Examination of Witnesses (Questions 463-479)
MR JULIAN
MILLER, MRS
TERESA JONES,
MR HUMPHREY
MORRISON, COMMODORE
ROBERT FRASER,
BRIGADIER STEPHEN
ANDREWS AND
AIR COMMODORE
PAUL HUGHESDON
16 FEBRUARY 2006
Robert Key: Good morning. It is very
good to see the Bill Team present again. Mr Miller, you are in
the lead, I know. Could we start by looking at reporting restrictions?
Q463 Vera Baird: We have had submissions
from several media organisations that are concerned that there
is no route for the media to appeal against a decision to impose
reporting restrictions on a Court Martial and, of course, the
Bill does not change that. The Guardian expresses the belief
that this is a mistake and not deliberate policy. Can you help
us about whether it is and, if it is an oversight, will there
be amendments to rectify the position?
Mr Miller: We have also heard
from The Guardian about this matter. Indeed, I think there
has been correspondence involving the Minister in which we have
acknowledged that this may indeed have been a mistake, an oversight.
We have said that we will look into this and if that further work
confirms that there has indeed been an oversight then we will
bring forward an amendment to correct it.
Robert Key: Could we look at the Service
Complaint Panel and the whole question of redress and grievance?
Q464 Mr Jones: This is my ongoing
theme, Chairman. I raise the issue around independence and I think
I got some way with the General but not very far. In what circumstances
do you think it would be inappropriate to have an independent
person on one of these panels, and in what circumstances do you
envisage you would need an independent person?
Mr Miller: As the CDS and I think
the Chiefs last week said, we do not see an independent person
as being relevant when administrative issues are coming forward,
questions of disputes over allowances or promotions, that sort
of area, which could be dealt with by the grievance panel. The
thinking on this came out, as you know, Mr Jones, from the HCDC
report on Duty of Care and it is responsive to concerns in that
area, so it is issues where there are questions of welfare, allegations
of bullying or harassment, that sort of area, where we think an
independent member would be particularly appropriate. The underlying
point here is the view that in principle it is for the Armed Forces
to deal with complaints themselves and for the chain of command
to be seen to be responsive and to be able to address people's
concerns and resolve them, but we do understand that there is
a case where issues of the welfare type arise and where it can
add a degree of confidence to feel that an independent person
can contribute to the consideration if a case reaches the level
where the panel is having to address it.
Q465 Mr Jones: I understand why it
was put in and I do not agree. I think it is quite a weak response
to our recommendations, but can I also put to you what I put to
the General about other organisations? We took evidence, when
we did the Duty of Care report, from Chief Constables who, if
you go back 10 or 15 years, were making similar arguments, that
if you had independent oversight of the police it would be political
interference and this would be a step too far. All the Chief Constables
that we interviewed, including my own whom I spoke to about this,
came to the view that the independent police complaints procedure
had actually helped them in terms of their job. They recognised,
I think, that, whether they like it or not, society is going to
be more inquisitive, asking questions more. They all said, and
we said in the report, that it had added to their operational
effectiveness. If that is the case with Chief Constables and the
police what is so different in the Armed Forces?
Mr Miller: You have heard from
the CDS the explanation about the different functions of the Armed
Forces. They have a very different role to fulfil from the police.
In terms of the independent scrutiny of the police, my understanding
is that this was looking much more at how the police interact
with the wider public. It is complaints about what the police
have done in the fulfilment of their duties. What we are looking
at in the issue we are addressing is complaints that arise within
the Service from someone who has a grievance about how their colleagues
or their superiors have dealt with them. Seeking to resolve that
seems to us to be something which is best dealt with through the
chain of command initially and through the Defence Council panel
if an earlier resolution cannot be achieved.
Q466 Mr Jones: I am sorry: I know
the MoD are very inward-looking and not very open to new ideas,
but do you not actually think that they have got a problem here
in the sense that the perception is now, like the police used
to have with the police investigating themselves, that this is
something which is not going to wash out there in terms of the
broader damage that has been done over the last few years in terms
of various allegations? I also accept that there is a difference
when it comes to operational matters but, frankly, a lot of these
complaints are not necessarily to do with operational matters,
and we took evidence from people at Catterick and other places,
but are on bases and in static training in other places. Do you
think that this is going to put to bed and stop this damage that
is being done to our Armed Forces while these allegations look
as though they are being investigated by themselves, which was
the case with the police a few years ago?
