Appendix: Government Response
Introduction
1. The Government welcomes the Committee's report
on the UK deployment to Afghanistan.
2. The UK's further deployments to Afghanistan are
now in progress. On 4 May the Headquarters Group of the Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC) assumed command of the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for nine months.
On 1 May the UK assumed control of the Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT) in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province. The Helmand Task
Force (HTF) will be fully operational by July 2006.
3. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) would like to address
the conclusions and recommendations made by the Committee. In
particular, we do not believe that there is a "fundamental
tension" between our objectives in supporting the Afghan
Government's Counter-Narcotics campaign, and our broader aim to
help spread security and stability.
4. We would also like to reiterate that the force
package the UK is sending has been fully endorsed by the Chiefs
of Staff as the right mix of capabilities to enable our troops
to carry out their mission. Furthermore, we will be operating
in a multinational environment. This means that UK troops will
have access, where necessary, to air assets, including helicopters
provided by a number of other nations (among them the US). We
do, however, keep the size and composition of the force package
under constant review and will alter our plans if deemed necessary.
Response
It is vital for the future of Afghanistan that
the ISAF mission is a success. Political and economic development
in Afghanistan is dependent on stability and security. (Paragraph
25)
5. The MOD is pleased that the Committee has offered
such a full endorsement of the UK's and the NATO-led ISAF's objectives
in Afghanistan. It is essential that the UN-authorised and NATO-led
ISAF, working in support of the sovereign Afghan Government, helps
to create security and stability so that democratic government
can take firm root across the country, and the legitimate economy
is given a chance to grow.
The successful completion of ISAF stage 3 expansion
under the leadership of the ARRC will demonstrate NATO's value
as a force for international stability beyond the geographical
confines of its original Cold War remit. (Paragraph 26)
6. The UK is playing a key role in enabling Stage
3 expansion by providing a PRT and Task Force for Helmand Province.
Our deployment of the HQ ARRC is further evidence of our commitment.
We recognise that some countries have historical
and constitutional reasons for not participating in certain aspects
of military operations. It is important for the success of the
stage 3 expansion that ISAF is able to present an effective and
united front to those who seek to undermine it. Despite the Minister's
assurances, we remain concerned that national caveats risk impairing
the effectiveness of the ISAF mission in the Southern provinces
where conditions are likely to be most challenging. (Paragraph
31)
7. Upon the transition to HQ ARRC's command of ISAF
on 04 May 2006, the revised NATO Operational Plan (OPLAN) and
associated Rules of Engagement (ROE) for ISAF expansion came into
effect. In recognition of the more hostile operating environment
in the South, these revised ROE are more robust than NATO has
previously worked to in Afghanistan. As a matter of Government
policy we do not comment on the detail of ROE and it would not
be appropriate to comment on the national caveats that may have
been imposed by other nations. The UK is, however, content that
we, along with our coalition partners operating in Southern Afghanistan,
have ROE suitable for our mission.
We note the Minister's assurances that national
caveats would be less of a constraint in Afghanistan than they
had been during the deployment to the Balkans. We recommend that
MOD continue to work with NATO partners to develop robust rules
of engagement with the minimum of national caveats so that further
progress is made before the ISAF stage 4 expansion. (Paragraph
32)
8. There has been significant reduction in the national
caveats applied by nations participating in ISAF. We will continue
to work with our ISAF partners to ensure that national caveats
are kept to a minimum and do not impinge upon ISAF's operational
effectiveness.
We are concerned that, should the security situation
in the South prove worse than anticipated, the UK will be called
on to provide additional forces. The UK has already committed
significant numbers of troops and assets to ISAF stage 3. NATO
should call on the military assets of other countries before approaching
the UK for further contributions. (Paragraph 34)
9. The UK has made a substantial commitment to Afghanistan,
and we believe the force package we are sending is sufficient
to match the threat as currently assessed. We keep the size and
make-up of our commitment under constant review, and will adapt
our planning if necessary.
