Conclusions and recommendations
The Government's proposals
1. We
urge the Government to consider a range of means to secure for
the public benefit a portion of land value uplift which results
from the granting of planning permission. Such consideration should
include comparative cost-benefit analyses of PGS and scaled-back
Section 106 arrangements on the one hand and, on the other, a
fully effective utilisation by local authorities of Section 106
powers, including possible reforms and enhancements. (Paragraph
8)
The levy base
2. We
agree with the Government that the granting of planning permission
is the most appropriate point at which to calculate PGS liability
as it is a clearly identifiable point in the planning process
and would capture the majority of any land value uplift. It should,
however, be defined as the point at which sufficient planning
permission has been granted in order for development to commence.
(Paragraph 10)
Calculating PGS liability and valuation methodology
3. We
agree that actual valuations should be used in the calculation
of current use value and planning value for PGS purposes. (Paragraph
15)
Valuations
4. Standard
definitions and procedures will be critical to the success of
PGS and thus will determine the extent to which it can contribute
to the provision of infrastructure and growth in the housing supply.
We recommend that the Government conduct a further round of consultation
with industry and other stakeholders specifically on definitions
and procedures relating to current use value and planning value.
Such consultation has to be concluded prior to any implementation
of PGS. (Paragraph 16)
5. We prefer the Government's
proposal that developers should be responsible for calculating
current use value and planning value, drawing on the existing
expertise within the private sector, through a system of self-assessments
monitored and endorsed by the Valuation Office. (Paragraph 17)
6. We recommend that
the Government set a minimum value of zero for current use value.
This would reduce any perverse disincentive to brownfield site
development which PGS could otherwise represent. (Paragraph 18)
7. We recommend that
calculations of current use value and planning value reflect actual
site conditions, including implemented planning permissions, as
well as actual patterns of land ownership and actual liabilities
and interests. No assumption of freehold vacant possession should
be made. (Paragraph 19)
Self-assessment approval
8. We
recommend that the Government work with the Home Builders' Federation
and other stakeholders to develop a pre-clearance system for PGS
self-assessments and that such a system be incorporated into the
PGS regime. (Paragraph 20)
PGS liability and option agreements
9. We
welcome the Government's willingness to consider the impact of
PGS on development on land with option agreements. Any special
arrangements will need to be agreed and promulgated prior to the
implementation of PGS. (Paragraph 21)
Scope
10. We
welcome the proposed broadening in the scope of development gain
capture and endorse the proposal that liability should be based
on the land value uplift achieved rather than on the nature of
the development. (Paragraph 22)
The PGS rate
11.
We recommend that the Government provide us with regular updates
on the progress of its research into the impact of PGS on the
markets for housing and land.
(Paragraph 23)
12. while we accept
that in some specific instances PGS may generate less revenue
than the current regime would, the important question is whether
PGS can generate additional revenue overall. (Paragraph 26)
13. It is clear that
extensive further research and statistical analysis is required
to enable the Government to determine the rate at which PGS should
be set. (Paragraph 30)
14. In making its
determination of the PGS rate, the Government will need to strike
a balance between setting the rate too high, which could discourage
development and encourage avoidance, and setting it a rate which
will cover the additional costs of administering the tax, generate
a surplus over current arrangements and provide a contribution
to investment in strategic infrastructure. It will need to make
a strong case to support its determination if the rate does not
fall within the anticipated range if the proposals are to retain
credibility. In any case, we would expect the analysis and statistical
modelling supporting the Government's determination to be made
publicly available and open to widespread scrutiny. (Paragraph
32)
Changing the PGS rate
15. We
welcome the Government's understanding that it would be impractical
to vary the PGS rate frequently. The need to keep revisions to
a minimum makes it all the more important to establish a workable
rate at the outset. (Paragraph 33)
Point of payment
16. None
of our witnesses favoured requiring payment at the point at which
full liability is established. We agree with the Government that
to do so would be impractical. (Paragraph 34)
Definition of commencement and start of works
17. We
recommend that the Government and stakeholders reach a mutually
agreeable and robust definition of commencement of development
prior to the introduction of PGS. (Paragraph 35)
Deferred payments
18. We
recommend that the Government permit phased PGS payments particularly
in relation to those large sites where development itself is phased.
(Paragraph 37)
19. one implication
of a deferred payment scheme would be to increase the gap to be
bridged by forward funding and therefore increase the size of
the initial dowry required from Government. (Paragraph 38)
Revenue collection
20. we
concur that it is appropriate for central Government to collect
PGS payments. (Paragraph 39)
Marginal sites
21. We
find no grounds for PGS exemptions or discounts for developments
of marginal viability. (Paragraph 41)
Brownfield sites
22. We
are not persuaded by the case for discounts against or exemptions
from PGS liability in respect of developments on brownfield land.
(Paragraph 46)
Small-scale developments and a minimum threshold
23. We
recommend a minimum threshold for PGS liability which puts very
small-scale developments, including home improvements, outside
the scope of PGS liability. This threshold should be set at a
very low level to preserve PGS revenue and to prevent market distortions.
(Paragraph 48)
Conclusions on exemptions and discounts
24. The
Government should resist all calls to grant exemptions and discounts
other than for very small-scale developments. To do so would increase
the complexity of the tax and risk market distortions. There is
a risk that financial advantages for developments desirable in
policy terms will have the perverse effect of encouraging local
authorities to permit the kinds or locations of development being
discouraged in order to increase their revenue-take. Where exemptions
and discounts have been sought to drive certain desirable behaviours,
other mechanisms can be used to achieve the same ends. Where exemptions
and discounts have been sought to maintain project viability,
the arguments that PGS threatens viability are not convincing.
