Select Committee on Regulatory Reform First Special Report


2  Background

12. In analysing Part 1 of the Bill, we thought it would be useful to outline the different forms of delegated legislation and the benefits of the Regulatory Reform Orders (RROs) and also critically to assess two crucial reports that form much of the Government's case for the Bill.

Delegated legislation and the Regulatory Reform Orders

13. Delegated or secondary legislation (also called subordinate legislation) is law that Ministers are able to make under powers granted by the relevant parent Act. Normally, it consists of statutory instruments, types of which include orders and regulations. The instruments, which usually implement and administer specified requirements of the parent Act, must be based on those specific areas of the law as set out in the primary legislation. By its nature, delegated legislation is particularly apt for technical matters, such as the level of fees or other technical requirements, which commonly do not need to be specified in the primary legislation and which may need to be changed frequently. Delegation has enabled those changes to be achieved without recourse to primary legislation.

14. The Deregulation and Contracting-out Act 1994 introduced an innovation: "Deregulation Orders", a form of delegated legislation that enabled Ministers to amend or repeal primary legislation even where there was no other explicit provision in the original primary legislation to be amended to confer such powers. This increase in power was counterbalanced by restricting the scope of Deregulation Orders to a number of areas of only moderate political interest or administrative importance. The Regulatory Reform Act 2001 (RRA) extended these powers further, enabling a wider range of "burdens" to be addressed by means of Regulatory Reform Orders (RROs). Although the RRA gave Ministers greater flexibility in the use of the order making procedure, its scope and power were still limited by the requirement to provide for the removal of burdens in relation to carrying out activities.

15. As regards the parliamentary procedures for handling such orders, these have remained essentially unchanged since 1994. The Minister lays the proposal for a RRO and this proposal is automatically referred to a committee of each House (the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) in this House and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in the Lords). The Minister is then prohibited from laying a draft order for 60 (calendar) days during which the Parliamentary Committees consider each proposal against a set of criteria.[11] In the case of the RRC, it assesses each order against 14 criteria (set out in S.O. No.141(6)), including whether the proposal appears to make an inappropriate use of delegated legislation, removes or reduces a burden or the authorisation or requirement of a burden; continues any necessary protection; and has taken account of adequate consultation. During the 60 day period of scrutiny, both Parliamentary Committees may receive and take note of representations made to them about the proposal by any interested party. Each Committee independently reports its views on the proposal and publishes a first stage report. That is necessarily implicit from the legislation.

16. In their reports, the Committees may recommend either that the draft order proceed as proposed, that it is not proceeded with or that the proposal be amended before the draft order is laid. Having considered the reports of the Committees, the Minister may then lay a draft order proper, which is then (as a result of the Standing Orders) the subject of a second stage report from each committee. In the case of the RRC, it is required to report within 15 (sitting) days as to whether it recommends that the order should be approved. A debate in the House is automatically triggered if the Committee divides when making its recommendation on a draft order. If the Government wishes to overturn a Committee recommendation not to proceed with the order, then more time would be set aside for debate. In short, the RRC can trigger a debate on draft orders when dividing, but does not have a veto over whether or not an order should proceed. The RRO procedure therefore provides the Government with an effective means for repealing and amending primary legislation imposing burdens without the necessity of taking a Bill through the various parliamentary stages.

17. Not surprisingly, when approving this order making procedure in 2001, Parliament decided that Ministers could only use these exceptional order making powers after a number of legal tests had been satisfied, which narrowly defined the use of the power. For example, the procedure could only be used if the specific legislation being amended was not less than two years old or had not been amended within the previous two years. In addition, although not included in the RRA, the Minister accepted in debate that additionally the procedure would only be used for measures that the Minister and Parliamentary committees agreed were suitable for delegated legislation.

