Conclusions and recommendations
Governance and funding arrangements
1. Regional
Management Boards, in the absence of the previously planned regional
assemblies, are a confusing addition to the already complex governance
and structural arrangements for the FRS. The FRS needs certainty
over its future. The mixed messages from the ODPM on regionalisation,
and the lack of consistency between its policy and those of the
Departments responsible for the other emergency services, are
fertile ground for those fearful of a hidden agenda. Further regionalisation
of the FRS should not take place without full consultation with
the relevant stakeholders and clear justification for its aims.
(Paragraph 14)
2. We recommend that
the Government fund fully from central resources any additional
burdens on FRAs imposed as a result of the modernisation agenda
which cannot be met through greater efficiency and other savings.
(Paragraph 15)
3. We recommend that
the Government set a baseline against which the future performance
of FiReBuy can be measured, drawing on international comparisons
as appropriate. The sources for any data used should be clearly
stated. Without such basic information, the Government's assertion
that FiReBuy will result in savings on procurement will remain
untested. (Paragraph 17)
FiReControl: Regional Control Centres
4. We
recommend that the Government clarify the future role of the Interim
National Coordination Centre, in particular in relation to RCCs.
(Paragraph 21)
5. The new technology
that will be provided by FiReControl should allow operators to
mobilise the fire-engine closest to the incident regardless of
which brigade or service it is from, thus mitigating the risks
of coordination across larger areas. (Paragraph 26)
6. We are unconvinced
that the Government can offer the assurance of maintained or improved
service quality resulting from the FiReControl project and there
is clearly widespread doubt across the FRS. If it can, we recommend
it does so, and provides the evidence, immediately. (Paragraph
28)
7. We recommend that
the Government ensure that the location of each RCC meets strict
criteria on resilience. (Paragraph 29)
8. We are disappointed
that the Government is unable to provide fuller details of duties
that have been defined as out of scope. Removing some operations
from control rooms should clearly result in savings in control
room costs, but it is not clear where these operations will be
transferred to, nor how the costs of the transfer and future operations
will be met. There is no evidence to suggest any overall saving.
As a result we, like many within the FRS, do not have full confidence
in the Government's claim that FiReControl will achieve enhanced
efficiency. We recommend that the Government complete its analysis
of control room functions immediately and certainly before making
further progress with the FiReControl project. (Paragraph 33)
9. We recommend that
the 'end to end' testing of the technology include assessments
of the likelihood of total systems failure nationwide. We further
recommend that a resilient disaster recovery plan which addresses
systems failure should be put in place. (Paragraph 37)
10. We agree that
it is difficult for FRAs to have certainty regarding the financial
implications of the move to Regional Control Centres without a
full business case which includes information on what costs will
be borne by whom over what timescale. We recommend that Government
provide a full breakdown of the costs implicit in the FiReControl
project and identify which of these will be met by central Government
and which it expects local authorities and FRSs to meet. Any cost
over-run should be met by central Government. (Paragraph 39)
11. We note that the
Government is consulting on the governance arrangements for RCCs
and recommend that the final outcome, while seeking to achieve
consensus among stakeholders, gives clarity on how FRAs are to
retain their legal responsibilities within a framework giving
clear direction to the RCC. (Paragraph 42)
12. The Government
should provide the FRS with all the non-commercial information
of the latest full business case for FiReControl immediately.
Information on the full business case should follow as soon as
possible consistent with commercial considerations. This will
ensure that the final decision is informed by the knowledge of
those expected to operate within the new structure and help to
build confidence in the new arrangements. (Paragraph 44)
13. We consider that
achieving a common location for command controls for the three
emergency services would facilitate greater collaboration in responding
to incidents. It is disappointing that the Government has missed
the opportunity to further increase resilience through co-location
of control rooms as part of the FiReControl project. (Paragraph
49)
14. The fact that
the FRS has not been given enough information about the detail,
particularly the financial detail, of FiReControl, is at the heart
of the opposition to the project. The absence of information means
that fire authorities and representative bodies cannot give unqualified
support as they are unconvinced that the aims of enhanced resilience
and efficiency will be achieved. There are considerable risks
associated with the project, identified in our evidence and in
the ODPM's own business case. We consider the greatest of these
to be the opposition to the project from the FRS itself. For FiReControl
to have any hope of success, the Government should obtain greater
support from the FRS. This can only be achieved through provision
of greater information on both the project specifics and long-term
plans for the structure of the FRS. The Government should also
better communicate to the FRS that the FiReControl project is
based on the findings of past reviews of the FRS, notably the
2003 Mott MacDonald Report. (Paragraph 50)
FireLink
15. We
welcome the attempts made by the Government to integrate FiReControl
and FireLink, but also note that integration of the two projects
will mean that FireLink will be subject to the same risks as FireControl.