Mr Miller: What we feel is that
it is important to have a system which preserves the central strength
of the Armed Forces and allows them to do their duty and to be
as effective as they normally are, and it is that effectiveness
which earns them the respect which we are all keen to preserve.
That takes us back to the way the Armed Forces are structured
and operate as a disciplined organisation with a clearly visible
and understood chain of command, so we do think it is important
that in responding to concerns we should do nothing which weakens
that fundamental approach. What we have proposed is a system which
takes us beyond where we are now, introduces a system which will
tackle concerns about welfare, allegations of abuse, within the
system very much at unit level through strengthening the provision
of welfare services and support for individuals, and then speed
up the system through which complaints which cannot be dealt with
in that system can be elevated to a panel with the delegated authority
of the Defence Council. By introducing an independent element
at that level we think that it will show not only that the system
has been adapted lower down but also that we have been responsive
to wider concerns and have introduced an element which will ensure
not only that the judgments are properly made but are seen to
be properly made.
Q467 Mr Jones: I beg to differ and
I shall put some amendments down too. I want to ask you one other
question on the problem of selecting the independent person. We
have heard this morning that the General clearly wants somebody
for the role who has got military experience. Who do you think
would be these independent people and would they have very much
credibility if they were, for example, retired serving officers?
Who is this super person we are looking for who is going to be
so independent from influence?
Mr Miller: What we are clear on
is that they will not be a member of the Armed Forces, they will
not be a member of the Civil Service. We will need to come forward
with detailed proposals for exactly what they would be but I think
that we would expect an independent member to be someone who could
bring to bear relevant experience and skills. I would certainly
think that knowledge of welfare issues, for example, would be
relevant, as would the question of understanding a wider context
that the CDS talked about earlier.
Robert Key: Mr Miller, you will know
that every year since 1689 Parliament has passed an annual vote
setting the limit on Army numbers, and I for one was very surprised
to get a letter from the Leader of the House saying it was time
to stop all that nonsense and move forward in the 21st century,
but we do wish to find out a little bit more about that.
Q468 Mr Burrowes: Why are you not
following the advice of the Service Chiefs, who wish to retain
the annual renewal, and how do you respond to the Defence Committee's
conclusion that the rationale for the requirement for annual renewal
is not clear?
Mr Miller: We recognise that this
is an interesting issue and that there is quite a wide range of
opinion expressed about it. As you heard from the CDS, the point
which the Department attaches particular importance to is the
retention of the quinquennial review. We think that has both a
practical value in ensuring that there is a place in the legislative
programme to allow disciplinary legislation to be updated routinely
and regularly, and also it serves a symbolic function in terms
of demonstrating Parliament's continuing interest in this area
of Armed Forces business. The annual renewal, as the CDS said,
has been perhaps slightly less central to our thinking and the
issue of annual renewal was, I think, debated 30 years ago and
the decision was taken then that it should be retained, but there
have been developments since then and the level of parliamentary
engagement with the Armed Forces is such that there is now a regular
debate on personnel matters, for example. The Select Committee
on Defence has become a much more established part of the system
from when this was last considered and there is a whole range
of other ways in which these issues can be aired in a parliamentary
context.
Q469 Robert Key: Flattery will get
you nowhere, Mr Miller.
Mr Miller: It is always worth
trying.
Q470 Mr Jones: I just thought you
ignored our reports.
Mr Miller: It seemed to us that
the central issue was the quinquennial review. On annual renewal
the judgment is a finer one. We have, in the proposals put forward
in the Bill, come down not to include it but we are very interested
to hear the range of views which has emerged and to hear the judgment
which this Committee reaches.
Q471 Mr Burrowes: I am still not
clear what particularly is wrong with the annual review itself.
There is a justification for the quinquennial review, but with
the Service Chiefs saying themselves that it is not particularly
onerous and the Defence Select Committee saying why not, and at
this particular time when there is concern about a proper review
and scrutiny, why not keep it? It is not broke.
Mr Miller: If that is the view
that the Committee comes to then we would—
Q472 Mr Burrowes: The suspicion is,
is it pressure from Government business managers to get rid of
it?
