Memorandum from the UK Coalition to Stop
the Use of Child Soldiers[19]
UNDER-18S
IN THE
UK ARMED FORCES
Executive Summary
The submission is concerned solely with Under-18s
in the armed forces. It reviews problems arising from the lack
of any establishment in law of a minimum age for military recruitment;
the policy of targeting Under-18s for recruitment; their terms
of enlistment; the unfair disparity, in the case of the army,
between terms for minors and those for adults; the difficulties
recruits and their parents may have in understanding the terms;
and the refusal of the government to give an unequivocal assurance
that under-18s will never again be sent into battle. It makes
six constructive recommendations.
BACKGROUND
1. The vision of the UK Coalition to Stop
the Use of Child Soldiers is an end to the military recruitment
and deployment of anyone under 18 in armed conflict. The Coalition
believes that setting the highest possible standard of age 18
in the UK upholds the right of young people to protection from
armed conflict and would act as a precedent for other countries
to stop recruiting under-age soldiers. It was founded in 1998
and is affiliated to the [International] Coalition to Stop the
Use of Child Soldiers. The term "child" in this context
is derived from the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,
to which the UK is a party, and which defines, as protected by
the Convention, anyone under the age of 18.
AGE OF
RECRUITMENT
2. The Coalition welcomes the UK's ratification
in 2003 of the Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,
which required the UK to make a formal declaration of an age not
less than 16 as the minimum age for armed forces recruitment.
We are concerned, however, that the UK did not take the opportunity
to raise its minimum recruitment age beyond the existing level
of 16, leaving Serbia and Montenegro as the UK's sole European
companion in recruiting at that age, and in Serbia's case only
exceptionally. The Ministry of Defence thereby ensures that Britain
endures the obloquy of training people to take part in warfare
whilst they are still too young to drive a car or visit a public
house, let alone to vote. Some states, such as Portugal—reputedly
Britain's oldest ally—have taken the opportunity of their
declaration of a minimum recruitment age, required to be made
upon ratifying the Protocol, to overtly criticise the Protocol
for permitting under-18 recruitment.
3. We are also concerned that the Ministry
of Defence has not taken the opportunity of the present Armed
Forces Bill to write into law even the low minimum age which has
been formally declared. The UK is virtually alone in the world
in not having a statutory minimum age for military recruitment.
A number of states have a minimum military recruitment age enshrined
in their constitution. Although Britain has a law governing, for
example, the minimum age for part-time delivery of newspapers
to households, it has never laid down in statute a minimum age
for voluntary enlistment in the armed forces, and even in the
secondary legislation of regulations and statutory instruments,
references to minimum ages have been confined to certain forms
of engagement, and never to enlistment generally.
4. It is also to be noted that even in the
explanatory memorandum to the present Bill, intended to be a codification
and consolidation of the law relating to the armed forces, there
is no mention of any minimum age for recruitment other than reference
to certain provisions for those enlisted under the age of 18.
One is tempted to conclude that the armed forces are ashamed of
their low recruitment age and have no wish to draw attention to
it by having it publicly and authoritatively displayed in the
statute book.
5. Recommendation (1): that in Clause
325 (2) there be inserted a new sub-subsection,"(b) prohibiting
the enlistment of persons under a certain age, which shall in
any case be not less than 16 years;", with consequent re-lettering
of the succeeding sub-subsections.
RECRUITMENT POLICY
6. At any one time there are around 6,000
under-18s in the armed forces, the great majority of them in the
army. This is the result of an avowed policy of targeting 16-year-olds
for recruitment in preference to adults. This policy was supported
by the Select Committee on the 2001 Armed Forces Bill: "We
believe it continues to be important to recruit young people straight
from school, including at the age of 16. If they are not caught
at this point, they are likely to take up other careers and be
permanently lost to the armed forces." [Select Committee
Report, para 63] A disturbing implication of this argument, especially
the use of the word "caught", is that the personal,
educational and career development of individual young people
is to be valued less than the insistent demand of the armed forces
for new recruits.
7. The UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child, in its quinquennial report in 2002 on the UK's observance
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, commented: "The
Committee is deeply concerned that about one third of the annual
intake of recruits into the armed forces are below the age of
18 years [and] that the armed forces target young people . . .
The Committee recommends that the State party . . . while it recruits
persons who have attained the age of 16 years but have not attained
the age of 18 years, shall endeavour to give priority to those
who are the oldest, in light of article 38, para 3, of the Convention,
and strengthen and increase its efforts to recruit persons of
18 years and older." [UN CRC, Concluding Observations
on UK's second periodic report, paras 51, 52, 19 September 2002]
There is no evidence that the UK government, as party to the Convention,
has taken any heed of the recommendation of the body set up under
the Convention to monitor its progress.
