UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 837-xxiv

HOUSE OF COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

taken before the

COMMITTEE

on the

CROSSRAIL BILL

DAY TWENTY-FOUR

Tuesday 18 April 2006

Before:

Mr Alan Meale, in the Chair

Mr Brian Binley

Mr Philip Hollobone

Kelvin Hopkins

Mrs Siân C James

Sir Peter Soulsby

 

Ordered: that Counsel and Parties be called in.

6645. CHAIRMAN: Today the Committee will continue hearing the Petitions relating to the Residents' Society of Mayfair and then we will hear the case of Antique Hypermarket Limited, Dystopia Limited and the Regent Street Association. First of all, an apology: counsel will see that we are not currently working on Commons time but we are having to work on Lords time, which is considerably slower. Counsel, is there anything - before we return to Mr Pugh-Smith - you want to tell us?

6646. MS LIEVEN: Only to mention, sir, that we have been informed that Dystopia have withdrawn their Petition, so we shall not be hearing from them this afternoon.

6647. CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr Pugh-Smith, do you want to call your second witness?

6648. MR PUGH-SMITH: Good afternoon, sir. My next witness is Mr Michael Schabas.

 

MR MICHAEL HUNTLY SCHABAS, Sworn

Examined by MR PUGH-SMITH

6649. MR PUGH-SMITH: Can I also confirm that you have the bundle of exhibits, which have been distributed on the last occasion, to hand? There is a thick and a thin bundle. Most of the exhibits are in slide form, which Mr Schabas will refer to. Mr Schabas, can I ask you to introduce yourself to the Committee and briefly explain your background and qualifications please?

(Mr Schabas) Thank you, yes. My name is Michael Schabas. I have 25 years' experience working in the railway business and in projects - planning, design and operation. I have a Masters Degree in Transport Planning from the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University and I have worked on rail projects in the United States, Canada, Australia and Britain. I am a director of companies that carry passengers and freight trains in Britain and in Sweden and Norway, and have been in Australia as well. Some of my experience is particularly relevant, I think. I planned and promoted the Jubilee Line Extension on behalf of the Canary Wharf developers, I worked extensively on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Bill and I was retained by the Department for Transport in 1992 to review the Crossrail scheme, which was actually then before the House as well. I have set out in exhibit 1 a full CV with further details of my experience for the Committee.

6650. On what basis do you appear before the Committee today?

(Mr Schabas) I am here in my own right; I am not representing any of the companies that I am involved in but on behalf of the residents of Mayfair and St James.

6651. Mr Schabas, what I would like you to do now is if you could kindly outline briefly the issues that you wish to talk to the Committee about.

(Mr Schabas) I think my evidence will show that the Promoters and their agents, Cross London Rail Links Limited, have not seriously considered alternatives to the safeguarded route between Paddington and Liverpool Street. They have considered alternatives only superficially and only in order to discard them. They have spent five years and more than £150 million of taxpayers' money to promote the scheme but they have always been in such a hurry to get shovels into the ground that they have cut corners on the planning and alternatives analysis process. My experience on other rail projects is that if you rush the preliminaries you have to pay back for it later with interest. If the railway is not designed carefully it may not achieve the stated objectives, it will cost more than promised and will not attract the expected passenger volumes. Sometimes you have serious cost overruns; sometimes you have to make very expensive changes to make it work operationally and I have actually been involved in some situations where that has happened - several unfortunately. Fortunately, there are checks and balances in the system and obviously one of those checks and balances is that designed schemes often do not get funded or built - even sometimes after powers are obtained. On this point I have a bit of a sense of déjà vu; the last time - I think it may have been in this room - that I sat here as a witness was in 1994, giving evidence on behalf of the King's Cross Residents' Association, who are, I should say here in case there is any doubt, an equally respectable group of people as the Mayfair residents, and their neighbourhood was entirely blighted by the Kings Cross project that British Rail was promoting to build an expensive underground terminal for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link at a cost of about £1 billion. I suggested that instead you could come round the back and use the St Pancras station, which was mostly empty at the time. I have to say the Committee did not appear to take much notice of what I said - it was a Lords Committee, though, so that might explain some of it. British Rail, at the top level, did not take any notice but the Department for Transport took a great deal of interest and John Prideaux who was in charge of the project took a great deal of interest, and I worked with him inside, effectively, British Rail - Union Railways - I should say with people like Bernard Gambrill, over there, looking at alternatives and I think you know that it is St Pancras that is now being built as the new terminus.

6652. Mr Schabas, what I would like you to do, if you would, is explain briefly how, in your own words, the safeguarded route came to be identified.

(Mr Schabas) Sure. I go back to 1988, actually when I first came to this country - when I first came to live permanently, the economy was booming and the Government established a Central London rail study. They said "Find a route across London for a railway". Halcrow was given the job and identified in about six weeks the route that pretty much you have before you now, from Paddington to Liverpool Street. They were very proud of it because they said they had found a route from Paddington to Liverpool Street that avoided deep pile foundations, and being engineers that was a very important requirement for them. It is a very important requirement, but it was a quick study - they did it in six weeks and for a pretty small amount of money. They showed that there was one feasible route. They did not say that it was the best route or the only route, and I think they would admit that, Halcrow would agree even that engineering and missing deep pile foundations are not the only requirements that you should take into account when planning a route across London, especially one that is going to cost £10 billion and disrupt the City for years. It is not an ideal route, I have to say, and my background extends beyond deep pile foundations and tunnelling (although I do know a bit about that). It has some serious shortcomings. It has no interchange with the Victoria Line or the Piccadilly Line which are the two busiest tube lines across Central London. It has no connections to Oxford Circus station because of the way Oxford Circus is configured. It swings south under Hyde Park in order to provide for a connection on to the Marylebone Line, but there is no plan now to do that connection ever. It runs along past the American Embassy, which I guess in 1988 was not seen as a security issue the way it maybe should be seen now. The main reason for staying south of Oxford Street, I have been told by the engineers, was they did not want to conflict with the Post Office tube, which as you may know runs from Paddington to Liverpool Street as well, along the north side of Oxford Street. The Post Office railway is, unfortunately, closed and has been for a few years now. So to go south of Oxford Street under Mayfair because of a junction that you are not ever going to build and to miss the Post Office tube, which is closed, it seems you have lost two of the main reasons for doing it. Then not having a good interchange. If one looks at the stations and walks around Central London, if one walks around Tottenham Court Road or Oxford Circus or Bond Street, it is hard to imagine also another 100,000 passengers being put on to the pavement, but that is what Crossrail is supposed to do: it is supposed to put another 100,000 people on to the street. If it does not put another 100,000 people on to the street, then it has not accomplished its objective. I think if you look at the passenger numbers, in fact, it does not accomplish the objective; they are not expecting to put 100,000 more people on the streets, they are going to be the same people on different trains - but that is another story. To put this line right through the most crowded and congested places, which are already so crowded, seems to me to be maybe not the right answer; that other factors should be thought about.

6653. Mr Schabas, how do you come to look at alternatives?

(Mr Schabas) As I said, I did the review in 1992 and that was just a review of the current scheme and we basically gave it a pretty lukewarm recommendation. I think the Committee then read our report as part of their deliberations and rejected the Bill. They never looked in detail at the alignment. At the time I had not thought much about the alignment either. Around late 1999 the Strategic Rail Authority, as it then was, asked train operators, including GB Railway, which I was part of, if we had any ideas how to relieve congestion at Liverpool Street, Paddington and Waterloo. I got out some maps and started scratching my head and thinking about it and said: "Well, London has changed a lot since 1988. It has now got Stansted in the East - a big airport - Heathrow is getting bigger still, Crossrail does not serve either of them really - it still does not - you have got Canary Wharf which did not exist in 1988 (we were just starting the first piles there) and now it is another city and it is a third major centre. So I thought, "How can you build a railway from Paddington via Canary Wharf and on to the east with the least problems, frankly, getting the powers" - whether it is using Transport and Works or Parliament because this and the funding are the two major problems of getting any railway across London built. The statutory approvals and the funding. I looked at the map and I thought - it was not quite this quick - "Actually, there is at least one other route that has been safeguarded through Central London, from east to west, which does not have a lot of deep pile foundations", and that is the river. It was not safeguarded by the Department for Transport, it was safeguarded by a higher authority, shall we say.

6654. If we could have that up.

(Mr Schabas) There we are. Maybe I should walk through this and explain. It serves the West End in a different way. It does not serve Bond Street and Tottenham Court Road, it does not go to John Lewis; it is a bit closer to the Army & Navy and, frankly, a bit closer to Westminster where we are here. It would come down under the Royal Parks, so no foundations, there are a few security tunnels to worry about - remember I was involved in the Jubilee Line which goes under Green Park, so I have got a bit of experience. Interchange with other tube lines and within walking distance of the heart of the West End but the station itself would be under the river. A second station probably in front of the Tate Modern, Blackfriars Bridge, where you can have an excellent interchange with Thameslink. One of the problems with Crossrail, the safeguarded route, is the interchange with 'Thameslink is up at Farringdon. Anyone who has been on the Thameslink Farringdon platforms in the rush hour knows they are very narrow and constrained platforms. They cannot be widened without demolishing some pretty expensive buildings and they are not proposing to do that, so there is a real problem in the current scheme of going through Farringdon. At Blackfriars Station you can build a proper interchange. Another station at London Bridge - it is actually in front of the Mayor's office, in front of City Hall - and again interchanges with the tube lines. Yes, you can interchange with the major Tube lines, and then through to Canary Wharf. The whole alignment follows the river. You can do the construction - this is how the Tubes were built at the turn of the last century - from the river using barges and therefore reducing truck traffic through Central London. Next slide, please. That is a cross-sectional drawing. We commissioned Mott Macdonald who engineered about half the Tube network, I think, and are working on Crossrail too, but they were not back in 1999, so they did this for us, and they did the drawing. You can see the Tubes there; they are deep under the river; they are in the London Clay, and you would have escalators and stairs and lifts and so on up to either side of the river and you can actually add pedestrian subways through so you can get people up on to the embankments on either side. They wrote us a letter which I think is in your evidence, exhibit 3, which says they found no fatal flaws from an engineering point of view on the proposal. We presented this all to the SRA in January 2000.

6655. There is a summary slide to go in at this stage.

(Mr Schabas) We suggested it to them. It avoids deep pile foundations. It serves the City, the West End and Docklands. It provides better interchange with the tubes and the other railways. Stations are in much less congested areas; better places for these 100,000 more pedestrians to distribute, and the construction impacts should be less severe. The second-last point I will come back to and explain because it is a bit out of sequence. The SRA took a year to respond to us. It was a rather long wait for a meeting because we put quite a bit of work into it, and it was at their request actually, and I had a meeting first of all with Keith Berryman. Keith had already been appointed to do the London East/West Study for the Strategic Rail Authority, and he actually did a presentation in December 2000 about eleven months after we put forward our proposal. He did a presentation to London First, stating that they had already made the recommendations to the Secretary of State and he made no mention of looking at any alternative routes through Central London. I asked for a meeting. I said "Keith, what happened to our proposal?" "Oh, I guess it will be okay". So we had a meeting on 17 January and he said that they were not looking at alternative routes because that would add two years' delay and they were under strong political pressure to get something under way, and there really was not time to start looking at alternatives. Any change from the safeguarded route would delay things for two years. They had already then submitted the London East/West Study to the Government and confirmed that to me, and that was eventually released. Before that came out I wrote another letter back and said, "I think you are making a mistake. You are rushing this process and you are going to regret it later."

