Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Supplementary evidence submitted by David Monks, Chairman, Electoral Matters Panel, the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives and Senior Managers (SOLACE)

  Further to my evidence at the Select Committee hearing I did mention the proposal put forward by colleagues in London concerning a new method of dealing with postal votes. I am pleased to attach a document which explains this process.

SECURITY OF POSTAL VOTING

  Possible amendment to provisions proposed in the Electoral Administration Bill and the concurrently announced secondary legislation.

BACKGROUND

  Security remains an issue, in terms of registration, postal voting and, through media speculation, voting in person at a polling station.

  The Commission's report published mid-October flags the lack of confidence in postal voting amongst the electorate at large and particularly amongst some age groups etc.

  The law does not currently require voters to present a poll card, either at a polling station or to accompany a postal vote application.

  An issue for many parts of London is the number of houses in multiple occupation (HMOs) and apartments etc with security-controlled access. Being in possession of one electoral document sent out by post cannot always be assumed to prove the individual's identity.

ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION BILL ETC

ID

  The Bill paves the way for individual registration with personal identifiers, including signatures, dates of birth and other items. An individual's signature may vary according to where they write it, the pen they use and individual idiosyncracy.

  These individual identifiers will be used for the application for a postal vote and the postal voting statement to accompany the returned postal ballot paper envelope. This aims to demonstrate that the person applying—and voting—is (or knows more than the name of) the person whom they purport to be.

  The process of checking signatures at the opening of postal votes (against registration records or postal vote applications)—whether generally, or simply on challenge by an election or other agent—would be inordinately time-consuming and appear to invite challenge because of the real likelihood of dissimilar signatures.

Security markings

  The EA Bill proposes to provide an option to replace serial numbers on ballot papers with bar-codes or other security markings to improve security, facilitate tracking, checking etc.

  Just as the serial number of the ballot paper is now recorded on the ballot paper, counterfoil and also, for postal votes, on the postal voting statement and the ballot paper envelope, so the bar-code would have to replace it in each place.

Application for postal vote

  EROs will have to send each elector a notification that s/he is entitled to a postal vote at the forthcoming election.

Content of poll cards

  The Bill also provides for ROs to send all electors a poll card, stating the type of vote the elector has—postal, proxy or in person. [ie different types of poll card required]

PROPOSAL

  Security and public confidence would be enhanced if administrative arrangements were aligned around the checking of matching bar-codes for each individual elector printed on:

    —    the notification letter to an elector that his/her postal vote application is approved;

    —    the (pre-poll) poll card;

    —    the postal voting (security) statement; and

    —    the ballot paper return envelope (ideally, this would be visible through the window of the outer envelope to assist scanning upon receipt and before "opening").

  The ballot paper itself, if bar-coded, could of course have a different bar-code in order to preserve the secrecy of the ballot.

  The return of a postal vote without a matching notification letter or poll card would cause the vote to be rejected. Loss of one of the accompanying documents would require the elector to deliver the postal vote to a polling station in the constituency/borough or the RO's office and sign a postal voters list with their individual identifiers and register number before the postal vote was accepted and bagged for transfer to the count.

  The aim, at the opening of postal votes, is not to re-confirm the entitlement to vote (this would have been done at the point of application), but to check that the person returning the postal vote is the same person who applied for—and was sent—the notification letter.

  The procedure would, therefore, be as follows:

  1.  Any elector who wishes applies for postal vote, using their individual identifiers of signature and date of birth, whether for all elections or the next election only. This could be at first/renewal registration or on separate application.

  2.  Notification sent by ERO to each elector whose applications has been approved. This would be bar-coded by reference to the elector's register number.

  3.  Poll cards could be bar-coded by register number either to all electors or solely to those who had been registered for a postal or postal proxy vote (each bar-code matching those used on the notification letter).

  4.  Postal votes despatched to electors (or proxies) registered to vote by post at that election. The postal voting statement and the ballot paper return envelope to be bar-coded in matching fashion to the notification letter and poll card.

  5.  Elector or postal proxy returns postal ballot paper in bar-coded return envelope, with bar-coded statement and either bar-coded notification letter or bar-coded poll card.

  6.  Upon return to RO, the return envelope and accompanying documents are scanned to ensure match. If no match or document missing, the postal vote is rejected.

  7.  If the voter misplaces the notification letter and poll card before returning the postal ballot paper, s/he may attend a polling station on the day of the poll, sign the postal votes list in person and then deposit the postal ballot paper envelope with the presiding officer.

  This process will not address a situation where an elector voluntarily surrenders their postal ballot paper and other bar-coded documentation to another person, whether or not they have already voted.

  The success of the proposal is subject to human error, both at the local authority's end and on the voter's part.

  The process is reliant, to avoid disenfranchising anyone, on an efficient service to deliver at least two pieces of mail to every postal voter.

Anthony Mayer

Chief Executive

Greater London Authority

December 2005





 
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