10. Should a need for additional troops or equipment
for the South arise, the UK will work with NATO and other Allies
to identify the most effective and appropriate solution. We aim
to ensure that NATO and other troop contributing nations take
on their share of the burden, and work to encourage appropriate
force contributions from our Allies through the NATO Force Generation
process.
We welcome the creation of a single HQ to command
ISAF and OEF as a logical consequence of the increased "synergy"
of the missions. On paper the command, control and communication
arrangements between ISAF and OEF seem clear, but the success
of the arrangements will be tested when operational decisions
have to be made. We will scrutinise closely the operational effectiveness
of these arrangements particularly in regard to the allocation
of air assets. (Paragraph 38)
11. The Department welcomes the Committee's support
to greater synergy between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF). This arrangement will make the best use of available military
resources; will facilitate coordination and deconfliction of ISAF
and OEF missions across the whole of Afghanistan; and will provide
a single international military authority for the Afghan Government
to deal with.
12. The MOD notes the Committee's intention to scrutinise
the operational effectiveness of these arrangements, particularly
with regard to the allocation of air assets. The Department may
provide further briefing once these arrangements are in place,
if the Committee feels this would be helpful.
We welcome the Minister's assurances that UK Forces
would be permitted to take offensive action against forces that
are threatening them and, if necessary, pursue and destroy such
forces. In the more dangerous South, it is essential that UK commanders
are empowered to act proactively against known threats. (Paragraph
40)
13. UK forces will have the ROE they need to accomplish
their mission. They will adopt a robust posture for their security
mission, in support of the Afghan Government and international
community's reconstruction efforts. They will defend themselves
and be prepared to respond to challenges posed, and where necessary
they will take pre-emptive action to reduce the threat posed by
insurgents.
MOD anticipates that ISAF stage 4 expansion will
happen under the leadership of the ARRC and that OEF Forces in
the East will be re-badged under ISAF command. It is important
that command and control arrangements are finalised and shown
to be effective before the two missions are merged. (Paragraph
42)
14. It is the UK's expectation that OEF forces operating
in the East will come under ISAF command following transition
of Stage 4 (East), which we hope will be later this year. This
is an assumption of responsibility by ISAF rather than a merger,
and those elements of OEF involved in the counter terrorist mission
will remain under OEF rather than ISAF.
We support the objectives of the UK deployment
to Helmand. UK Forces working with the Government of Afghanistan
in building the capability of Afghan security institutions can
bring greater security to the people of Helmand and help create
the conditions for political and economic development. To achieve
greater security and stability, the deployment will have to overcome
significant vested interests. These threats are significant and
the success of the UK deployment is by no means certain. (Paragraph
47)
15. We welcome the Committee's endorsement of our
objectives. These objectives will be achieved primarily through
reconstruction in Helmand, led by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and Department for International Development, and supported
by military forces. The MOD has therefore worked intensively with
other Government Departments (OGDs) to draw up a cross-governmental
comprehensive strategic plan for Afghanistan, including, political,
judicial, economic, developmental and security support.
While we note the Minister's assurances that there
are no security threats which pose a strategic threat to Afghanistan,
recent events suggest that the security situation in Helmand is
becoming increasingly fragile. (Paragraph 51)
16. We have always maintained that the security situation
in southern Afghanistan is fragile, and certainly less benign
than in the North. We recognise that there has been a rise in
the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombings
by insurgents in recent months, and continue to monitor these
and all other known threats to our troops.
We note MOD's estimate that the Taliban in Helmand
might number "over a thousand" and that allegiances
were determined by "who is paying them". It is imperative
that UK Forces work quickly and closely with Afghan security forces
to develop a reliable intelligence picture of threats in Helmand.
(Paragraph 52)
17. The MOD works closely with OGDs and with the
Afghan security forces to monitor and assess the security situation
in Afghanistan. Our preliminary operations team, which prepared
the ground for the UK's deployment to Helmand Province, was particularly
useful in helping us to ascertain the nature of the threat we
face in the South. We continue to work with OGDs to refine our
intelligence picture in Helmand, including by developing a clearer
understanding of the tribal dynamics in the region.
