SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. We recommend that, as a matter of urgency,
the Cabinet Office should retrospectively assess the estimates
of costs and benefits that have previously been submitted to the
House for each RRO with a view to establishing whether or not
the estimated savings have been realised and that, if the savings
cannot be validated, the Cabinet Office should investigate why
and suggest how the RIA process or the delivery of benefits itself
could be improved. (Paragraph 25)
2. We reaffirm the recommendation of our predecessor
Committee that Departments should be assessed on their progress
in removing unnecessary regulations and controls and not simply
on their progress in simplifying measures. We recommend accordingly.
(Paragraph 26)
3. Given the range of views expressed in the
consultation submissions, and in the interests of completeness,
we consider that the individual submissions be published on the
BRE website alongside its brief summary. We recommend accordingly.
(Paragraph 35)
4. We invite the House to consider whether
the Part 1 of the Bill should be amended to reserve further specified
areas from the scope of the new powers (and, if so, to identify
the areas to be reserved). (Paragraph 50)
5. We recommend that Part 1 of the Bill should
be amended to provide scope for an effective veto, on the following
basis:
first, during the preliminary period for procedural
consideration, it should be possible -
for either House of Parliament by resolution,
or
for the relevant committee of either House charged
with reporting on the order by recommendation (if not rejected
by House resolution),
not only to vary the Minister's recommended procedure
on a given draft order, but also to determine that the Part 1
procedure should not apply to it at all;
secondly, if that determination has been made,
no further draft order to the same effect (or to the same effect
but for modifications) should be laid within two years of the
determination date. (Paragraph 59)
6. We invite the House to consider whether
- in the case of super-affirmative instruments (however introduced
by the relevant Minister) - the Houses or their committees should
have their power of suggesting amendments reinforced by a provision
to the effect that, if the amendments were agreed by both Houses,
the Minister would either have to take the amendments on or discontinue
his proposal to legislate by order. (Paragraph 60)
7. We recommend that the Bill should be amended
to reinforce Parliamentary procedures in relation to Part 1 orders,
so as to reduce the risk of effective scrutiny being by-passed.
We offer three options (mutually exclusive in structural terms),
in ascending order of preference, for consideration by the House.
The first option is closest to the current text of the Bill, the
second goes further and the third further still. But none of
them fundamentally alters the Bill and none of them extends the
scrutiny period beyond what the Cabinet Office states that it
needs itself. (Paragraph 65)
8. We invite the House, as a first option,
to consider amending Part 1
- to change the 21 day time
limit (for not following the Minister's recommended procedure)
into a 30 day time limit, and then -
- to provide that the parliamentary time limits
for consideration of a Part 1 order should be adjustable upwards,
with a maximum adjustment of 30 days, on -
a resolution of either House, or
a recommendation of the responsible committee
of either House (not rejected by such a resolution). - (Paragraph
67)
9. We invite the House to consider, as a second
option providing for stronger reinforcement of Parliamentary control,
amending Part 1 -
- to remove the option of
negative procedure,
- to merge all time limits into a 60 day limit
both for scrutiny and for either House not to follow the Minister's
recommended procedure, and also
- to provide that the Parliamentary time limits
for consideration of a Part 1 order should be adjustable upwards,
with a maximum adjustment of 30 days, on
a resolution of either House, or
a recommendation of the responsible committee
of either House (not rejected by such a resolution). - (Paragraph
71)
10. We invite the House to consider, as a
third option providing for still stronger reinforcement of Parliamentary
control, amending Part 1 -
- to delete the negative option,
- to introduce a default rule of super-affirmative
procedure,
- to merge all time limits into a 60 day limit
(both for scrutiny and for either House not to follow the default
procedure), and also
- to provide that the Parliamentary time limits
for consideration of a Part 1 order should be adjustable upwards,
with a maximum adjustment of 30 days, on -
a resolution of either House, or
a recommendation of the responsible committee
of either House (not rejected by such a resolution). (Paragraph
73)
11. The Cabinet Office's Final Regulatory
Impact Assessment in effect addresses four possibilities: doing
nothing; altering parliamentary procedures alone; adding extras
to the 2001 Act; and providing for radical change by conferring
on Ministers a power with no outer limit on coverage, as in Part
1 of the Bill. In summary, this Special Report offers for consideration
a fifth possibility: leaving the outer limit on coverage unspecified
while identifying areas that should be off limits, as not appropriate
for delegated legislation, and also tightening aspects of Parliamentary
control. All of the recommendations and issues highlighted for
consideration in this section identify ways in which the Bill
can be amended at Committee and/or Report Stage in a way that
ought to be manageable if the principle of the Bill is accepted
by the House. (Paragraph 74)
12. We recommend that the Standing Orders
be amended to require the responsible Committee to assess the
validity, in relation to any order, of any new preconditions (for
example the first precondition: that the policy objective could
not be satisfactorily secured by non-legislative means). (Paragraph
77)
13. In order to undertake inquiries into regulation
more generally, we recommend that the Standing Orders of any successor
committee also include the same powers as those granted to departmental
select committees under S.O. No. 152. (Paragraph 78)
14. We recommend that the relevant Committee
be able to recommend that no further draft order to the same effect
(or to the same effect but for modifications) should be laid within
two years. In our view, it is essential that the
Standing Orders reflects this provision so that the committee
has power to indicate its view on the merits of an order i.e.
as to whether an order should be made or not and - in the case
of a super-affirmative - whether it should be amended. (Paragraph
81)
15. We also recommend that the current provision,
as set out in S.O. No. 18(1)(b), that allows us to trigger a debate
on the motion to approve the order be retained and supplemented
by a further provision to allow the relevant successor committee
to require a debate to be held, if (in the committee's view) a
draft order is of sufficient political or legal importance (Paragraph
82)
16. The revisions to the Standing Orders,
as recommended, would in our view remove uncertainty and would
enhance the power of the committee to scrutinise the draft orders
while also providing an opportunity for other Members to debate
the orders, regardless of whether they had been scrutinised under
the super-affirmative procedure. (Paragraph 84)
17. We recommend that the resource implications
of the eventual provisions of any Act for our successor committee
be assessed at the earliest opportunity with a view to identifying
how best the expected extra workload can be scrutinised effectively.(Paragraph
85)
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