Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-30)

RT HON LORD PHILLIPS OF WORTH MATRAVERS AND JUDGE PETER HURST

6 DECEMBER 2005

  Q20  Dr Whitehead: So in terms of making sure that that regulation goes hand in hand with expanding services, could one, for example, provide means to cap legal costs to ensure proportionality of legal costs under CFA?

  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers: Capping legal costs is something that certainly could be done by regulation or by statute. It is something that can be done by the judges if an application is made at an early stage.

  Q21  Dr Whitehead: What discretion does the judge actually have in that respect?

  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers: I think this is just the moment for me to pass the ball to Peter Hurst because this is just the kind of thing he does.

  Judge Hurst: Section 51 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 gives the court full power in relation to costs, and that power was interpreted as giving the power to make a costs capping order in the organ retention litigation which is reported as AB and Others v Leeds Teaching Hospital. Mr Justice Gage in that case was persuaded that he had the power to make a cost-capping order and, as far as I know, that was the first time that power was used. It was subsequently used in the Ledward group litigation. Mr Ledward was a consultant who was alleged to have assaulted a number of his patients and they, having recovered damages, brought a subsequent action against the hospital authority for negligence in not controlling the activities of their consultant, and the NHS LA were very concerned about the level of the costs and Mrs Justice Hallett, as she then was, was again persuaded to make a cost-capping order. In a more recent case, King v Telegraph Group Ltd, which was a defamation case, there was an application for a cost-capping order but it was only made two weeks before trial, and Lord Justice Brooke, with whom the other members of the court agreed, refused to make such an order but in so doing he confirmed that what the two first instance judges had done in those other two cases was permitted by the Act and the Rules.

  Q22  Dr Whitehead: There is however an issue, I think, of the whole taking root of uplifts in terms of uplifts being charged in order to take account of the fact that the costs may not be recoverable by a lawyer if they lose the case. Are there mechanisms or should there be mechanisms to ensure that those uplifts are actually proportionate to the risks?

  Judge Hurst: Yes, there is a mechanism. The lawyer, when taking on the client and signing the client up to the CFA, has to explain to the client what it involves, and also has to prepare a risk assessment at that time, because it is very easy at the end of a case to look back and think it was actually a very easy case or a very difficult case, but the lawyers have to enter into these agreements at an early stage and so they have to record their risk assessment. At the end of the case, if the costs are not agreed, the matter is assessed by judges like me up and down the country, district judges and cost judges, and there may be tremendous arguments about the level of the success fee and the costs judge has really a very difficult task because he or she has to put himself or herself in the position of that solicitor right at the beginning of the action and say, "Was this a reasonable and proportionate figure to arrive at?" So there is that control. If I can put this rider on it, it is very difficult at the end of the case to actually control the costs that have already been spent and so, as Lord Phillips has said, there is the cost-capping power, which is not extensively used at the moment but I suspect it will be. In the more expensive cases there is that power which would control costs from the outset. The difficulty with cost-capping is, like everything else in the law, it is extremely expensive and so for modest claims, it is really not a sensible option.

  Q23  Dr Whitehead: Is there not a sense though that the culture of uplifts could be in danger of becoming something like a general tax on the whole method of doing things and as such, perhaps beyond the mechanisms that you have described in order to maintain proportionality?

  Judge Hurst: Yes. You say the culture of uplifts. This is the system we have of access to justice. We used to have Legal Aid; now essentially in personal injury we do not have that. Liability insurers are now finding that they have to pay not just the base costs, not just the damages, but also the uplift, which can be up to 100%, and probably an after-the-event insurance premium, so the liability insurer's expenditure has gone up significantly. The way they deal with that, obviously, is by adjusting the premiums, so there may very well be a knock-on effect. I am not in a position to give you figures but there may well be a knock-on effect.

  Q24  Chairman: If that is what the liability insurers do, does that mean that, in the absence of Legal Aid, you have lost the mechanism that would otherwise drive down costs and discourage cavalier costs in the form of either excess fees or unnecessary processes and disbursements?

