6 Chapter Six: Allocating PGS revenue
70. PGS payments are to be collected centrally. The
Government then has to consider how best to allocate the revenue
generated among local authorities. Diss Town Council said that
there was "a very strong case" for ensuring that PGS
revenue is "distributed locally, for the benefit of the community
in which it is generated".[135]
Similarly, London First told us that "at a time when Government
policy is to increase development and community involvement in
the planning process, it is critical that communities see direct
benefits from development, beyond the development itself [
]
Without this, opposition to development is likely to increase".[136]
Many other witnesses agreed that it was important to maintain
a local link between revenue generation and investment in infrastructure.[137]
We recognise that the Government proposals for PGS would, if implemented,
make more opaque the link between development and the provision
of local facilities funded through locally negotiated Section
106 agreements. It seems to us however that this will have advantages
as well as disadvantages. It will, for instance, reduce the pressure
on local planning authorities to permit otherwise undesirable
developments solely to gain specific local benefits.
71. The Minister for Housing told us that "you
would expect most areas to be seeing something of an increase
overall in the resources that they would get" but the Financial
Secretary added that "you cannot say in the short term that
every local authority will gain from this".[138]
Within the South East, for example, there is no correlation between
the amount of housing growth, the cost of infrastructure and the
likely yield from PGS. Unless there is a redistribution mechanism
the impact of PGS will be widely variable. SEERA proposes that
the redistribution should be handled through a Regional Infrastructure
Fund, based on priorities set by the Regional Assembly, following
the model successfully developed by the Regional Transport Board.
Similar proposals are under consideration in the South West and
East of England.[139]
72. Maintaining a direct link between the locality
in which revenue is generated and that in which investment is
madelocal gain for local pain, as the TCPA put itis
not incompatible with an element of redistribution.[140]
The Chartered Institute of Housing and Bedfordshire Councils Planning
Consortium agreed.[141]
PGS is expected to result in higher returns overall than the existing
Section 106 arrangements, not least because a large proportionsome
93 per centof developments at present is not subject to
any planning obligations at all.
Table 4: Proportion
of planning permissions with planning agreements
Type of development
| Major
| Minor
| All
|
| 1997-8
| 2003-4 | 1997-8
| 2003-4 | 1997-8
| 2003-4 |
Dwellings
| 25.8% | 40%
| 3.5% | 9.2%
| 7.1% | 13.9%
|
Offices and light industry
| 13.1% | 20.4%
| 1.3% | 2.6%
| 2.6% | 5.8%
|
General industry and warehousing
| 5.6% | 12%
| 0.6% | 0.9%
| 1.4% | 3.4%
|
Retail, distribution and servicing
| 18.9% | 21.4%
| 1.5% | 1.8%
| 2.7% | 3.7%
|
All other major developments
| | 7.5% |
| 1.8% | 0.7%
| 2.3% |
North |
14.8% | 18.3%
| 1.5% | 1.7%
| 1.4% | 4%
|
South |
22.9% | 29.4%
| 1.9% | 6.4%
| 1.6% | 8.9%
|
Permissions with planning obligations
| | | |
| 1.5% | 6.9%
|
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government,
Valuing Planning Obligations in England: Final Report, May 2006,
table 2.4
73. We expect a small surplus to be available after
a portion has been top-sliced for strategic infrastructure projects
and each local authority has been allocated funds at least equivalent
to those which they would have expected under the current system.
The allocation of this remaining portion of PGS revenue provides
the Government with the opportunity to target resources: as the
RTPI argued "some mechanism must be found to redistribute;
otherwise [
] two effects may happen: first that one might
ratchet up development pressure within those areas that are already
experiencing development pressure but, secondly, that those areas
in need of infrastructure [
] will not receive the benefit
from Planning Gain Supplement unless there is some redistributive
mechanism".[142]
The Minister for Housing argued that there was already a strong
correlation between those areas in need of infrastructure investment
and those areas where the most PGS revenue was likely to be generated.
Working on this basis however seems to us to be missing an opportunity
to support development in those areas where development has historically
been set back by poor infrastructure.[143]
As the RTPI told us "infrastructure helps to make markets
and to shape markets in areas where markets are not working very
well".[144]
The TCPA and others supported an element of redistribution
in PGS revenue allocation.[145]
This view is supported by the SEERA-commissioned report which
made a strong case for the inevitability of a proportion of revenue
raised needing to be redistributed out of the area of origin,
even if the funds are required to meet infrastructure requirements
relevant to the needs of the area in which the funds were generated.
The entirety
of any surplus after allocations to local authorities and to strategic
infrastructure should also be allocated to development-related
infrastructure and not absorbed into general Government funds.
The local authority distribution formula should allow for an element
of targeting resources to areas of greatest need. It is essential
however, that any targeting is not undertaken to the extent that
it would risk undermining the link between particular developments
and local infrastructure provision. There should be a statutory
undertaking that a majority of PGS revenue is returned to the
local area affected by the development. A clear funding formula
should be used to determine precisely how much revenue is returned
to each local authority.
74. Providing
demonstrable benefits for local areas will be a key element in
the implementation of PGS. This process should be as transparent
as possible. Local authorities, and the communities which they
represent, should be able to see precisely how much revenue has
been raised in their area and how much has been made available
for investment in infrastructure. John
Healey MP, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, said that the
Government "would have to find a way, I think, of making
sure that [PGS] operated transparently so that it was obvious
to those in any local authority area what the gains were from
any potential development".[146]
We agree. We recommend that the Government also, through transparent
means, make available data enabling comparisons between the hypothetical
benefits that would have accrued in a particular area under Section
106 and that are realised under PGS.
75. Some witnesses were concerned that if the amount
of PGS revenue allocated to individual local authorities were
directly linked to the amount of PGS revenue generated in their
area, developments with a low PGS liabilitywhich are often
those of significant value to local communities such as sporting
or leisure facilities, redevelopment of brownfield sites or remediation
of contaminated landwould be disadvantaged if local authorities
sought to maximise their returns.[147]
Other witnesses, when questioned did not see this as a significant
risk: the RTPI acknowledged the risk but said that it was "not
a main fear".[148]
Similarly, the TCPA argued that at present "local authorities
do not prioritise raising revenue from Section 106 over resisting
greenfield development. It seems to us that a number of authorities
are quite able to resist that temptation in the current system
and they should be able to resist the temptation in the new system".[149]
We agree
with the Minister in this regard: perverse decision-making for
financial gain is no more likely to occur under a PGS regime than
under current arrangements and that "ultimately, local authorities
have to take responsible decisions in the interests of the whole
community and they are democratically accountable for those decisions
[
] to the extent that sports and recreation ought to be
part of other planning systems and planning strategies".
[150]
135 Ev 5 Back
136
Ev 9 Back
137
See, for example, Q 22 Back
138
Q 287 Back
139
The Hewdon Group, The Administration of Planning Gain Supplement:
Final Report, June 2006, paras 8, 30-31; Q 116 Back
140
Q 3 Back
141
Ev 73, 89 Back
142
Q 2 Back
143
Q 318 Back
144
Q 2 Back
145
Q 3 Back
146
Q 285 Back
147
See, for instance, Ev 2 Back
148
Q 7 Back
149
Q 8 Back
150
Q 312 Back
|