It is essential that the legal status of embedded
trainers is made clear and that all operational practices with
regard to prisoners, and the rules of engagement under which the
trainers will operate, are properly clarified before they are
deployed. We intend to monitor these arrangements closely. (Paragraph
54)
18. The MOD is content that the legal status of UK
Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) is clear. Their legal status will
be no different from other UK troops deployed under the ISAF and
they will operate in line with UK ROE. Should they need to detain
individuals, they would follow the ISAF policy of handing over
to the Afghan authorities or releasing within 96 hours. We retain
the right to withdraw UK embedded trainers should the Afghan National
Army (ANA) decide to engage in an action that was outside our
operational boundaries and/or ROE.
Building security will take time, and is dependent
on developing the capability of Afghan Forces. We welcome MOD's
plans to work closely with Afghans to develop the capability of
the Afghan National Army. A well-trained army is key to bringing
long-term stability to Helmand. (Paragraph 55)
19. Strong progress has been made in training the
ANA and other security forces. As the Committee notes, the Afghan
Defence Minister recently stated the ANA had reached a total strength
of 34,000. The UK-supported Officer Candidate School began training
cadets on 4 April, and will begin a second course later this year.
UK ETTs will also shortly begin operating with ANA Kandaks (Battalions)
in Helmand.
Given the importance to the Helmand mission of
airlift capability, we note with concern the small number of UK
helicopters dedicated to the deployment. We welcome the commitment
made by the US and Dutch air forces to supplement the UK airlift.
We remain deeply concerned about the ability of the UK's ten dedicated
helicopters to perform the extensive range of roles that will
be asked of them, particularly given the demanding environment
in which they will operate and the likely attrition rates that
will result. (Paragraph 59)
20. As announced by the Secretary of State on 26
January, the HTF will be supported by a total of 18 helicopters:
6 Chinook support helicopters, 4 Lynx light utility helicopters,
and 8 Apache attack helicopters.
21. The number of support helicopters deployed on
this mission is based on recommendations made by the relevant
military planning staffs and was agreed by Chiefs of Staff earlier
this year. The planning figure takes into account the expected
flying hours for each aircraft and attrition rates. These planning
assumptions will be kept under review.
22. In addition, a substantial number of helicopters
will be made available by other nations participating in ISAF
Stage 3 expansion in the South, including an impressive package
of support and attack helicopters that the US has committed to
maintain in the South for 12 months.
23. The UK has also deployed 4 C-130 air transport
planes to assist in the UK deployment, all of which operate from
both Kabul and Kandahar, and a number of other nations have also
made transport aircraft available to ISAF.
We note MOD's assurance that the total close air
support package is robust and that the US commitment of close
air support will remain following the withdrawal of US Forces
from the Southern provinces. We will continue to monitor closely
whether experience bears out MOD's confidence about the continued
availability of air assets to the UK deployment. (Paragraph 62)
24. We believe that sufficient close air support
is available to ISAF forces in the South, including the six Harrier
GR7 aircraft based at Kandahar. We note the Committee's intention
to monitor this situation.
The availability of close air support providing
sufficient mobility and fire power will be absolutely essential
to the success of the Helmand deployment. We recommend, if no
equivalent force can be provided by the NATO force generation
process, that the Harrier GR7 squadron based at Kandahar should
remain beyond June 2006 and for as long as necessary. (Paragraph
64)
25. As the Committee will be aware, the Government
decided, following requests from NATO and other Allies, to extend
the Harrier GR7 detachment until March 2007. This is in addition
to the eight F16s offered by the Netherlands, although these latter
will continue to be based in Kabul while repair work at Kandahar
Airfield continues.
We note that concerns have been raised about the
appropriateness of the defensive aid suite (DAS) fitted to C130
Hercules used in Afghanistan. We also note MOD's assurances that
the Hercules DAS is appropriate to conditions in Afghanistan.
