10 Conclusion
126. The Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) is experiencing
change that is unprecedented in its history. Its 'modernisation'
has included a shift from simply reacting to incidents towards
preventing them and planning for them, using a risk-based approach.
We see this shift in emphasis as a positive change, and one that
is already proving its worth as evidenced by continuing reductions
in fire-related deaths. Part of modernisation has involved the
FRS assessing risks locally to enable it to provide locally responsive
services (through the IRMP process). Recent steps toward a regional
approach run the risk of reversing this element of modernisation.
We have not given detailed consideration to the advantages and
disadvantages of further regionalisation of the FRS, but note
that restructuring of the police, and possibly the ambulance services,
has implications for the FRS, in particular the extent to which
it is coterminous with other emergency services. The ODPM claimed
it has no plans to force the FRS to regionalise, whilst simultaneously
stating that coterminosity is Government policy. The lack of coherence
in policy on regionalisation within the ODPM, and across the Government
Departments responsible for the emergency services, has understandably
left some in the FRS confused and concerned.
127. During our inquiry, we found the most controversial
of the current changes facing the FRS to be FiReControl, the project
to create nine Regional Control Centres. It is intended to increase
resilience and efficiency in the way the FRS manages its emergency
response, but has faced significant opposition from within the
FRS. Whilst there is agreement on the aims, many FRAs and FRS
representative bodies have not been able to give their unqualified
support to the project as the best way of achieving those aims.
Whilst there are valid alternative models for control centres,
we accept the ODPM's position that the FiReControl model is based
on the findings of the 2003 Mott MacDonald report, and is a cost-effective
way of achieving a necessary upgrade of control room technology.
But the ODPM has not provided sufficient information, by way of
a full business case or other document, to convince and reassure
the FRS that the project will indeed produce enhanced resilience
and efficiency. Whilst we understand that certain commercial information
may have to be kept confidential, the absence of information about
project specifics, and in particular, the long term financial
implications for FRAs is in our view unacceptable.
128. As with any technological project, FiReControl
carries some high risks. However, we consider the lack of genuine
support from the FRS to be a high risk, and one which the ODPM
is not taking seriously. We are disappointed that the ODPM has
not taken the opportunity, as part of this major re-structuring
of Fire Control Rooms, to further enhance resilience by co-locating
fire control centres with those of the other emergency services.
Furthermore, we are disappointed that the technological upgrade
to be provided by the associated FireLink project does not currently
include an upgrade of fire-ground technology, crucial to both
fire-fighter safety and civil resilience. We urge the Government
to address this gap immediately. This should not however, further
delay the implementation of FireLink, delays to which have already
had major financial implications for some FRAs, particularly in
the South West.
129. Whilst its role and function has changed, the
FRS has been expected to manage its performance effectively, demonstrate
value for money, and enhance the management and development of
its staff. The introduction of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment
(CPA) process should help the FRS to manage its performance more
effectively. In developing an operational assessment to measure
how well the FRS carries out its functions (as opposed to how
well it plans and manages itself) for the CPA it is crucial that
the full range of FRS activity is assessed. This should also be
reflected in the ODPM performance targets, some of which should
be revised. Progress in effective management, particularly relating
to diversity and management of the retained service, has been
worryingly slow. The Government must lead by example by making
diversity and retained issues a high priority.
130. We considered whether there is a risk that the
new duties imposed on the FRS relating to fire prevention and
civil resilience, detract from its primary role in fighting fires.
We did not find this to be the case. Although there is some evidence
that resources are being allocated to fire prevention at the expense
of recruitment, the proven benefit of prevention activity demonstrates
that these resource decisions are justified. Nevertheless, the
Government should closely monitor the impact of resource allocation
through IRMPs, to ensure that the FRS can maintain and improve
its operational capacity for emergency response. The Government
should strengthen the emphasis on prevention by ensuring that
the Building Regulations provide for adequate fire safety measures.
In particular, it should ensure that guidance relating to new
and refurbished schools includes a requirement for sprinkler systems
to be fitted in all cases, not just those where there is particularly
high risk. The potential life-saving benefits far outweigh the
cost of fitting sprinkler systems. We conclude that, despite the
changes the FRS is undergoing, the public can continue to have
confidence in the FRS's capability to respond quickly to incidents.
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