18. According to the Government, these and other restrictions have had the effect of unnecessarily obstructing the use of the procedure, with the result that departments are discouraged from adopting the procedure to implement much needed regulatory reform, or are delayed in adopting it. For some time, the Government has repeatedly suggested ways of widening the scope and power of the procedure. For example, last year the then Minister suggested removing or relaxing a number of the limitations. The current Bill gives effect to those changes that the Government has been seeking in a way that is wider than was apparent during the lead up to the Bill.

Benefits and of RROs

19. Since 2001, 27 orders have been approved under the RRA covering a variety of subjects, including for example particular aspects of consumer protection law relating to trading stamps and fire safety. Both parliamentary committees rejected the Government's order relating to civil registration on the grounds that it was inappropriate for delegated legislation. The details on the made orders are set out in Appendix 1.

20. The RRO procedure has two obvious benefits. First, it provides an alternative to the Bill procedure for amending or repealing primary legislation while providing a mechanism for detailed scrutiny both inside and outside Parliament. Because of the statutory requirement to put proposals for RROs out to public consultation, bodies that are most likely to be affected by legislative changes are directly consulted. The current RRO procedure is not a fast track option. The RRC has consistently resisted the notion that it was in the business of providing the Government with a fast track procedure. Instead, the RRC has worked on the understanding that its duty, as defined by its Standing Orders, is to undertake effective scrutiny of RROs. Sometimes, as the previous Committee noted, this may result in RROs receiving more detailed parliamentary scrutiny than the same provisions would have received if they had been included in a large Bill. In our view, we consider this to be effective scrutiny and a strength of the current RRO process, not a weakness.

21. A second benefit of the RRO procedure is that it helps the Government to deliver its better regulation agenda, which is aimed at simplifying necessary burdens and reducing unnecessary bureaucracy. As evidenced by the benefits presented in individual Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) that accompany each proposal, the RRO procedure is capable of delivering real economic benefits. For example, it was estimated that the Regulatory Reform (Special Occasions Licensing) Order 2002 would benefit businesses to the sum of £9 million per year.

22. Despite their attractions, however, the true potential of RROs has not yet been fully realised. As the following table indicates, the number of orders made has consistently fallen below the Government's own targets.

Table 1

RRO performance against successive PSA targets
Financial year ending Target announced Actual and cumulative number of RROs
200140 (by end of 2003 calendar year) 1 (1)
200260 ("by end of 2005") 7 (8)
200360 ("by end of 2005") 8 (16)
200475 ("by March 2008") 4 (20)
200575 ("by March 2008") 7 (27)

Notes: As at 20 July 2005

Source: HC 8 Dec 2004, c578W; and Review

Review of the Working of the 2001 RRA

23. As noted above, during the passage of the 2001 Bill, the Government made a commitment that it would undertake a Review of the working of the 2001 Act within three years of that Act coming into force. Given the low numbers of RROs, a review would provide the Government with an opportunity to establish why the number of orders had fallen consistently below their target numbers. Unfortunately, the Government decided to delay the launch of its promised review on the grounds that the ability of the Act had to be tested against more RROs, especially large reforms. Finally, on 20 July 2005, following pressure from our previous Committee, the Government eventually published its Review of the RRA along with a consultation document entitled A Bill for Better Regulation. Although the review identified many positive aspects to the Regulatory Reform Order process, it argued that the RRA unnecessarily limited the scope of reforms that could be delivered through this procedure, and thereby inhibited the more rapid implementation of the Government's "Better Regulation" initiatives. According to the review, departments had found the regulatory reform procedure disproportionately complex with legal constraints being unnecessarily burdensome. For example, the review found that departments were critical of the rule that prevents RROs being used to amend or repeal legislation that is less than two years old or which has been amended within that period. Department also found the absence of an express power to include powers of sub-delegation within RROs excessively restrictive and criticised the restrictions relating to the legal concepts of "burden" and "activity" as used in the RRA. The review also cited as a problem the time spent by Parliament scrutinising the proposals, especially during the first stage scrutiny period.