(Paragraph 67)
26. Only Hercules C130 aircraft fitted with appropriate
defensive systems are deployed to operational theatres.
We accept that the scope for investment in equipment
is infinite, but the suggestion that aircraft are not being properly
protected for resource reasons is a serious one and we call on
MOD to provide evidence to demonstrate that this is not the case.
(Paragraph 68)
27. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Min(AF))
has previously written to the Committee on this subject, and we
regret it was not possible to incorporate his response in the
report.
28. The MOD takes force protection extremely seriously.
We constantly review the threat and consider appropriate mitigation
measures. Over recent years, several significant defensive upgrades
have been embodied into Hercules aircraft. Emphasis has been on
modification designed to counter the greatest perceived threats,
whilst also evolving tactics and improving force protection on
the ground.
29. Following the Board of Inquiry into the Hercules
C130 crash, MOD decided to fit Explosion Suppressant Foam (ESF)
to some of our Hercules aircraft. The first aircraft fitted with
ESF are expected to be available for operations in the next few
months.
30. Decisions on fitting protective systems to our
aircraft must reflect a balance of investment judgement taking
into account: the time it would take to fit the fleet's remaining
service life; the impact on operations (by taking aircraft out
of service); the likely effectiveness of the system; and the impact
on other priorities.
We note MOD's assurances that the force package
to Helmand is fit for purpose. The threat from improvised explosive
devices will need to be kept under constant review. (Paragraph
71)
31. The force package the UK is sending to Southern
Afghanistan was based on recommendations made by the relevant
military planning staffs, and was fully endorsed by the Chiefs
of Staff. We will keep our planning assumptions under review and
will adjust the force package if deemed necessary. All known threats
to British troops, including from IEDs, are kept under constant
review.
We note the Minister's commitment that commanders
in theatre will be listened to and given what they need to ensure
the protection of troops. We shall monitor this closely. (Paragraph
72)
32. The MOD takes its duty of care towards the UK
Armed Forces very seriously. The force package we are sending
is, as already noted, based on relevant military planning staffs'
recommendations and has been fully endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff.
We believe it is sufficient to match the current assessed threat
but is kept under review. Requests for further equipment or personnel
will be passed up the command chain as appropriate, where the
request will be scrutinised before adjusting the force package
if necessary.
We call on MOD to provide greater clarity about
the UK Forces' responsibilities to detainees in the period before
they are handed over to Afghan security forces. It is unsatisfactory
that these matters are not yet concluded. (Paragraph 77)
33. The responsibilities of UK forces to detainees
have always been clear. United Kingdom procedures governing the
handling of detainees are consistent with the principles of the
Geneva Conventions, whether detaining as part of an ISAF operation
or OEF. Joint Warfare Publication 1-10 "Prisoners of War
Handling" covers the principles, responsibilities, practices
and procedures for the UK Armed Forces in handling prisoners of
war. The publication is currently being updated; a copy will be
placed on the Ministry of Defence website in the near future.
34. In addition the UK has now concluded a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) on detention with the Afghan Government,
which sets out, inter alia, the responsibilities of UK Armed Forces
towards detainees in the period prior to their handover to Afghan
security forces or release.
We recommend that pre-deployment training should
emphasise the responsibilities of UK soldiers to detainees under
their care before they hand over responsibility to the Afghan
authorities. (Paragraph 78)
35. As Min(AF) stated in response to a question in
the House of Commons on 20 January (Official Record, 20 January,
Column 1648W), all personnel receive appropriate pre-deployment
training in advance of commencing operations. For those to whom
it is relevant, this includes specific training on the rules and
principles involved in handling prisoners of war, internees and
detainees; this can also include briefing by institutions such
as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
The MOD Memorandum of Understanding with the Government
of Afghanistan must establish clearly the rights of detainees
so that they are treated justly and fairly. We urge MOD to recognise
that, whilst its legal responsibilities may have been discharged,
its duty of care to detainees does not end once they have been
handed over to the Afghan authorities, and we look to see this
fully reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding. (Paragraph
79)
36. Under the terms of the MOU agreed between the
UK and the Afghan Government, representatives of the Afghan Independent
Human Rights Commission and International Committee of the Red
Cross will have full access to any persons transferred by the
UK Armed Forces to Afghan authorities whilst such persons are
in custody, as will the UK. Records of these detainees will be
kept by Afghan authorities and will be available to the UK for
inspection if required.