Richard Morris, who is now Operations Director of Crossrail, wrote a letter saying he had taken over running the project in the SRA and he wrote me this letter saying, "We examined this last year". I do not believe they really did; I think the word "examined" means they looked at it. "We are not as sanguine as you regarding the engineering difficulties, although these could no doubt be overcome. The main difficulty is the amount of interchange required would be substantially increased". Essentially he was saying if you put it under the river everybody has to walk further because nobody works on top of it, and I think that is true, but there is analysis there: how important is that? Everyone knows Waterloo Station is on the wrong side of the river but many people use it and we have lived with that over 150 years and there have been proposals to take the railway across the river and those have always been rejected for pretty good reasons. Mr Morris was using a planning argument now, not an engineering one, to say that they should take up the safeguarded route, and not using a political argument. They then published the London East-West Study Report which you can still find, I think, on the website somewhere. It is an interesting document because it is used in the Environmental Statement for Crossrail as the key foundation for their route selection process. Chapter 6 of the Environmental Statement refers to the London East-West Study as basically the study with which they decided where to go with Crossrail. The funny thing about it is, the London East-West Study's Crossrail is not very much like the one we have got now. They actually say in London East-West that it should not go to Heathrow. They do not go to Reading. They do not go to Abbey Wood. They have not apparently heard of the East Thames corridor. They did not go to Canary Wharf, so after this report was produced Canary Wharf then put on a lobbying effort and the Mayor, Ken Livingstone, I think pretty much said, "If you want me to back this it must go to Canary Wharf and it must go to Heathrow. You are crazy if you do not do that", and they changed it. I raised it before that they had not tried to address those two major destinations with the scheme but it kind of throws the London East-West Study out the window as a report as the foundation for your house. I heard nothing more from the Crossrail team until December 2001; every ten months we go through the cycle again, when I was contacted by Julian Maw. I worked with Julian on the Jubilee Line extension and he was now working for Cross-London Rail Link. He said, "We would be interested in looking at your scheme". I think Julian understood that in today's world you are supposed to look at alternatives, or at least be seen to pretend to look at alternatives, and he invited me in. We had a meeting with Keith Berryman that went on for the better part of a morning about the route through central London and the other ideas that we had presented as to what Crossrail could do, and I am not here to talk about them. Obviously, I would love to explain them but we are here to talk about the route through central London and how or why it should affect Mayfair. They responded. They were interested in studying this further in that they would study the feasibility and the business case. They even paid GB Railways and therefore me to work with them for about six months. I would not say it was a very two-way relationship. I produced a lot of papers saying, "If I was trying to build a railway that could get through Parliament and get funded these are some of the things I would do". They did produce alignment plans and profile drawings. If you go to the next one, that is one of the ones. It is a very faint drawing but you can see their title block in the corner, "Crossrail Line 1". That is the Embankment Gardens, that is Blackfriars Station, and that is showing the line under the river done by their engineers. You can see that those stations fit quite nicely between the banks of the river with entrances on either side which come up into what is usually open space. Some of it is parkland, some of it is for the front of the National Theatre; it is for their car park, actually. It might work a lot better to put an entrance there. It was feasible. The feedback from the engineers was that this was feasible. There were not any serious problems they could see, which is the same as Richard Morris had said in his letter, especially if you build this line, and Mr Berryman even said to me that it might be cheaper because as it happens along the river route you intersect the two lines. You do not need quite as many stations; you save one station and that is £300 million or £400 million.

6656. MR PUGH-SMITH: So what happened next?

(Mr Schabas) I went away on my summer holidays thinking that they were going to be doing computer modelling of the revenues and so on, because this is how you would know whether being in the river rather than up on Bond Street was better or worse for traffic generation and congestion, and I came back and I had an invitation to meet with Norman Haste, who had just taken over as the Chief Executive of Crossrail. I came into the meeting with Mr Haste and they handed me a letter signed by Mr Berryman, which I think you have as exhibit 7, which frankly came as a bit of a shock because it was completely inconsistent with everything that had been said in the previous six months. First of all they said that the river route was not really feasible because there would be serious environmental problems with cofferdams. Actually, the cofferdam in front of Blackfriars Street was their idea. That provided a work site and a nice straight section of the river with a new embankment wall in front of the Tate Modern where the engineers said, "This is great. We can take barges there to take the dirt out and not cause a disruption in Spitalfields or anything like that", but here was Mr Berryman turning round and using it as an argument for not building the scheme. He also said there would be problems with vent shafts in or adjacent to the royal parks. I think that with the Crossrail scheme before you put vent shafts in the royal parks; there is no route through central London that does not have them. Those did not seem to me to be a reason to reject this. They also said that they were not going to bother modelling the schemes and in that meeting I think it was Mr Haste, and I think Mr Berryman may have been out of the room, said to me, "Look: I have been appointed to this job. They want me to get it built. I have not got the time or money to look at alternatives". Frankly, I was shocked to hear him saying this because he obviously had money and he had plenty of time too, and I knew he had plenty of time; this was four years ago. I followed that up with a brief letter on 4 October, exhibit 8, seeking clarification on some points. Mr Berryman responded with exhibit 9. He said, "I do not wish this to be the start of a long correspondence on the subject", which was basically slamming the door in our face and not offering to provide any more information, because I asked questions about the statements made in the letter: how had he come to this conclusion, could he prove it? In 2005 under the Superlink hat, which I now wear sometimes, we asked them under the Freedom of Information Act for some of the evidence to support the claims in his letter, including the cost estimate. They said that the route would cost two to three times as much. The cost estimate which you have in exhibit 10 shows quite clearly that the river route from Paddington to Canary Wharf would be £3.6 billion, which I think is roughly the same, maybe slightly cheaper, than the safeguarded route.

6657. MR BINLEY: Could you heighten that so that we can see it better?

(Mr Schabas) You have the letter in the exhibits too, exhibit 7. Exhibit 7 is the first one from Mr Berryman when he says it is too expensive, three times the price. It is funny that in the next letter he wrote back and said it was twice the price.

6658. MR PUGH-SMITH: Mr Schabas, can I stop you there? It is in the larger bundle, sir. Mr Schabas, can we come back to the position where you left off? You were told under the Freedom of Information Act that the cost would be about £3.6 billion.

(Mr Schabas) Yes.

6659. You were telling the Committee that it would be no more expensive and possibly cheaper than the safeguarded route.

(Mr Schabas) Yes, that is right, and we also made suggestions as to how they could serve Heathrow, how they could serve Terminal 5, which they are not doing, and how they could serve Stansted, but nothing came of it. I was in a difficult position. I was a director of GB Railways; we were a franchise-holder from the Strategic Rail Authority which was a part owner of the Cross London Rail Link scheme at the time and so I could not rock the boat too much and quite frankly I had to back off. I said, "It is not my problem but I think you should be listening because I am trying to help".

6660. In addition to the river route can we now turn to see if there are any other feasible alternatives shown on the line through central London?

(Mr Schabas) Sure. In 2004 I was again in a position where I could take an interest in this and I was one of the people who formed the group called Superlink with John Prideaux, who had been Chairman of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project, Chris Stokes, who is Deputy Director of Network South East. He was the British Rail person in charge of Crossrail back in the 1988 scheme. The three of us got together as well as some other people and said, "We want to see Crossrail built. How can we help?", whether it was to help them to help themselves, but there must be an easier way through London, a better way through London and something that has a better business case. And with respect to central London we could see that there were clear advantages to the river route in terms of reducing environmental impacts and property impacts and petitioners, but that there was also maybe another route that had not been looked at sensibly, because again they had taken something that had been done in 1988 in six weeks and just stuck with it. In particular, if you go to slide 18, from my experience of planning several railways this is a list of some of the main things you take into account when you are taking a route for a railway. It should be something you can build. Preferably you do not have to go through deep pile foundations, but if you had to go through one or two you would be willing to pay that price as the rest of the route was very good. You wanted, in this case, the West End, the City and Docklands to interchange with other underground and national and international rail lines. Remember, the Channel Tunnel was not open in 1988, and then it went to Waterloo for a while but now it is going to King's Cross. You want to design stations in locations where you do not make surface congestion, not just cars and buses but also pedestrians, and minimise the constructions impacts, and you have a lot of trade-offs to make between these, and you have £150 million, among other things, to do the kind of analysis to evaluate these alternatives, and the word "evaluation" is important because it implies - I did not study Latin but it implies some numbers, some modelling. We have quite sophisticated computer modelling in this country which allows us to analyse whether that route or this route is going to generate more people and save more time. If you go to the next slide, there is the river route and there is the safeguarded route through the centre of that. The red line is another route that we came up with. We do not have any engineering on this. Superlink does not have the budget of the kind they have, but we said, "Now that the Post Office tube is closed there is probably no reason you could not stay on the north side of Oxford Street running roughly under Wimpole Street. You could then have the station at Cavendish Square". Cavendish Square has an underground car park and it is a terrible underground car park because it was built when people had Austin Morrises. The spaces are very small, but it is a great site to build a station from. It is twice the size of Hanover Square. There are no mature trees because they were all taken out when they built the car park, and it has few historic buildings. It is also on the north side of Oxford Street and that much closer up the Euston Road so you can get trucks up on to the trunk road system with less disruption and without them running past the American Embassy. You can also, at Cavendish Square, probably connect both to Bond Street and to Oxford Circus stations. As you know, at Oxford Circus station the Bakerloo and Victoria line platforms have their entrances mostly at the south end, not at the north end, and that is why Crossrail could not connect into the Victoria line in the current alignment, but if they had stayed on the north side of Oxford Street they could. The second thing we said was what we would really like to do is to connect with the national rail network because this is massively important. There is a billion pounds a year of passenger rail revenue that comes into the King's Cross, Euston and St Pancras areas, and I am sure many people use those trains regularly. Not only is there a billion pounds' worth of revenue a year but if Crossrail connected those terminals with Heathrow, with Stansted, with Canary Wharf and with Reading, national rail would benefit, probably with an increase of about £100 million a year in passenger revenue. That is a very big amount of money in the railway industry.

6661. Of course, I had never thought of it before, John Prideaux thought of this, and he used to run Intercity, he was the one who brought it up to be without subsidy in 1990, you may recall. If Crossrail is truly to cross the capital and connect the UK - which I think Mr Gambrill uses in his slogan, and it is a great slogan but it is not true in this current scheme - it has to go via King's Cross, Euston and St Pancras. We do not know the engineering from Cavendish Square up to King's Cross, you can do anything for a price, it might require moving some deep pile foundation. We do know there is a station location safeguarded right in front of King's Cross for Crossrail Line 2, Chelsea-Hackney it used to be called. There is a place for a station. We also know one of the main reasons they want to build Chelsea-Hackney in Crossrail Line 2 is because there is massive congestion, some of the worst congestion on the tube, from King's Cross and Euston down to the West End.

6662. If you swung Crossrail up there and back down again you might not have this problem - you would not have this problem. Given the difficulties in funding Crossrail Line 1 it might be a good idea to solve some of the problems of Crossrail Line 2 while you are at it. The line could then swing back down and rejoin the safeguarded route through Liverpool Street. It is a bit of detour but I am not sure it is no more of a detour than they are doing to go to Whitechapel and back into Canary Wharf. Why they are going to Whitechapel is a bit of a mystery for some people. The business case for going to Shenfield has evaporated. Chris Stokes, part of the Superlink team, was involved in the original selection of Shenfield. We have taken apart Cross London Rail Link's business case for it. We have done quantitative analysis with numbers we got from Freedom of Information and the business case does not stack up so they should just dropt the Shenfield branch and then you do not need to go to Whitechapel. The money you would save from that would ---- This might not be any more expensive than the safeguarded route and would certainly generate masses of extra revenue on the Intercity network.

6663. The Cross London Rail Link is a London-led project and their models do not take account of the Intercity revenues, I think that is correct. They take account of commuter rail revenues but they take no account of generation on the national rail system and to me that is a major flaw in the methodology. As I said, as far as I know they have never bothered to model pedestrian passenger circulation. The statement that the stations in front of Charing Cross, Blackfriars and London Bridge are not convenient without any analysis to back it up is a worthless statement to me.

6664. MR PUGH-SMITH: Mr Schabas, if we have on the screen to assist you, the three identified alternatives - the northern route, the river route and safeguarded route - could you explain to the Committee the way in which you understand these alternatives being treated?

(Mr Schabas) We presented, as Superlink, our proposals to the Department for Transport in July 2004 with a lot of proposals from Superlink but also saying there seemed to be three routes through the centre that needed to be evaluated and that had not been done. Initially we had quite a cordial, even friendly, reception from the Department for Transport but clearly there was a political will to move forward regardless of the process and about two weeks later the so-called Montague Report was published.

6665. I should just back up. The thing about the alternatives analysis is it is not rocket science. Mr Gambrill was involved in the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project with me and John Prideaux and we looked at hundreds of alternatives between Folkestone and London, including many different alternative locations. It took two years and it probably did cost £50 million but we ended up with a scheme that although it did not sail through, it got a pretty smooth ride through Parliament and it has now been funded and built. I could not understand why they had skipped this process and I could not understand when, indeed, the civil servants, some of the ones involved in Crossrail were involved in the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. It was a surprise to me when they decided to release the Montague Report with a statement that the Montague Report endorsed the scheme and they were now going to put a Hybrid Bill in before the end of the current parliamentary session.

6666. That seemed to be a very hasty way to move, also because the Montague Report did not exactly give a resounding endorsement of the project. If we go to the next slide Montague, in his report, said: "...while there are no pivotal problems, the aggregation of the concerns noted...creates significant uncertainty. Some of these concerns reflect the still preliminary development of the scheme, and could be expected to be resolved in time, but others are and will remain more enduring objections.... Accordingly, as matters stand, the Review cannot confirm the deliverability of the CLRL Business Case." This was very surprising because this was released at the same time that they announced, "That's great, let's go on and build it", because clearly he is not saying that you can do that, he is saying, "There's lots to figure out still, guys".