(Paragraph 53)
16. We recommend that
the Government communicate to the FRS the assurance that it gave
us, namely that any additional costs incurred by the FRS as a
result of slippage on the FireLink project will be met by central
Government. (Paragraph 54)
17. It is essential
that the Government learn from the experience of both the FRAs
and other emergency services that have already migrated to the
new technology. This will help to avoid repetition of difficulties
involving technical teething problems and project specifications.
(Paragraph 57)
18. We recommend that
the Government address the need for upgraded fire-ground technology
to enhance resilience and the safety of fire-fighters. This should
be done as part of the FireLink project. (Paragraph 59)
Prevention and risk assessment
19. We
recommend that the impact and adequacy of Integrated Risk Management
Plans is assessed on a nationwide basis. (Paragraph 62)
20. We recommend that
the Government provide guidance to the FRS on priorities between
local and regional planning and stipulates clearly how IRMPs should
reflect those priorities. (Paragraph 63)
21. We recommend that
the Government ensure that, in future, publication of the National
Framework is co-ordinated with FRAs' planning processes. (Paragraph
64)
22. We welcome the
recent announcement that the Government will continue to provide
grant funding to support prevention work until 2008. (Paragraph
65)
23. We welcome the
postponement of the commencement of the Regulatory Reform (Fire
Safety) Order 2006 as a sensible precaution to allow thorough
preparation. We recommend that the Government monitor the implementation
of the Order, and assess its impact on a regular basis. (Paragraph
67)
24. We strongly recommend
that the DfES require sprinkler systems in all new and renovated
schools.
(Paragraph 69)
25. There is no evidence
to suggest that the rescue role of the FRS function has been compromised
by increased emphasis on prevention and risk assessment. If successful,
prevention may lead to further efficiency savings as fewer fires
would need to be attended. We recommend that the Government monitor
the impact of diverting resources to fire prevention on FRS activity
in other areas. (Paragraph 71)
Civil resilience
26. We
recommend that the Government give urgent consideration as to
how the Integrated Risk Management Plans may be better linked
to planning for major catastrophic incidents. (Paragraph 74)
27. We recommend that
the Government conduct a review of civil resilience equipment
requirements across England in light of the experience of the
July 2005 attacks on London. (Paragraph 77)
28. The failure of
Government to include an element of collaboration, or at least
co-location, in its model of Regional Control Centres represents
a missed opportunity for civil resilience. (Paragraph 79)
29. We recommend that
the Government encourage greater use of mutual aid agreements
by FRAs to further enhance resilience. (Paragraph 80)
People management
30. We
consider that it is necessary to make a distinction between uniformed
and non-uniformed staff as the need to increase diversity amongst
non-uniformed staff is less pressing. A diversity target covering
the entire workforce could take the pressure off FRAs to increase
diversity amongst uniformed staff. (Paragraph 86)
31. It is important
that the Government set both national targets and Best Value Performance
Indicators (BVPIs) which are consistent, making it clear exactly
what is required of FRAs. The Government needs to reiterate that
the national target for ethnic minorities relates to the entire
fire service workforce, not just operational uniformed staff.