The UK deployment to Afghanistan is likely to
result in a breach of harmony guidelines in some key areas in
the short term. MOD has plans to address these potential breaches
by encouraging contributions from NATO partners in those trades
under most pressure. Overall, we accept MOD's assurance that the
impact of the Afghanistan mission on our Armed Forces is manageable.
We will continue to monitor the situation. (Paragraph 84)
37. The UK's Armed Forces are heavily committed.
That said, the numbers of regular Armed Forces deployed on operations
now stands at just under 18% overall. We believe this is sustainable.
38. Harmony guidelines are measured by average Tour
Intervals for units and personnel, and are based both on unit
deployments and single separated service. Having
taken into account the planned increase in deployments in Afghanistan
in 2006, on average the Infantry, Royal Armoured Corps, Royal
Artillery, Royal Engineers and Royal Signals will be approximately
20% deployed. An average of 20% deployed results in an average
tour interval of 24 months, which is of course the 'Harmony' target.
However, these unit-level figures are distinct from individual
deployment levels, since there is a requirement to backfill undermanned
units, and to fill a range of key individual staff positions.
As the Committee notes, we are likely to continue to breach Harmony
levels in a range of specialised capability areas such as medical,
intelligence, helicopter crews, logistic, provost and engineers.
39. We are keenly aware of the burden which operations
place on our forces and we are always looking for ways in which
they can be reduced. Harmony breaches are managed in a number
of ways, including through tailoring of force packages to achieve
objectives in the most efficient way possible, and sensitive posting
and deployment of personnel. As the Committee notes, pressure
is further alleviated through contributions made by other Allies,
which we continue to encourage through the NATO force generation
process, and through eventual reductions in UK force commitments
elsewhere. Over the longer-term, programmes such as the Future
Army Structure will help to bring Tour Intervals in line with
Harmony guidelines.
40. Individual separated service and breaches of
harmony are currently managed under single-Service arrangements
using several information systems. The Joint Personnel Administration
(JPA) change programme is introducing a harmonised personnel administration
system for all military personnel. This system will make it possible
to work out the separated service of every individual in the Armed
Services using a single IT system. Most importantly, this will
measure separated service against a set of criteria that are common
across Defence. After JPA roll out, which started with the RAF
in the Spring, a Unit Separated Service Report will be available
giving a breakdown for each individual covering a rolling period
(3 years for the RN and Army, and 2 years for the RAF). Individuals
will be able to check their own Separated Service records, and
reports will be also available for Formation HQs and MOD use.
There is a fundamental tension between the UK's
objective of promoting stability and security and its aim of implementing
an effective counter-narcotics strategy. It is likely the more
successful the deployment is at impeding the drugs trade, the
more it will come under attack from those involved in it. In the
short term at least, the security situation is likely to deteriorate.
(Paragraph 90)
41. We do not believe that there is a fundamental
tension between our objectives in this mission. There can be no
long-term stability if the opium trade is not tackled: President
Karzai has said that terrorism and narcotics represent the two
gravest threats to Afghanistan's future, and the drugs trade feeds
on and contributes to insecurity in Afghanistan and the region.
Ending the opium industry is essential for Afghanistan's long-term
future.
42. Although overall the decrease in opium cultivation
seen in 2005 is unlikely to be sustained this year, and in Helmand
cultivation is likely to rise, this year's eradication programme
in Helmand has been more effective than in previous years and
has not led to a significant deterioration in the security situation.