6667. Superlink wrote to Mike Fuhr at the Department for Transport who was the person in charge of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Bill as well, as Bernard knows him well, and we said there were a lot of questions in the Montague Report, and I have only touched on them here but there were many questions that his report raised about the business case, about the feasibility, the engineering, even down to how many trains an hour you could run through the middle of it. We got no response. We sent the letter 20 October and we got no response. We did get a response from Adrian Montague very quickly. He had been appointed as Chairman of CLRL by this point and he came back and said: "My mandate is very much to press ahead with this scheme...I really have no locus to consider alternatives." I think that is probably correct, that was probably what he was told to do. It does not seem to me to be the correct instrument for him in a statutory process affecting individuals and the future of London.

6668. We then decided to publish the Superlink proposals. We were accused of being too late, which was something we did not want to respond to directly but clearly the proposals had been fed to an uninterested Cross London Rail Link over the previous years. We were not too late, they were just refusing to listen. Finally we decided to publish them in public.

6669. In February the Government introduced the Crossrail Bill and published the Environmental Statement and Mr Derek Twigg stated, and it says in the Environmental Statement in response to a question in Parliament that CLRL had evaluated and rejected the Superlink proposals, and he used the word "evaluated". He probably thought they had evaluated it but we had not seen any evidence of anything that could be called evaluation.

6670. Cross London Rail Link followed up in May with a report called the Super-Crossrail and Superlink update report, which was their attempt to justify their thinking - a bit late - that they put forward in the Environmental Statement. The update report has nothing in it that could be described as analysis, it is 25 pages of unsupported assertions. There are no numbers in it, no comparison with the Crossrail scheme, they just say, for instance, that it will have problems building it, as if Crossrail has no problems. They note that it will be difficult to have worksites on the river. There is no analysis in there to say whether it is easier to have a worksite at Hanover Square or Bethnal Green or Spitalfields than in the river, it is stating basically they did not like it, they had their scheme, they did not need another scheme and it would complicate life to look at another scheme. We presented a detailed word by word rebuttal, paragraph by paragraph, and you have that in your exhibits if you are looking for something to read. It would have been good to read it over the holidays. Basically paragraph by paragraph rebuttal of unsupported statements by them, every one of them.

6671. MR PUGH-SMITH: Mr Schabas, what are the main points that you would like the Committee Members to dwell upon?

(Mr Schabas) We think they have been in a great hurry and they need to slow down. This scheme has already cost £150 million and they are no closer to funding it, nobody has any idea how they are going to come up with £10 billion. They are causing a disruption to people's lives, to their homes, to businesses. They have blighted many people. They have not addressed the issues we have raised. London has changed enormously since 1988 and the London East-West study is frankly a joke. They need to go back and comply with the law and with good planning practice, quite frankly. They need to go and study alternatives with taking constructive advice and input from people like Superlink and the Mayfair Residents. It is déjà vu, it is frankly a tragedy because if they had done this from 2000 for the last six years and been open-minded instead of saying, "We do not have time to look at alternatives, we are going to start building in two years", they might now have a scheme that was funded, that was better value for money, that had public support, that did indeed cross the capital and connect the UK and maybe did not mess up Mayfair. It may well be the safeguarded route is the best route through Central London, I do not know, but they do not know either. This work will take a few months, it will require a few million pounds, but it is money that needs to be spent. A proper analysis consistent with law and good practice is required before we spend this kind of money. We need to know for sure. Thank you.

6672. MR PUGH-SMITH: Thank you very much, Mr Schabas.

6673. CHAIRMAN: Ms Lieven?

6674. MS LIEVEN: Sir, as I indicated last time we met, I have no questions for this witness. It is our view that these matters go to the principle of the Bill and we dealt in the information papers I referred to in opening and I will refer to in closing as to why we have chosen this alignment. I am not going to waste the Committee's time by an extended cross-examination about the merits of our alignment.

 

Examined by THE COMMITTEE

6675. MR BINLEY: I understand, Chairman, why counsel for the Promoters would say what they have just said, however the taxpayer has to be fully aware that the decisions arrived at are right and proper, that politics has to be seen to be done as well as be done, quite frankly. This raises some particular questions from me. The 18 billion, Mr Schabas, were there any figures at all that you were given which suggested the evaluation of your scheme should be twice as much as the evaluation of the route being proposed?

(Mr Schabas) Not at the time. They refused to give us any more numbers. He said three times and in the follow-up letter he said maybe only two times. We did get a break down in 2005 under Freedom of Information as to how they got 18 billion. The 18 billion we got last year. I think you have that in your exhibits. It is exhibit 10. It is one page and a spreadsheet. I should explain the 18 billion was for the entire Superlink scheme which includes branches at Stansted, through Terminal 5 and so on. We have also said that Superlink as a whole was 25 per cent more than Crossrail, we never said it was cheaper, but we always said that Paddington to Canary Wharf should be similar in price, and this, which they gave to us only in 2005 under Freedom of Information, confirmed that. If you go down to EE Central Area, GB Rail Alignment ----

6676. MR BINLEY: I am getting a little lost.

(Mr Schabas) It would be nice if the pages were numbered.

6677. MR PUGH-SMITH: We are looking at exhibit 10 in the big bundle.

6678. MR BINLEY: Does it have a page number?

6679. MR PUGH-SMITH: No. If you look at exhibit ten.

6680. MR BINLEY: Exhibit 10, yes.

6681. MR PUGH-SMITH: There is a one sheet summary.

(Mr Schabas) This was all they gave us. This was their evaluation that they had done. The key point with the Central London alignment is EE Central Area, GB Rail Alignment, and if you look over to the right you see 3,623,000, which is the same price, it is not three times as much or twice as much, the central area is the same price. The other parts they were arguing were much, much more expensive, the line to Stansted and the line to Heathrow, and we have argued that those numbers are wrong too. As I have said, we do not have an army of engineers behind us, but we have built the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, the Jubilee Line extension and things like that, so we are not completely guessing in the dark. We also thought the 18 billion number was wrong, and I could explain the other lines, but I do not think they are relevant the central London route.

6682. MR BINLEY: Can I secondly ask, on the letter dated 30 September, which is your Exhibit 7, from Mr Berryman where in paragraph 1 under "Cost", sub-paragraph 2, he says, "Although we accept that it is possible that the benefits and in particular fare box income may be higher than the reference scheme", how does that relate or does it relate in any way to the statement that was made on 16 February 2001 to the effect that the evidence relating to the catchment area would mean that the river route would not attract the catchment and, therefore, I assume the fares that the decided route will?

(Mr Schabas) They seem to be contradictory, do they not?

6683. It does seem to be contradictory to me.

(Mr Schabas) I do not think I should be explaining Mr Berryman's letters, but I do not think they are contradictory actually and I can maybe explain on his behalf what he was trying to say.

6684. Perhaps we could at some stage have Mr Berryman and he could tell us what he means by it because these questions are important.

(Mr Schabas) The Superlink differs from Crossrail in two major ways. One way that it differs is that we are not sure that the route from Paddington to Canary Wharf which they have picked is the right one. We are not saying that the river is better or the northern route is better; we are not sure and we do not think they can be sure either. The second difference with Superlink is that we do not go to Shenfield and Maidenhead, but we go to Reading, we go to Milton Keynes, we go to Basingstoke, we go to places where frankly traffic growth is happening. These require some additional bits of railway to be built, not a lot, but a bit, seven or eight miles of tunnels, but tunnels are actually pretty cheap if you do not have stations in them. Those generate the extra revenue. I think what Mr Morris was saying back in 2000 was that under the river you would get less traffic in central London, and I think he may be right, he may be wrong, but the difference is going to be minor. There is going to be different traffic generation. If the route goes under Oxford Street or it goes under the river, it will generate traffic in different ways. What Mr Berryman is admitting here and agreeing with is that if you build the line up to Basingstoke and over to Stansted and Reading, of course you will generate more people and more revenue. He is saying that it will cost £18 billion to do it and that would bring us to Exhibit 10 where he has done some estimates to suggest that they did not, until they got Mr Morris involved and Mr Morris is not here, but until Richard Morris came in, they had nobody in their team who had real rail operational experience, they were engineers, and they added in a lot of costs which do not need to be there.

6685. Can I stay with the same letter and go to section 3 of that letter where Mr Berryman says, "In particular it does not relieve the most grossly overcrowded sections of the rail network which are on the LUL lines". Do you think he is specifically referring to Liverpool Street there in any sense?

(Mr Schabas) I think he is talking through his hat, with all due respect. I do not think he is qualified to say or know and, frankly, without some modelling, he could not really know. Superlink would relieve Liverpool Street very substantially because we are proposing that from Canary Wharf you would then swing up to Shenfield and take trains off the line into Liverpool Street. Half of the people who go to Liverpool Street now walk to work which is why Crossrail linking in Liverpool Street makes life worse for them because people in Romford will find themselves deep underground when they would rather be on the surface and walk to their offices. The other half are going all over the place and they do not want to go to Liverpool Street and Superlink relieves Liverpool Street in a different way.

6686. On the Liverpool Street one, I need to understand whether you had heard the initial arguments about Liverpool Street where it was felt that the additional capacity, whilst it needed some change, could in the main be taken by the present ticket halls and so forth. Crudely, that was the argument, as I saw it, and yet if this is about Liverpool Street, Mr Berryman is now arguing, or the argument in 2.2 is, that your scheme does not relieve the most grossly overcrowded sections, and that is why I am specifically concerned about Liverpool Street.

(Mr Schabas) I have not read all of the testimony on Liverpool Street, but what we did find under freedom of information was the generation of traffic that Crossrail will bring and what is amazing is that it was much less than they like to claim. Under the Department for Transport's own numbers, Crossrail will increase commuting into central London by 2.5 per cent because, frankly, it is not going to make the journey from Romford or Shenfield much nicer than it is now, so I think it is probably true that at Liverpool Street they will not have a more severe crowding problem because, having spent £10 billion, they will not have many more passengers. It is, therefore, probably right, but in a kind of way which to me damns the whole project and, if that is the case, what is the point?

6687. Early on in 2001 you were told that delay was not required and government pressure was suggesting there should be no delay and that was the inference of the statement you made to us.

(Mr Schabas) Absolutely.

6688. Then in October 2004 Mr Prideaux said, "I really have no locus to consider alternatives".

(Mr Schabas) Mr Montague.

6689. Sorry, yes.

(Mr Schabas) Mr Prideaux is with us.

6690. Yes, Prideaux is your man, my apologies. It is quite confusing stuff, is it not? He says, "I really have no locus to consider alternatives". I will ask later on, but do you think that is the same pressure, that those statements arose from the same pressure to drive this along and your view seems to be that that drive was so important as to suggest that they would not properly look at any alternatives? Is that what your evidence suggests?

(Mr Schabas) Yes, minister!

6691. Not quite! In fact, quite a long way off!

(Mr Schabas) But I think that is exactly what they said.

6692. CHAIRMAN: Mr Pugh-Smith, before your witness goes, it might be unsatisfactory, the route which has been chosen, but actually it is the instructions you have been given and, in that respect, counsel is correct. We really cannot approve this in any way, we are not authorised to do that and it is not within our powers.

6693. MR PUGH-SMITH: We are not inviting you to do that.

6694. CHAIRMAN: But the discussion we have had here has been useful because it has informed members of the Committee perhaps why the route which has been chosen is so central to the instructions you have been given, so, in that respect, I am grateful.

6695. MR PUGH-SMITH: I am glad it is helpful in that regard, but, as I mentioned in opening on 30 March, there is a more fundamental legal point as well to which I will return in closing and that is the requirement in the Environmental Statement to consider alternatives adequately and we have called Mr Schabas to demonstrate that, in our submission ----

6696. CHAIRMAN: It is well within your remit to challenge that.

6697. MR PUGH-SMITH: That is right.

6698. MRS JAMES: From what you are saying, the plan you have been telling us about with all of your rail experience appears to be one that takes in a wider perspective and a longer-term future for rail, because you are talking about the Reading end of things and with us knowing what we poor, long-suffering travellers to south Wales experience on a regular basis, that is a particular pinch-point, so would you see that on the back of this the problems could be addressed with the plan that you are taking?

