Annex
THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION'S
COMMENTARY ON
THE ELECTORAL
ADMINISTRATION BILL
INTRODUCTION
1. The Electoral Commission was established
as an independent statutory body five years ago, under the provisions
of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA).
We are accountable to Parliament through the Speaker's Committee
and are responsible for overseeing a number of aspects of the
electoral process: the registration of political parties and third
parties; monitoring and publication of significant donations to
registered political parties; and regulation of national party
spending on election campaigns. Since 2002, the Commission has
been responsible for reviewing local authority boundaries and
implementing changes to promote electoral equality across England
and Wales. The Commission also has a statutory duty to promote
public awareness of our democratic systems, to report on the administration
of every major election, and to keep the legal framework for elections
under review. In parallel with these responsibilities, the Commission
provides guidance to Returning Officers, Electoral Registration
Officers and political parties on electoral law and practice.
2. We welcome the introduction of the Electoral
Administration Bill and are pleased that it would implement many
of our recommendations designed to improve participation and confidence
of our electoral system.
3. However, the Commission believes it is
time to replace the outdated household registration system, which
is open to abuse and error, with a system of full individual registration
that is both desirable in principle and vital as a means of underpinning
the security of postal voting. Modernising our registration system
would not only allow voters to participate with confidence at
elections, it would also be a key step towards achieving the Government's
target of holding an "e-enabled general election sometime
after 2006".
4. We understand and share the Government's
concerns about the need to avoid making the registration process
too difficult for people, especially in the light of problems
with under-registration; and we agree that there is a crucial
balance to be struck between ensuring the security of the voting
system on the one hand, and encouraging access to and participation
in it, on the other. The debate is about where that balance should
be struckthe Commission believes that individuals should
be asked to provide their signature and date of birth at registration,
and that this should be allied with better resourcing of the registration
process and the other measures to encourage registration which
are in the Bill.
5. We are concerned that the suggested experiments
with collecting individual identifiers which the Bill provides
for will not provide permanent safeguards against postal voting
fraud quickly enough, or on a sufficiently wide scale. We also
have a number of concerns regarding the benefits and usefulness
of conducting pilots which are outlined below.
6. The Commission regards individual registration
as a matter of principle as much as practice, and piloting of
a principle only makes sense if there is an up front commitment
to the idea, whilst recognising the need to test the best way
to implement. This is why we currently find it difficult to support
the approach which the Government has suggested without either
an agreement in principle to ultimately move towards individual
registration, or any interim steps to mitigate the risk associated
with postal voting. We also have a number of concerns about the
practicability, purpose and effectiveness of running pilots.
COMMENTARY ON
CLAUSES
Part 1: Co-ordinated on-line record of electors
(CORE)
7. The Commission welcomes provisions within
the Bill to establish a framework for national access to electoral
registers, and agrees that electoral registers should continue
to be compiled and managed locally.
8. Provisions in the Bill would allow more
than one CORE scheme to be in place at the same time. While regional
or sub-national CORE schemes may be helpful in learning lessons
and improving the operation of the system, the Commission expects
that ultimately a national CORE scheme would be maintained by
a single keeper.
9. However, we are concerned that without
the collection of electors' personal identifiers it will be impossible
to accurately identify duplicate registration entries to improve
the accuracy and integrity of the register, one of the main anticipated
benefits of CORE. It would also make it much harder to provide
a secure method of allowing voters to register their details on-line.
Part 2: Registration of electors
Clause 9Registration officers: duty to take
necessary step
10. Providing an exhaustive list of steps
that EROs must undertake to identify potential electors will,
it is hoped, mean that a formal duty will be supported by the
necessary funding. The Commission may also seek to use the proposed
performance standards power to help maximise registration and
participation especially amongst under-registered groups. The
Commission recently delivered a series of successful seminars
for electoral administrators that were designed to help promote
registration among young voters by equipping administrators with
the skills and resources to develop and deliver interactive sessions.
Clause 10Anonymous registration
11. Clause 10 enables people to register,
and vote, without their name and address appearing in the public
register in instances where the ERO decides that their safety
would be at risk.
12. The Commission fully supports the principle
of anonymous registration, and believes that the provisions in
the Bill are a step in the right direction. However, the Commission
holds some concerns over the ability of anonymous registration
to be effectively achieved in the absence of individual registration,
as the continuation of a system of registration based on the household
form presents risks that both existing and would-be registrants'
anonymity may be compromised.