We were concerned to hear that the Taliban is
becoming more involved with the narcotics trade in Helmand. This
development is likely to increase the exposure of UK Forces to
attack as it seeks to limit the opium trade in Helmand. (Paragraph
91)
43. There is no conclusive evidence of a direct link
between drug trafficking and the insurgency in Afghanistan. We
are aware of recent suggestions that insurgents (possibly the
Taliban) are encouraging Afghan farmers to grow opium poppy, and
this is an issue we will be paying close attention to.
We remain uncertain of the exact role which UK
Forces will be asked to play in support of the counter-narcotics
strategy and call on MOD to provide clarification. (Paragraph
92)
44. The UK is working to help develop the Afghan's
ability to bring about a sustainable reduction in cultivation,
production and trafficking of opium. These are not primarily military
tasks. Instead, the relevant OGDs, supported by the military,
will provide an environment in which Counter-Narcotics (CN) activities
can have the greatest impact, the rule of law can be applied and
reconstruction can take place.
45. In addition, ISAF can provide support to Afghan-led
CN efforts in a number of ways as set out in an Annex to NATO's
operational plan for the mission in Afghanistan. These include
training of Afghan security forces, gathering and sharing of information,
assistance with the Afghan CN information campaign, and provision
of logistical and enabling support to Afghan CN operations. If
discovered in the course of routine operations, ISAF troops may
also seize and secure drugs, associated equipment and traffickers
before handing them over to the appropriate Afghan authorities.
ISAF forces are not, however, permitted to take direct, pre-planned
action against the drugs trade, including eradication of opium
poppy.
We note the proposals of the Senlis Council for
the licensing of opium production but we accept, in the absence
of a well developed legal and security system, ADIDU's conclusion
that the Senlis Council's proposals would be inappropriate at
this time. (Paragraph 95)
46. We support the Committee's conclusion. The Afghan
Minister of CN has said: "The poor security situation in
country means that there can simply be no guarantee that opium
will not be smuggled out of country for the illicit narcotics
trade abroad. Without an effective control mechanism, a lot of
opium will still be refined into heroin for illicit markets in
the West and elsewhere". The UK supports and agrees with
the Government of Afghanistans position on licit cultivation.
As partner nation for counter narcotics and as part of the international
community committed to supporting Afghanistans reconstruction,
it would be irresponsible for us to do otherwise.
We support ADIDU's focus on developing Afghan
security institutions capable of targeting drug growers and traffickers,
and on encouraging farmers to pursue alternative livelihoods.
However, we believe the task of controlling and reducing the amount
of opium produced in Helmand, requires a long-term strategy lasting
well after a secure environment has been established. (Paragraph
96)
47. Sustainable drug elimination strategies take
time, particularly when the challenges are as severe as those
in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the drugs trade is not an isolated
problem; tackling it will require substantial progress across
the broader reconstruction (security, economic development and
governance) effort. The UK fully supports the Afghan Government's
National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), which represents a more
sophisticated approach to CN than we have seen to date, focussing
on four key priorities: targeting the trafficker, strengthening
livelihoods, reducing demand and developing effective institutions.
The inclusion of CN as a cross-cutting theme in the Afghanistan
Compact and the Afghan Government's interim National Development
Strategy, further recognises the need for a broad based approach
to the problem.
48. There are a number of encouraging signs of progress
already. Last year saw the passage of vital CN legislation, the
conviction of over 90 traffickers, an increase in drugs related
seizures and a 21% reduction in land under opium poppy cultivation.
Recent UK research into cultivation trends for 2006 shows that,
for the first time since the Taliban-enforced ban, reductions
in cultivation may be sustained in some areas, particularly those
close to provincial centres where there is better security, governance
and resources. Nevertheless the challenge ahead is huge and the
international community must increase support for the CN campaign
to help the Afghan Government build on these successes and deliver
its long-term CN goals.