  Judge Hurst: No, I do not think so. The Woolf reforms, the Civil Procedure Rules, are designed to prevent those sorts of abuses, and my perception is that they work extremely well in that regard. The Legal Aid system—and it still exists in part—is very strictly controlled and solicitors are quite simply not allowed to run up enormous bills, and the case management powers of the court are such that the court can control what the parties do. You may be familiar with the overriding objective of the Rules, which is that the case is dealt with justly, which includes dealing with it proportionately. That objective overrides the whole of the Rules, so every aspect of litigation is governed by that objective.

  Q25  Jessica Morden: Do you think that the media are disproportionately disadvantaged by people using CFAs in libel and privacy cases because of the costs involved?

  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers: I think there can be a real problem. The problem arises in part because the costs of defamation actions seem to be so enormous, for a start. There are some claimants' solicitors who are prepared to undertake to act in defamation actions on a conditional fee basis, with uplift. Defamation actions are quite speculative, and if you are giving an uplift that reflects the risk, it may be quite considerable. If they do not take out after-the-event insurance, and the litigant himself has no significant means, the publisher who is being sued is on the horns of a dilemma. If he fights the case and wins, he will have incurred very substantial costs and will not be able to recover them. It may be cheaper to settle at the outset, even if he thinks he has a strong case, and so there is I think a potential problem there. I am not sure that it would be solved by saying the claimant must take out after-the-event insurance against the risk of losing, thereby in effect ensuring that the defendant will get his costs if he wins, because the premium for such insurance cover would again be enormous and I suspect the publishers, when they lost, would be complaining at the quite inordinate, they would say, bill of costs that they were then called upon to pay.

  Q26  Jessica Morden: In a recent judgment, the House of Lords made reference to the possibility of primary legislation. Do you think that would be a way forward or do you have any other suggestions to help solve the situation?

  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers: The law lords in that case drew attention to this problem. It is not a problem that it is very easy to solve if you are going to have access to justice for a claimant who has been defamed who does not have much money. It is not easy to work out a system which will ensure access to justice for that claimant without exposing the defendant to a situation where he may not be able to recover the costs. Who is going to pay the costs if the claimant fails?

  Q27  Chairman: You have referred to the potentially very high costs in defamation actions. Is that not an illustration that the mechanisms that Judge Hurst described as perhaps working in other areas of the law just do not work here and the cash register just rings up and up as those practising in the area know that they can charge more and more?

  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers: The remedy must be to apply at an early stage for a cap on the costs.

  Q28  Chairman: There is an issue here, is there not, particularly for smaller periodicals and perhaps regional publications, that the ability to engage in investigative journalism could be severely circumscribed?

  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers: There is an issue here. Of course, defamation is one area where there never was Legal Aid.

  Q29  Chairman: That makes me ask the question really. Is that a reason that there has not been anything else to hold down the costs?

  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers: I do not know. I think in the past you very often had libel actions in which each side was quite well-heeled. There are small publishers but there are also big publishers, newspaper magnates, and very often a defamation action would be by a claimant who had no difficulty in finding the costs because otherwise he would not be suing. He could not get Legal Aid, he could not agree no win, no fee because that was unlawful, so if you had a claimant it must be somebody who had quite a lot of money to fund the litigation, therefore he would probably have the money to meet the costs of the defendant if the claim failed. The difference now is that the claimant can get support on a no-win, no-fee basis.

  Q30  Barbara Keeley: Lord Phillips, moving on to the NHS Redress Bill, obviously, as it is currently drafted, do you think it will achieve its aim of removing people from the court process?

  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers: The Bill really does no more than open the door to an alternative scheme to litigation. It builds in the possibility of safeguard for the claimant in the form of some kind of impartial legal advice being provided. I believe that it ought to be possible for hospitals to run a scheme which will encourage those who have claims against them to negotiate and to settle them without expensive litigation.

The Committee suspended from 5.12 pm to 5.36 pm for a fire alarm





 
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