Mr Miller: I am aware that the
business managers have expressed a view. It was not actually what
led to the proposal in the first place to remove the annual renewal.
As I said, in looking at the extent to which it made an important
contribution to the scrutiny we came down with the view that it
was less important than the quinquennial element and we proposed
its removal as a piece of process rather than a piece of business,
but we would be very happy to hear the considered views of the
Committee in the light of all the evidence that has come before
them.
Q473 Mr Howarth: Can I put it to
you that the statutory authority which the Chairman mentioned
arises out of the Bill of Rights 1689, so it is actually a rather
important constitutional point and, whilst you say that there
are plenty of other opportunities today, none of those is statutory.
Those are offered by the Government as opportunities when we might
discuss defence matters but the Government of the day could just
as easily decide that they did not wish to discuss defence matters
and therefore there would not be that statutory opportunity which
is provided by way of the individual Service discipline Acts today.
Can I put it to you that for an hour and a half per Service that
is a small price to pay for ensuring that there is an annual discipline
on Parliament and on the Government of the day to ensure that
Parliament does have that opportunity for scrutiny?
Mr Miller: As I say, the argument
can be made and has been made in both directions. We will listen
to the views that you reach when you weigh up those arguments
and be very interested in where you think the balance should be
struck. The proposal we have put forward has drawn the line in
one place. It could clearly be drawn either side of where we have
chosen to put it.
Q474 Mr Howarth: We used to have
an annual defence review which used to be published but that seems
to have fallen into disuse and I think that the established practice
at the moment of holding a debate on a range of defence issues—defence
in the world, defence in the UK and defence procurement and so
on—could also fall into disuse.
Mr Miller: A great deal of information
is published on defence, as you know, in the form of the annual
reports, which is, I think, much more detailed in many respects
than it was 10 or 20 years ago, so that the trend seems to me
to be towards putting more information rather than less in front
of Parliament.
Robert Key: And, of course, Mr Miller,
we are aware that it is not your fault that these debates always
take place on a wet Thursday afternoon when the House is on a
one-line Whip. That is up to the usual channels, I do realise
that. One of the things which this Committee has constantly banged
on about is how difficult it is that we do not have in front of
us so many of the statutory instruments, the secondary legislation,
which will flow from this Bill, and one of those areas is in clauses
325 and 326 over enlistment and terms of service.
Q475 Jim Sheridan: Can I first of
all look at terms and conditions and the recruitment of young
people in the Armed Forces, in particular the Army? For instance,
I understand that someone under 18 signs up for a fixed six-year
period and for anyone over 18 it is four years. I do not understand
why that difference is there. More importantly from an Army perspective,
I understand that the Navy and the Royal Air Force are still quite
sexy careers that people wish to choose, particularly people from
affluent areas, whereas the Army tend to recruit in the more deprived
areas. I am somewhat concerned that perhaps a young person signing
up to join the Army may not fully understand the commitment that
is required and therefore, once he has signed up, that is him
in. Are you looking at any arrangement, even in the first six
months, that would make it easier for young people who wish to
leave the Armed Forces to do so?
Brigadier Andrews: I am not sure
it is essentially a matter for here but I can reassure you that
young people who join the Army, particularly those who are under
18, of course have a great deal of time and effort invested in
their wellbeing and it is critically important that if they feel
that they have made the wrong decision they have a chance to make
a properly informed decision about changing their mind. Indeed,
they have got what we call a discharge as of right, and they can
give their Commanding Officer 14 days' notice in writing to exercise
that right. The Commanding Officer can take account of the circumstances
and can vary that if necessary. Then the rules are, depending
on their age, whether they are under 18 at attestation or over
18 at attestation, that they have a window in which they can leave
the Service, having made a properly informed decision, and that
is that. If they turn out to be what we call in the Army "unhappy
soldiers", that is, soldiers who are really not suited to
military service; they have tried their best and really they are
persistently unhappy and dissatisfied with their lot, there is
a provision for them to leave within a reasonable time as well.
There are detailed rules about that but I think the key thing
is that this is really a human problem, for officers and Commanding
Officers to know their people and to know them well enough to
make sure they have made the right decision to stay in the Service
and to soldier on, and I think that that works in the Army.