8. The Select Committee on Defence, in its
Duty of Care Report, stated, "Much of the material we
received relates to the risk factors associated with young people,
particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds. Undoubtedly
some people who apply to join the armed forces are vulnerable
. . . Concerns have been expressed about the appropriateness of
recruiting under-18s into the Armed Forces. We recommend that
MoD examine the potential impact of raising the recruitment age
for all three Services to 18." [Select Committee on Defence,
Third Report, 14 March 2005, paras 61, 62] The government's response
was extremely disappointing. Although acknowledging that as many
as 8,215 Under-18s had been recruited in the financial year 2003-04
(41% to the army), it argued that "the Armed Forces must
recruit school leavers if they are to be able to compete for the
better candidates and meet current recruiting needs. Once people
attain the age of 18 years they are more difficult to attract
as recruits . . . we wish to attract recruits before they have
made other lifestyle choices." [Government's Response
to the Defence Committee's Report on Duty of Care, July 2005,
para14] In other words, catch them young before they know any
better.
9. In any case, the Duty of Care report
states, "Currently recruitment is buoyant, particularly
in the Army. In all three Services the number of applicants is
at least double the recruitment target. Manpower requirements
are expected to fall following the announcement of future force
structures . . . The reduced recruitment requirements should enable
the Armed Forces to be more selective in their recruitment."
[Select Committee on Defence, Third Report, 14 March 2005, para
37] This clearly raises the question whether the armed forces
need to continue to target 16-year-olds in preference to adults.
10. Recommendation (2): that the Select
Committee examine MoD witnesses on the question of a continuing
need to target 16-year-olds for recruitment, and consider inserting
their own higher minimum age for recruitment in the Coalition's
proposed new subsection in paragraph 5 above.
TERMS OF
ENLISTMENT
11. From the point of view of an under-18
recruit, the army, the largest recruiter, has the harshest terms
of enlistment of the three armed forces. All recruits to the army
are required to enter on a 22-year open engagement, but with a
right to give 12 months notice to resign at any time after completing
the first three years, making a four-year minimum engagement.
In the case of recruits enlisting under the age of 18, however,
the period between the date of enlistment and the 18th birthday
does not count towards either the 22-year full engagement or the
four-year minimum. This means that a recruit enlisting on or soon
after his/her 16th birthday is liable to a minimum six-year term,
as against the minimum four years required of an adult entrant.
This is described by critics as the "six-year trap".
The navy used to have a six-year trap, and the air force a five-year
one, but they were both abolished in 2001, the minimum engagement
for under-18s being aligned in each case with that for adults.
12. The Select Committee on the Armed Forces
Bill 1996 found "the justification for the difference
in length of service for under-18s and adults unconvincing"
and recommended the giving of "careful consideration to
the desirability of requiring minors to commit themselves to a
period of service longer than that of adults". [Select
Committee Report, paras 41, 42] The 1996 Select Committee also
reported, "The 1991 Committee expressed dissatisfaction
with the conditions of enlistment for under-18-year-olds and recommended
that the MoD bring forward proposals for change. No such proposals
have materialised. However, we were told that following the Bett
Review of the career structure in the Services a working party
is to look at enlistment . . . of under-18-year-olds."
In its second report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child in 1999 the UK government referred to the 1996 Select Committee's
report: "It again [referring back also to the 1991
Select Committee] recommended that careful consideration be
given to requiring minors to commit themselves to a period of
service no longer than that of adults. As a result a Working Group
was set up examine how this anomaly might be removed, and to see
whether common terms of service might be introduced across the
three Services . . . Work is now under way to draft revised terms
of service for personnel under 18." [UK Second Report
to the UN CRC, 1999, para 10.65] What the Working Group reported
has never been published. What is apparent is that the navy and
air force eventually responded positively in 2001, as mentioned
in paragraph 8 above, but the army's response in 1999 was to increase
its former five-year trap to the present six-year trap, and the
2001 Armed Forces Bill Select Committee refrained from comment.
13. The UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child unsurprisingly commented adversely in its 2002 quinquennial
report: "The Committee is deeply concerned . . . that
those recruited are required to serve for a minimum period of
four years rising to six years in the case of very young recruits."
[UN CRC, Concluding Observations on UK's second periodic report,
para 51, 19 September 2002]
14. For recruits to all three armed forces
there is a period for claiming what is known as a "discharge
as of right" extending from the 29th day of joining to the
end of the sixth month from joining. However, as cited by the
Duty of Care report, the Directorate of Operational Capability
found that "staff and instructors applied pressure to recruits
to dissuade them from leaving, as this reflected on success rates
and wastage targets." [Select Committee on Defence, Third
Report, 14 March 2005, para102] In any case this arbitrary period
does not necessarily reflect the rapidly changing and developing
attitudes of a 16- or 17-year-old. The Duty of Care report recommended
"that all Services adopt procedures that allow recruits
who express a wish to leave training an opportunity to leave their
training establishment and contemplate further before making a
firm decision on their future. " [Select Committee on
Defence, Third Report, 14 March 2005, para 105] The government's
bland response was, "The Services acknowledge the merit
of timely and pragmatic management of those who desire to leave
and seek to apply common sense and understanding to those individuals.