The Government should keep PGS as transparent, straightforward
and cost effective as possible (Paragraph 50)
Timing of the provision of infrastructure
25. the
Government is silent on how it will ensure that PGS supports infrastructure
in a timely and predictable way. We would welcome clarification
from the Government on this specific point. (Paragraph 51)
26. Ministers suggested
that local authorities could secure funds to provide timely infrastructure
through a "prudential borrowing regime" in which they
could take out loans against expected PGS receipts. If the Government
is to proceed with this suggestion, we will require regular updates
on progress and further clarification on the details of the operation
of the scheme. (Paragraph 53)
27. The proposal that
local authorities should borrow against expected PGS receipts
is entirely unattractive. It would be an unnecessarily expensive
option for local authorities. Moreover, the primary purpose of
PGS is to provide the resources for infrastructure to free up
land for development and support housing growth, not to enable
local authorities to acquire debt. That would be a retrograde
step from the existing arrangements. Servicing debt is not an
appropriate use for PGS revenue. (Paragraph 54)
28. Local solutions
to forward funding could be permitted to persist alongside the
national PGS regime. This may be a particularly appropriate solution
for growth areas and areas where there is a single body able to
provide forward funding, as there is in Milton Keynes. (Paragraph
56)
29. A substantial
element of Government forward funding to enable infrastructure
to be provided in a timely manner is essential to the successful
operation of PGS. Without substantial forward funding there is
no way that PGS can deliver the certainty for local authorities
and developers which is essential if the tax is to be effective
and to carry the confidence of stakeholders. We are adamant that
the Government should not proceed with PGS unless and until it
has made provision to bridge the time difference between the need
for expenditure and the receipt of PGS funding. (Paragraph 57)
Funding strategic infrastructure
30. We
welcome the Ministers' commitment that the PGS revenues allocated
to strategic infrastructure will be additional to rather than
instead of funds already provided through other means. (Paragraph
59)
31. We recommend that
the criteria and priorities for strategic infrastructure funding
are determined through a broad and inclusive process, incorporating
the views of not only regional and sub-regional bodies but all
statutory planning consultees. (Paragraph 60)
32. The Government
will need to provide a significant element of pump-priming in
respect of strategic infrastructure as well as forward funding
local infrastructure requirements.
(Paragraph 61)
Impact on the supply of affordable housing
33. We
welcome the Minister's assurance that the Department of Communities
and Local Government was working to establish the reasons behind
the shortfall between Section 106 affordable housing commitments
and delivery. We look forward to seeing the outcomes of this
research. (Paragraph 65)
34. We recommend strongly
that the Government, through planning guidance and target setting,
ensure that meeting affordable housing targets is not jeopardised
in favour of revenue raising. (Paragraph 67)
35. We recommend that
the local authorities remain free to require developers' contributions
to affordable housing even where such provision is not co-located
with the related development. Local authorities should also be
able to use PGS revenue to support affordable housing where appropriate.
(Paragraph 68)
36. Retaining affordable
housing within the scope of planning obligations is wholly appropriate:
it will serve to ensure that affordable housing has the first
call on any land value uplift and it will provide a means to deliver
sustainable mixed communities. Even so, if the potential for PGS
to increase the supply of affordable housing is to be fully realised,
the Government needs to increase the scope of developments subject
to Section 106 agreements beyond the current limits, to ensure
affordable housing is eligible to benefit from PGS receipts and
to facilitate more local authorities making fully effective use
of planning obligations. (Paragraph 69)
Allocating PGS revenue
37. The
entirety of any surplus after allocations to local authorities
and to strategic infrastructure should also be allocated to development-related
infrastructure and not absorbed into general Government funds.
The local authority distribution formula should allow for an element
of targeting resources to areas of greatest need. It is essential
however, that any targeting is not undertaken to the extent that
it would risk undermining the link between particular developments
and local infrastructure provision. There should be a statutory
undertaking that a majority of PGS revenue is returned to the
local area affected by the development. A clear funding formula
should be used to determine precisely how much revenue is returned
to each local authority. (Paragraph 73)
38. John Healey MP,
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, said that the Government
"would have to find a way, I think, of making sure that [PGS]
operated transparently so that it was obvious to those in any
local authority area what the gains were from any potential development".
We agree. We recommend that the Government also, through transparent
means, make available data enabling comparisons between the hypothetical
benefits that would have accrued in a particular area under Section
106 and that are realised under PGS. (Paragraph 74)
39. We agree with
the Minister in this regard: perverse decision-making for financial
gain is no more likely to occur under a PGS regime than under
current arrangements and that "ultimately, local authorities
have to take responsible decisions in the interests of the whole
community and they are democratically accountable for those decisions
[
] to the extent that sports and recreation ought to be
part of other planning systems and planning strategies".
(Paragraph 75)
Transitional arrangements
40. We
recommend that these arrangements include a short period only
between any announcement that PGS will be introduced and the date
on which the scheme comes into effect, with special transitional
arrangements for those areas committed to a tariff-based model
where a longer timeframe of preparation may be required. All applications
for planning permission made before the announcement should be
exempt from PGS (and subject to the existing range of Section
106 arrangements) regardless of the date of determination. (Paragraph
76)
Impact on the planning system
41. Ensuring
that the scope of scaled-backed Section 106 arrangements is not
subject to the same vagaries of interpretation will be critical
to retaining the credibility of the new tax. We welcome, therefore,
the Government's statement that "the scope of planning obligations
would be defined on a statutory basis". (Paragraph 77)
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