Clause 11Alterations of registers: pending
elections
13. This clause provides for voters to have
the opportunity to register to vote after the formal start of
the election periodup to 11 days before polling day. In
the case of clerical errors and appeal decisions, alterations
may be made on polling day.
14. The Commission considers allowing electors
to register closer to polling day, and specifically after an election
has been called, an essential measure in both encouraging registration
and promoting participation in the electoral process.
Part 3: Anti-fraud measures
Clauses 13 and 14Registration: personal identifiers
15. These clauses make provision for an
obligation to provide personal identifiers when registering to
vote. However, the Commission is disappointed that there is as
yet no clear commitment to introducing these urgently needed provisions
on a permanent, nationwide basis. Indeed, the Commission would
support the immediate commencement of clauses 13 and 14.
16. Our Summary Statement explains our position
in more detail.
Clauses 15 and 16Personal identifiers: piloting
and evaluation of personal identifier pilots
17. The Bill makes provision for the piloting
of personal identifiers to be provided when registering to vote
in some areas of Great Britain. This provision falls short of
a commitment to implement full individual registration throughout
Great Britain, which the Commission believes is right in principle,
as well as necessary to counter the risk of postal vote fraud.
On a more practical level, we have a number of other concerns
regarding the piloting provisions.
Outside the pilot areas, postal voting
will still be available without an adequate system of security
checks. Without full individual registration, it is hard to see
how the real and immediate concerns which people have about the
security of the postal voting system can be properly addressed.
The public opinion research we conducted during and after the
2005 general election found that while postal voting was the voting
method of choice for many people, 46% considered it to be unsafe
from fraud or abuse. For the first time, we found more people
rating postal voting as unsafe than rating it safe. Even among
those who actually chose to vote by post, a fifth rated the method
as unsafe.
There has been no commitment that
following the pilots full individual registration will be introduced
across Great Britain. As such, postal voting at the next General
Election could still take place under a system which lacks the
security that individual registration provides. Specifically,
we question how the introduction of individual identifiers in
what may be a piecemeal fashion will help assess the impact on
registration rates, its effect on participation, or how it will
help counter fraud.
Piloting reliant on applications
from local authorities may result in scattered pilots which will
fail to provide a sufficient evidence base or a necessary scale
to allow the Commission, and local authorities, to run effective
public awareness campaignswhich our experience in Northern
Ireland suggests are crucial to the successful introduction of
such a change. Additionally, staff training, data-matching and
data-sharing arrangements are necessary to effectively support
to the change programme are likely to be far more difficult to
implement for a series of scattered pilots.
We question the need for further
piloting given the lessons that have been learnt from Northern
Ireland. We should build on this experience and provide a platform
of shared standards in promoting electoral integrity across the
United Kingdom.
Piloting individual registration
will do nothing to counter fraud or increase participation. Fraudsters
would be unlikely to attempt to commit fraud in pilot areas. For
the duration of any pilots (ie from now to 2008) the Commission
would therefore remain concerned about the lack of what we see
as key safeguards against postal voting fraud.
18. As stated above, the Commission believes
that the best time to introduce a significant change to the registration
process is as far as possible ahead of major election. Making
the change in one move now would give time for the changes to
bed down, voters to get used to the new process and any initial
drop in registration rates to be reversed. Even if pilots were
to start in 2006, continuing in 2007 (with evaluation taking account
of the election period in 2008) this leaves us in a very precarious
position in implementing the changes nationwide ahead of a possible
2009 general election.
19. Finally, we would also point to the
experiences of Northern Ireland where an initial drop in registration
rates reflected not only an increase in the accuracy and integrity
of the electoral register, but also the removal of duplicate entries.
The register now has more accurate entries than were the case
under household registration.
Clause 18Offences as to false registration
information
20. Clause 18 makes provision to extend
section 13(D) of the 1983 Act, which established an offence in
Northern Ireland of providing false information in an application
for registration whether made during the canvass or under rolling
registration, to the whole of the UK. The offence is also amended
by clause 18 so that it will be an offence to provide false information
for "any purposes connected with the registration of electors".
As it has effect in Great Britain the offence will also cover
false information provided in respect of applications for absent
votes.