" [Government's Response to the Defence Committee's Report
on Duty of Care, July 2005, para 30] The question reported by
a witness to the Defence Committee that he put to the Commanding
Officer of Deepcut about a boy who kept running away, only to
be put on a charge each time he was brought back, "If
he is no good, just send him away from the Army. Why are you doing
this? " remains unanswered. [Select Committee on Defence,
Third Report, 14 March 2005, para103]
15. Recommendation (3): that in Clause
326 (2) (c) there be added, after the words "reserve force",
the words, ", provided that in no case shall a person enlisting
under the age of 18 be required to serve a longer minimum period
with a regular force than a person enlisting over that age on
the same engagement".
16. Recommendation (4): that in Clause
326 (2) (d) there be added, after the words "paragraph (c)",
the words, ", provided that such restriction shall in no
case apply to a person receiving such benefit or advantage whilst
under the age of 18".
UNDERSTANDING WHAT
IS INVOLVED
17. The Duty of Care report stated: "We
have considered a range of written material provided to recruits
. . . In general the pamphlets and brochures are clear and understandable.
However, since a significant proportion of those applying to the
Armed Forces, and the Army in particular, have poor basic skills,
they may not assimilate all the information available, particularly
that related to duty of care issues. " [Select Committee
on Defence, Third Report, 14 March 2005, para 53] The significance
of the reference to poor basic skills is illustrated elsewhere,
it being reported that "MoD's figures suggest 50% of all
recruits entering the Services have literacy or numeracy skills
. . . equivalent of those expected of an 11-year-old. "
[Select Committee on Defence, Third Report, 14 March 2005, para
83]
18. The problem of clear and unequivocal
understanding has particular relevance to the Notice Paper given
to applicants proposing to enlist, setting out the precise terms
and conditions of being a member of the armed forces. Amnesty
International has expressed concern that "the Notice Paper
is written in a complex and obscure manner, which may not be readily
understood by the parent/guardian or the [young person]. The commitment
to serve in the armed forces has serious consequences. The onus
should be on the armed forces to explain the commitment fully,
yet in an accessible and clear way. " [AI, UK Under-18s:
Report on Recruitment and Deployment of Child Soldiers, 2000]
It needs to be borne in mind that the parents of young people
with poor educational achievement may themselves have poor literacy
skills, and therefore the undertaking a parent acknowledges on
the parental consent form that he/she has read and understood
the Notice Paper, as well as the young applicant, may not be as
reassuring as it might superficially appear. This is certainly
borne out by anecdotal evidence of parents of unhappy under-18s
who aver that they never realised the full extent of the commitment
to which they had signed their son or daughter up. "I thought
we could buy him out" is one common misunderstanding.
19. One aspect of the complexity of the
army Notice Paper is that it is designed to cater for all applicants,
those under and over 18, with their differing commitments, as
well as entrants from the TA and re-entrant ex-soldiers. This
makes the form both lengthy and wordy, with pages of small print,
an off-putting feature for anyone, let alone someone who has difficulty
in reading. It would simplify matters greatly to have a separate
form solely for Under-18s.
20. Recommendation (5): that the Select
Committee recommend to the MoD that separate Notice Papers be
designed specifically and solely for the use of enlisting Under-18s,
in which the length of minimum commitment of engagement is clearly
and boldly set out.
DEPLOYMENT
21. The Coalition, having worked for UK
participation in the Optional Protocol, is disappointed in the
UK's additional declaration, originally made on signature but
confirmed on ratification, that, although it recognised the Protocol's
commitment not to send Under-18s to take a direct part in hostilities,
it would not exclude the possibility of such deployment where
"there is a genuine military need", or "it
is not practicable to withdraw such persons before deployment,
" or "to do so would undermine the operational effectiveness
of their ship or unit". It is significant that the UK
is the only party to the Protocol that has made such a declaration.
If other states can manage without it, why should the UK make
itself a pariah? If withdrawing Under-18s from a unit is potentially
a major problem, that is all the more reason for not recruiting
them in the first place.
22. The Coalition shares the concern expressed
in the Duty of Care report about apparent lack of supervision
of weapons handling by Under-18s, and in particular their placement
on armed guard duty. [Select Committee on Defence, Third Report,
14 March 2005, paras 326, 327] The Coalition believes such use
to be contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Optional
Protocol.
23. Recommendation (6): that the Select
Committee urge the MoD to withdraw its declaration on potential
deployment of Under-18s, and to prohibit the placing of Under-18s
on armed guard duty.
January 2006
19 Member organisations: Amnesty UK, Anglican Pacifist
Fellowship, Anti-Slavery International, Jesuit Refugee Service,
Pax Christi, Peace Pledge Union, Quaker Peace and Social Witness,
and UNICEF-UK. Back
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