4 CONCLUSION
83. Our visit to Iraq gave us an opportunity to see
for ourselves the work of the UK Armed Forces and the difficult
conditions in which they operate. Our admiration for the courage
and dedication of our troops was enhanced by what we saw on the
ground. We are conscious that we saw only a fraction of the tasks
undertaken by our Service personnel, and that our exposure to
the environment and challenges in which they work was fleeting.
84. Our visit gave us some insight into the new challenges
which UK Service personnel are facing in supporting post-conflict
governments as they seek to build their democratic institutions,
specifically those relating to security. The role they are playing
in peace making and peace building is as challenging as anything
they face in more traditional war fighting roles. They of course
build on long years of deployments in Northern Ireland. To fulfil
this role fully and effectively, and indeed to meet the duty of
care for their security, procurement of the equipment they must
become smarter and more flexible in response to emerging requirements.
85. This report has focused on the issues raised
with us during our visit, many of which require urgent action
by the MoD. Some of these issues raise important questions about
the MoD's broader policy and priorities.
86. Some of the difficulties currently experienced
by our Services in Iraq stem from deficiencies in equipment. Our
predecessor Committee published a report into the Future Capabilities
White Paper in March 2005. That report highlighted the concern
that:
Across the Services equipment is being withdrawn
over the next two to three years, but new (and significantly more
capable) equipment in the same areas will not enter operational
service until after 2010…We are concerned that these programmes
may be delayed or may fail to deliver the full range of planned
capabilities. Other important requirements (eg for new helicopters)
seem still to be some way from crystallising into specific programmes.[56]
87. Over recent years, the MoD has been quick
to implement changes that produce savings but it does not appear
to have addressed the growing number of capability gaps with the
same or sufficient urgency. Long-term procurement projects are
failing to deliver mission-critical capabilities on time. Capability
gaps are opening up and these need to be met by the MoD as a matter
of urgency, even if that means opting for interim solutions. This
may well require more money—not just a reshuffling of priorities.
We intend to return to this issue when we take evidence from the
Chief of Defence Procurement in October.
88. The Defence Industrial Strategy seeks to make
a quantum difference to procurement on time and to cost. Given
the tasks which our Armed Service personnel now face, it is vital
that it should succeed. However, the DIS will take some time to
deliver the capabilities required.
89. The issues raised in this report give rise
to a fundamental question: are our Armed Forces structured, trained
and equipped to fulfil the role envisaged for them in the Strategic
Defence Review and its successor policy documents? This is a question
of very great importance, going to the heart of the Government's
defence policy. We believe this question needs to be addressed:
we will return to it.
56 Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2004-05,
Future Capabilities, HC 45-I, p 3. Back
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