(Mr Schabas) Yes, it has no difference which route you use through central London, but I think that Reading is another example that it is symptomatic because they were going to terminate at Maidenhead. I asked Cross London Rail because I have some friends in the organisation, "Why are you terminating at Maidenhead? Why don't you go to Reading?" They said, "We have to pay to resignal Reading which will cost £150 million". I said, "If you look on their website, Network Rail are actually planning to do that in 2011 anyway, so you don't have to pay for that". It was too late for them to realise this. Instead, if they do terminate at Maidenhead, it will cause real operational difficulties because they will have to run shuttle services as well on the diesel line. They will actually be adding more trains. There is no one solution to trains coming through to Reading and there is no simple solution, but it is symptomatic of them, as I said at the very beginning, being in too much of a hurry, haste makes waste, and they rushed ahead without thinking through all the issues.

6699. SIR PETER SOULSBY: Mr Schabas, what you have told us, as Ms Lieven has pointed out, does strike at the principle of the Bill and it is clearly beyond the remit of this Committee as given to us by the Commons, and I think in the circumstances it is quite right that Ms Lieven chose not to respond to it. Can I just, without putting words in your mouth, try and summarise what it is you have said to us. I think I am right in saying that you are saying to us that we are wasting our time, looking at a particular route, when in a broader sense it is probably not the best value for money, being based on an inadequate consideration of alternatives. I think perhaps you are also saying to us that it is most unlikely that it will ever be funded or built.

(Mr Schabas) Yes, absolutely. It is a great tragedy really.

6700. KELVIN HOPKINS: I am quite staggered by what we have heard this afternoon. I had made the assumption, naïve though it may be, that all of this is sorted out before and that every possible mind is concentrated on all the alternatives and we come up with the best alternative. What you are suggesting is that this has not been done and this may not be the best alternative.

(Mr Schabas) Correct.

6701. I know a bit about railways myself and I know the Reading argument. Could we not even now say to Network Rail, "It is your job to sort out the signalling at Reading"? I know that Reading is a problem, but are you suggesting also that the reason why the scheme does not go to Reading is because of the cost of resignalling Reading?

(Mr Schabas) Reading is going to be resignalled. The reason it does not go to Reading is because the Cross London Rail Link team has so little understanding of railway operations and the national rail network that they did not know that it was going to be resignalled, so when they went to Network Rail and said, "We want to run to Reading", Network Rail, which is a different organisation, tried it on and said, "Okay, fine, you can run to Reading, but you will have to pay to resignal it and that will cost £150 million". "Well, then we'll stop at Maidenhead". Of course Network Rail was just kidding because they are going to do it anyway, but it is symptomatic of the whole process, that they have not understood the big picture and they have been in too much of a hurry, so they rushed the Bill in terminating at Maidenhead and they found out later that of course Network Rail has got to resignal Reading anyway and once you are resignalling it, it does not make much difference which you will be resignalling it for, so it is not the cost, but just their own inability to understand the network.

6702. If one wants to build the best scheme which is what the country needs, it may just be that it will cost a bit more than an alternative scheme which is not what the country needs. Reading is a major junction and a commuter town and Heathrow Airport, as it would, is linked to CTRL ----

(Mr Schabas) Except it does not. They say it does, but it does not. It does in words and they hoped it would, but it never will. It is another thing that does not work.

6703. But Canary Wharf clearly is an international hub. All of these things have not been properly considered, in your view?

(Mr Schabas) That is correct. You have the same on the Shenfield branch where they have never addressed how trains would interact with the freight, with the longer-distance trains, possibly making services worse on both branches. There are ways to find solutions to these problems, but they have only belatedly become aware of them, so instead of seizing opportunities, they are trying to overcome mistakes they have already locked themselves into. There is one point on Reading which is worth mentioning. Crossrail, I think, still have on their website something called the 'outline business case' from about two and a half years ago which was what Montague reviewed. They had no branch to Maidenhead either at that point and it went to Kingston-upon-Thames, the Richmond branch, Kingston and Acton. Montague dropped that branch because it cost a lot of money and brought no extra revenue. It was a financial black hole. He added the Reading branch, or rather the Maidenhead branch back in in his study as a kind of last-minute thing and said, "Maybe you should put this one in instead because it makes money", and indeed running to Reading should make the business case better and would probably cost less money and require less subsidy, but that is not something that they have understood. They have always been in a hurry as engineers to find something they could build. With some of these additions, going up to King's Cross will pay for itself quite probably and certainly the one to Reading pays for itself and you get extra money. Those people pay real money. This is not something in the case of the United States and most of Europe where, when you build a railway, it loses money. In Britain, because it costs so much to drive, sometimes you do something that makes money and the Superlink argument was that it would cost 25 per cent more to build to go to all these places, but the subsidy net would be much, much less.

6704. There is a phrase that, "If one wanted to get there, one would not start from here", but we are where we are.

(Mr Schabas) That is true.

6705. CHAIRMAN: Would you accept that, in the same way you have said that people have not fully examined all the issues, you yourself are not the expert on revenues and it is just an opinion that you are giving today?

(Mr Schabas) No, there is no one person who is an expert, but I have looked at the business case and quite a lot of numbers have now been released from Montague's analysis of different branches.

6706. But you personally have not studied or written that up to say that that should apply and, therefore, it is your opinion that that could make a difference?

(Mr Schabas) That is correct, but the rail industry is actually quite an open organisation once you are inside it. We have passenger and revenue data from every station in the country, I have it on my laptop here, and we have a lot of experience. If you provide three services from Reading to central London, we know what that will do to revenue from Reading, like we know what it will do when you provide three services from Shenfield to Tottenham Court Road.

6707. I understand that, but the case being put by Mr Pugh-Smith is that all the options have not been fully examined.

(Mr Schabas) That is right.

6708. Well, I am saying that what you are here telling us is your opinion and you yourself have not actually done any detailed study.

(Mr Schabas) That is right, absolutely.

6709. In the same vein, you have not dismissed either that the route which has been chosen is the best route?

(Mr Schabas) Correct.

6710. You have given alternatives, but you have not dismissed the route which has been chosen?

(Mr Schabas) That is right, and I have told my friends in Mayfair that it may be that the right route is beside the American Embassy, but I do not know.

6711. MR PUGH-SMITH: Sir, I think in view of the time, I will spare you re-examination.

 

The witness withdrew

6712. MS LIEVEN: Sir, having said so determinedly that I was not going to call a witness and I was not going to cross-examine on this, it is still our clear position that these matters go to the principle of the Bill, but in the light of the concerns raised by certain members of the Committee and their obvious concern, which is not surprising given that they have only heard Mr Schabas' evidence, that we have not considered alternatives properly and this is not the best scheme, both of which we hotly contest, if the Committee so wishes, I am more than happy to call Mr Berryman, obviously after we have heard Mr Winbourne and the Mayfair residents have completed their case, in order to explain why, on those two key points, which is the degree to which we have considered alternatives and why this plainly is the best route in transport planning terms and that this is the right scheme. It does go to the principle of the Bill and it is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to this Committee, but I am obviously not happy on behalf of the Promoters that any member of the Committee should feel that we are promoting this Bill irresponsibly, which is very plainly not the case and the best person to tell you that is Mr Berryman.

6713. CHAIRMAN: That is very helpful and I think it is probably necessary for Mr Berryman to come and give evidence.

6714. MS LIEVEN: Certainly, sir. As you know, he is sitting behind me, so he does not have to come far!

6715. CHAIRMAN: Mr Pugh-Smith, do you wish to call your final witness and then we will call Mr Berryman?

6716. MR PUGH-SMITH: Yes, sir. My final witness is Mr Winbourne. Perhaps I could stress again, to save time, that why we have called Mr Winbourne is to explain why the issue of alternatives needs to be looked at holistically, given the legal requirement under the Environmental Assessment Directive and Regulations, but also in the context of dealing with the issue of compensation on which Mr Winbourne is acknowledged as an expert. Without further ado, if I may, I will call Mr Winbourne.

 

MR NORMAN JACK WINBOURNE, sworn

Examined by MR PUGH-SMITH

6717. Mr Winbourne, could you introduce yourself to the Committee?

(Mr Winbourne) My name is Norman Jack Winbourne. I am a consultant of Winbourne Martin French Chartered Surveyors in the City of London. In 1977 I took over the long-established Mayfair practice of Martin French in Bond Street and my office was then with Martin French in Bond Street, I stress. I appear today before the Committee on behalf of the Residents' Society of Mayfair and St James', 'the Society' from now on. Since 1991 I have advised the Society and its predecessor, the Residents' Association of Mayfair, RAM for short. However, my overall compulsory purchase and compensation evidence is also entirely relevant from an all-London viewpoint.

6718. In that regard, Mr Winbourne, for those who do not have a copy of your CV in front of them, you will see that from 1956 when you joined the LCC as a surveyor, continuing your employment with the GLC, in that time and since you have specialised in the selection of sites and buildings for public works, the making of CPOs and payments of compensation claims. You have also studied railway schemes and published some papers on their expropriation attribute, especially the largely out-of-date and confiscatory Victorian compensation regime.

(Mr Winbourne) That is correct, sir, exactly 50 years this month.

6719. Just in terms of routes, because this is something Mr Berryman may touch upon, the Society in its previous emanation, RAM, put forward an alternative alignment. Were you party to those discussions?

(Mr Winbourne) Yes, I was. I do not want to go into what Mr Schabas has done so well this afternoon because, as far as I am concerned, he has done the job on that, except that he has not stressed that since 1991 one of the routes through central London is one which I proposed in outline, the Residents' Association of Mayfair route. This was one for the other side to evaluate. I do not have Mr Schabas' wealth of knowledge and from the very first I had the advice of other people who were civil engineers in their own right, originally Dennis Hunt and then Dr Ronald West, who was at one time with British Rail and was an acknowledged rail expert, and unhappily Dr West died suddenly about 18 months ago and left a big hole in our position.

6720. Could we then deal with the issue of the compensation system and some points you wanted to draw to the attention of the Committee please?

(Mr Winbourne) Before I do that, could I just mention the shift in the route which I suggested, and I do not want to go into the details because Mr Schabas has done that, but I did mention the shift in the route, the Wigmore alignment, and that, I respectfully suggest, is not outwith the direction of your Committee.

6721. Could we then turn to the compensation system and the points you want to draw to the attention of members?

(Mr Winbourne) My evidence focuses on two areas. The first is the proper presentation of the gross inadequacies of the compensation system for those affected by the Crossrail scheme, and that includes those who get nothing, which in turn emphasises the importance of considering any reasonable alternative route to the extent that it cuts down on the physical, environmental and financial disruption for people. The second is the significant and welcome improvements that can be made to many London tube stations which would ease pressure on key central London interchanges and which do not require the need for Crossrail and can be done for a fraction of the cost and with very little disruption and/or compensation arising.

6722. Mr Winbourne, because we are quite tight on time, can we just deal with that second point very, very briefly please and, for that purpose, there is a slide. You have highlighted a number of old interchanges where escalators and travelators could be put in ----

(Mr Winbourne) That is right.

6723. ---- as one of the ways in which congestion could be relieved at less cost.

(Mr Winbourne) I have identified a dozen and there are actually 11 in your pack because one got left out, Chairman. I reckon they would cost, though I am no expert on this, but probably under £50 million each, so you are talking in a budget, say, of £500 million which could achieve a terrific amount in terms of better interchanges. They may not all be perfect and it may be that some would be rejected, I accept that, but these are suggestions. What I can say is that linking up with existing stations is used in Paris, but they did it very badly, and I think we would do it very well.

6724. Mr Winbourne, have you seen any analysis of this kind in the Environmental Statement at all?

(Mr Winbourne) None whatever.

6725. Let us turn to compensation please and can we just focus on the particular points please that you want to draw to members' attention this afternoon?

(Mr Winbourne) In my considered opinion, some of the alleged underlying property valuation assumptions, which have been put forward by some estate agents and economists monotonously in support of the chosen Crossrail alignment, are almost wholly misconceived. Normally, there can be no margin for much increase in the top property values along the route chosen through the City and the West End; they are already at the peak, the highest in Europe. It is often overlooked in planning circles that property values are the most immediate and commonly perceived yardstick of household and business amenity and environmental quality in any given area. It is also not appreciated by most people that a public compensation claim (for property and personal losses similar to liquidated damages) may be a reasonable component in the assessment of the environmental impact, stress and damage, all of those things always provided that every aspect of loss and damage is being addressed. In the case of, say, an intrusive trunk road project, the chance victim will claim a reasonable amount of money which reflects his or her officially inflicted property and other losses. Always provided that he or she is advised expertly, he or she may get a reasonable settlement.

6726. However, the current compensation system in general and where some land interest is taken, and those are called 'Section 7 claims' in the business, is in many ways unfair and inadequate. This leads in most cases to people settling for less, even when they are advised. This is because of the arduous system of claiming which is open to improvement.