The national target should be supported by separate BVPIs which
distinguish between uniformed, non-uniformed, operational and
non-operational staff. While it is important that the Government
does not devalue, or appear to devalue, any particular section
of the workforce and that its diversity strategies and targets
apply to every area within the Fire and Rescue Service, the distinction
between uniformed and non-uniformed staff needs to be retained
in order to focus the attention
and activity of FRAs. (Paragraph 87)
32. We recommend that
redundancies should not be contemplated until every avenue for
re-deployment has been explored. (Paragraph 89)
33. We recommend that
in future, a Fire Authority should not receive a Comprehensive
Performance Assessment rating higher than good unless it can demonstrate
that significant progress, in line with any revised Government
targets, has been made on diversity issues generally and within
the workforce in particular. (Paragraph 90)
34. We are disappointed
and dismayed at the lack of progress that has been made on diversity
within the FRS and particularly at the Government's half-hearted
and ineffective leadership on the issue. We recommend that the
Government immediately (i) establish support groups for the Diversity
Happens forum; (ii) re-appoint a national adviser of equality
and diversity for the FRS; and (iii) implement the long-promised
new selection tests for fire-fighters. We further recommend that
the Government conduct a thorough review of its diversity policy
and initiatives relating to the Fire and Rescue Service, reporting
within the next 18 months. We also recommend that the Government,
within two years, publish and promulgate a nationwide strategy
for promoting diversity within the Fire and Rescue Service that
takes into account the experiences and expertise of all stakeholders.
(Paragraph 92)
35. If Retained Liaison
Officers (RLOs) are to have any effect, they must be given adequate
information and training and should consult with colleagues in
the retained service. (Paragraph 95)
36. We recommend the
Government ensure that retained firefighters are recognised as
a vital bridge between the FRS and the communities they serve;
their status should be enhanced by greater involvement in planning
systems, for example with seats on the National Joint Council,
and a clear role in fire planning, particularly in rural areas.
(Paragraph 100)
37. We recommend that
the Government provide a clear indication of the reforms it intends
to be implemented affecting the Retained Service, including target
dates for key benchmarks and completion. (Paragraph 101)
38. The Government
will be consulting on introducing initiatives to improve the quality
of leadership; this should be done sooner rather than later.
(Paragraph 102)
39. We recommend that
the Government regularly review the FRAs' attitude toward the
Integrated Personnel Development System scheme to ensure that
it is not viewed as merely a bureaucratic and burdensome exercise.
(Paragraph 103)
Performance measurement and management
40. We
welcome the introduction of Comprehensive Performance Assessment
for the FRS. We note its usefulness in highlighting areas where
improvements are required. (Paragraph 108)
41. We welcome the
plans for the independent operational assessment of fire authorities
to be carried out next summer. The proposed assessment should
be conducted by the Audit Commission and combined with the current
CPA to minimise the audit burden on FRAs. (Paragraph 109)
42. We recommend that
the Government ensure the CPA inspection process covers all the
activities of the Fire and Rescue Authorities. (Paragraph 111)
43. We recommend that
the Government introduce performance indicators on community fire
safety. (Paragraph 113)
44. We congratulate
the FRS on meeting the PSA target on accidental deaths. This is
clear evidence that the shift to fire prevention is having a positive
impact. The Government should ensure that it identifies the factors
which have an impact on the number of accidental deaths (for example
ethnic and socio-economic background) so that resources can be
appropriately targeted in future. (Paragraph 114)
45. We agree that
the first duty of the FRS should remain providing a response to
fires and civil emergencies. The introduction of a target directly
relating to rescues would not, however, serve a useful purpose.
Measuring performance in such a way could prove misleading because
the number of rescues could decline as a result of earlier warning,
avoiding the need for rescue at all, or, perversely, could increase
as a result of effective fire safety initiatives, such as smoke
alarms.
(Paragraph 115)
Joint working with other emergency services
46. We
are convinced of the life-saving benefit of co-response schemes
and are concerned at the reluctance of some in the FRS to participate
in them. We recommend that the Government, in conjunction with
the Department of Health, develop a national co-response protocol
which includes guidance on how co-response should be paid for.
(Paragraph 123)
47. Given the worries
about the impact of possible boundary changes, we recommend that
the Government commission research into the relationship between
coterminosity and the likely workings of Regional Control Centres.
(Paragraph 125)
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