Supplementary evidence submitted by David
Monks, Chairman, Electoral Matters Panel, the Society of Local
Authority Chief Executives and Senior Managers (SOLACE)
Further to my evidence at the Select Committee
hearing I did mention the proposal put forward by colleagues in
London concerning a new method of dealing with postal votes. I
am pleased to attach a document which explains this process.
SECURITY OF
POSTAL VOTING
Possible amendment to provisions proposed in
the Electoral Administration Bill and the concurrently announced
secondary legislation.
BACKGROUND
Security remains an issue, in terms of registration,
postal voting and, through media speculation, voting in person
at a polling station.
The Commission's report published mid-October
flags the lack of confidence in postal voting amongst the electorate
at large and particularly amongst some age groups etc.
The law does not currently require voters to
present a poll card, either at a polling station or to accompany
a postal vote application.
An issue for many parts of London is the number
of houses in multiple occupation (HMOs) and apartments etc with
security-controlled access. Being in possession of one electoral
document sent out by post cannot always be assumed to prove the
individual's identity.
ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION
BILL ETC
ID
The Bill paves the way for individual registration
with personal identifiers, including signatures, dates of birth
and other items. An individual's signature may vary according
to where they write it, the pen they use and individual idiosyncracy.
These individual identifiers will be used for
the application for a postal vote and the postal voting statement
to accompany the returned postal ballot paper envelope. This aims
to demonstrate that the person applying—and voting—is
(or knows more than the name of) the person whom they purport
to be.
The process of checking signatures at the opening
of postal votes (against registration records or postal vote applications)—whether
generally, or simply on challenge by an election or other agent—would
be inordinately time-consuming and appear to invite challenge
because of the real likelihood of dissimilar signatures.
Security markings
The EA Bill proposes to provide an option to
replace serial numbers on ballot papers with bar-codes or other
security markings to improve security, facilitate tracking, checking
etc.
Just as the serial number of the ballot paper
is now recorded on the ballot paper, counterfoil and also, for
postal votes, on the postal voting statement and the ballot paper
envelope, so the bar-code would have to replace it in each place.
Application for postal vote
EROs will have to send each elector a notification
that s/he is entitled to a postal vote at the forthcoming election.
Content of poll cards
The Bill also provides for ROs to send all electors
a poll card, stating the type of vote the elector has—postal,
proxy or in person. [ie different types of poll card required]
PROPOSAL
Security and public confidence would be enhanced
if administrative arrangements were aligned around the checking
of matching bar-codes for each individual elector printed on:
— the notification letter to an
elector that his/her postal vote application is approved;
— the (pre-poll) poll card;
— the postal voting (security)
statement; and
— the ballot paper return envelope
(ideally, this would be visible through the window of the outer
envelope to assist scanning upon receipt and before "opening").
The ballot paper itself, if bar-coded, could
of course have a different bar-code in order to preserve the secrecy
of the ballot.
The return of a postal vote without a matching
notification letter or poll card would cause the vote to be rejected.
Loss of one of the accompanying documents would require the elector
to deliver the postal vote to a polling station in the constituency/borough
or the RO's office and sign a postal voters list with their individual
identifiers and register number before the postal vote was accepted
and bagged for transfer to the count.
The aim, at the opening of postal votes, is
not to re-confirm the entitlement to vote (this would have been
done at the point of application), but to check that the person
returning the postal vote is the same person who applied for—and
was sent—the notification letter.
The procedure would, therefore, be as follows:
1. Any elector who wishes applies for postal
vote, using their individual identifiers of signature and date
of birth, whether for all elections or the next election only.
This could be at first/renewal registration or on separate application.
2. Notification sent by ERO to each elector
whose applications has been approved. This would be bar-coded
by reference to the elector's register number.
3. Poll cards could be bar-coded by register
number either to all electors or solely to those
who had been registered for a postal or postal proxy vote (each
bar-code matching those used on the notification letter).
4. Postal votes despatched to electors (or
proxies) registered to vote by post at that election. The postal
voting statement and the ballot paper return envelope to be bar-coded
in matching fashion to the notification letter and poll card.
5. Elector or postal proxy returns postal
ballot paper in bar-coded return envelope, with bar-coded statement
and either bar-coded notification letter or bar-coded
poll card.
6. Upon return to RO, the return envelope
and accompanying documents are scanned to ensure match. If no
match or document missing, the postal vote is rejected.
7. If the voter misplaces the notification
letter and poll card before returning the postal ballot paper,
s/he may attend a polling station on the day of the poll, sign
the postal votes list in person and then deposit the postal ballot
paper envelope with the presiding officer.
This process will not address a situation
where an elector voluntarily surrenders their postal ballot paper
and other bar-coded documentation to another person, whether or
not they have already voted.
The success of the proposal is subject
to human error, both at the local authority's end and on the voter's
part.
The process is reliant, to avoid disenfranchising
anyone, on an efficient service to deliver at least two pieces
of mail to every postal voter.
Anthony Mayer
Chief Executive
Greater London Authority
December 2005
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