6727. The Law Commission, a highly respected body of eminent lawyers, exists to promote legal reform. Recently, after very widely invited consultation, to which I contributed, it reported on the inadequacies of the current compensation system generally in two voluminous, comprehensive and detailed reports, what you would expect from the Law Commission. Regrettably, so far Parliament has not found the primary legislation time to make the recommended and necessary changes. The Compulsory Purchase Association, of which I am its most senior member, is concerned at this delay which has detrimental effects upon the plans of compensating authorities as well as aggravating large numbers of ordinary people and claimants, large and small. Moreover, in my own opinion, many procedures could be improved now through limited and targeted regulatory changes, and I may prepare a paper on that. I should say, sir, that the Compulsory Purchase Association of course includes people from the official side as well as people like myself in private practice, so it is not one-sided in its view.

6728. MR PUGH-SMITH: Mr Winbourne, you have looked at the information paper the Promoters have provided, C2, on compensation. Have you some comments to make on that?

(Mr Winbourne) I have reviewed information paper CT2 contained in the Promoters' rebuttal document which purports to explain to lay people the existing system for providing compensation for expropriation. That is what it is and that is what it is called in other countries. All in all, the C2 paper obfuscates the grim realities, instead of explaining them straightforwardly. I cannot possibly agree with the bland statement in the paper that "in general the Compensation Code is appropriate for application to the Crossrail project". It is poor enough for any surface railway project within its published limits of deviation, let alone Crossrail below ground, which is the very worst, as it is offered now.

6729. Consultations have been confined to hypothetical surface limits of deviation, as shown on the plans of the 'safeguarded route' since 1991. What are not shown on plans are much wider outer zones of subterranean caution, as contained in an unpublished annex. Taken together, those zones are up to a quarter of a mile wide under central London and likely to affect countless building insurance policies. I do not exaggerate, Chairman. At stations, that is the width we are looking at, on their own figures. They talk of 144 metres either side in this annex to the safeguarded route which is, I am sure, in the library of this House.

6730. There is no written-down 'Compensation Code', as the rebuttal document suggests. The general compensation system is an arcane one based upon legislation well over 150 years old and a large body of complex case law since then. Indeed in document C2, quoted compensation cases are referred to in footnotes, but without recent update. Under Victorian rules, as re-enacted in the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, so that is 40 years old, there is an unfair disparity in treatment even for general, non-railway compensation, as between ordinary compensation for a road, a housing scheme, what-have-you, but not a railway scheme, as between those whose land is being compulsorily purchased where they take your property, Section 7 claims, and certain others where no land interest is taken from them, Section 10 claims, but I have sat in this room and heard the CBI worrying about this, and I just refer to that in passing. Sir Digby Jones was quite eloquent, I listened to what he had to say and I agreed with every word.

6731. Where any land interest whatsoever is taken from the claimant, fuller compensation is payable, not only for the value of the interest in land as such, but also for contingent claims, such as for consequential business or residential disturbance, the cost of moving or whatever, and sometimes for collateral losses incurred at other properties of the claimant, and in the trade that is called 'lands held with', where you might have a house here and your garage is affected or the other way around.

6732. However, during public works where no land interest is taken from the claimant, compensation is restricted in scope to provable injurious affection, effectively limited to otherwise actionable nuisances arising from the actual construction of the public works, and those are Section 10 claims. Furthermore, Section 10 confines any compensation to reductions of property values. In other words, you will get whatever it costs in the lowering of your property value, but you will not get anything else, no consequential losses. It cuts out any claims for residential or business disturbance as "parasitic", and that is in the judgment of Lord Hoffman in Wildtree Hotels v Harrow, House of Lords 2001, which is in the footnotes of C2 and it is the leading case on this matter and, as you will appreciate, it is recent. He quotes all the Victorian railway cases as precedent in connection with that particular hotel which was to do with a road next door to it, but precedents are all railway precedents and this is quite important. The doctrine was confirmed and slightly extended by the President of the Lands Tribunal and upheld by Lord Justice Carnwath and the other judges in Ocean Leisure v Westminster City Council, Court of Appeal 2005, where my firm advised the successful claimant, and that was my son James Winbourne whom you saw on a previous Petition.

6733. After a scheme is completed, such as an airport, road or railway, claims for noise and other nuisances from its later use may lie under Part 1 of the Land Compensation Act 1973. If part only of a property is taken, the ordinary surface claimant may opt for 'material detriment' protection. Suppose they are widening the road and taking your front garden, you can claim that they should take the entire house. You can do that by notifying in advance and demanding that the acquiring authority should take the whole property with all attendant claim items, which comes under Section 8. Unfortunately, where subsoil is to be taken, ie for Crossrail, the claimant may not be alert enough to notify in advance, and that is the position I have in a current sewerage case in Hull. Meanwhile and singularly for rail tunnelling and other rail works in subsoil, material detriment cases are ruled out and, in particular, so are contingent business and residential disturbance claims, as being parasitic.

6734. MR PUGH-SMITH: Can we turn specifically to the way in which the compensation system applies to underground railways?

(Mr Winbourne) As to underground railways, the compensation system has always been more restrictive and oppressive. With tunnelling and for stations, subterranean engineering and manual mining work, and stations are all dug out by hand by the way, compensation for structural settlements, et cetera, is payable only for consequential building repairs, and that is all you get, of provable building damage, and I stress 'provable', but nothing more. It resembles repairs payments for coal mining subsidence, and I have written an article on this called 'Blight in the Tunnel' in 2002 and I have some copies here if anyone wants them. That incidentally includes a satellite image of the lowering of the land level all over London caused by the Jubilee Line extension which was widely published, and Crossrail is four times as big. For example, even if tunnelling causes differential settlements and the walls to crack or there is serious noise and vibration and people and firms have to cease operations for long periods or even permanently, and there is a recording studio which I will come to later, they are not reimbursed a penny beyond the cost of building repairs related directly to the scheme. Non-rail compulsory purchase schemes do not benefit from these additional privileged financial advantages over direct claims. These privileges are allocated only to railways in the UK and only under Victorian-based adopted general Acts. The Crossrail Bill does not have to adopt them.

6735. Other European countries are not so restrictive in their expropriation codes. I understand from two reinsurance underwriters, one of whom is a relative of my wife, and our client that for previous schemes of major rail tunnelling in Europe, compensation was made available for full consequential loss, including disturbance, from the construction of both the Rome and Barcelona metro systems, and there will be others, I feel sure. As to structural settlements, dust and muck, noise and vibration, I am deeply concerned to see repeated Crossrail evidence that "all was always well for the JLE" and, therefore, Crossrail too will be all right. The Crossrail evidence skates over the far more severe environmental and physical impacts of the much bigger overall size of Crossrail engineering - a full-size railway the same as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. The outline stations (?) in sprayed concrete caverns will be four times as big as the JLE and likewise the several almost unmentioned emergency intervention points (or EIPs) on Crossrail's evidence they simply call them shafts but they are stations. The twin Crossrail tunnels will have bore-faced areas of some 50 square metres each, compared to only some - I have got 20 square metres but I think it is a little more; it is in the 20s anyway. The tunnelling shot ways themselves and the consequential damage will increase exponentially; it is not just twice or two-and-a-half times because it is two-and-a-half times in diameter. Well beyond any crude 2.5:1 ratio. However, what is worse is the playing down (I have only seen it once or twice in the evidence I have been able to look at that has gone before) of prolonged cases of essential but disruptive compensation grouting for up to 18 months each. We have had evidence on compensation with Professor Meyer, with illustrations which I have seen, and it refers somewhere, I think, to 18 months of grouting. It did not say it for the JLE but it happened in a lot of other places too, one of which I have been concerned with directly and heard the result personally. Finally, that there are no serious structural settlements or attendant vibration problems arose from the JLE; as to the absence of any recording studios, I have read the Petition of Mercury Theatres, thereby overlooking the Stock cases which I was called in to review.

6736. The Stock cases?

(Mr Winbourne) The Stock cases. We are well aware of cases from the construction of the Jubilee Line Extension. I am sorry. There were largely uncompensated heavy damage claims from Mike Stock (that is Mr Stock of Stock Aitken and Waterman, the well-known composer of the 1980s) of Mike Stock Recording Studios which is at 100 Union Street Southwark SE1. I would mention the building is still standing - and I bet you can still hear it - adjoining the large Jubilee Line Extension Wardens Grove emergency intervention point. Right next door the ghost station. So far as I know, that is the only EIP in London but it is only a quarter of the size of any Crossrail EIPs. It could be inspected, nevertheless I mention it.

6737. Mr Winbourne, can we turn to the solution to these concerns in terms of what the Committee can recommend?

(Mr Winbourne) The ideal solution would be for Parliament to find the legislative time to implement the recommendations of the Law Commission, which has recognised the need for reform, to ensure that appropriate compensation can be paid in all foreseeable cases. I recognise that this is unlikely to happen in time to benefit those who suffer from the Crossrail construction, but it does emphasise the importance of, firstly, considering alternative routes (as Mr Schabas said) which will not affect adversely as many people during the construction process or permanently thereafter. Attention should be paid to everyone who suffers, including those cut out of claiming. This is my standpoint, as a compensation surveyor. The route should take this into account very much so. I do not believe they have even considered it. Secondly, to look for the lowest overall costs; both in terms of engineering and compensation payable to those adversely affected, whilst at the same time also considering the interests of those ordinary people who are unable to make a claim at all - whether they are high or low in the social and financial scale. This is not only to save public and private money but also to make for the least environmental impact levels. Thirdly, it is important that those who need to claim compensation have a single clear-cut and compulsorily identified legal entity (this is most important), preferably the Promoter itself, against which to make all claims and obtain direct payment. The carefully worded Crossrail responses would avoid such direct "lead" responsibility. I have read the evidence being put to other Petitions and I am horrified to see that they are trying to pass the buck down the line. Unlike the acquiring and compensating authority in any ordinary CPO, Crossrail appears to be trying to pass the buck down the construction chain. I am well aware of cases, from the construction of the Jubilee Line Extension (JLE), where the lack of, or breaking down of, any single identifiable entity, against which to enforce claims, caused significant hardship to claimants. This arose from my careful dealing with all the work on the Stock case and I only came on it later but I have a pile of papers this high in my office in relation to the case which was partly settled and may still be outstanding.

6738. MR PUGH-SMITH: Thank you very much, Mr Winbourne. That is all I need to ask you.

Cross-examined by MS LIEVEN

6739. MS LIEVEN: Just one point, sir, that I want to clarify, just so we can respond and understand Mr Winbourne's case. So far as your last point is concerned, Mr Winbourne, and compensation, compensation is payable under the Bill by the Secretary of State. Is it not?

(Mr Winbourne) What I am saying is that the way I read - and I might have it wrong, Mr Chairman, but I do not think so - the responses of Mr Colin Smith in evidence previously, he refers, when dealing with some of the people at Shenfield but it does not matter whether it is Shenfield or anywhere else, that they would look at it in the same way as if it were an ordinary developer - which is wrong - which is at variance with the decision in Ocean Leisure, which is left out of your C2 paper. Secondly, he indicates (I cannot remember the words but I have got it here) something to the effect that it implies the contractor will deal with it. I think that is all wrong. What you must have is a decent compensation set-up, whether it is for Crossrail or anywhere else, where the authority pays. If they have to sue the contractor or sue the architect or sue the engineer, that is their problem. They are the paymaster and it should not have to pass down the line from the contractors to sub-contractors, to the professional advisers and, behind them, their indemnity people and, behind them, a bunch of other lawyers. That is the team that turned up, as far as I can see from the papers in my office, to deal with Mr Stock.

6740. MS LIEVEN: Thank you, sir. I can deal with that in my closing.

6741. CHAIRMAN: Mr Pugh-Smith, do you want to re-examine?

6742. MR PUGH-SMITH: No, thank you, sir.

6743. CHAIRMAN: Mr Winbourne, thank you very much. Before you leave, I want to thank you because we have had previous evidence and I think that gives a balanced view when we come to the time to have a look at your Petition.

(Mr Winbourne) I should say, sir, that I have done a précis of my answers to C2, if the Committee is minded to have it. Counsel has got it but I do not want to take up any more time today.

6744. CHAIRMAN: That would be helpful. Thank you very much.

 

The witness withdrew

 

6745. MR PUGH-SMITH: That is my evidence.

6746. MS LIEVEN: I will directly call Mr Berryman.

 

MR KEITH BERRYMAN, recalled

Examined by MS LIEVEN

 

6747. CHAIRMAN: Before you start, Ms Lieven, we have managed to negotiate an extension to the Committee today to five o'clock, if necessary. The stenographers are here and willing to work on yet again, but that is not to say we cannot finish before five o'clock.

