Select Committee on Communities and Local Government Committee Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 208-219)

MR STEWART BASELEY, MR JOHN STEWART AND MR JOHN SLAUGHTER

16 MAY 2006

  Q208 Chair: Can I welcome you to this afternoon's session and ask you to introduce yourselves from the right? When we get into questions I will leave it entirely up to the three of you to decide which one of you responds to individual questions.

  Mr Slaughter: I am John Slaughter, the Director of External Affairs for the Home Builders' Federation.

  Mr Baseley: I am Stewart Baseley, Chairman of the Home Builders' Federation.

  Mr Stewart: John Stewart, Director of Economic Affairs for the Home Builders' Federation.

  Q209 Chair: Can I start by asking whether you would agree that the Planning Gain Supplement proposals are inherently fair in that every developer would pay the same proportion of land value uplift and that it would do away with the lottery of section 106 negotiations?

  Mr Baseley: Perhaps I could answer that by saying that we do inherently agree that if we are going to increase the supply of new homes in the country, which is the Government's fairly ambitious agenda, we have to have an adequate infrastructure to enable those homes to go ahead. It is impossible for us to contemplate increasing house building rates from 150-200,000 homes a year without putting in place a properly thought through infrastructure that will adequately service the needs of the people who will live in those homes. The question you ask as to whether PGS is potentially fairer than the existing section 106 agreements is actually quite a difficult one to give you a completely straight "Yes" or "No" answer to. One of the problems that we have with the whole concept of PGS is whether or not raising revenue to provide infrastructure in a one-size-fits-all approach actually is possible. The reason that I say that is because development sites come in all shapes and sizes across the land with a variety of different issues that are attached to them. Greenfield sites, of which there are very few these days—as you know nearly 70% of all construction that takes place in England is on brownfield land—typically speaking are much easier to figure out how to realise development gain from than some brownfield sites. I guess one of our fundamental concerns is that, as a house builder until just six months ago, so having recently come into this area of life, I know that my experiences were that actually a lot of brownfield sites are very complex, require a high degree of risk taking by the companies that are going to develop them and often, frankly, do not throw up a huge increase in value over their current use value, which can be quite high depending upon what that use is. One of the fundamental concerns we therefore have about this tax is the rate at which it gets potentially set. Our concern would be that if the rate is too high, and we can talk about that in a lot more detail perhaps, the reality is will the tax enable or help to facilitate an increase in the supply of land with planning permission to meet the Government's relatively ambitious house-building targets or is it likely to actually lead to a frustration, a reduction if you will, in the supply of land coming forth. Our own conclusions, as a result of the consultation exercise and the deliberations we went through before we submitted our views back in February, is that it is likely to lead to less land coming through rather than more and, therefore, will not actually assist the Government's housing programme.

  Q210  Chair: Are you making the point that, unless certain changes are made to the detail of the Planning Gain Supplement, it would have those effects or that inherently it would have those effects?

  Mr Baseley: I do not think we know enough about the detail to be able to answer that question honestly either. What we do know is that the current system, the section 106 agreement system which we have had in place for many years, fundamentally is not necessarily a bad system. What has happened over the last several years is that section 106 agreements and the use to which they were put to extract planning gain and development gain from development sites has extended, and the time attached to negotiating section 106 agreements has extended quite substantially. I repeat, I do not think that the section 106 system is necessarily a bad system. It can and does deliver Planning Gain Supplement for developments across the country at the moment. The problem with it is that, as I say, it has extended beyond its original remit.

  Q211  Sir Paul Beresford: Along the same line, this tax is going to be collected nationally and redistributed. If you look at the Government's past performance and habits of redistribution, even the Audit Commission have been a bit concerned about this and the way in which they have taken capital receipts from some councils and distributed them elsewhere, do you have concerns that this sort of thing is not going to happen with this tax?

  Mr Baseley: Yes, we do. Not because we have any particular reason to suppose that what the Government says will not happen, but just because at the moment one of the advantages of the section 106 system is that it is negotiated locally, it is negotiated between the developer and the local people through their representatives, be they officers or councillors in a particular district, and the people, of course, can touch and feel in a very real way the benefits that development might bring to their particular locality. I think we all know that building homes is not that popular amongst certain sections of the population, and there are concerns particularly in the south, about the rate and scale of home building that is being proposed. At the moment it is possible for local residents to identify real and tangible benefits that come from section 106 agreements and contributions that developers make. Clearly one of the concerns we have through the introduction of PGS is that the money, as we understand it, is going to be remitted to the Treasury. The Treasury is going to despatch the majority of it, but we are not quite sure what "the majority of it" actually means, whether that is 51% or 91%, back into the community. We do not know whether that will be back into the local community, back into the regional community or whether, ultimately, cross-subsidisation could occur as certain areas help other areas of the country.

  Q212  Chair: Can we explore that point a bit more later on. Do you think that one effect of the Planning Gain Supplement might be to improve local planning authorities' understanding of "development economics", and would that be helpful?

  Mr Baseley: I think it would always be helpful for local authorities or, indeed, anybody to understand better development economics. I cannot really see an instant answer—my colleagues may have a view on this—whether it is PGS, a tariff system or section 106 agreements that is necessarily going to help local authorities to understand the issues any clearer.