24. Overall, the review added little, if anything, to the points already raised by the Government in correspondence with our previous Committee, which was the subject of a Committee report.[12] The review also suffered a number of weaknesses. First, it lacked any detailed analysis of the working of the RRA. Instead, the review seemed to rely largely on unsourced anecdotal evidence, which may have included comments from departments that had little if any direct experience of the RRO process. Second, the review failed to reappraise the Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) that had been published alongside each RRO. This weakness was subsequently acknowledged in oral evidence by the Minister:

    "In terms of any analysis of previous estimates, it is a fair point to say that not enough work has been done either by the Cabinet Office or by other departments in terms of retrospectively validating the proposed savings and efficiencies from RROs and the impact assessments. If I were to be brutally frank, I think that is a weakness in the system. Impact assessments in advance suggest likely savings and likely efficiencies and there is not a retrospective challenge as to whether that impact assessment has been accurate in its proposed savings plan. I think that is a piece of work on which Cabinet Office and departments across government have to do a good deal more work. I think that is one of the lessons from this process that should be learned."

25. We recommend that, as a matter of urgency, the Cabinet Office should retrospectively assess the estimates of costs and benefits that have previously been submitted to the House for each RRO with a view to establishing whether or not the estimated savings have been realised and that, if the savings cannot be validated, the Cabinet Office should investigate why and suggest how the RIA process or the delivery of benefits itself could be improved.

26. The most disappointing aspect of the review was its failure to address the problems that departments have in a) identifying promptly measures suitable for RROs and b) successfully presenting them to Parliament. For example, the figures in table 2 show that even for completed RROs, relatively little time of each RRO is spent undergoing Parliamentary scrutiny compared with the time spent within departments. The reasons for the failure to make full use of the RRA procedure have never been clear. A possible reason for the inertia that Departments show when it comes to identifying and delivering RROs could be the low political importance attached to RROs by officials and Ministers compared with that associated with being involved on a Bill team. For example the career advantages that civil servants obtain as Bill leaders, which the Minister identified, may be far less evident when its comes to taking an RRO through. Unfortunately, the review did not report any work on overcoming this cultural bias. Our previous committee saw merit in requiring departments to publish annual results of their efforts to remove unnecessary regulations. We note that for the next year departments will have to publish simplification proposals. Although these will be welcome, we reaffirm the recommendation of our predecessor Committee that Departments should be assessed on their progress in removing unnecessary regulations and controls and not simply on their progress in simplifying measures. We recommend accordingly.

Consultation document and responses

27. The consultation document, which was published alongside the review, invited comments on a number of Government proposals. Part 1 of the document focussed on proposals to widen the scope of the RRA and to make the procedure easier to remove or amend legislation that the Government considers outdated, unnecessary or too complicated. Part two contained the separate proposals relating to the regulatory framework that were based on the Hampton Review - Less is more.[13] The consultation document listed a number of consultees, the vast majority being business or industry interests. The two parliamentary committees, ourselves and our sister Committee in the Lords (Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform and the Regulatory Reform Committee) were listed as consultees to the consultation document. The consultation period, which officially ended on Wednesday 12 October, lasted for the duration of the summer recess. At our meeting on 12 October, we agreed to decline the invitation to respond to the public consultation, preferring to wait until we had seen the Bill, but decided to request early sight of the responses to the consultation. The Lords' Committee also decided not to respond with a substantive response to the consultation.

28. The Government helpfully supplied us with copies of some 70 individual responses to the consultation document on I November. However, we were concerned at initial reports that the Department's own analysis and summary of the responses would not be prepared for some three months after the closing date of the consultation period, during which time the Bill itself could have been presented. In the event, we were pleased to see the Department bring its publication date forward. The summary of responses was duly published on 14 December, the day after the Minister appeared in front of our Committee.

29. Overall, the responses to the consultation document helped the Government to identify general support for many of its proposals, especially those flowing from the Hampton Review. Unfortunately, the consultation exercise had a number of weaknesses.