6748. MS LIEVEN: We will do our best. Mr Berryman, the Committee has just heard the evidence of Mr Schabas. Can you explain to the Committee, first of all, what consideration of alternative routes there was in the development of this scheme as a generality, and then turn to the two specific alternatives which Mr Schabas gave evidence on: that is the river route and the northern alignment?

(Mr Berryman) During the development of the scheme after Cross London Rail Links Limited was set up the first thing we did was to re-examine the work that had been done previously in the 1980s on possible alignments and which we also briefly covered during the new East-West London Study. We identified a number of factors which I think merited an explanation. First of all, the fact that an alignment had been safeguarded since the 1980s meant that no new buildings had been constructed on that alignment during that period. Moreover, some of the sites which had been reserved as stations had been identified as sites of surface interest, so no development at all had taken place on those sites during that period. The conclusion of the LEWS study was that there should be a period of project definition - that is actually deciding in detailed terms what the route should be across London. The conclusion was that a line similar to Crossrail should be built but it did not go into very specific details. Having said that, the Crossrail alignment was used for comparison purposes from the beginning. The two alignments which we looked at it in detail in the early 2000s are shown on this plan. Line C is the river route, which Mr Schabas has explained and I will come back to in a minute; Line B was an alignment proposed by the residents association of Mayfair but is actually somewhat different from the alignment which Mr Schabas put up, although some of the points are common to both. Clearly, when we were given these potential alignments to look at it was not in a much more developed form than you see in front of you - in other words, a very long way away from being something which could be appraised properly. So the first thing we had to do was to design these alignments in detail, and we did that using consultant engineers - Mott Macdonald - which Mr Schabas is familiar with as well. We had two firms involved, Mott Macdonald and another firm called Parsons (?) which is a very respected engineering consultancy. We spent about four or five months looking at each of these routes and spent on consultants over a quarter of a million on each route, and my own staff time (I do not mean me personally, I mean people who work for me) probably another quarter of a million on each route. So there have been substantial pieces of work done to evaluate if they could be built. The river route is clear of buildings, obviously. It is not clear of bridges - there are a number of obstructions in the way which are rather more intrusive than you might expect - and there are also a number of existing underground tunnels which cross the river, so we have to look below in order to find a suitable alignment. The difficulties with the river route, from a construction perspective, really depend on the stations and the intervention shafts which are required. As you have heard in evidence already, we need to provide interventions shafts for the fire brigade at one kilometre centres (?) and if you are under the river it is quite difficult to provide an easy, accessible direct entrance into the tunnels. It is possible but it is not easy and it closes the centres of the shafts that you have to put in because you have to allow the distance for the firemen to get from the surface to the tunnel before they can start going along the tunnel. It means you have to put the shafts a bit closer together. Having said that, the cost of the river route would probably not be very much different from the cost of the route that we have chosen. In fact, it might be cheaper because there are fewer stations. But if you carry that argument to its logical extreme, the cheapest line of all would have no stations. The stations are essential for people to get on and off the trains. The problem with the river route in terms of passenger numbers is that the corridor on which you will be relying for your walk-on passengers, which is perhaps half a kilometre wide, or half a kilometre on each side of the station, half of that space is taken up by the river because there are obviously no buildings, and the buildings to the north of the river back on to the river rather than facing it. So there are issues there around how people will be distributed from the stations. The other site that was suggested was in Park Lane for a possible station with access to the West End. Park Lane is very non-central to the West End and all the space on one side of the station would be park, Hyde Park, and so there would be no walk-on catchment from that side of that station. The walk-on catchment from all stations on this proposed route would be very significantly reduced from that which has been adopted. On the northern alignment, as I say, the alignment we examined was slightly different from the one Mr Schabas put up on the board. We examined walk-through to Baker Street rather than coming down further south towards Bond Street. We found that that alignment first of all was no simpler to construct. In fact, I think there were environmental problems, but performed very much less well in terms of passenger numbers simply because the areas that people are really wanting to get to are in that Oxford Street, Tottenham Court Road, Bond Street area. There are many destinations for leisure as well as for employment in that area which people need to get to. We came to the conclusion that the route selected in the early nineties was still probably the most appropriate route of the ones that we had examined. We had a look around for variations on these routes. You very quickly get into problems with tall buildings which have deep foundations, particularly in the City area. The way that we have got over that to get to the City is from Liverpool Street to Farringdon we propose to go underneath the existing railway line and the corridor is already occupied by Thameslink and the Metropolitan line. What the northern route does is follow that alignment round all the way up to King's Cross. It is difficult to find another route which would be able to do that so easily. It is not impossible, but it takes people away from the areas where the biggest walk-on catchments exist and it is really walk-on catchment we are looking at for the stations there. The alignment proposed, alignment B on there, brought further south to Cavendish Square, which Mr Schabas proposed, was a late entry, you might say. We had in this case, I have to say, a fairly brief examination of it and decided that we could not really see what the advantages were in terms of getting people to their places of work and entertainment and therefore we did not take it any further.

6749. CHAIRMAN: What you are saying is that there has been examination of a number of different options?

(Mr Berryman) Oh yes.

6750. Which is contrary to what we heard a little earlier.

(Mr Berryman) Yes. I can tell you that there has been a lot of examination of options.

6751. What about the particular route? There is some cross-matching of what is here and what was in the new proposal. Clearly, you have had a look at those also, but it was largely on the evidence which we have previously taken that you stick with the route which was agreed? Is that a fair summary?

(Mr Berryman) That is a reasonably fair summary, yes. There are always local variations that are possible but you need also to bear in mind that some of the sites on the route have been reserved for occupation for Crossrail for a number of years. The landowners are well aware of those sites. It would be quite difficult to come at a late stage and say, "We were going to take that building out but we are going to take this building out instead", particularly if the developer had based his plans on what we had originally proposed, and, of course, what we had originally proposed was covered by the safeguarding direction.

6752. MS LIEVEN: Going back to the generality of the appraisal, Mr Berryman, were the alternatives appraised in a manner consistent with the appraisal of the Crossrail preferred route?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, they were. They used the approach to appraisal, the name of which escapes me but which has been used for all alternatives considered in the scheme. I have to say that we are only talking about the central section. Many different alternatives were considered for the outer sections of the railway but it is considerably different from that which was brought forward in 1992.

6753. Can we just stay with the two central section alternatives for the moment and I will come to one question about the other alternatives? So far as the river route is concerned, were there any particular engineering problems with constructing stations in the river?

(Mr Berryman) Yes. There are two or three particular issues that it is worth bearing in mind. It is true that if you go deep below the river the clay or ground is just as competent as it is on either side of the river, but there are obviously special problems in making shafts and things like that in a river which do not occur when you are on dry land, and in particular constructing stations, the entrances to the stations and the ventilation structures would require significant cofferdams to be in the river. Cofferdams in the river are not impossible if you remember the Millennium Bridge which was constructed recently. The foundations of that were in cofferdams, but the size of cofferdams that we would need for the kinds of structures we are talking about here would be very substantial. We took it as far as having discussions with the appropriate authority, which I think is the Environment Agency, although one of my staff had them and he unfortunately is not here today. The Environment Agency were not terribly supportive of this proposal, in particular the possibility of building cofferdams under the river. In fact, when I say they were not particularly supportive, they were quite strongly opposed to it.

6754. So far as the transport case for the river option is concerned, what would the river option do first of all in terms of reducing overcrowding on the Central line, and secondly in terms of the Northern line?

(Mr Berryman) First of all, it does not reduce congestion on the Central line for obvious reasons. It is going to a different place. The other thing it did was increase the amount of traffic on the north-south links. People's ultimate destinations are generally further north than the river and to get from the river line to their ultimate destination they would have to use a north-south Underground link.

6755. Turning then to the northern alignment, in terms of the transport benefits, what was the balance of advantage between that and the preferred route in terms of passengers and overcrowding relief?

(Mr Berryman) Here again, of course, it does not go to the areas where the biggest demand lies. It goes around the Intercity stations, that is true, but there already is an existing line from the Euston/King's Cross area to the Barbican, the Metropolitan line, which is a relatively uncrowded section of the Underground. For anyone who uses it, I am using the word "relatively". It is nowhere near the same level of congestion as one gets on the Central line between, say, Stratford and Liverpool Street.

6756. One of the complaints that the Residents' Association have made about our route is the lack of interchange with the Victoria line. What does the northern alignment do to passenger flows on the Victoria line between King's Cross and Oxford Circus?

(Mr Berryman) On this alignment that we examined at the time when we were doing this comparison it would make it very much worse and the Victoria line is already extremely crowded. I have the unfortunate pleasure of using it every day. It is not a pleasant experience. The suggestion Mr Schabas made later of an alignment that came further south towards Bond Street, towards Cavendish Square, may to some extent ameliorate that and that would be a slight improvement on option B that we looked at but not in terms of tipping the balance.

6757. Staying on overcrowding relief, a particular point was made by Mr Schabas in relation to the letter that you wrote to him on 30 September 2002. The letter is exhibit 7 of his exhibits, and a particular point was raised about what you meant in paragraph three. Perhaps you would explain that.

(Mr Berryman) When we were looking at what Crossrail should do we were looking at the relief of overcrowding. Most rail services into and through London are, of course, overcrowded, so it is a question of degree. The central line, particularly between Stratford and Liverpool Street, is one of the most overcrowded sections of the rail network if one considers the Underground and the surface rail as a whole network rather than considering them individually.

6758. Finally, Mr Berryman, exhibit 10 in that bundle sets out some comparative costs. This is for a much wider scheme that was described as SuperCrossrail. The central section is the same as we are proposing but it has a lot more arms to the octopus, if I can put it like that. Could you just explain briefly what the problem is as you see it with having a scheme that serves this number of outer locations?

(Mr Berryman) There are two significant problems. The first is the cost. I think it would be fair comment to say that a scheme like this with longer tentacles may bring in more revenue but not enough to compensate for the very much increased costs. The problem with this project is really the affordability. It is a very expensive project, however you look at it, and making it more expensive would make it less likely to be built. The second point is really an operational problem which is the fact that you have lots of trains in the central area going to a diverse range of other destinations. If you have, say, four or five destination points at remote ends of the line, that means that only every fourth or fifth train can go to that remote end. In turn that means that passengers for that fourth or fifth train are standing on the platform waiting for their next train and platforms in deep Underground stations would become overcrowded and that is a dangerous situation. I can cite you a very good example at Victoria Station, which I am sure members of the Committee will be familiar with. The District line goes to four destinations, some trains for the Circle line, some trains go to Wimbledon, some go to Richmond and some go to Ealing Broadway, and you get very heavy crowding on the platforms there simply because people are waiting for the train which goes to their destination. Many destinations from deep level Underground stations are not a good idea. There is another issue in that the trains coming from those distant destinations, in order to get the high throughput of trains that we need through central London to make this scheme viable, have to present very accurately at the tunnel mouth. We only have a 30 or 40 second window within which the train needs to present and that is quite difficult even when we have got an almost self-contained system, but when you have trains coming from Cambridge and Ipswich and places like that, to get them to present on time to allow those high levels of throughput through the central area is something that has not been achieved anywhere yet, as far as we have been able to establish, in the world, and we have done a fairly comprehensive search to see if anybody can do that.

6759. MS LIEVEN: Finally, sir, to explain our position, a good deal was said by Mr Schabas about Reading, although it is difficult to see quite what that has to do with the Residents' Association of Mayfair. Obviously, there will be Petitioners later in the process when we will be coming to deal specifically with Reading, and I would suggest that it is both fair and sensible to reserve the response on the Reading issues until the people specifically interested in Reading are here.

6760. CHAIRMAN: I can assure you that that is how we see the case.

6761. MS LIEVEN: We do not accept what Mr Schabas has said but I am not going to ask Mr Berryman to deal with it now if that is acceptable to the Committee.

6762. MR PUGH-SMITH: This is where we try and achieve a contortionist act in getting you to answer questions either put to the back of your neck or you turn round to me with your back to the Committee, but if you manage the logistics I will be grateful. You are familiar, are you, with the environmental assessment process?

(Mr Berryman) I am, yes.

6763. Since when have you been familiar with it, Mr Berryman?

(Mr Berryman) I could not tell you the date. It is something which has grown gradually throughout my career. When I started work in the 1970s environmental assessment was almost non-existent.

6764. The process which now operates under the Directive as transposed in the 1999 Regulations; are you familiar with that process?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, I am.

6765. So you are familiar with the need to ensure that members of the public as well as the decision-maker (in this case Parliament) are sufficiently informed about decisions that have gone to the formulation of the project?

(Mr Berryman) Yes.

6766. Yes. Have you got Section 6 of the Environmental Statement to hand?

(Mr Berryman) I do not have it to hand, I am afraid, no.

