph add—
“(4) For the purposes of determining the Court Martial’s powers when sentencing an offender to whom Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 (ex-servicemen etc) applies for an offence under sub-paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (3) has effect as if the reference to rows 2 to 12 were to rows 2 to 10.
(5) Where an offence under sub-paragraph (1) is committed by a person within sub-paragraph (3), the time for which he is for the purposes of section 62 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (time limits for charging) to be regarded as being a relevant reservist (within the meaning of that section) includes the period from (and including) the time he committed the offence to the time he became a member of the reserve forces.”
(5A) In paragraph 6(1) for “a court-martial” substitute “the Court Martial”.’.
No. 73, in schedule 12, page 228, line 15, at end insert—
‘7 Omit Schedule 2 to that Act (deserters and absentees without leave).
8 Omit Schedule 3 to that Act (evidence).
9 Omit Schedule 7 to that Act (postponement of transfer to the reserves or discharge from the reserves).
10 In Part 2 of Schedule 9 to that Act (transitional provisions) omit paragraphs 22 and 23.
11 In Schedule 10 to that Act (minor and consequential amendments) omit paragraphs 1 to 13 and 23.’.—[Mr. Touhig.]
Schedule 12, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 352 to 354 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