30. First, a number of the questions were leading questions. The commentary often provided no context that might inform consultees about the potential downside of some of the proposals. For example, consultees were asked: "Do you think it is appropriate that the Regulatory Reform Orders (RRO) should be extended to allow the implementation of simplification measures and uncontroversial Law Commission reports?" It would have been helpful if accompanying this question some information had been set out outlining not only the potential benefits but also the potential costs or adverse effects of this proposal. "Is it desirable that all RROs should receive the same level of scrutiny, regardless of size or complexity?" was criticised by the Professional Contractors Group (PCG) in its submission as a leading question. The PCG made the point that all RROs should be thoroughly scrutinised and that it was unacceptable for RROs to be "nodded through". It also suggested that simple RROs should be subjected to thorough scrutiny and the more complex ones should be subjected to even greater scrutiny. A comment that we endorse.

31. Secondly, the document was very short on specifics. For example, the document did not identify any specific regulations that would be repealed or amended under the revised procedure that could not already be amended under the existing provisions.

32. Thirdly, the consultation document contained an ambiguity about the Government's proposals for RIAs. The text was unclear as to whether the Government was consulting on a proposal to replace the current requirement for detailed analysis of costs and savings with some general assessment of the wider benefits, which would have been be in line with the position that it was promoting last year, or whether it was actually consulting on a proposal to add a more general assessment of the wider effects to the current detailed analysis. When we questioned the Minister about this, he said he too was surprised when he saw this and had also misread the proposal in the same way. He added that "we are not doing it instead of, I think we have plans to do it as well as."[14] We welcome this clarification. We also note that a number of the consultees underlined the case for the Government providing detailed costs and benefits of various options.[15]

33. Fourthly, a number of the responses, especially those from businesses and trading associations, focused on the Hampton report proposals almost exclusively and supplied little if any detailed comment on the Government's specific proposals to widen the scope and power of the 2001 Act. This is not to criticise the individual submissions, but to simply point out that by requesting responses on specific proposals covering law reform and separate proposals relating to regulators the responses were always likely to be skewed one way or the other. In its submission, the Institute of Chartered Accountants (England and Wales) (ICAEW) made the compelling point that the consultation should have been presented as a major Law Reform Bill, not a Regulatory Reform Bill, and that the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) and not BRE should have undertaken the consultation. ICAEW expressed concern that DCA would have produced a different list of consultees, those more familiar with law reform. ICAEW concluded that the Government should either restrict the powers to regulatory reform or pursue its wide law making powers, but only through the DCA following a major consultation and a Law Reform Bill. We believe that the ICA also makes a compelling point.

34. Finally, the consultation document did not make clear how the provisions of the Bill would fit in with the similar provisions in Part 31 of the Company Law Reform Bill [HL] which provides for a general power to reform company law by order.

35. As regards the summary, although we welcomed its publication, we were surprised that the Cabinet Office did not deal point by point with the various points made by consultees, especially those that raised clear concerns. Instead of what would have been a more forensic approach, the Cabinet Office produced a general outline summary. While we recognise that the Government's brief summary could not cover all arguments, we nevertheless noted that the summary seemed disproportionately to highlight those submissions that provided strong support for the Department's proposals while giving much less attention to the reservations and concerns found in less favourable submissions. For example, the BRE's summary found space to even include quoted extracts from the highly supportive submission from the BR Taskforce, which has links with BRE, but seemed to find no space for the important concerns raised by the Law Society, ICA and the Advertising Authority. We are concerned that the BRE has published only its summary of the responses, but has not published the individual responses. Given the range of views expressed in the consultation submissions, and in the interests of completeness, we consider that the individual submissions be published on the BRE website alongside its brief summary. We recommend accordingly.


11   In calculating the 60 calendar days, no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than four days. Back

12   op. cit. Back

13   The Hampton Review measures are outside the scope of this report. Back

14   Q52 Back

15   It was pointed out that all options should be properly costed and close monitoring would allow comparisons to be made with the original RIA in order to establish validity of original RIA.  Back


 
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