6767. Can I ask you this: does that constitute what has been published to the decision-making body and to the general public in terms of your organisation's consideration of route development and alternatives?

(Mr Berryman) The Environmental Statement generally covers those issues, yes.

6768. Is it what has been published, Mr Berryman, was the question I put to you?

(Mr Berryman) Yes.

6769. Yes. So where in that document (because I have flicked through it) is there any reference to this NATA assessment carried out on these various alternatives.

(Mr Berryman) I do not have the document in front of me unfortunately. Certainly in the generality there are statements made that the NATA method has been used.

6770. CHAIRMAN: Have we got that?

6771. MS LIEVEN: I have got it, sir, and perhaps it might be sensible to give it to Mr Berryman as he is being asked about it.

6772. MR PUGH-SMITH: Break your position, Mr Berryman. Help me please, where in Chapter 6 do I find this NATA comparative assessment that you have told the Committee this afternoon you have undertaken with regard to these various alternatives?

(Mr Berryman) It is not set out in that format here. This is a summary of the results.

6773. Where would I get that document? It is not referred to in any reference or appendices?

(Mr Berryman) I cannot tell you offhand.

6774. No, well, that would suggest to me that it was not in the public domain and not accessible.

(Mr Berryman) I cannot answer that question offhand. I would have to check up on that.

6775. That might be rather important in view of the consequences that follow when information is not disclosed to the public. As far as alternatives are concerned, am I right in assuming that the Promoters of this project have simply responded to suggestions put forward by others as to alternatives? Would that be right?

(Mr Berryman) As far as the central section is concerned, no, that is not correct.

6776. I see.

(Mr Berryman) We have also looked at another alignment which has not been mentioned here which was one which was proposed for the original Jubilee Line Extension before it was moved. Outside the central area we have looked at probably two or three dozen alternatives.

6777. But my understanding is that the way in which this document is structured is that those which are the alternatives that you have considered are those which are there set out. Is that right?

(Mr Berryman) Certainly these are the ones we have considered in most detail, yes.

6778. Yes, well, in terms of the decision-maker again and the general public where is the comparator assessment of these various alternatives other than in the form we have here which is three pages of text at most and a plan?

(Mr Berryman) I would have to check whether it is in the back-up papers. I am sure you are aware that the total Environmental Statement is a huge document.

6779. Indeed so.

(Mr Berryman) I do not have it all to my fingertips.

6780. And that is the reason why a non-technical summary is also provided to ensure that those who are less familiar with wading through voluminous appendices know where to look for the information?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, that is so.

6781. And the only two alternatives that are identified are those which you have shown, and that is the original northern alignment promoted by the Residents' Association and the river route, the Superlink?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, that is correct. Yes, those are the ones which we took forward in most detail. There is an issue here about how one does analyse alternatives. If you can see quickly that an alternative is not going anywhere you do not take it to the final degree of analysis. It does not make economic sense to do that.

6782. That may be the case, Mr Berryman, but as Mr Schabas told us when he was involved with Channel Tunnel Rail Link, they looked at numerous alternatives including minor alternatives to see whether the best route could actually be put forward.

(Mr Berryman) That is true.

6783. And that is an exercise that you have not done, is it not, Mr Berryman?

(Mr Berryman) No, that is not the case. We have looked at a very large number of alternative alignments. It happens that in the central section there is a limit to how many alternatives one can look at because the physicality of London means there are only a limited number of alternatives.

6784. Have you looked at the Wigmore alignment which takes in Cavendish Square as part of your consideration?

(Mr Berryman) We have not looked at that in the same detail as we looked at the other two, certainly.

6785. That suggests that you have not considered the alternatives adequately, does it not?

(Mr Berryman) Well, not to me, no, because the features of that alignment are substantially the same as the Baker Street alignment. It is probably slightly better in that it relieves the Victoria Line a little bit but not really significantly so.

6786. The Wigmore alignment/the Wigmore shift, as Mr Wimbourne suggested this afternoon, would utilise Cavendish Square as a station?

(Mr Berryman) It would, yes.

6787. And where do I find in Chapter 6 any reference to Cavendish Square in that section as part of your consideration of alternatives?

(Mr Berryman) You would not find it there, no. It is not there.

6788. Or whether or not Cavendish Square would be a more suitable place for a work site than Hanover Square, for example, again another comparative exercise. We do not find it, do we, Mr Berryman?

(Mr Berryman) No analysis has been done of Cavendish Square. A superficial analysis would indicate there would not be very much difference but certainly no analysis has been done.

6789. No. Bearing in mind the environmental impacts that will take place finding the least worst option can be significant, can it not?

(Mr Berryman) Indeed it can, that is what it is all about.

6790. In terms of whether or not a scheme is going to have a heavier compensation bill to have to fund or not, for example?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, but whichever option you take, if you take the Cavendish Square option you will still be affecting the same number of landowners albeit different ones than in the Mayfair option.

6791. How do you know that, Mr Berryman?

(Mr Berryman) Simply by looking at a plan of London.

6792. With the greatest respect, you just told the Committee a few minutes ago that you have not actually looked into Cavendish Square so how can you express an informed view?

(Mr Berryman) You can express an informed view simply by looking at an A-Z. You do not need to take it any further than that.

6793. Not even a land ownership map the investigation of land registry titles, and things like that?

(Mr Berryman) Generally speaking, the distribution of the different kinds of property across the area immediately to the north of Oxford Street and immediately to the south of Oxford Street is not much different.

6794. I see. Of course, one of the benefits also of having an alignment north of Oxford Street is there are commercial opportunities, are there not, as well? You can link in other shops as they have done at Bond Street. Have you looked at that?

(Mr Berryman) You certainly could do that if you came fairly close to Oxford Street. I do not think you could do it at Cavendish Square, you would be too far back. The answer is no. Our Bill is about promoting the railway. Any commercial opportunities which arise incidentally to that can be considered but we are specifically precluded from promoting matters relating to commercial development, as I think you know.

6795. I see. Mr Berryman, the evidence to this Committee is that no commercial opportunities are being considered as part of the funding of the railway?

(Mr Berryman) No, that is not what I said. I said we are only allowed to consider taking powers for building the railway. If there are commercial opportunities as a result of taking those powers, of course they will be considered, but that is different from what you just said.

6796. Of course, commercial opportunities again are reflected in the extent to which a scheme is commercially attractive and capable of funding; agreed?

(Mr Berryman) They are but they are a very minor consideration.

6797. I will move to one other matter and that is operational issues. You were talking to the Committee about concerns about platform waiting and the potential for overcrowding. My understanding, and indeed it remained unchallenged when Mr Schabas raised it, is that only one in six trains is going to go to Heathrow. Is that right?

(Mr Berryman) Only one in six trains is going to go to Heathrow, that is correct, yes.

6798. So as five trains go by there will be a growing number of people on the platform waiting to go to Heathrow, will there not, by way of example?

(Mr Berryman) There may be and that is probably not a very desirable feature of our scheme, but ten of those 24 trains will be going to Ealing Broadway and other intermediate stations on the way, so most of the passengers for that branch will be able to get on the first train that comes along.

6799. If so directed?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, if so directed, but the majority of them will not be going to Heathrow. Perhaps it is worth just pointing out that the actual passenger numbers going to Heathrow will be relatively low for a railway of this type. The demand at Heathrow is really not enough to fill Crossrail trains on anything more than four trains an hour.

6800. Again, that is further work you have undertaken, is it?

(Mr Berryman) It is indeed. We have done a very considerable amount of work on this.

6801. So in terms of the modelling exercise, in terms of passenger origin and destination there is survey material, is there, that is available to be inspected?

(Mr Berryman) There is a huge amount of back-up material to this Environmental Statement which I think is available in the form of CDs and the like.

6802. So amongst that will be of course such matters as construction disruption as well, would there?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, indeed.

6803. I see and that is all available, is it?

(Mr Berryman) That is all available, yes.

6804. And where does one find it, Mr Berryman?

(Mr Berryman) I cannot tell you off the top of my head. I was not expecting to give evidence this afternoon.

6805. Well, you have that pleasure.

(Mr Berryman) But we will certainly write to you and tell you where it is.

6806. MR PUGH-SMITH: That will be very helpful to know because again, as I say, the Environmental Assessment does lead one up a few cul-de-sacs in that regard. Thank you very much.

 

Examined by THE COMMITTEE

6807. CHAIRMAN: Mr Berryman, can I bring you back to the Environmental Statement and what you said in relation to the alignment proposed by the previous witness, the loop line from Bond Street up to King's Cross-Euston-St Pancras. You said that would alleviate the Victoria Line. I am not sure because, as you know, the Euston-St Pancras-King's Cross loop has the Piccadilly, the District, the Circle and the Victoria Line, and it strikes me that the outer alignment would distribute more people on to those already overcrowded lines significantly?

(Mr Berryman) Yes without doing a proper analysis, it is hard to say, but it kind of follows the desire of some people to go down towards that part of the West End. I would expect it to be a second order effect and not to be hugely significant.

6808. The reason I am asking that is because one of the arguments that has been put is that people would use predominantly Crossrail trying to get into this inner circle of Bond Street or through to the City itself. It would strike me that if Crossrail went on that loop it would become a distribution point on those lines which are already there in existence and that would be considerable.

(Mr Berryman) Yes.

6809. One other thing, you did say that, all told, you had examined a couple of dozen different alignments.

(Mr Berryman) Mainly in outer parts of London.

6810. Could we get some sort of list of the ones that have been carried out, either briefly or in depth?

(Mr Berryman) Yes.

6811. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

6812. MR BINLEY: I have six questions and I apologise for that again but you will know that the third reading has not taken place and we have got a lot of work to do collectively as Members of Parliament. My first question is with regard to pressure on a specific route. It was told to us that on 16/02/02 that Mr Schabas was told "they do not want any delays because of Government pressure". Thereafter, it was told to us that Mr Montague said in October 2004, "I really have no locus to consider alternatives". My concern about all of this is that here we are with a massive scheme, one of the biggest Parliament has ever dealt with, which will create immense disruption over a long period of time. My concern is that there was a route which had to have quite a bit of work done on it and that there was pressure to stay with that route because that would be more cost effective at this time. Am I right in thinking that or can you tell me why that is not the case?

(Mr Berryman) I have never picked that up. When we did the east/west study we looked at three really fundamental alternatives and each of those alternatives had a sub-variant. The three that we looked at were something along the present line that we have got, something along the 1980s preserved line; something which went into the centre of London and then turned south west and went down towards Clapham Junction and that area; and something which went from Clapham Junction up to the north east, up to Hackney and that way, and a combination of the two, so any permutation of two out of four branches.

6813. My question was about pressure. If we have got two statements, one in 2001 and one in 2004, which suggest first of all that there was Government pressure and secondly that there was no alternative to the line, how do you interpret that if you do not interpret it as pressure?

(Mr Berryman) Going into Adrian Montague's review, as I understand it, and I think I can understand it correctly, his brief was to see if the scheme that we brought forward was viable. He was specifically not there to examine alternatives, he was just looking at is it worth Government proceeding to the next stage. The earlier one, I am not quite sure where that came from in because I know Mr Schabas' evidence but I cannot remember the context.

6814. My question is a rather subjective question, I recognise that, and I understand why you would not have the information. My second question is with regard to the cost of alternatives in that you made a specific statement to Mr Schabas in your letter of 30 September 2002: "On this basis we have arrived at a projected cost of £18 billion or approximately three times the cost." I reckon that takes into account all of the additions that Mr Schabas said. Thereafter, you recently said that the difference in the central part of Crossrail is not very great and, in fact, the scheme Mr Schabas has put forward today on behalf of the Mayfair residents might be cheaper.

(Mr Berryman) Indeed, particularly if you miss the station out.

6815. Can you tell me then why when he asked for a breakdown of estimates and so forth in your letter of 16 October 2002 you really did not give a very fulsome answer to costs of alternatives, did you? You did not even suggest that papers were available that he could look at, or whatever?

(Mr Berryman) That is correct.

6816. If I got that answer as a politician I would be a bit suspicious. Why did you not give him more information than you gave in this rather evasive answer dated 16 October 2002?

(Mr Berryman) Mr Schabas is rather a persistent correspondent, as I think you have probably guessed.

6817. Is there anything wrong with that?

(Mr Berryman) Rightly or wrongly, I was just trying to close the discussion down.

6818. Would it not have been easier to close it down by saying "Here are the figures"?

(Mr Berryman) It would not have closed it down; he would have come back and argued.

6819. My third question is the evidence relating to catchment and the fare box income and that is specifically relating to the situation of Liverpool Street because you state in one of your letters - and I hope I can find it very quickly but I think I am right and you did talk about this - I wanted to know how much you were referring to Liverpool Street when you answered this letter on 13/09/02 because I got the impression that when we were arguing that there would be more pressure on Liverpool Street your arguments were couched in the vein that there would not be that much more pressure on Liverpool Street.