Air Commodore Hughesdon: Can I
just say, representing one of the sexy Services, I am flattered
to note that sort of background. We similarly have processes in
place that help people. Clearly, it is in our own interests to
make sure that when they come through the recruiting gate they
know exactly what they are signed up for. I hope that the words
that are included in the various documentation they receive at
attestation time and when they arrive at our basic training units,
the sorts of words that are given in written agreements and the
like, are readily understandable and that, for those who cannot
understand them, we help them through that. As has just been explained,
we similarly have easy routes out for people. For example, provided,
if they are over-18s, they have completed 28 days, then between
28 days and six months they have the right to leave at 14 days'
notice, and that is enhanced for under-18s. We do want to help
and, particularly in terms of the recruiting front, you are right:
we do generally draw from similar pockets of areas and the last
thing we want people to do, having been unhappy, having had a
horrendous experience, having made the wrong life choice, to go
back into that pool, if you like, and poison it for subsequent
recruiting. It is in our interests and our recognisable concerns,
and I think we now have a system in place that helps everybody.
Commodore Fraser: I think it is
right to say that we also realise that it is a particularly important
time for somebody during the first six months of their service.
It is in all of our interests to make sure that people are there
for the right reasons and want to be there. We have a similar
process of people being able to leave within 14 days. As well
as that we make sure people have advice available to them so that
they can make a measured decision, because obviously that may
well affect the rest of their career.
Q476 Jim Sheridan: So in the first
six months they can leave without any financial restraints, by
themselves?
Commodore Fraser: Yes.
Air Commodore Hughesdon: Certainly
in the case of my Service. Beyond the six months they then have
to serve to three years to return the training investment.
Q477 Jim Sheridan: Following on from
that, will the secondary legislation flowing from the Bill make
any changes in the arrangements for those who join the Services
under 18 years of age?
Mr Morrison: No. The intention
is to keep the provision that at the moment is in the legislation,
for the parental consent and so on, but it will be in subordinate
legislation.
Q478 Mr Campbell: On what may be
renamed the day of the Burrowes principle, that if it is not broken
do not fix it, the Bill seeks to amend the inquiry system. Are
we therefore to conclude that there are serious problems with
it and they need to be fixed?
Mr Miller: No, I do not think
you are to conclude that. There are a number of specific issues
which the Bill addresses with regard to inquiries. One in particular
concerns the Navy and I will ask Robert Fraser to say a word about
that. Otherwise there is an issue of whether lower level inquiries
need to be statutorily based as they are now or whether there
is greater flexibility in making them effectively a management
tool and the Bill moves us in that direction. It also introduces
a power to summons civilian witnesses where it is essential to
hear their evidence for the Board of Inquiry to do its business.
Commodore Fraser: For the Navy
it is the biggest change in this regard because we have always
operated our Boards of Inquiry on a prerogative basis, so this
is the biggest change for us. The other two Services have always
been statutory until now. I think it is right to say that there
have not been any specific difficulties with running on a prerogative
basis. The point is that there are a couple of positive advantages
which Mr Miller has referred to in terms of moving to a statutory
system, for example, having witnesses giving evidence on oath
and also the fact that you can issue a summons for a witness to
attend. That is particularly important nowadays because we are
working increasingly with civilian contractors and so on. It is
the sort of situation where you can make sure somebody comes to
give evidence in a particularly important or sensitive Board of
Inquiry.
Q479 Mr Burrowes: It is also an issue
which I think we have heard about earlier today and in previous
sessions about whether or not next of kin should be able to attend
Boards of Inquiry, and the debate ranges from only under exceptional
circumstances to a presumption in favour of saying that they should.
Why is the view here that it should be exceptional rather than
a presumption in favour?
Commodore Fraser: I think it comes
back to the fundamental reason why we have Boards of Inquiry.
They have been with us in the prerogative form for many years
as far as the Navy is concerned particularly. They were always
intended as very much an internal inquiry to be set up very quickly
indeed and quite deliberately to make sure that you had got the
facts, much as CDS said a little earlier on. The point is that
you want absolute candour from your witnesses and you want to
be able to move as quickly as you possibly can because the whole
idea is to learn lessons and then put those lessons into effect
straightaway before any other processes. I think it is that rationale
that is the basis of this. That is why I am saying as a standard
rule you should say that no next of kin should be there. That
is why we have approached it that way.
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