21. The Commission strongly supports the
introduction of stronger deterrents against electoral fraud through
the introduction of new elections offences relating to the provision
of false registration information.
Part 4: Review of polling places
Clause 19Review of polling places
22. This clause makes provision for a requirement
to be imposed on local authorities to review the accessibility
of all polling stations in their area over a four-year period.
The Commission believes this measure will work to improve the
accessibility of polling places for all electors (particularly
disabled electors) by imposing an obligation on local authorities
to review polling stations in accordance with a set timeframe.
We support this provision and will continue to provide guidance,
drafted in co-operation with organisations representing disabled
people, to assist local authorities in this important task.
Part 5: Standing for election
Clause 20Minimum age
23. The Commission welcomes the provision
to amend the minimum age of candidature from 21 to 18 for all
UK elections, and hopes this measure will work to encourage further
participation in the electoral process.
Clause 22Nomination procedures and Clause
23Description of independent candidates
24. Clauses 22 and 23 make provision for
a number of changes, recommended by the Commission, designed to
make the nomination process fairer and more accessible. These
changes include:
allowing deposits to be paid using
credit or debit cards;
allowing the correction of minor
errors on nomination papers by the Returning Officer;
providing a 24-hour period for checking
nominations after the close of poll; and
providing for independent candidates
to stand under descriptions of up to six words on the ballot paper.
25. Part 5 also provides for reducing the
threshold for forfeiture of deposits. We recommended that deposits
for candidates should be standardised at £500 and that the
threshold for forfeiture should be reduced from 5% to 2%. We believe
that candidates should be able to take part in the electoral process
without having to meet substantial financial costs at the outset.
The difficulty with the current deposit system is that it may
deter independent candidates and those from smaller parties who
have a valuable contribution to make in encouraging participation
and interest in the political process. However, we note the points
made by Members in the course of the debate on the Second Reading
of the Bill.
Part 6: Conduct of elections
Clause 25Use of candidates' common names
26. The Commission is concerned that the
provision to allow for the use of common surnames, in addition
to allowing the use of common forenames, could lead to the confusion
(or offence) through the use of abbreviated or alias names. We
are of the opinion that the use of common first names only should
be permitted on ballot papers. For example, the Bill provides
for James Smith to appear on the ballot paper as Tony Blair by
stating that he is commonly known by this name.
Clauses 27-29Election expenses
27. Clause 27 allows for third parties campaigning
in respect of particular candidates to spend up to specified sums
on public meetings and displays, and on issuing advertisements,
circulars or publications. Previously they had been unable to
incur any expenditure on these forms of campaigning.
28. Clause 28 amends the provisions relating
to candidates' election expenditure returns. The new provisions
allow greater flexibility in respect of the content and format
of the return.
29. Clause 29 makes provision for a standardised
four month regulated period for the election expenditure of candidates,
and introduces Schedule 4A of the RPA 1983 which makes provision
for a list of items that qualify (and do not qualify) as candidates'
election expenditure. Currently the regulated period varies between
three and six weeks. The four month period, which we recommended
is in response to concerns raised by political parties, during
the Commission's consultation in 2002, that spending was taking
place outside the new regulated period, but close enough to be
in effect part of the campaign. While this means that for non-fixed
term elections the controlled period will start before the election
is announced, this is in line with controls on political parties
who are subject to campaign spending limits before a general election
is announced.
Clause 31Observation of procedures and working
practices
30. The Commission believes that opening
up the electoral process to observers will facilitate evaluation
of our electoral processes and provide opportunities for international
electoral practitioners and experts to share knowledge. As such
we welcome the introduction of these provisions within the Bill.
Clauses 34 and 35Translation etc of certain
documents and Assistance for certain postal voters
31. These clauses make provisions for improving
the availability and accessibility of information to assist members
of the public to vote. The Commission is pleased to see the introduction
of the measures which will improve the accessibility of the voting
process, particularly for those voters with specific access needs.
We will assist Returning Officers in this task by providing standard
translations and advice on formats and dissemination methods.
Clause 37Undue influence
32. The Commission has previously recommended
that the law on undue influence should be revised to clarify the
nature of the offence, and put forward the view that it should
not be necessary to prove that the intended effects of the defendant's
conduct have occurred. As such the Commission welcomes the amendments
to the offence provided within clause 37 which address the Commission's
concerns in this area.