(Mr Berryman) Can you refresh my memory on what I said?

6820. "It does not relieve the most grossly overcrowded sections of the rail network which are on the LUL lines." You further added to my thoughts that you were talking about Liverpool Street when you talked specifically about that section between Liverpool Street and a bit further out to the east.

(Mr Berryman) Stratford?

6821. Yes. I am getting two impressions.

(Mr Berryman) There are two separate issues. They are related but they are separate. One is the crowdedness of the trains and one is the number of people emerging from the station. Much of the overcrowding on those trains is caused by people who are going beyond Liverpool Street, they do not all get off at Liverpool Street by any stretch of the imagination. I am sure Members of the Committee will be familiar with the Victoria Line which passes through Warren Street. The Victoria Line going through Warren Street is a very, very heavily trafficked railway but Warren Street station itself, the Victoria Line part of it, is used very little. I am not suggesting that Liverpool Street is the same as Warren Street, I am just pointing out that the fact that a train is overcrowded does not necessarily mean the people emerging from that particular station will be that many.

6822. I am not sure I understood that but never mind. I have just two very quick questions. The first question is has your costing taken into account on the main route the cost of compensation?

(Mr Berryman) Yes.

6823. Did it take into account an estimation of disruption costs during the length of construction of Crossrail?

(Mr Berryman) In what kind of ----

6824. If I run a business near to Crossrail and my business is going to be adversely affected, as no doubt it will in one way or another, by what is going to be sizeable disruption, would that have been taken into account?

(Mr Berryman) I cannot answer that generally, it would be on a case-by-case basis.

6825. Forgive me, I asked a specific question. Was that costing taken into account in the costs you projected for the cost of Crossrail, because it is a cost, is it not?

(Mr Berryman) It is a cost.

6826. It is a direct cost.

(Mr Berryman) I would have to get Mr Smith to give evidence on that point.

6827. I am happy with a letter from you.

(Mr Berryman) We will look at that. I genuinely do not know the answer to that question.

6828. SIR PETER SOULSBY: Mr Berryman, can I go back over one of the questions asked earlier on. Is it the case that in the summary, and perhaps in the full environmental appraisal, the only alternatives to the central section you discussed were those shown to us in the extract of the plan that we saw earlier on identified by the names of those who proposed the alternatives?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, those were the ones that we looked at in detail.

6829. So the only two that were discussed were the ones described as put forward by the Residents' Association of Mayfair and Super Crossrail?

(Mr Berryman) Yes.

6830. Those were the only ones that were described in the environmental appraisal?

(Mr Berryman) It is worth bearing in mind that those two organisations were not linked at that time, they were completely separate proposals which came in from the two parties.

6831. It is fair to say that you were reacting to proposals put forward by third parties?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, that would be fair comment. As I said, in the initial study we did look at a number of alternatives.

6832. When you came to the environmental appraisal, the alternatives that you discussed, whether in detail or in outline, were those that were being put forward by third parties who responded then?

(Mr Berryman) That is correct.

6833. Can I just clarify from you just how much of the detail of that assessment was put in the public domain?

(Mr Berryman) Very little. It was shared with the people who proposed it and, as Mr Schabas has told you, we employed him for a time to work with us on developing his proposal. Certainly the other proposal was shared with the Residents' Association of Mayfair, but they were not put into the public domain in the sense that anybody could get hold of them.

6834. So it is fair to say in both the summary and the detail of the environmental appraisal the assessment, the detailed assessment, would not have been put into the public domain?

(Mr Berryman) Certainly the detailed design work we had done was not. I would have to check what detail went into the back-up documents for the Environmental Statement. I suspect the answer to your question is no, it was not, but I would need to check.

 

Re-examined by MS LIEVEN

6835. MS LIEVEN: Just on Sir Peter's question first. Can you look - I will hand you my copy - at volume five of the Environmental Statement, table 1.1. We will put it up on the screen. If we look at paragraph two, table 1.1 is setting out the contents of an Environmental Statement as required by the EIA regulations. The first column on the left is the legal requirement: "The legal requirement in terms of alternatives as set out at paragraph two is an outline of the main alternatives studied by the applicant or appellant and an indication of the main reasons for this choice taking into account the environmental effect" and then there is a summary in the right-hand column of what we have done. In the ES first: in terms of what was done in the ES do you consider that it meets the legal requirement to provide an outline of the main alternative study?

(Mr Berryman) Yes, it certainly provides an outline of the main alternative study.

6836. So far as further information in the public domain is concerned, we heard reference from Mr Schabas to a report on Super Crossrail and Superlink which was produced, I believe, by CLRL in May 2005, is that correct?

(Mr Berryman) That is correct, yes.

6837. I think that is the report? (Same indicated)

(Mr Berryman) That is the one, yes.

6838. It obviously postdates the ES, there is no doubt about that, but is that document in the public domain?

(Mr Berryman) My recollection is that it is posted on our website and if it is not it is certainly posted on Mr Schabas' website.

6839. Just one other question in response to a question asked by Mr Binley. That was about the suggestion made by Mr Schabas that there was political pressure, although it was not clear placed upon whom, to maintain the original safeguarded route and not go elsewhere. My notes of Mr Schabas' evidence give a reference to a meeting of 17 January, although I have not managed to note the year, in which you were reported as saying that you were not looking into alternative routes because political pressure had been placed and there was no time. To what degree are you conscious, on your own primary evidence, of political pressure to pursue a particular route?

(Mr Berryman) I have never been under any political pressure to pursue any route, this one or any other route. There has occasionally been concern about time but never any particular route specified. As far as the people employing me are concerned, they have been most supportive of the approach we have taken. When we have suggested looking at alternatives, and I am talking mainly about the outer area, we have never had anybody saying, "You cannot do that, there is not enough time".

6840. MS LIEVEN: Thank you very much, Mr Berryman.

6841. CHAIRMAN: Just one question before you go, Mr Berryman. You mentioned that you had had some liaison on the river route with the Environment Agency.

(Mr Berryman) That is right.

6842. I presume also the Port of London Authority because it has responsibility in part for that route.

(Mr Berryman) Yes, that is why I said one of my colleagues who dealt with that is not here today so I could not ask him but it was the relevant authorities.

6843. I do know on most of that the Environment Agency has full environmental rights, but there is the other authority. I wonder if you could write us a note on their objections to the river route.

(Mr Berryman) Yes, certainly. I can tell you briefly about that. They were suggesting that it would increase the risk of flooding upstream and that was the issue they were very concerned about.

6844. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Mr Pugh-Smith, how long do you think you will need for summary?

6845. MR PUGH-SMITH: I will be under five minutes, sir. I have a logistical problem: I have to be in Cardiff later on this evening and if it is possible to get completed by five o'clock or thereabouts I would be very grateful.

6846. CHAIRMAN: That is entirely in your hands!

6847. MR PUGH-SMITH: I appreciate that and I will be very brief.

6848. CHAIRMAN: Ms Lieven?

6849. MS LIEVEN: I will do my best, sir, two minutes.

6850. CHAIRMAN: We have the most important people in the building here, the stenographers, and we have only got agreement until five.

6851. MS LIEVEN: I appreciate that, sir. I will keep it extremely brief. As I understand it there are three principal issues raised by the Residents' Association: failure to consider alternative alignments; the EIA requirements; and compensation.

6852. So far as the issue of alternative alignments is concerned, you have just heard the evidence of Mr Berryman. It is important to focus on the legal requirement, which is not to set out in the ES every alternative but to deal with an outline of the main alternatives. That is done in the Environmental Statement.

6853. So far as our consideration of alternatives is concerned, we have over the past years considered alternatives in very considerable detail and at the end of the day it comes down to a professional appraisal that the alternative schemes do not provide sufficient additional benefits, and in most cases provide no additional benefit and, indeed, additional disbenefit. In particular, they do not believe the overcrowding on the Central Line, they produced other problems on other lines, and in terms of the river route they produced significant construction problems as well. You have heard Mr Berryman's evidence on it and we also dealt with it briefly in opening at Day 1, paragraphs 58-60. Sir, can I suggest that we have this report which deals with the alternatives in much more detail copied and circulated to the Committee so that if Members do have any concerns about more detailed points they can look at the report.

6854. So far as the EIA requirements are concerned, we dealt with that in opening at Day 1, paragraph 137. The ES at volume one, chapter six, pages 112-127 does meet the legal requirements to consider the main alternatives in outline. Importantly, as Mr Elvin made clear in opening, the fact that an ES does not provide the level of detail on a particular point that a particular objector wants does not make it an invalid ES. We say we have entirely met the legal requirements.

6855. Finally, sir, on compensation, the evidence that Mr Winborne gave, as Mr Winborne very freely accepted in evidence-in-chief, comes back to an attack on the National Compensation Code. We call it a code but, of course, it is made up of different legislative pieces, we all know that by now, but Mr Winborne quite freely accepts what he is seeking is a change in the national law at this point and, as we have said again and again in our submission, it is not appropriate for this Committee to do that, it would be quite wrong to change the law in relation to those affected by Crossrail and not those affected by other schemes elsewhere. It is right that compensation should be provided consistently across the United Kingdom in accordance with the will of Parliament. Can I just refer you to Mr Elvin's closing on Smithfield Traders at Day 14, paragraphs 4041-4049 where we dealt with that comprehensively.

6856. CHAIRMAN: I think that is a fair summary but may I remind you also the Committee has the right to look at all evidence that is presented before it and to have a view. Whether or not it is a direction is another matter, but we can certainly give a view.

6857. MS LIEVEN: So far as compensation is concerned, it has been raised by a lot of Petitioners and I suspect it will be one of those points that we will come back to briefly in our final closing at the end of this process, whenever that should be, so we can pull together all the points that have been made. I do not want to keep repeating the same point every couple of days, it is going to get tedious.

6858. CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Ms Lieven. Mr Pugh-Smith?

6859. MR PUGH-SMITH: Thank you very much. Chairman, as I explained when I opened the case on behalf of the Residents' Society on 30 March, the issue that was in front of you was an issue of alternatives and so I raise the same point in closing and put matters in their appropriate context starting with the requirements of the environmental assessment directive and the EIA regulations for England. Parliament is the decision-maker. You can form a view as to whether or not alternatives have been adequately considered. We point to the fact that the consideration of the Environmental Statement is sketchy, to put it at its most benign, and inadequate substantively, to put it at its most precise. The very information you were told blandly by Mr Berryman this afternoon which could be available is not available, or if it is available it is hidden away in such a form that it is not readily accessed. You were promised a document that was a response to the Superlink proposal and in fact we have provided it for you already, it is exhibit 15 in your bundle, the 25 pages that Mr Schabas said did not actually provide substantive answers to the points that he had raised.

6860. Members, I have to put it to you that really what you are being faced with today is a stark reality: of a scheme that has not been adequately considered. There are questions as to the legality of the Environmental Statement. I simply raise this because they are capable of cure. As Mr Elvin pointed out on Day One, there have already been two supplementary addenda to the Environmental Statement and all my clients seek today is for you to suggest to the Promoters, in somewhat more forceful terms than we can, that they look at these alternatives properly before this Bill is allowed to proceed further - certainly before it comes to the third reading, if necessary (in response to Mr Binley's point).

6861. The reason why we raise the question of compensation is it is not just how the system is going to operate, it is its impact upon those residents and businesses which are going to be affected day-on-day for the future life of this railway. If the compensation bill can be less, as Mr Winbourne has indicated, simply by appropriate measures being taken, why not take them? Why not study them now? Why leave this all till later to find there are disadvantaged people not having sufficient money even though the compensation code is being applied which may be one that is nationally based but, nonetheless, is one which has been recognised by the Law Commission as being in such need of reform that it has produced two volumes of very detailed work which will await Parliamentary time for consideration in terms of the substantive Bill.

6862. Members, that is the position in which my clients wish to place this matter in this context at this time. We ask you to recommend to the Promoters that there be further consideration of the alternatives so that Parliament as well as the nation have the reassurance that what finally gets passed as an Act of Parliament, if it ever does, is not only in the national interest but is the best value to this country, not only in terms of utilisation of taxpayers' money but, also, in terms of having the least environmental effects. Thank you very much.

6863. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed. Tomorrow morning, at 10.00 am in this room, we will recommence firstly to hear the Petitions of the Regent Street Association, followed then by the London Borough of Havering and we will then return, at 2.30 tomorrow afternoon, to hear the case put by Antique Hypermarket Limited and then return, if necessary, to the London Borough of Havering case.