We note the UK's commitment of £38 million
for sustainable development in the Helmand PRT's first year. We
welcome the intention to commit resources through the Government
of Afghanistan and provincial bodies, but call on the UK Government
to put in place safeguards to ensure that those resources fully
reach their intended recipients. We argue that only by involving
Afghans in key decisions will reconstruction work prove to be
sustainable. (Paragraph 101)
49. Reconstruction is the primary responsibility
of the Afghan Government, with support from the international
community. PRTs are only one of a range of mechanisms for providing
this support at the provincial level.
50. DfID plan to put funds through the Afghan Government's
existing National Priority Programmes, which are rigorously appraised
by the World Bank before they can receive Afghanistan Reconstruction
Trust Fund (ARTF) funding. The new Joint Coordination and Monitoring
Board recently created to oversee implementation of the Afghanistan
Compact will also help to coordinate international assistance
in accordance with Afghan Government priorities; this will help
ensure that resources are appropriately targeted so as to have
an impact at the Provincial level.
51. Furthermore, it is not true that the UK PRT will
have significantly lower levels of funding available for Quick
Impact Projects than the US PRT did. There will be a £3 million
pound fund provided by the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the
Afghan Drugs Interdepartmental Unit (ADIDU) and DfID per year
as well as an additional sum of around £500,000 provided
by the MOD. This means that the funds are roughly equal to the
$6 million formerly available to the US PRT.
We do not believe it will prove possible to complete
the reform of the security and justice institutions in Helmand
within the three-year commitment so far made. (Paragraph 104)
52. We have always said that achieving sustainable
reform and reconstruction in Afghanistan would be a long-term
process, and we have made clear that we do not expect to achieve
all the UK's objectives for Helmand within the three year deployment
announced on 26 January.
53. That said, the UK's plans for Helmand are ambitious.
They set out a range of desired outcomes, in the broad fields
of governance, security, economic and social development, and
CN. Several key factors will determine the pace of progress towards
achieving these outcomes. These include the prevailing security
situation and the impact this will have on the ability of UK personnel
to operate in the province; on the absorptive capacity of the
local institutions and people; on the political will exercised
by President Karzai and his government; the ability to ensure
that funds contributed to central programmes benefit the provinces;
and the pace of reform of central institutions. It is clear that
capacity-building activity will be needed in both Kabul and Helmand.
54. We are therefore realistic about the challenges
we are likely to face in our efforts to support stabilisation
and reconstruction in Helmand. We may, after three years, have
made uneven progress and, in some areas, have established only
the initial building blocks. But we are right to set ourselves
an ambitious and demanding programme, and remain confident that
by the end of the three-year commitment irreversible progress
will have been made.
The Minister's reluctance to discuss an exit strategy
from Helmand is understandable but we believe that MOD should
be more forthcoming about how it will measure the success of the
deployment. We recommend that MOD make public the targets by which
they intend to measure the success of the Helmand deployment.
(Paragraph 105)
55. Our exit strategy is clear. It is to build the
capacity of the Afghan Government and National Security Forces
to enable them to maintain security in Helmand without international
support.
56. The assumptions upon which more detailed UK plans
for Helmand are based are now being scrutinised by UK personnel
(military and civilian) as the HTF deployment becomes established.
At the same time, programmes to implement the plan will be developed,
and both the plan and the programmes contain means of measuring
progress. The Strategic Delivery Unit, based in the Embassy in
Kabul, will play an important role in bringing together the complex
strands of our plan, and in monitoring and advising on its progress.
57. However, measuring the development of local capacity
is not easy. We will seek to use a mixture of broad targets (such
as the effectiveness of local offices of central Government Ministries
and the number of security incidents/insurgent attacks) alongside
more precise indicators of economic and social development (such
as the number of children attending school).
58. Should the Committee find it useful, a briefing
focussing on UK targets and progress may be arranged later in
2006. It would not, however, be appropriate to make public the
detail of UK Government plans.
| 