Clause 38Offences relating to applications
for postal and proxy votes
33. Voting fraudulently is already an offence,
but currently there is no specific electoral offence of fraudulently
applying for a postal vote. The Commission considers the introduction
of such an offence essential as part of a package of measures
to improve the security of postal voting. The Commission hopes
that this new offence, with appropriate publicity surrounding
its availability and use, will have a deterrent value, and will
help to encourage greater public confidence in the system.
However, without a requirement for electors
to provide personal identifiers on postal vote applications and
powers for Electoral Registration Officer to check against identifiers,
it will be harder to detect fraudulent applications before an
election. Although this new offence is welcomed, it would not
protect innocent electors from being dis-enfranchised by fraudsters.
Part 7: Regulation of parties
34. Part 7 of the Bill make provision for
amendments to the framework provided by the Political Parties,
Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), including:
In addition to their registered party
name, registered parties will now be able to register up to five
descriptions with the Commission. Candidates standing on behalf
of a registered party will only be able to stand under the party
name or a registered party description on the ballot paper (clause
46).
A duty for the Commission to remove
parties from the register where they fail to submit their annual
confirmations within a specified period after the statutory deadline
(clause 49).
Increase in the time limit for parties
and accounting units with an annual income of less than £250,000
to deliver their statements of accounts to the Commission from
three to four months (clause 52).
Exemption for parties that have submitted
four consecutive nil donation returns from requirements to submit
further returns, until such time that they receive a reportable
donation (clause 54).
The abolition of section 68 of PPERA
which requires donors to report multiple small donations (of £200
or less which in aggregate exceed £5,000) to the Commission
(clause 55).
35. Together with clauses 27-29 (election
expenses), we welcome these provisions, which amend financial
controls and reporting requirements placed on candidates and third
parties, and consider that such measures will work to reduce the
administrative burdens placed on political parties, candidates
and others, whilst still maintaining the necessary transparency
and accountability.
36. The Commission does however believe
that the Bill provides an opportunity for the introduction of
further measures to improve PPERA. For example; the exemption
of holders of relevant elective office from the requirement to
report donations to the Commission under Schedule 7 of PPERA,
as well as to their relevant standards bodies would remove a duplicated
reporting regime and remove an unnecessary administrative burden
on those required to submit returns. Additionally, we would wish
to see the power to remove parties from the register expanded
to cover non-submission of donation returns and statements of
accounts.
Part 8: Miscellaneous
Clause 61Performance of local authorities
in relation to elections etc
37. This clause provides the Commission
with a power to develop and set, through consultation with the
Secretary of State, standards by which the performance of local
authorities might be measured in respect of their administration
of elections and referendums. The Commission will consult widely,
including with political parties and elected members, in setting
both the framework and the standards themselves.
38. While the Commission welcomes the introduction
of performance standards for electoral officials, in order to
secure more consistency in the way elections are administered,
we are very concerned that the Bill currently excludes the application
of this clause to Northern Ireland by virtue of clause 70. The
Commission, while recognising the particular circumstances of
Northern Ireland, remains firmly of the view that the introduction
of performance standards for electoral services should be UK-wide
to ensure equality of service delivery for all electors.
Clause 63Encouraging electoral participation
39. Clause 63 gives legal powers to returning
officers and electoral registration officers to encourage participation
by electors in the electoral process. The Commission is strongly
supportive of such measures and welcomes the clarification this
clause provides in respect of the role of electoral officials
in encouraging participation. We also welcome the Government's
commitment to provide additional funding, and will of course work
with the Government and electoral officials to improve the quality
of information being provided, as well as the quantity.
Clause 64Time limit for prosecutions
40. The Commission supports the introduction
of this clause, which enables magistrates' courts (in England
and Wales) to extend the time limit for the commencement of public
prosecutions by up to 12 months, giving prosecutors up to two
years to launch a prosecution from the date on which the offence
was committed.
Schedule 1
41. The Commission has concerns regarding
the provisions requiring voters to sign for ballot papers in polling
stations. Elections staff should be empowered to confirm the date
of birth of a voter, or require any other piece of identification
that can be checked against details collected at registration.
We would question the workability and practicability of introducing
such a measure in the absence of any identifier provided at registration
to check against. Additionally, it may not only increase the perception
that voting in polling stations is unsafe, but also may raise
undue concerns about the privacy and secrecy of the voting process.
The Electoral Commission
October 2005
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