  Mr Slaughter: I think it could possibly do in principle, in the sense that, if a system like Planning Gain Supplement was linked to transparency of information about what infrastructure requirements were and how those related to development, then there may be a case that that could assist with understanding development economics, but I do not think that area has been looked at in any depth so far. It could be an advantage, but I think it is one that probably will be a longer term advantage rather than an immediate one.

  Q213  John Pugh: Seventy per cent of output is currently on brownfield sites, so an appreciable amount of development there. Does that not by itself indicate that there is plenty of profit in developing brownfield sites and that some of your conditions about its capacity to absorb PGS payments are a little overstressed?

  Mr Baseley: I would not pretend for one moment there is not a profit to be made out of developing brownfield sites or greenfield sites or, in fact, other house building or development generally in the UK. It would be a foolish man who sat here and tried to persuade you otherwise. The real question is to what extent the land owner is going to be encouraged or discouraged to bring forward brownfield land, bearing in mind that, as a result of the intensification of brownfield land development over the last 10 years, an awful lot of what you might call the simpler brownfield sites have now been built out and quite a few of the more complex ones, by definition, have been left further behind. I think what I foresee, and, indeed, I am already seeing in some parts of the country, is land owners very concerned about this potential tax, very concerned about the rate at which it could be struck and actually questioning in their own minds whether or not the whole exercise—getting planning permission on a piece of land can be very timely and very expensive, involving lots of consultants and experts that are required to facilitate the development—is actually worthwhile. I think it is a major concern that we have that it is creating uncertainty in the market. Of course the impact of that, potentially, is that already we are beginning to see certain land vendors sitting on their hands and not bringing their land forward whilst this process that we are now all involved in unfolds.

  Mr Slaughter: I was going to add perhaps two other remarks. First, I think it is worth bearing in mind that the proposal the Government has put forward is to increase the overall amount of revenue coming from land uplift. We are talking about a qualitatively different situation in principle to what has existed up to now; so any consideration of the impact on brownfield needs to look at that. The second issue I think that we want to raise in discussing this area is that there is a problem with the volume of land coming through the planning system, it is actually tending to go down rather than increase, and the essential requirement here is that we find a mechanism that will enable the flow of land through the planning system to increase because without that we are not going to be able to meet the housing supply objectives that we share with the Government. I think on both counts one has to be very cautious about saying that there is a significant additional capacity for brownfield development to absorb additional taxation.

  Mr Stewart: Chairman, could I add a comment to that? I think the key variable is the land value that is left there to be taxed, not the profit margin of the development, and that is where our concerns lie. You are quite right; development on brownfield land is profitable, as it is on Greenfield, in many cases. The issue is how much land value is there that can be taxed.

  Q214  John Pugh: Is it quite hard to generalise about brownfield now. Brownfield can be anything from a back garden to a heavily contaminated site. Is that part of the problem, the fact that "brownfield site" is too global a term?

  Mr Baseley: Sure, because back garden developments, frankly, are not terribly different to greenfield developments in lots of cases. They do not have nasty, horrible substances under the ground from factories that existed 150 years ago that have to be removed in a very safe manner, for obvious reasons.

  Q215  John Pugh: Do you need recognition of that factor in how Planning Gain Supplement is pitched, whether or not it is a brownfield or a greenfield site we are talking about, the fact that sites themselves are intrinsically quite variable even though they have the same headline description?

  Mr Baseley: That is one of the difficulties we had when we were producing our submission in deciding whether or not a one-size-fits-all approach was possible.

  Q216  John Pugh: Do you have any other concerns about the operation of the Planning Gain Supplement on brownfield sites apart from the issue of definition and financial viability?

  Mr Stewart: When you say "definition" you mean valuation.

  Q217  John Pugh: Yes.

  Mr Stewart: That is a very complex area. I am not a valuer, but when you talk to valuers and when you talk to the developers who do it day-to-day, it is an extremely complex area. One of the requirements that the Treasury had in mind when it drafted the tax was that it would be simple, and one suspects that when they were drafting it they had a picture in their mind of a greenfield site.

  Q218  John Pugh: Is there anything you could suggest that would make it simpler and less complex?

  Mr Stewart: If you were to adopt a valuation approach, you are going to need a very clear set of rules which are agreed by both the industry and the valuation office, or HMRC, whoever is going to levy the tax, because without an agreed set of rules you can see all sorts of problems, disputes, delays and delays is what we do not want because that will mean a sidestep coming on. The point you made a moment ago about brownfield sites varying is very valid—greenfield and brownfield—across the whole spectrum of sites. Some brownfield sites have a negative land owner and to actually make them develop there is a cost in getting them to that point, right through to some greenfield sites. The Milton Keynes example is an obvious one.

  Q219  John Pugh: With some sites you are actually adding value by building on them?

  Mr Stewart: Indeed, and even greenfield, there is a whole spectrum from a completely unencumbered extension of a settlement where very little infrastructure is required through to our Milton Keynes example, where there are enormous infrastructure costs involved; so it is very difficult to generalise.


 
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